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Research Study
International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis
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FOREWORD
The primary goals of this study are to cast the problem of internationalized terror into clear perspective and to provide the readerrameworkore systematic grasp ofthe subject. Terrorismis,articularly controversial and complexence, il must be emphasized that the approach adopted andudgments udvanced are those of the author, David L. Milbank.oo, arc the basic definitions. And although il is analytically usefulhe purposes of this paper, the distinction made betweennd transnational terrorism is bound to draw someonly because the former term has acquired sourrency in academic and journalistic literature.
The statistics presented also break new ground. This is because theuthor was able to drawomprehensive new data bank called j! ITERATE (Internutionul Terrorism: Attributes of Terroristhat was developed for the Office of Political Research by Edwardickolus during the summer5elated but separate project.
Despite this advantage, however, several words of cautionhe figures and statistical inferences that are set forth in this study arerder. In the first place, there are many significant gaps innowledge about specific incidents andeven those terrorist organizations and actions on which there is considerable reliable information do not always fit neutly into the typologies that have been created for them. Moreover, the universe of incidents under review is small enough that unintended omissions (of which there arc undoubtedly many) or erroneous classification of borderline events couldtatistically significant impact.
Comments or questions concerning this study (which doesIA position) will be welcomed.They should be addressed lo the Director, Political Research.
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CONTENTS
FOREWORD
SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS
THE DISCUSSION
OBJECTIVES AND BOUNDARIES OF INQUIRY
AN ANALYTICAL
Definition*
Method
Pag,-
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7
7
8
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PHENOMENA IN
Whai. Where, und
How CdM
How
What International Constraints?
International
Transnational Terrorism
j V.
APPENDIX A: Significant
APPENDIX B: Statistical Trends und Pultcrn* in Terrorist
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APPENDIX C: Noteworthy Groupsfald-oM
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SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS
For the purposes of this study, intcrnutionul und transnational terrorism are defined as follows:
Common Characteristics: The threat or use of violence for political purposes when (i) such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behaviorarget group wider than its immediate victims,ts ramifications transcend nutionul boundariesesult, for example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its locale, the identity of its institutional or human victims, its declared objectives, or the mechanics of its resolution).
International Terrorism: Such action when carried out by individuals or groups controlledovereign slate.
ransnational Terrorism: Such uction when carried out by | basically autonomous non-stale actors, whether or not they enjoy
some degree of support from sympathetic slates.
PHENOMENA IN RETR08PECT
j There hasarked and enduring upsurge in transnationalterrorism7 that has been characterized by:
jsubstantial increase in the number of terrorist groups involved as well as in the number of countries in which they arc operating;
trend toward greater international contact and cooperation ' among terrorist groups;
'; jtrend toward bolder and more dramatic actions;
general popularity of American targets; und
number of significant regional differences in the intensity and j nature of such violence.
This upsurge is utlributablc in part to the dynamics of theKi conflict, an imbroglio which affects the interestsarge number of nations and is attended by particularly deep-seated feelings of bitterness and frustration. But the problem of transnational terrorism
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would noi have mushroomed lo its present dimensions were it not lor the concurrent convergence and accelerationumber of changes in the global environment that hud begun to take shape much
,technological advances tha: have provided terrorists with new mobility, new weaponry, and {through the introduction of TV-capable satellite communications) the near certain prospect that their more dramatic actions will receive prompt andpublicity;
growth, fed by modernizing change, of global and regional ties, dependencies and obligations that have both provided terroristsost of new and potentially highly disruptive targets for attackower grids and jumbo aircraft) andeactive upsurge in nationalism and ethnicity:
iincreasingly permissive political environment horn of the challenge raised to the postwar order by the developing nations of the Third World, the "maverick" Communist regimes, various dissatisfied second rank powers,road array of social forces fired, with differing degrees of responsibility,ew sense of "social conscience";
persistent if uneven behavior of those slates, lesscore in number, thut have furnished practicing or potential terrorists with funds, arms, training, documentution. and other operational support; and
in the overall economic environment that have funned local dissidence and fed the communities of emigre workers thut cun provide terrorists with cover, recruits, and various forms of operational supporl.
There has not, however,arallel upsurge in iniernalional terrorism. Although there hasood deal of such activity associated with the Middle East conflict over the pust decade, the dimensions of the problem are essentially no greater today than ihey were
nother significant difference stems from the fuel that resort to (ntvrnational terrorism is just as likely lo result from calculations concerning the relative efficucy of alternative methods of bringing national power to beariven situution as from an outright deurth of national resources. Hence, such bchuvior has not been the special province of any purticulur category of state. In contrast, us an option more congenial to urban than to rural groups, transnational terrorism has been characteristically spawned by societiesid to advanced stage of socio-economic development.
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For its praelioncrs, terrorism's principal drawback is thai its i, consequences ureonsiderable degree unpredictable. Asdemonstrated in Jordan0 and in Uruguayven what seem lo be dramatic tactical successes can lead totrategic reverses of major proportions. All told, however, the recordale shows that the personal risks lhat have been incurrednternational und transnational terrorists have been relatively low. and
j that their chances of uchieving at least some of their near-lerm
: objectives have been strong. Moreover, because the impact of their activity has been magnified by Ihe publicity it has received andits
. interaction with other destabilizing trends and forces, its disruptive jeffecls have been grossly disproportionate to the resources employed by
; the terrorists as well as to the actual damage done in terms of ihe cost loife and properly.
With the exceptionumber of bilateral agreements oftility (most notably ihe US-Cuban accord. theesponse lo terrorism hus been relatively weak and ineffective. The
principal obstacles to greater progress in this field have beenontroversy over justifiable versus illegal politicalesistance to such further infringement of national sovereignly ase implied in any inflexible curtailment of the right lo grantsylum.atural relucluncc on the part of many stales to commit
themselves to any course of action that might invite. by terrorist groups or by stales sympathetic lo the lerrorisls* cause.
III. THE OUTLOOK
International terrorism seems unlikely to pose much morehreal to world order or US interests in the decade ahead than il does today.
in Us currently rather fluid condition, the international system subjects slatesosi of legal obligations and practical constraints thai they can ignore only at considerable risk.
poicnliul implications of the various slate-sponsored terrorist incidents thut have been associated with the Middle East conflict notwithstanding, it seems likely that the employment of terrorist groupsurrogate warfare role will continue to be more the exception lhan the rule for some lime lo come,
espite the potentially salutary impact of some recent or likely developments (including the tougher stance toward terrorists-that has been adoptedumber of stales and the prohahilily that technical innovations in the securityll makeore riskyhe outlook for transnational terrorism is considerably less
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encouraging. specifically, the following factors and trends hold promise of aggravating ihe problem:
combined effects of technological advance, modernizing social and economic change, and growing interdependence will
robably generate further increases in (i) divisive ethnicity andrbanerrorist capabilities,
' * societal vulnerabilities.
widespread erosion of established institutions ofin multiple challenges lo the international order and the increasing difficulties of governance encountered at the nationalhas both invited and facilitated terrorist uetivity in recent years seems likely to persist
i throughout much of the decude ahead.
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the net thrust of ihe forces ut work within the international community promises lo remain more centrifugal than centripetal, il seems unlikely thai efforts to combat terrorism through binding world-wide conventions will prove lo be much ! more effective than in the past.
Ilikelihoodational liberation and leftist revolutionary formations will continue to receive both moral i and muicrlul supportide variety of transnational internutionul organizationsransnational contact cooperation among terrorist groups will gain further momentum | holds forth the ominous prospcel of the emergenceomplex support base for transnational terrorist activity that is largely independentquite resistant lo controlstate-centered internutionul system.
under such circumstances, any governmental assistance i rendered to terrorist groups could have un even more deleterious j impuci than in ihc past, for it would risk simply increasing the recipients' potential for autonomous action.
iproblems of (i) extensive and sometimeublicity for terrorist tictshe diffusion ofdaptable technological know-how are likely to persist in most purts of the world und thus to reinforce the risks associatedhe wholesale deployment of sophisticated (and in manyan-portable) weaponry and ihe race to sell nuclearnd modern armaments lo developing countries.
the prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists can. in fuel, no longer be dismissed. but because of the mujor problems that would he involved in ihe acquisition, storage, transport, and employmentuclearore likelyleast in theerrorist
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'. seizureuclear weapons storage facilityuclear power plant to exploii the publicity and the bargaining power inherent in the attendant threat of radiological pollution.
A more pressing threat, however, would seem to lie in the field of chemical, biological, and radiological agents of mass destruction. Not only are many of these agents relatively easy to acquire, but {becausearc usually all that are needed for potentially devastating cflcct) they also lend to be easy to conceal, easy to transport, and easy to introduce into the target area.
. All told, transnational terrorism promises toontinuing and potentially gravely unsettling problem for the world community until suchyearsins international system gels into new and generally accepted contours. Although the frequency und intensity of violence in some current trouble spots will probably decline, it seems likely that:
overall number of terrorist groups engaged in transnational terrorist activity will, al best, remain at about the present level;
number of countries in which these groups are operating will increase;
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of their symbolic value, their availability, and the embarrassment they can crcalc. ihe popularity of American targets will remain Sigh;
world will witness steadily greater and more widespread j sophistication in terrorist lurgetling. execution, and weaponry; and
most terrorist groups will probably continue lo be deterred by both morul considerations and calculations of the risks involved, the dangerunatic few might resoneapons of mass destruction will increase accordingly.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
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The phenomenon of widespread internationalized terror is not only likely to persist for at least the next several years, but also to evolve in ways that couldore substantial threat to USunder certain circumstances, to worldin ihe rccenl past.
or not weapons of muss destruction are actually brought into play, the odds arc that the impact of transnational terror will be more sharply Tell in ihe US in the years justas the result of periodic increases in attacks on American targets ahroud. hut possibly throughrequent terrorist demands on the US Government und
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I occasional operations on US soil by foreign-based groups as 'I wcli-
if the problem of internationalized terror is not brought closer lo home in the ways suggested above, il promises lo impinge more directly on US interests and options with respectroad range of critical issue areas, including both Eusl-WeM and North-South relations, the politically and economically sensitive questions of arms sules and the transfer of advanced technology, and the resolution of problems associated with ihe dependence of Wesicrn industrialized countries on foreign
I j energy sources.
The importance of fuctors that are likely to affeet the objective capabilities and options of terrorist groups in the years ahead is obvious. But in ihe final analysis, il is man's subjective perception of "realily" lhai serves as the primary determinant of his political behavior. Hence, those variablesultural heritage, credo, and chunges in Ihe overall political environment) that can shape or alter the prisms through which the terrorists concerned view ihe world around them will bear equal attention,
| Indeed, although the dimensions of Ihe ihreat posed by internationalized terror should not be overdrawn, the factors bearing on this phenomenon and its potential ramificutions are so numerous and cut! across so many jurisdictional and disciplinary lines lhai ihe development of more effective national and international countcrmcasures is likely toarticularly demanding lask. Sadly, there arc no sure guidelines for endowing uny given government's approach to the problem of terrorism with the qualities required lo meet wis challenge. But while any number of alternative courses of action could prove equally effective, it bears emphasis that together with timely intelligence and sound multi-disciplinary analytical support, flexibility and extensive coordination (both intra- andwould seem to be critical lo devising andounter-terrorist strategy that is both internally consistent and minimally disruptive to national values and foreign policy objectives in terms of "hidden" social, political, and economic costs.
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THE
THE OBJECTIVES AND BOUNDARIES OF INQUIRY
Political violence predates recorded history.istinctive form of political violence sporadically employed hy rulers and ruled alike, terrorism is prohahly not muchit owes its name and subsequent conceptual flowering to ihe- French Reign or Terroror is Ihe spill-over ol terrorist activity unto the internationalarticularly; recent development: witness the slir caused hy various anarchist groups operating in Europe and North America in theh undh centuries as well us hy the hehuviortw of their more self-interested political contemporaries, Someears ugo. forenegade Moroccan chieftainuetic favoredumber of.terrorist groups today hy kidnapping two foreign businessmen (one English, llic other of dubious American citizenship)uccessful effort lo gel England {and the; US to pressure France into forcing the'Sultan to accedeong list ofa substantial ransom. Ihe releasearge nUmher of prisoners. Ihe cession of two lerrilorlul districts, and the arrestew key[ul despite historical precedents und parallels, modern-daylierrorism is veryunction of our limes. Advances in technology and growing world interdependence huvc afforded terrorists new mobility, new targets, new weaponry, und the neur certain prospect thul Iheir more dramatic acts will receive prompt nnd world-wide publicity. Moreover, recent changes in the overall political and economic climate have provided terroristsomewhat more hospitable environmeni in which lo operate,
Indeed, there has been such an upsurge of terrorist activity in recent years that some observers have warned that! we may heeritable age of terrorism. Among, other things, ihcra hasarked increase in the number of active terrorist groups u* well as in ihe number of countries in which they arc operating. Internal and international cooperation among terrorist groups has ulso risen notably. There hasrend toward holder and more dramatic actions, with an ucevmpunying escalation of casualties, damage, and demands. And most importantly, perhaps, there hasuantum jump in terrorist incidents affecting the interests or more thun one stale.
Not surprisingly, these developments have generated unprecedented interest in terrorismubject for serious research und unalysis. In sharp contrast with ihe situation which prcvuilcdecade or so ago. existingopenide range of useful insights into the root causes, logic, and characteristic attributes of noliiicul terrorism us wellubstantial number of detailed case studies.
The trouble is thut the picture which emerges is slill confuseu1 and incomplete. For one thing, there is us yel no generally accepted definition of terrorism per se. much less of its international or transnational variants. For anolher. much ofthe work ihai hus been done on terrorism suffers from the limiting effects of narrowly focused tactical concerns or of particularistic institutional and personal biases. And, largely because of these differing perspectives und priorities, little progress hus been made toward developmentomprehensive and readily accessible data base. In short, we are still hard put to explain the current state of affairs or lo venture firm predictions about the future.
Of necessity, therefore, this study is on exercise in both synthesis and innovation. It is confined to an examination of international und transnational terrorism as defined in Sectionelow {with primary emphasis on transnational terrorism as, in the short term at least, potentially ihe more injurious to USts principal underlying assumptions ure three. The first is that the basic societul problems und tensions ihul can give rise to politicalthus tolikely to prove particularly intractable in this era of rapid change, growing nationalism and ethnicity, and world-wide economic strains. Such irritants may, in fact, be ireulcd asn the global environment for muny years to conic. The reader is forewarned that because of this, and because they have already received considerableR RELEASE SATE:1
scholarly attention. Ihcsc factors will not he subjected la extensile analysis here.*
Corolla r> lo the above. It is assumed thai the potential for domestic, international, and tnn>nationjl terrorism will remain high in ihc decade ahead .irul :hul the scope of the ri jhkm will ihererorc depend primarily on factor* uf Tec ting ihe opportunities alternatives, and hehuvioral constraints faced hy the group acton involved.
Finally, il is postulated lhai man's suhjetiiw perception of "realily" serve* as the primary determinant of hi* political behavior. Hence, without neglecting the many factor* that haveihfft ma>objective capabilities and option* ofroups. Ihi* paper repcuiedly draw* ullcriion to those variable*ultural heritage, credo, and change* In Ihc overall political environment! ihut enn thupe or tiller ihe prism* through which the terrorist* concerned view ihc world around them.
Broadly staled, the objective* of the study area belter understanding of the dynamicsof iniernalionalo identifyactor* likelyor inhibit such activity in the year*lo assess the implications of these findingslo US policies and interests. Suchany tftbri lo guugc the extent of theto US iiilcresls und world order byterrorist group or consortium. Givenof variable* that would have to hetaskemain the province of traditionalcase-hy-case analysis. Ii islhai Ihc substantive generalization*techniques that ure setaluable frame of reference fortreatments. of specific uspvcis of
II. ESTABLISHING AN ANALYTICAL
FHAMEWOF K
OtflnHtoM
irst step, it is necessary locut through some of the semantic and yuluc-irencraled fog which currently surrounds Ihe eanctpt of terrorism and lo spell out precisely whai son of behavior falls within the purview of this study. In part, ihe existing confusion is attributable lo journalistic licenseopular tendency to labelf acts in which ihc elcn.cni of terror is clearly incidenial lo other and mute prc**ingut. as amply illustrated hy the tortured and fruilless effortsmcmbcr ad hat UN committee to define (and thereby, in effect, to outlaw) iniernalional terrorism not long ago tic: hearl of Ihc problem lies in differing moral perspectives andimply slated, one man'* terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.
Since terrorism always involves the deliberate breach of generally accepted hounds for individual or collective violence, il i* difficult to define in totally value-free terms. Nevertheless, il can be *ctelatively rigorous and objectiveood way to begin is byerceptive description of ihe characteristic attributes of terrorism hy one of the (eliding specialists on the subject.
Theiolence. individual arts of violence,erf violence deigned primarily hih* railed lemnSm Terronwn tiokree fnr cfhsi' mm only, and wmelimes not at aU. fur ihe efieo on ihe<rf the iceromiv In fact, ih* ttdUM mav he'Iin iheumioltnee .untcd ii the.he intended effect, no*rialuct. nf lerwrWm. Th.ii. atuetic* from mugginger lorms of aioleni crime ihui may teirifv hui are not lerromm."
Politicul terrorism is. then, ihc above sort of violence employed in pursuit of politicul objectives. It is. as claimed hy its practitioner*.of thet i* calculated violence aimed at influencing the altitude and behavior of one or more target audiences, lis proximate objective* may include publicity, coercion, extortion, disorientation and despair, provocation of unpopular counter measures, and (with regard to the terrorist* themselves) morale-building. Its ultimate goals can he either concretehc seizure or consolidation of political power or
"Ihcciimmniivmet in New Yurif. Jul) tn IIiiKii vnuNe hi reach uflrvVYni eHhcr ihrnternal >mat icrurMn ormvnxre*he taken in proentjiiniu lasimrvndnim ofjnd omriM.ptdale, neither ihc UNhemuniliceKvn jNe |iirlh> exaaaaler "
at mm. ImmmmttimmlAPanel No1 alifofiMa Settitnar nn Arm,and lorogn rSJk; (Ln* Angde*Pi-MieuDonv
.
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Ilic jlliiinnicnl of clhnie self-rule) or netiuloushe fomenting of world-wide revolution).*
The foregoing observations and generalizations form ihe basis lor the definitions or international und transnational terrorism that are employed in this study. These are us follows:
Churacterhtkx: The threat or use of violence for political purposes when (I) Mich action is intended to influence the attitudes und behavior of it lurgct group wider than its immediate victims,ts ramifications transcend national boundariesesult. Tor example, of the nationality or foreign tics of its perpetrators, jits locale, the identity or its institutional or human victims, its declared objectives, or the mechanics of its resolution).
Terrorism: Such action when carried out hy individuals or groups controlledovereign state.
.Terrorism: Such action when curried out hy basically uulonomous non-state
j actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states.*"
Im chapter cniiikd "Terroreapon of Pnlttkulunit(editedurry
nnd published hy Collier. MucmiHiinondon,Thomas I'. Thnrton define* polltkul terror at "uik'Miincu to influence political hehuvior hy cMtunormalthe use or threat ofther particularlyurulystt nf poterrorism arc lo he found iniv cit.'; Roheit Mow, t'rhm UnvmltM (London:('rosier, ctl, AnmittPtmrr and Cunffut.
4 (London-fat the Studytdiik'ul rtrrurbm (London; Mavmilltin, "The Concept of Revolutionary
hr Jwnal 1'iuiflffi ffrwrftartm. Volume XVI,eptemberp.W; und Philip A. Kurhvr,rkin Tcrronun: Baselineemee Quarirrlr.. The lasl-namcd author(he tymhnlw uualillet of politiul terrorism and mickcM* lhal it can he analyzed in much the *nmc fi.hmn ;i* other mcilium< of communk'ution.the element ofommon to huh. Ihe hooniliift line between transnational und Intcrnntionul* often dilTicdl to draw. To the deprce thai it win he deici'iineil ihe key distinction lie* inailing the*ith respectiven action or campaign Hence, group* can and do Aitl buck ami liirththefnc>llme "contract loh" undertaken on behalfovernmental actorroup that normally act* asvuritinpIHlight! qualifiesxilcrnational icrri.rism.
Jusi how meaningful the posited distinction between international and transnational terrorism is likely to be in the longer run is, ofcourse. open to question. But for ihe lime being, at least, the (wo phenomena do pose questions and problemsua! ita lively different order. For one thing, since il involves ihe behavior of slate actors, international terrorism can in theory he handled and contained within the framework of the existing international system with only minor adjustments. Moreover, its practitioners seem to beew notable exceptions, at letist moreut some other points of time in ihe recent past. Transnational terrorism, on the other hand, has been growing in boih geographic scone and intensity. And the inicrnaiional system is still ill-equipped lo deal with uulonomous non-siule act rs.
Method
At best, discussions of methodology carry the risk of blurring and diluting the analytical ihrustesearch paper. Bul the subject al hand presents somethingpecialinew words about the analytical techniques employed ure needed to lay the groundwork for subsequent discussion. For one thing the myriad of factors which bear on terrorist activity dictated adoptionulti-disciplinary approach. For unother. the fuzzy boundaries ihul separate terrorism from other forms ofthe previously cited lack of any generally accepted analytical approach or comprehensive and logically organized datathe constructionelatively detailed frumcwork for screening und ordering the nvuilable information.
umber of working hypotheses derivedurvey of ihe existing literature on both terrorism und political violence per se were used toist of (I) key group und environmental variables that uppeur to have uffcclcd the scope, nuiurc. and intensity of international and transnational terrorism in recent years,nalytically useful event characteristics. (Those iniiiul hypotheses that survived subsequent testing appear, logeiher with later additions, as judgments und conclusions al various points in this study.)
The resultant tabulation is presented in somewhat abbreviated form at Appendix A. Il will be noted that, in addition lo fulfilling their primary (und distinctly tradition <l) disciplinary function, most of the variables listed therein are amenable to machine processing and manipulation. And while, as suggested in Ihe Foreword, the statistical inferences lhal arc highlighted below rest on sometimes ratherdaia. theyto refine some of
Uie author's preliminary assumptions and hypotheses and to suggcsi other trends and patterns that cold be
significant.
III. THE PHENOMENA IN RETROSPECT What,and Whin?
Ah previously indicuted. international and transnational terrorism were not yet mutters of much uncial or academic concernn contrast to other forms of political violence, there simply had not been very much of cither since the close of World Wurleast not of the sort thut made hcudlines. Moreover, much of what there was had been associatedovershadowed by the more Important consequencesadversary relationships stemming from cither the Cold War or the anti-colonial struggle. For the most part, noncomhalant third parlies hud been left unmolested.
It is true, of course, ihut two brief (lurries of skyjacking had already drawn attentionotential new problem area. Bul. for the most part, neither had involved moreew actions that would be classified us terrorism under Ihe definition employed here. The first, in the. had been comprised almost entirely; of, Eastern European aircraft commandeered for the sole purpose of escape to ihe West. And while the second, which extended from theo the. had been climaxed by the first postwar hijackings of American airliners (thereby prompting (he, US to pressomprehensive international convention covering crimes committed on civilian aircraft engaged in internationalt too had been attributable primarily lo individuals seeking personulexpedient transport to or from Cuba or outrightthan 'political leverage or impact.
n any cvcnt^sLyjackings tapered off againhe nvcrull level of international and transnational i. errorist activity, remained relatively low through
hen turned upward aguinsl the backdrop of intensified Palestinian guerrilla activity that preceded7 Arab-Israeli war. Admittedly, the record up to thai point is sketchy. For one thing, the mass mcdiu still lacked cither Ihe incentive or Ihe technical means for systematic 'and comprehensive coverage of terroristmuny undoubtedly went unreported. Bul even ifelow substantially understates the number of International and transnational terrorist Incidents thai occurred Ineriod, the international Impact of such activity was negligible. Indeed, when the qualitative dimension is added8 emergesatershed year. At lhalombination of Palestinian initiatives and the cumulative impact of ihe broader environmental trends discussed below seems lo have finally sensitized dissident groups (hroughoul ihe world to iheir latent and growing potential for effective transnational terrorist act!"Hy.
8 throughhere were atecorded international and transnational terroristfere kidnappings:ere barricade and hostagentuilcd Ihe use of explosive devices of one type or unother:ere armed assaults ornvolved the hijacking of an aircraft or other means of transportation;ell under the category of incendiary attack or arson:onstituted assassination or murder; undere characterized by other forms of violence. All told, moreerrorista number of fictional entities created lo shield ihe identity of the perpetrators of some particularly shocking or politically sensitivenearlyifferent countries or disputed territoriesalestine) have thus far been linked lo this uctiviiy, and there may have been more.""
orlrays the overall geographic distribution of international and transnational terrorist incidents Torore informative breakdowntatistics by type of event und other operational criteria is provided in Appendix B.
Despite ihe widespread and coniinuing popularity of certain "traditional" forms of violencessassinations and highly discriminatehe picture which emerges from these assorted charts and tablesumber of marked regional and lime-related variations in the frequency and nature of iransnational terroristub-Saharan Africa and large parts of Asia have, for example.
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Geographic Distribution of International and Transnational Tarruritt
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relatively Tree of such activity, So loo has theSoviet/East European region. Latin Americans havearticular affinity for kidnapping foreign diplomats and businessmen. On the other hind, ciccpl for ikyjackingi. seemingly indiscriminate and potentially bloodymoss hostage episodes, large bombs in public places. Lod Airport type massacresnnocent bystanders, and the destruction (or attempted destruction) without warning of passenger-carryingmost frequently been the province of extremisi formations from the Middle East, Europe, und Japan.
For it* part, skyjacking reached near epidemic proportions0 only to toper off sharply thereafter. There were. In ruci. fewer recorded tcrrori*!in all5 thim there were In an average month just five years curlier. The drumulic decline in popularity of this particular form or terrorist violence has. however, been purtlally offsetise in equally unsettling hnrrlcndc and hosluge episode*.
Another point brought home by the data presented ini that although transnational terrorists have, until recently at least, rarely sought to wring concessions from Washington. Americanhuman or physical, official orconsistently been among ihc mosl popular for attack. For example, betweennd3 (when lightened security and ihc implications of Ihe US-Cuba agreement mudc American planes seem lessS aircraft figured In aboutercent of niloreover, this ratio is relatively modest in comparison to US experience with some other forms of terrorist activily, especially kidnapping, Indeed, ihe available daia suggests lhai over ihe pail eight years. US citizen* or US faclllllerbeen victtmlzetl in al least one-lhlnl nf oil transnational temnHsi Incident*.
The hard fuel is that substantial pocket* of popular opinion in many parts of the world are prone io identify the US wiih reaction, intervention, and "neo-coloniul" exploitation. Hence. American targetsigh symbolic value for "anti-imperialists" of both
nationalistic and ideological persuasion. Moreover, such turgels also tend toigh "embarrussmcnt quotient" In relation lo the governments of the countries In which the attacks occur and. if different, the governments against which the terrorists levy their demands. j
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Despite their, summary nature, the group profiles set forth inerve, in part, lo document the three additionalwith the proliferation of active terrorist groups in recentwere cited as particularly significant at the oulset of this study. For example, even ihough the criteria employed for selecting ihe groups Included inrelative levels of activity or prominence) tended to favor long-lived rormalions, the majority of the organizations listed therein are less than eight years old, Less ;evldent from the profiles but perhaps more significant Isthe instability and ephemeral quality lhal have been characteristic of many If not most of the organizations that have engaged in transnational terrorism over the past decade. The net growth in their, numbers has. in fact, been as much attributable to Ihe splintering of old groups as io the emergence of entirely new ones.
The next-mentionedtoward bolderbeen uneven. Moreover, its precise contours defy precise definition for they depend on unavoidably subjective judgments concerning the relative difficulty, risk, and shock value associated with often qullo dissimilar incidents. Nevertheless, the inherent dynamics and logicampaign of terrorist violence are such lhat ilatural propensity to escalate over time. Globally, this has found reflection in the adoption and spread of aggressive new tactics. Locally, it has been manifested in the tendency of
Debris flies through the air as the PFIP commence* destruction of the threea tolalt hl|ocked to Dawson Field, Jordan In early
certain groups lo probe the effective limits of any such innovation thut,they elect to employ before seating buck on its use or on their ussoc'uicd demands. Thus wc have witnessed:
multiple skyjucl.ing upcruiion stuged hy the Popular Front Tor the Liberation of Pulcstinc inhich capped Ihe wave of aircraft seizures thai had begun (wo years turfier;*-
all lime record for multiple and cumulative diplomatic kidnappings established by the Tupamaros betweennd1 in their effort to secure the release ofmprisoned collaborators: and
escalation of Ihe umount of ransom .': demanded by Argentine terrorists for Ihe release
of kidnapped multinutionul corporation .executives1eported
ngurc ofillion"
Becausehe complexity of the relationships involved, the sensitive nature of much of the uvuilable information, und the questions which ure raised with respect lo the past and present role of various state actors, the thirdtoward more extensiveooperation among terroristdetailed examinationeparate research study. Indeed,umber of notation! concerning known or suspected transnational links have been included in the material presented in Appendix C. the broad scope of this pjper precludes morerief overview of the
So fur. at least, ihe efforts of various terrorist groups to promote hroad regional and imcr-rcgionul coordination through the holding of periodic conferences and the formulion of such umbrella organizations as Latin America's Revolutionary Coordination Juntu (JCR) seem lo huvc generuled
phnio on.erie* of well-coordinated action* (all hut one of -huh were tinted during Ihe courseingleW)J, the Pr LP hijacked four ulrlineri and attempted tnifth. One nlutie was flown to Cairo, where it was destroyed us sunn as the nusscngtrs and crew had dlaemharked. The other three aircraft were divertedanding strip In lha Jordanian desert. These were Mown up oneptemhtr, hut soma uf Iheir pa'scnger* were held hint age for another IJ in IX days.
the lutier cuse, the Montonerm orgnrnzalinn kidnapped Jorge nml Junn Born, co-inMiers and directors of Bunge and Bomn4 and held them for nine months- An edditlonul condition fur Iheirntso "asthe puhliculMin inlending Wester" ntipcr*ull rsipe poalkwl "unnnuncenienl" drawn up hy Iheir captor* (see.
more smoke thanutowerrowing network of overlapping ad hoc alliances and mutual ussistuncc arrangement* huvc udded an ominous new dimension to the terrorist thrcul.
Although terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere seem lo have been entering the picture more often of lute, this phenomenon has been mosl evident in Europe and ihe Middle East where Ihc advantages that can be derived from transnational cooperation have brought together some sirunge bedfellows indeed. For exumplc. support rendered by individuals associated with the unnrchist Buader-Meinhof Gang facilitated preparations for the attack on the Isrueli Olympic team which was staged by the extremist but relatively non-revolutionary Palestinian Black September Organization in the falloi only have Ihc Popular Front for (he Liberation of Palestine (PFLP> und the Jupuncrc Red Army (JRA) teamed upumber of dramatic ventures,suggested hy the fact that the (hree Japanese gunmen who executed the Lod Airport massacre in2 carried papers forged in Germany and weapons that they hud picked up inorganizations huvc received assistanceumber of other terrorist groups In variousi> 'he world. The Turkish People's Liberation Army has used Palestinian training cump facilities in Syria and has reciprocated hy uttacking Israeli targets in Turkey. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) ha* developed linksumber of terrorist organizations outside Ihe UK and Northern Irclund. Including sepurutist groups in Fruncc und Spuin us well ns some Palcsliniun formations in the Middle East,
Overall, more and more groups throughout Ihe urcu have begun providing each olher with arms, safe housing, and other forms of support. In fact, thcrs is evidenceuropean-based terrorist "service industry" hus emerged in the form of organizations devoted primarily or exclusively to providing training, documenlulion. and other specialized assistuncc to revolutionary and nntionul liberution movements in all corners of Ihc world, Just how complicated this web of interrelationship* has become is well illustrated hy France'sstillAffair" nnd Its recent dramatic sequel in Vienna (see
JCR I* compcised of Argentina's Resololiunury People's Army (IRPl. Bolivia's Nutional Liberation Army (LLNj. Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Leftaraguay's Nationalmnlnd the remnant* of Uruguay's Nwinnul Liberation Movementacked hy ihc LRPN oscrflowinpl hus grown more active In resent months and hus the polenllul fur hemming un effecto* and dangerous orsnnl/allivi.
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THEF CARLOS
ebanese guerrilla-turned- inMichel Moukarhcl. threeagent* in Pari* attempted toa suspectedman known to ihemhis cover name ofquestioning onofnexplicably, theyCarlos was not. Me escapedlazethat left Moukarhcl and two of theofficers dead at the scene. The thirdwas gravely:
Carlosa thoroughly shaken French security service behindto reappear as the leader of the group ofrorisls ihut successfully took almost ull the delegates to an OPEC ministerial-level conference in Vienna hostage one remain* somethingon of mystery. But during the months between his hasty esit from Paris anddramatic return to the limelight, enough evidencehintingextensive terrorist activities and connections wus uncovered to mukc him seemeul lifehe first piece in the jigsaw puzzle wus furnishedhance break in London that enabled the British to identify Carlos as lllich Ramirez-Sanchez. Ihesonealthy and staunchly Communist Venezuelan lawyer who had dispatched his family io London
Carlos' early political career was highlightedrief stint at the Patrice Lumumba University inwhence he was reportedly expelled for dissolute living and improper attitudes inittle is known of Carlos' movements in the wake of his unscheduled departure from the USSR. In any event, moreear was to pass before he returned to London, and he apparently spent at least part of this period in the Middle East. At some point in the, heember of the extensive terrorist network operated by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinefact openly acknowledgedpokesman in5 with the boastful addition that Carlos and Moukarbel had beeneries of dramatic new actions when the French authorities finally closed in on them.
Painstaking investigation of Carlos' known associates subsequently revealed that, in addition io Moukarbel (described by the PFLP as its "Parise had been workingixed entourage of dedicated revolutionaries that included several Latin Americans. One of the latter has been further identifiedember ofthe secretariat ofthe Colombian Communist Party. Carlos had also been provided with shelter and other helpful servicesumber of women friends, including at least two European nationals, who probably had little knowledge of what he was really doing.
Charged, in general terms, with striking at "Zionism andhe Carlos organization had apparently been given latitude to operateide geographic area embracing not only the UK and much of Continental Europe but, according to plans recovered by British authorities, parts of the Middle East as well. Moreover, evidence in the form of records that had been maintained hy Moukarbel and the nature of tome of the weapons that Carlos had left for safekeeping with friends in England and France established that the group had been cooperating, in keeping with PFLP policy,umber of other terroristnotably the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and the German Bander-Mcinhof Gang, Il now seems ccrtuin, for example, that Carlos and Moukarbel were deeply involved in the planning of ihe JRA seizure of the French Embassy in The Hague in
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unknown. Bul Cuban official* had been maintaining contact with members of ihe Carlos group in holb England and France, and Iheere sufficiently suspicious or this activity io send ihrce of Havana's diplomats packing in the wake of Carlos' escape.
ABOVE: The Soviet-modeocket louncher uied by members ot*roup in their abortive ottock on on El Al plane at Orly airport ovlside Paris on5
' !
rench policemen paints to the hole in the fuselage of ihe Yugoslav airliner that was hit by one of ihe rocket grenades fired at the CI AI plane
l least. Ihe group lhal Carlos had headed in Paris had generally identified ilself as ihe "Mohammed Boudiahen he reappeared in Vienna inl was at ihe headeemingly new formationifferent name (Ihe "Arm of ihe Arabnd.ifferent principal sponsor. (The PFLP has denied responsibility for Ihe OPEC operation: so too has Libya, bul the Egyptians, among others, have openly accused Colonel Qaddafi of being behindn any event, the composition of Carlos* Vienna atlack force (believed to have consisted, in addition to its Venezuelan leuder. of two Germans and three Palestinians) provided solid new evidence of the trend toward closer cooperation among terrorists of different nationalities.
As of this writing.hereabouts are again unknown. Nor ore ihe reiums on his December venture as yet all in. Il remains lo be seen, for en-ample, jusi whai new internationalresult from lhal action. Nevertheless, the immediate outcome of Carlos' OPEC operation (including safe haven for the terrorists and massive publicity for iheirwith his boast thai he currently controls some two-score seasonedlhal the world will hear from him again before too long.
Other headline incidents to which Carlos has been linked since his near irrest in France include an assassination attempt against J. Edward SscfTrominent English Jew and clothing-store magnate) inhe bombing ofpopular Paris Left Bank hangout. Le Drugstore,wo attacks against El Al aircraft al Orly Airport innd an assassination aiicmpiugoslav consular official in Lyons Inxtras or The hostages token in Coriot'on the OPEC principals from other terrnhsl organizations were mlmsteriollevel conference In VVnno onecember involved in some of Ihcsc as well. To whatftlrtrff Aft"ff Austrian AirUe*hat flew ihem and any. lhal stale actor* may also haveandJCfTWP'0'*lgierskfe trip to Tripoli)
Why?
r' .
Ths commonalities, differences, or changes inf behavior (hat have been described thus far are. of course, attributable lo the interplayost of variables.ew ofhe ones lhai seem to have had the greatest direct bearing on the liming, scope, and nature of Ihc internationalization of terror, are addressed at any length below. No attempt is made to develop some sort of model or overarching theory with respect to this phenomenon. Far more modest, ihc objective here is simply to ascertain to what extent the current rash of transnational (and.esser degree, international) terrorist activity is attributable to broad regional and global trends and developments as opposed to unique and possibly transitory local problems and
A few generalof them, perhapsneeded to set the problem in perspective and lo lay the groundwork for further analysis. First, of all, transnational terrorism is by nature more congenial lo urban than to rural-based groups and is thus characteristically spawned by societiesid to advanced stage of socio-economic development. Resort lo International terrorism, on the other hand, is just as likely to result from calculations concerning the relative efficacy of alternative methods for bringing national power to beariven situation us from an outright dearth of national resources. Hence, such behavior is not the special province of any particular category or state.
Modern-day practitioners of transnational terrorism have benefitedenerally permissive internationalpoint which will be elaborated below. For the most part, therefore, tbe constraints on their behavior have citherunction of local environmental factors affecting their objective capabilities, opportunities, and alternatives or have been self-imposed for tactical or philosophical reasons.
These latter restraints ore. of course, unccrluin, for personal predilections can be overshadowed by frustration or desperation. Nevertheless, as evidenced hy the data prewntedin Appendices Bind C, cultural heritage hasey factor affecting individual terrorist groups* percepiions of the limits beyond which ihe level or intensity of violence is likely lo hecore counterproductive. Moreover, although generalization is diff^ult because the ideological mix is different in almost every ease, so has whai is here termed the group's credo or ethos. The sharp differences in behavior between the two wings of Ihc ' ;
IRA and among the various Palestinian terrorist groups are evidence enough of this. But far more research is needed before confident judgments will be possible with respect lo just what combinations of (reliefs are most likely to foster repeated resort io extreme and indiscriminate forms of violence.
Since Ihe extant and efficacy of internal security controls bear heavily on the frequency, form, and domestic impact of transnalionol terrorist incidents in any given country, the proliferation of this form of political violence has both contributed to and fed upon the recent trend toward more widespread resort to various forms of authoritarian rule. On one hand, open societies and weak or permissive authoritarian regimes are particularly vulnerable to suchto its domestic ramifications. On the other, rigid and forceful authoritarian rule can foster transitional terrorism by forcing dissidents to operate abroad.
Together with earlier references to Ihc basic societal problems that can give rise lo various forms of political violence, the foregoing observations focus on the human and local environmental factors affecting the extent, nature, and domestic impact of transnational or international terrorist activity in different parts of Ihc world. The question remains, however, as lo just why there has beenarked and enduring upsurge in transnational terrorism over the past eight years. In part, this phenomenon is attributablear-punctuated regional conflict affecting the interests ofa large number of nations and attended by particularly deep-seated feelings of bitterness and frustration. But it would not have grown lo its present dimensions were it not for the concurrent convergence and accelerationumber of changes in the global environment Ihst had been taking shape much earlier
These trends are difficult to disaggregate. Technological advance, growing globaland the increasing urgency attached lo forced draft modernization in many parts of Ihe world are, for example, closely interrelated. But each bears brief comment.
The impact of new technology on lerrorisl capabilities wiih respect to weapons, mobility, and tactical communications has already been ciled. As evidenced by the development of ever more sophisticated letler bombs, Ihe occasional employment of missiles, and the staging of coordinated actions in widely separated locations, it has been significant. But whatever the nature of a
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terrorist net or ihe mean* of it* execution, it mutt he remembered lhal Ihe role of ihe media ii critical to Ihe spreading and inicn.*ificalion of iis psychological impact. Hence, among all the technological advances in receni years, ihe development of satellitend in particular, their upgrading8 ioelevision capability have unquestionably been among ihe most important in making transnational activity seem attractive lo terrorist groups, j
The udvent of satellite communiculions has ulso fed and underscored the thickening network of political, economic, and technological dependencies and obligations now commonly subsumed under the rubric of interdependence. Whether or not this term has been abused of late, ihe growth in bolh Ihe numbers und imporiance of international, transnational, andf Ihe centralizing imperatives of local modernization efforts) subnational linkages over the pasl decade has had atwo-fold imoact on Ihe world-wide potential for terrorism. On ihe one hund. ii hasost of new, vulnerable, andighly disruptive targets for terrorist attackommercial and communications centers, transportation hubs, international power grids and pipelines, super tankers, and jumbon the other, il hasort of identity crisis that ha* been reflectedroublesome countervailing upsurge of nationalism and ethnicity.
.t
For their, part, the many other strains and
, dislocations associated with the process of modernising change have swelled (he ranks of Ihe alienated in many parts of the world. They have also added millions of emigre workers to the international pool of political exiles and refugees which terrorists can .xploil for cover, recruits, and various forms of operational support.
! The upsurge in transnational terrorism has also been aided and abettedrevolutionary" turn In the overall political environment somewhat reminiscent of lhat experiencedears ago. The postwar order hus, in faci, come under challenge from all sides: from the developing nations of the Third World: from "maverick" Communist regimes: from dissatisfied, second rank powers: androad array of social forces fired, with differing degrees of responsibility,ew sense of "social conscience."! :
Byhe potential forgeneral escalation of political violence was clear. Viewed in this context, the Palcslinians* dramatic entry into the air piracy business8 becomes somethingogical if unexpected extensionhain of developments lhal had ir.cluded ihe emergence of ihe unruly Newurther proliferation of violence-prone splinter groups, and the firsi indications of the general posi-Guevura shift in emphasis from rural io urban guerrilla warfare in Lalin America.'
The characteristics and contours of this "revolutionary atmosphere" have undergone some change in the intervening years. The salience of some of the original coniributoryietnam, has faded. Bul. a* amply illustrated by the increasingly sympathetic treatment accorded to ihe Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Ihe United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and other international forums over (he pastonths, (hat of Ihe new moral, political, and economic standards championed by Ihe Third World hasn ihe contrary, now backed by ihe new political clout of the Arab oil stales, ihese values appear to be gaining in force. In short, the established postwar international political system has been cast into somethingtate ofall that lhat implies wilh respect to its effective order-keeping capabilities.
Terrorists have benefited from this overall state of affairs in many ways. Among other things, it has:
an aura of legitimacy lo the ads of any terrorist group claiming leftist revofu >nary or national liberation movement status:
efforts lo develop more effective international counlcmeasures:
transnational contact and cooperation among terrorist groups;
a significant increase in the number of notional, transnational, and international organizations providing national liberation movements and other "progressive" dissident
"Willi Guevara'* demise and subsequent decline in natureevolutionary theorist and tactician, the work* ot *uch leading advocate* ot terrorist violence a* Fienon, Satrc, and Marigheta have auumcd increasing importanceajor literary source of inspiration for ultra militant* in many pan* of Ihe world
"The PLOolitical umbrella organisation embracing icveral
Fcdayeen commando groups II accorded recognition a* the mic legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (at the aipeme of Jordan) by4 "Islamic nonnligned" and Rahul summiln Nnvcmhtr of thai same year. Iiranted observerby the UNCI A. Allalt* have allowed Ihe PLO lo open offices In iheirn addition, five UN-affiliated international agencies <ILO. WHO. UPU. ITU. and UNFSCO) have granted it ohtcrtce
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formations with various forms of direct and indirect support.
the attitudes and behavior of supportivethose willing to provide iittle more than kind words und occasional safe haven to those that regularly furnish practicing or potential terrorists with funds, arms, training, documentation, and other operationalconstituted another key global environmental factor affecting the scope and nature of transnational terrorist activity during the period; under review. variable mightetter term, however, for the extent ol such assistance has fluctuated with changing appreciations of broader interests on the part of the state actors involved. For5istinct downward trend in such support.
In any event, if one excludes the simply indulgent or indifferent (including those liberal Western European states like France and Switzerland that, because of their strategic location and the extensive protection they accord lo democratic rights and freedoms, have become involuntary hosts to all manner of foreign dissident groups) the list of nations in question dwindles to lesscore.ew states that have recentlypartiallythe business, these "activists" include (but are noi limited to) Libya. Cuba, ihe USSR. China. North Korea. Algeria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Tanzania. Congo. Zaire, Egypt, Syria. Iraq, and. however reluctant it has been to engage in such octivity. Lebanon.
In some of these states, most of ihe support rendered to foreign revolutionary or guerrilla formations has been directed toward influencing the course of developments in one or two neighboring states or territories. And for many, perhaps mosl. Ihe nctuul promotion of terrorist violence has been no moreurgely unintended byproduct of their activities. Nevertheless, in one way or another, all of them have directly contributed to the recent upsurge of transnational terrorism.
Two or three bear special mention. Take Libya, for example. The oil-rich Gaddafi regime has for some scars been the world's most unabashed governmental proponent of revolutionary violence. And from the number of times that Libya has been linked to specific terrorist groups undCarlos' raid on Ihe OPEC meeting Inwould appear thai Colonel Quddufi has also been one of the world's least inhibited practioners of iniernalional terrorism,
:
Tripoli's focus has been on nationalist formations, whatever Iheir ideological coloration or religious leanings. Thus, the recipients of its favors (in Ihe form of various combinations of financial, logistical, and technical support) have been numerous and varied. In addition to some of the more militant Palestinian splinter groups, they have included the Irish Republican Armyumber of less widely kno 'it guerrilla movements based in the Philippines. Ethiopia. Somalia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Chad, Morocco. Tunisia. Thailand, and Panama.
This list is not exhaustive. Moreover, it bodes well io grow since, despite Tripoli's professions of reluctance to grant safe haven to the JRA terrorists who seized the American Consulate General in Kuala Lumpur inhere have as yet been no convincing indications that Colonel Gaddafi hashange of heart.
Moscow's posture has been more ambiguous. Basically, the Soviets have had serious misgivings aboul the utility of transnational terrorist activity. They have repeatedly warned that excessive violence can tarnish the reputation of those involved and have stressed their belief (hat such tactics are not only generally unproductive bui can lead to unforeseen and possibly uncontrollable adverse consequences. Al ihe some lime, however, ihe Kremlin's broaderimportantly, those stemming from its continuing adversary relationship withdenied it the option of ahands-ofl policy. Thus,eriod of hesitancy, the Soviets began channelling funds, weapons, and other assistance to fedayeen groupsumber of intermediariesll indications are that they continue to do soimilarly, they have continued their long-standing program (the more innocuous aspects of which arc publicly associated with Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University) of bringing young revolutionaries from all parts of the Third World to the Soviet Union forand indoctrination. And like Carlos, some of these individuals have subsequently cropped up on the transnational terrorist scene.
There Isonsiderable body of circumstantial evidence linking Moscow to various terrorist formations in Western Europe. That some linkages
theircommentary on fednyror activities, however, the Soviets (lavs consistently heen careful lo distinguish between "permissible" attacks on "legitimate" targets Inside Israel and "regrettable" Incident* involving noncombatant third pallet.
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exist may, in facl, be taken for granted, for the broad considerations cited abovs give the Soviets ample reason for selectively attempting to monitor, penetrate, and gain some influence over such groups. But for obvious reasons, they have had to be very circumspect. They seem, for example, io have relied more heavily there than anywhere else on the cooperation of intermediaries who, if exposed, can be plausibly represented as having acted on their own initiative. In any event, the only hard evidence of Warsaw Pact member assistance to individuals associated with the Biader-Meinhof Gang points to Pankow and Prague. The arms destined for the non-Marxist Provisional Wing ofthe IRA lhal were seized at Schiphol Airport in Holland in1 were of Czechoslovak origin and had been handledzechoslovak firm. Even in the original "Carlosuba was the Hate actor most directly implicated. In short, the true dimensions of Soviet involvement remain extremely difficult to ascertain.
Nonetheless, one thing is clear. Hiwe.er much Ihe Soviets might wish otherwise, their elforts lo gain some handle oi extremist activity have, together with iheir pursuit of less congruen*vcs, done more lo aggravate than to contain ihe current rash of transnational terrorist activity, The hard fact iss difficult to translate assistance into leverage or control when there are olhtr available sources of support. Indeed, as the Soviets should by now have teamed, any assistance provided io an extremist group under these circumstance) risks limply Increasing the recipient's potential for autonomous action,
A third actor deserving of separate comment isso much because of Ihe cxient of Havana's past activities In support of revolution and rebellion, hut because there is mounting evidence (such as ihe siatcmeni issued al the conclusion of the regional Communist conference which was hosted by the Cubans inhat Castro's ambiguous policies have finallyundamental change in this regard. After years of hedging, the Cubans have now publicly espoused Moscow's recommended via paeifica strategy with respec* lo revolutionary struggle in Latindevelopment which bodes ill for those smallci militant formations ihnt still rely heavily on Cuban support. It would appear thai ihey will hive to fall in linece ihe risk of extinction, Bui many of Latin America's more active pn'ponents of armed struggle are less vulnerably to Cuban retrenchmenl. Some are already highly self-sufficient. Of ihe remainder, those who are unable to lap ihe enormous war thesis that have been accumulated hy Argentine terrorist groups arc likely to engage in moic frequent ransom and resupply operations of their own. Partly bevause of ihis, and partly because Castro has made it abundantly clear lhat he does not intend ioarallel cutback in his support of arrred revolutionary struggle outside of Latin America, the impact of Cuba's new posture on ihe overall level of transnational terrorism may be minimal.
The last and most elusive global variable to be addressed here il ihe avnall economic environment. Il can impact on the problem of terrorismumber of subtle and, in some cases, countervailing ways. For example, extra-cyclical world-wide economicas (hose generated by the sudden quadrupling of oilso overtax ihe capabilities of local regimes asnvite domestic violenceort lhat could easily spill over national boundaries. Short of this, they can contributeeneral undercurrent of unrest by curtailing the resources that can be devotedmeliorating societal ills.
Because the social and political effects of cyclical trends in the overall economic climate tend lo be delayed and uneven, the potential consequences of short-term fluctuations do not lend themselves to generalization. Medium* to long-ierm Irends. however, can affect both ihe potential and ihe opportunities for transnational terrorist activity in any
given area. In so far as it affects industrialized countries, rising economic prosperity can. for example, facilitate Ihe undetected movement of terrorist groups byeavy flow of tourist and commercial travel. It also attracts Ihe large aggregations of emigre workers Ihai not only make it easier for foreign terrorist*scape notice buleady pool of manpower for their operational teams and support mechanisms. Morerolonged and general economic upturn can increase local potentials for political violence by causing popular expectations to far outpace governmental capacitieseliver. And in more affluent societies, at least, the attendant emphasis on materialistic values can alienate significant segments of the student ond intellectual communities.ombination of these last two destabilizing trends contributed, together with the factors cited earlier,he emergenceistinctly "revolutionary" political atmosphere in Ihe.
generally (ended lo dampen revolutionary ardor. Popular expectation* decline, and people everywhere arc preoccupied with Ihe exigencies of day-to-day existence. But the world has much changed since us last broad economic slide. Whether the numbing effects of generalized adversity will be felt as strongly in Ihe future is thus open to question, Their potential impnet on the level oftransnationul terrorist oc'ivily is even more uncertain. The uctors engaged therein are scarcely representative of the general population. They are few in number and elitist by nature. And given ihe proven strength of their convictions, they are likely lo be among the most resistant to the psychological effects of Lntoward changes in the overall economic environment.
Now Coot Effootlvo?
The answer to this question depends on the vantage point of the observer. The achievement of disproportionately large effects from the employment of minimal resources Is. of course, what political terrorism is ill about. Its most serious drawback is that its consequences are. as the Soviets maintain,onsiderable degree unpredictable. Il can alienate those groups whose sympathy was sought. Rather than disorient, the masses, it cun rally themreviously unpopular government. It caneak or wavering government into forceful counteraction.hort, tactical successes cm. as in Jordannd Uruguay, lead to
strategic reverses of major proportions.
! 1
This risk Is. however, easily accepted by those who dispose of noI effective alternative methods for achieving their goals. Moreover,umber of sobering experiences, the overall balance sheet thus
! far provides the practitioners of transnational terrorism with grounds for considerable optimism.
Briefly put, ihe record shows that bothand international terrorists have generally been successful in avoiding capture (or. if caught, in escaping punishment) and in meeting at least some of Iheir proximate objectives. For example,tudy ofajor kidnapping and barricade operations executed between8 andhe RAND Corporation concluded that such actions were subject to the following probabilities of risk and success:
percent probability of actually seizing
percenthai all members of the terrorist team would escape punishment or dcuth, whether or not ihey successfully seized hostages;
percent chance that all or some demands would be met in operations where something more lhan just safe passage or exit permission was demunded:
percent choice of full compliance such demands;
percent chance of success where safe passage or exit, foi ihe terrorists themselves or for others, wus theemand;
percent chance that, if concessions io ihe principal demands were rejected, all or virtually alt members of the terrorist team could still escape alive by going underground, accepting safe oussage in lieu of their original demands, or surrenderingympathetic government; and
ercent probability of gaining major publicity whenever that was one of the terrorists' goals,*
Such hostage operations have resulted in the freeing of large numbers of prisoners, the payment of huge ransoms, and in one case where Austria was targctied. the changing of government policy. Untilt least, the record for skyjacking wus fully comparable. Outerrorist attempts to seize aircraft between8 and earlyozen were abortive. Of Ihe remainder, less lhanre known for certain to have ended in Ihe death or imprisonment of ihe terrorists.reat majority of cuscshe skyjackers were successful in securing full compliunce with their demands. Thereuftcr, however, they generally received no more than safe haven, and for the past yearalf, skyjacking hasistinctly losing proposition. Ofttempts made between late4 and (he endere nipped In the bud and therought sentences of death or life in prison lo the terrorists involved.
Terrorist actsargaining dimensionombings and assassinations) have generallyorrespondingly lower degree of risk. All told, onlyndividuals associated with transnational terrorist activity have been caught in the pasl five years. Of these.ere freed without punishment.scaped punishment by getting safe conduct to another country.ere released from confinement
escerpted In TtrrwlilkTfrniHim-Itearlng* Before the Subcommittee to Investigate ihe Administration of the Internal Security Aci and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judkiary. United Stales Senate. Ninety-Fourth Congress. First Session: PartMS (Washington: US Government Printing..
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Onroup ol Weil German terrorist* identifying themselvesembers of the Holger Meinr Commando seized ihe FRG Embassy in Stockholmloody and oboriive attempt to farce Bonn to releasendividuals associated wilh the Baader-Meinhof organiiation from joil. When Iheir demands were refused, ihe terrorists dynomiled the top story of (he embassy building In an equalnsuccessful effort to cover their escape. The photo shows the embassy burning in ihe boekgiound os Swedish police carry off one of ihe captured terrorists.
in belter perspective, consider ihe fact lhal they Tall somewhat shorl of Ihe tolal casualties attributable lo domestic terrorism in Not them Ireland alone during the same period or lhal Argentine terrorists and "countcricrrorisls" have managed lo kill moref their countrymen sincetarker contrast, take Vietnam. There, in oneict Cong tcrrorisls were credited witheople and0 more. Comparisons with "normal" levels of domestic violence in the US may also be useful. There were, for example,orehere
on the demtind of fellow tcrrorisls.ere released after serving out Iheir prison terms,ere still in jails as ofhe average sentence meted out lo those tcrrorisls who have actually stood (rial has beenonths.*
How Disruptive?
The human and malerial toll exacted by transnational and international terrorist violence over the past eight years has bcecn rcluiivcly low. For exumple, although the total cost of such activity in terms of runsom payments and property damage has never been tallied, all indications are that it falls far shorl or ihe half billion dollars loss suffered io school vandals in the US each year.
Closer track has been kept ofthe human cusuullics involved. Latest esiimutcs pluce ihese al
killed and incurred hy
:
he losses he terrorists themselves. To put these
!0rowing nnd Increasinglynterview with Robert A. leurey. Special Assistant to the Secretary orSuile indrdiniiii* far Combattingtpnrt.
The juxtaposition of these statistics suggests lhal the dimensions of Ihe problem posed by transnational jnd international terrorism sre still quite small und that the Increase in such activityhile marked, should have done little lo undermine world order. Bul the disruptive impact of these ici.'orist incidents and campaign* ha* been magnified by the publicity Ihey have received and hy their interaction with olhcr destabilizing trend* and forces. Thus, while Ihe terrorists have made no revolutions and. hy
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DATELINE
A DECEMBER: South Molluccan Terrorist! Seize the Indonesian Consulate in Amsterdam
A blindfolded ondhoitaga it diipluyedhird tloO' boleony ol ihe-Indonesian Cooiviloie on 3lull two week* bclore hi* South Molloeeon caolon finally laid down ihoir o'mi ond iMffiwidawrJi
DATE OCT till
5
UPSURGE IN MAJOR TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS
ECEMBER: The Carlos-led "Arm of tho Arab Revolution" Attacks the OPEC Ministers' Meeting in Vienna
ECEMBER: An American EmployeeS Firm is Kidnapped
in Ethiopia by Eritrean Terrorists
11
il
S Embassy Official is Gunned Down byTerrorists In Athens
he oisoulr on OPCC'i Viennaai' ed otlhe hoipilol.following day, he woi ploeed on board the plane that tarried the rest ol hit grovp andl their hoitoaoi to North Africa.
s
themselves al least, toppled no governments. ihey hjve:
t
several governments andto the effective collapseewhe i initial Borduberry Administration in Uruguay and (he Isabel Peron regime in Argentina);
an abrasive new dimension to both North-South ana East-West relations:
11
to the growing international stutus and fortunes of the PLO;
some nations to temporarily abandon their law enforcement functiono release captured terrorists) out of fear of future
und accentuated the dilemmas generated within the existing international system hy the emergencerowing company of powerful non-siutc actors;
strains in relations umong those
Western nations which, because of divergent
national interests, feel constrained to adopt
differing positions with respect to specific
incidents or broader terrorist-related issues;
the currently pcrvusive sense of global Dux and disorder:
i ;
a large number of nations, including the US. to divert substantial resources to defense against terrorist attacks:*
affected the quality of life in many open or formerly open societies.
In short, while scarcely cataclysmic, ihe spoiling effects of modern-day transnational and international terrorism have been substantial. Harking back io earlier discussion, this stale of affairs iseasure and. in largeonsequence of increasing global interdependence. As ihe dimensions and complexity of the web or interstate and transnational linkages thai together comprise ihe funclional core of ihe "international system" have grown under the impact of technological advance, the reverberations ofterroristdisturb or threaten its more important intersections have tended to become increasingly widespread and sharply fell. Al the same time, the limits within which individual slates can attempt to cope with such problems through unilateral action without risk or adversely alTcciing ihe inieresis of others have steadily narrowed. Bui, as previously observed, rather lhan encourage increasing interest in supranational solutions, the frustrations born of this de facto shrinkage of sovereignly have generated an unhelpful backlash of nationalism. And this, of course, has been one of the key factors lhat have affected Ihe nature and effectiveness of the international community's response to ihe terrorist threat.
What International Conalralnla?
With the exceptionumber of bilateral agreements providing. Inter alia,reater exchange of intelligence and technical assistance or. us in the memorandum of understanding concerning hijackers of aircraft and vessels that was signed by the US nnd Cubaor ihe prompt extradition of specified categories of terrorists, ihe international response io terrorism has been relatively weak and ineffective.
The UN's problems in grappling wilh transnational terrorism were cited und illustrated ul ihe outset of this study. International terrorism, however, hus proved toomewhut less conicntious issue. Indeed. Ihe Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among Slates which the General Assembly adopted without vote on0 asserts at one poini that:
livery Stnt* ha* ihe duly to refrain from organl/iig. instigating, asshling or pariieipaiing in act* of civil urlfe of letYorlM -cit in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within it* territory directed inward' ihe cwnMission
or Civiligned int came into force inovering ihe sabotage or destruction of aircraft or air navigational facilities, it requires ihe contracting parties lo make such offenses subject to severe penalties and establishes (he same extndition-or-prosecution system for offenders as in The Hague Convention. Sixty-three countries have ratified it.
Organization of American Slates Convention (Convention lo Prevent and Punish Ads of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of Internationaligned int entered into force in3 (the USignatory, butith its emphasis on the prevention and punishment of crimes against persons io whom the stalepecial duly of protection under iniernalional law, itrecursor of the UN convention concerning the protection of diplomats which is cited below. It also employs The Hague Convention cxtrudiic-or-prosccutc formula. Only four of the thirteen signatory countries have ratified il.
Untied Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agcnls: Signed int has yet to come into force. It requires the contracting states to establish certain specified acts againsi protected persons (or against the official premises, private accommodations, or means of transport oferson) us crimes under internal low. Once again. The Hague Convention on extradite-or-prosecute formula bpplicx. So far, only nine countries huvc ratified il.
Although they reflect international concern and atlim majority consensus that something must he done, these conventions presently do not. singly or in combination, constitute much of an effective constraint on terrorist activity. In the first place, manya high percentage of those thut hove been particularly active in supporting revolutionary or national liberationnot yet parties thereto. Secondly, ihe conventions lack teeth in thai ull muke the extradition or prosecution of terrorists subject to discretionary escape clauses and none piovides for the application of punitive sanctions againsi states thut simply refuse to comply at all. Finally, ihe exclusive focus on skyjacking und the APPROVED FOR RELEASE JTAIE:1
protection of diplomatsood deal of terrorist activity outside the cognizance of international law.
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But this, it would seem, is all Ihe traffic will bear. The US has tried repeatedly to correct some of ihesc deficiencies and has runtonewall of opposition on each occasion. For example, al the conclave sponsored by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that formulated the final draft of The Hague Convention, the US delegation sought unsuccessfully to (I) limit drastically exceptions to extradition ofstablish hijackingommon crime,xclude political motivationefense against extradition or prosecution of hijackers. Two years later, inhe USraft convention to the UNGA that was aimed at limiting the "export" of terrorism. But even though itumber of restrictive criteria that would have lo be met before its enforcement provisions became applicable, it was effectively stifled hy opposition centering on the impermissibility of interference with the right of self-determination. The followingroposal sponsored by the US and several other nationseparate enforcement convention that would have backed the Tokyo. Hague, and Montreal documenls with sanctions affecting the rights and services guaranteed under existing international and bilateral air service agreements was soundly defeated at the ICAO's
Rome Conference and Assembly.
i
The obstacles which have blocked more effective internutionul action are formidable. They have, us previously indicated, included the controversy over justifiable versus Illegal political violence and broad resistance to such further infringements of national sovereignty as would be implied in any inflexible curtailment of the right to grant political usylum. Equally Important, however, they have also included an understandable reluctance on the part of many nations otherwise ill-disposed toward terrorist activity to commit themselves to any course of action thut might either invite direct terrorist retribution or provoke the application of sanctions by states that happen to be sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.
To make these observations is not, however, to imply immutihility. It must be remembered, for example, that such progress us has been mudc in the field of multilateral countcrmeasures hus. In each instance, been occasioned by reaction to some general or specific escalation of terrorist violence. (In this regard, hopes that Curios' assault on the OPEC ministerial meeting in Vienna will have some sort of salutary catalytic effect may yet be borne out inhere arc,ost of other factors which could alter the altitudes and behavior of any of ihe state acton concerned. Hence, whether or not all the obstaclesore effective iniernalional response that have been cited thus far will retain their present force in the decade aheadalidit is one that ii addressed below.
IV. THE OUTLOOK
Intomitlonal Terrorism
Although it is possibleew others may emulate the irresponsible behavior of Libya's Colonel Qaddafi, iniernational terrorism seems unlikely to pose muchhreatorld order or US interests during the next few yeors. Even in its presently weakened slate, Ihe international system subjects stalesost of legal obligations and practical constraints that they can ignore only al considerable risk. The continuing force of these consideraiions is evidenced by the fuel that international terrorism is no more prevalent today than it was
Indeed, throughout the entire postwar era. both the weak and the musclcbound have tended to view international terrorismolicy tool lo be used sparingly and (except when exercising their "right" of retaliation) discreetly when potentially effective alternative means are lacking. Moreover, while no apoiogia for such activity is intended, il should be notedthe exception of certain actions undertaken in connection wiih the Middle Eastobjectives have generally been defensivehe neutralization of hostile foreign-based groups or individuals) us opposed to the offensive and deliberately disruptive churacter of mosl transnational terrorism.
Nevertheless, the sporudic employment of government-controlled terrorist groups aguinst Israeli targets both within and outside that country's borders raises some troublesome questions aboul whutay hold in store. And while iheir true sponsorship has yet to be firmly established, so do the recent Rejeclionist Front-associated operations in Madrid and Vienna lhat were intended to bring pressure on moderate Arah regimes.
These questions center on the kind of adjustments in international behavior that may flow from ongoing changes in the distribution and component elements of national posver and. no less important, from the growing array of economic, political, and technological restraint* affecting the way* in which CPPRCVf] fIRILlfASE
ureter mi
laieni power can be translated into effective leverage. Are Aranrecursor of thing* to come? Is it. in fact, likely that, tacking or despairing of more conventional means for defending or advancing their international interests, an increasing number of slates will opt lo engageloactivity*?
In assessing this possibility, some observers have noted lhal because of ihe expense, the risks, and the constraints deriving from the patron-client relationships lhat are now involved, high* in tensity conventionalof ihe localhe becoming obsolete. On Ihe other bond, although it is "permissible" under current international ground rules, low-level protracted conflict of the Vietnam type is not. as they pointery attractive alternative. For these reasons, they suggest thai there willtrong temptation for governments to employ terrorist groups as means of wagingarfare" against other nutlons. Brian Jenkins has expressed this notion as follows:
! ITerrorists.r cease, hue dcmoettieicd the possibilities ofthirdwerfait.'* Terrorism, though now rejected atlegitimate moot or warfare hy mot convent-seel military esltiKf- could become an accented form ol wurfurc la the future. Terrorist* could be employed to provofc-iniernaoonal inctdenti, create alarm in anountryo divert valuable resources to protect Itself, destroy its morale, and terry out specific acts mt sah-vuge (ietvernmerm coeld employ eihtrag terrorist groufa
enact their opponent, or they could cieatc ihct owe lerrorms Terrorism require*mall investment, certainly far lew lhaaost to wage conventional war.
con be debilitating to the enemy. Prior to Iheom Klppurenior Israeli officer mimated lhat ihe total cost in men and moaey lo Israel To-all defensive and offensive measure*ulf* thousand Arabime* lhal of ihe Sis Day* Waracker of Ihe terrori*lio deny sponwing ihem. Theof uh-ersatn sabotage, ol lightniag rBHb carried out byrc notut the opportunities are.*
The cusc prcscnicd. however, is far stronger with respecthe probability of increasing resort lo some form of surrogatea* Brian Jenkins*ewfor ihe corollary argument that this development is likely lo he chnmcicri/cd hy widespread adoption of terroristor one thing, Ihe safety fuclur of denluhlllty
itrrmii" tfW MibV
"Il must be remembered that under inea* tmpeoyed ie thitthere are swan* hind* of cotert suhtersneincluding .appnri of insurgent paramilitary funv* ami oca sr-mwirship of highly discriminateol of themselves lontiitutr terrorism, would all bul disappeariaic were lo cngac.'- in such aciivilyegulur basis. For anoliicr. barring tolal collapse of world order and consequent international anarchy (something thai no stale actor has reason lonternational terrorism is highly unlikely lo gain acceptance as an admissible form of behavior in ihe foreseeable future.
All told, in fact, il seems likely thai the employmeni of terrorist groupsurrogate warfare role will continue to be mere ihe exception than the rule for some lime lo come. And if this proves lo be the case, il follows thai while there maylight upward trend in ihe annual total of international terrorist incidents, the scope of the problem5 should nol be much more serious thans today.
TraneriaHofial Tarrorlarn
On balance, ihe outlook with respect lo transnalional terrorism is less encouraging. On ihe positive side, the decline in ihe number of stales willing lo provide terrorist safe haven gives promise of beingt seems most doubtful that the currently shrinking aggregations of emigre workers will soon regain iheir former size, and this will probably have some small impact on the security and resources of terrorist groups operating in Western Europe More importantly, political developmentson which presently seem lo be at least possible could significantly reduce levels of lerrorisl activity in such current trouble spots as Northern Ireland, Argentina, and the Middle East.
Bul overall, the potential for domestic, inicrnutional. and Irunsnalional terrorismasserted ai ihe outset of thiscertain to remain high. Furthermore, most of ihe broad environmental factors that have contributed lo the feasibility, efficacy, und popularity of Irunsnalional terrorism in recent year* will continue to operate with at leust equal force in the decade ahead. The salience of some. In fuel, seems bound lo increase.
Barring some cataclysmic event which reduces mankindore primitive order of existence, technological advance, modernizing social und economic change, and growing glohul interdependence are, for example, essentially irreversible phenomena
ihi* irend ha* been evident lot some time, itui-ler*co-ed in August |Ms the JRA terrorist* who hud *ei/ed Un: US Consulate in KuiiIh Lumpur not only had great dlfiksitly Inate stilling in grant Ihem *afe haven, hut weredenied permission to transit nationally-controlled uirspiice hy some Third World countries.
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wiih nn urgency and momentum which seems more likely lo increase than to decline in the coming decade. And while iheir political consequences can.ertain degree: be controlled by curefully-iuilorcd policy decisions, ihey bode well to aggravate the terrorism problem by generating further increases in (I) divisive ethnicity andrbanerrorist capabilities,ocietal .ulncrahilities.
In Ihe political field, ihe widespread erosion of esiuhlishcd institutions of authority thul hus both invited und facilitated terrorist activity in recent years shows no signs of abatement. For its part, ihe postwur international order seems likely lo remuin underthus inIhe decude uhead. Bui the problem will probably continue to he most evident al the nationul level where increasing difficulties of governance hold forlh the prospecturther proliferation of ineffective and unstable regimes.
yproduct of the above, mosl non-slate actors on the world stage will probably manage lo escape significantly firmer national or iniernalional control for some lime lo come. Because of this, and because the values underlying the strong "social conscience" component of toduy's politicul environment seem likely to retain their current force, the chunces ure lhai naiional liberation land leftist revolutionary formations will .continue to receive both moral and material supportide variety of transnational nnd iniernalional organizations as wellotentially substantial flow of ransom and "Insurance" payments from vulnerable multinational corporations,
At the same time, the trend toward greater international contact and cooperation among terrorist groups lhat has already markedly enhanced the operational capabilities of some of Ihe organisations involved seems likely lo gain further momentum. For one thing, lingering Inhibiiion* born of sharply different goals and outlook are bound to decline in ihe face of continuing und wldcty-puhllci/cd proof of Ihc udvuntuges thut can be derived fromourse. For unothcr. the lough but scattered local counter-terrorist campaigns thai are sure to dot the political landscape ihroughout ihc decude ahead will each provide compelling new Incentives for transnational cooperation, j
Ominously enough, therefore. Ihe wuvc of the future seems to be lowurd the developmentomplex support base for transnational terrorist activity thul is largely independentqulcl resislunt io controlslate-centered internutionul system. This docs not mean, however, thai the behavior of supportive state actors will become increasingly irrelevant. On the contrary, it suggests thai unless the principal patrons of subversion and revolutionary violence eul back on the assistance ihey are furnishing io practicing or potential terrorists more drastically lhan currently available evidence as lo their intentions gives grounds to expect, tbe deleterious impact of their behavior may be considerably greater than in the past.
The problem of extensive and sometimes sympathetic publicity is another aggravating environmental factor lhat promises to persist in many purls of the world. Noi only has ull the attention that has been focused on terrorism made it increasingly newsworthy, but the coverage and capabilities of ihe world's satellite communications systems have been sieadily upgradedB. Moreover, radio, television, and Ihe press are bound to continue to rcuch an ever larger audience.
Although most Western media officials, at least, are by now fully aware of ihe danger of playing into terrorist hands, competitive pressures are strong and ihe line between responsible and irresponsible reportage or commentary is very fine. In short, self-censorship ia unlikely to work very well. On ihe other hand, the only potentially more effectivegovernmental management of thein time of peace, virtually out of the question in mosl Western democracies.
Another aspect of the information explosion that promises to continue to be troublesome is theof terrorist-adaptable technological know-howa lesserpossibly inspirational speculation about new and potentially ultra-disruptive terrorist ladies. Although the objectives of such liieraiure may be (and most often are) ubovc reproach, ii can scarcely help but aggravate ihc problems posed by the development and wholesale deployment of sophisticated (and in many coses, man-portable) weaponry; ihe world-wide proliferation of nuclear facilities: and the race, motivated by both political and economic considerations, to sell nuclear technology and modern armaments to developing countries. And these problems are serious enough as ii Is. Indeed, despite the attention thai has been paid to nuclear safeguards and Ihe physical security of sensitive Installations and depots, the world seems to he movingtate of affairs in which the limits of any "technological escalation" of terrorist violence will depend more on the self-imposed restraints
affecting the behavior of Ihe groups involved lhan on lack of capability or opportunity.
Il ia. of course, the upper limits of the potential scale of terrorist violence that arc of mosl concern. Individual terrorist groups already have ihe capability of manufacturing or otherwiseariety of weapons or agents of mass destruction. More will beosition lo exercise this option in Ihe future. Justi how likely is it tiiat they will do so?
, That Ihe threatened employment of suchrdnance would have profound political and psychological effectsdeniablc. Bui it must he emphasized that there are major hazards lhat would be involved for the terrorists as well. The mosl important of |fc;si!he one probably primarily responsible for the failure of terroristsake more of an effort io exploit mass destruction technology in the pusl) Is the high risk of adverse publicin the event that the group involved were to end uposition where il fell compelled lo make good its threat.
ew icrrons: groups have, in fact, resorted to Indiscriminate mass murder, such instances have been relatively rare, and in each case thus far ihe human toll has been negligible in comparison lo the casualties lhat would result from the broadcast ofew' ounces or lessighly toxic agent or the detonation ofmall nuclear device. Basically, terrorists are in business lo influence people, noi exterminate them. Moreover, those lhat aspire to some sort of politicalthis means mosl ofgenerally quite sensitive toneed lo take some care to avoid alienating local and international opinion.
The fact remains, however, that weapons of mass destruction cannol help but hold considerableor militants whose busk strategy of violence center* on wringing muximum politicul leverage from publicity and fear. Hence, it seems prudent to assume thul sooner or later some group is bound to lake the plunge.
Because their very mention strikes terror into ihc hearts of many, nuclear weapons come first io mind. But ihe practical problems facing the would-hc nuclear blackmailer arc numerous and complex. Although nuclear devices are clearly no longer beyond tcrrorisi rcuch. their acquisition (whether through theft or manufacture)ew yenrs yel will prohuhly continue tou relatively demanding task. Once id terrorist hunds. Iheir emissions present
anti-detection shielding problems not only during pussive storage but, if deployed againsi specific targets, during the delivery and bargaining phases of the operation as well. Moreover, there is further room for trouble when il comesstablishing ihe credibility of Ihe threat since ihe target authorities must be persuaded not only that ihe terrorists actuallyuclear device but thul it will probubly work. Finally, all bui the most funaiical terrorists might be given pause by ihe fact lhat if worst comes to worst, Ihe destructive effects of such weapons are not manageable.
Thus, while Ihc prospect of nuclear-armed terrorist* can scarcely beore likelyleas! in the shortseem tocrrorisi sctrurcuclear weapons storage facilityuclear power planttraightforward barricade operaiion.roup need notuclear holocaust (although thai possibility would be in the back of everyone'sust the destruction of ihe bunker or reactor with the attendant danger of radiological pollution. The threat would be inherently credible. The publicity would be enormous. And if their demands were to be denied, ihe terrorists would he inosition to tailor the umount of damugc they actually inflicted to their appreciation of the existing circumstances.
A more pressing threat, however, would seem lo lie in the field of chemical, biological, and radiologics agents. In contrast to nuclear devices, many of these ure presently relatively easy lo acquire. Hence Ihe danger lhat they could turn up in the hands of ihc son of ultra-radical or psychopathic fringe groupould have ihe fewest compunctions about actually using them is very real. Moreover, sincear* usually all that are needed for potentially devrstntinguch agents also lend to be easyonceal, easy to Iransport. and easy lo introduce into the target urea. Credibility poses few prohibits,malt sample of the agent delivered by mail or left at some designated pick-up point should quickly dispel any doubts on this score.umber of these agents offer the additional advantage of being amenable to relatively selective targetinghe occupantsingle building or compound).
much practical effect this would have is open lo serious question.
Simply put. the net thrust of the forces at work within the international community promises lo remain more centrifugal than centripetal throughout the decade ahead. Indeed, all indications are that rising nationalism and ethnicity, the developirg nations' fundamental challenge lo the existing world order, and ihc related proliferation of subnational and other non-stale actors will continue to render the international system increasingly complex and uncertuin. Moreover, the attendunt diffusion and erosion of political authority will tend to be seir-reinforcing. And under these circumstances, the degree of consensus needed to adopt and enforce meaningful counterterrorist accords will be more elusive than ever
It fallows that the recent stiffeningumber of nations' policies toward terrorists is almost certainly more reflective of relatively narrow und quite disparate tuclicalrespect, for example, to such things as improved domestic security arrangements, the current state of play in the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the latitude of action lhat may now be afforded by Third World divisions and the general unpopularity of certain terroristof any broad upsurge of interestlobal upprouch. Nonetheless, this development is encouraging for il opens up new possibilities for bilateral and limited multilateral counterterrorist undertakingsort that have, in combination with unilateral measures, proved relatively effective In the post.
In sum. although it Is unlikely toollapse of world order, transnational terrorism promises toontinuing and potentially gravely unsettling problem for the world community until suchyoursthe internutionul system gels into new und generally accepted contours. The frequency and intensity of violence will decline in some areas. The cast of characters will be constantly changing. In all likelihood, technological and orguni/nlionul innovations in the security field will makeore risky affair. Yet ul best Ihc overall num'icr of terrorist groups seems unlikely tothe number of countries in which they lire active appears destined lo grow. Furlhnmorc, because of their symbolic value, their uvuihliility. und the embarrassment they cun crcute. thr popularity of American largci* will probably remain high.
Ironically, there may well be fewer people engaged in transnational terrorist activity some five years hence (ban there are today, But this prospect is not as encouraging us it sounds. For even if chunges in the political environment or partial satisfaction of their objectives do encourage some of the larger and more "responsible" formations to eschew transnational violence, their place on ihc iniernalional stage is likely to be quickly filled by more militantmattering of total newcomers lo ihc game. And since (as amply demonstrated by the JRA. Carlos and company, and the PFLP) small terrorist groups can, when properly connected, mount all manner of highly disruptive operations,evelopmentthe introduction of additional increments ofat least temporary increases in the intensity of terrorist violence.
In any event, it seems likely lhat the constraints on terrorist behavior will, through international default, continue to depend primarily on (I) the terrorists* subjective orientationhe policies and resources of Ihe individual countries in which they operate. Of necessity, however, Ihe impact of these will be uneven. Remember, too, lhat the inherent dynamics and logicampaign of terrorist violence are such lhat ilatural propensity lo escalate over lime. Moreover, all bul the most isoluled terrorist groups will be able to drawommon and cumulative media-fed pool or experience and inspiration. Hence, even if the cited constraints do result in some tapering off in Ihc frequency of transnational terrorist incidents during the next few years, we should expect to witness steadily grcutcr und more widespread sophistication in targctling. execution, and weaponry, And while, as suggested earlier, most groups will probably continue to be deterred by both moral considerations and calculations of the risks Involved, the dungerunailc few might rssorl to weapons of moss destruction will inrrcase accordingly.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Two basic messages emerge from the foregoing discussion. The first is that the phenomenon of widespread internationalized terror is not only likely to persist for at least the next several years, but also to evolve in ways that couldore suhstnntiul threat to USunder ccriuin circumstances, to world order- ban in the recent
he second is that the factors bearing on this phenomenon and its political ramifications are so numerous and cut across so many jurisdictional and disciplinary lines lhat the development of more effective national and international couniermcasares is likely toarticutury demanding task.
Whether or not weapons of mass destructionactually brought into play, the odd' are that 'he impact of transnational and international terror will be more sharply felt in the US in the years just ahead. There is. for example, good reason to believe that atew foreign terrorist groups are planning to step up their attacks on American targets abroad in the near future. Moreover, the influx of foreign travellers and dignitaries expected in connnection with such major US-sponsored events as Ihe current Biccniennial celebrations and0 Winter Olympics will inescapablyost of opportunities for dramatic lerrorist action. Hence, despite ihe likelihood that the practical considerations that have so far generally deterred foreign-based terrorist groups from extending their areas of operation to US shores will retain their present force, thereood chanceew will succumb to the temptation to doinally, no matter how tough andno concessions" policy Ihe US Government maintains, it seems likely that Washington will he targeted by terrorist demands somewhat more frequently in Ihelo probe more fully the limits of US resolve, partly for sheer publicity or other psychological effect, and purlly to fosler intergovernmental or domestic tensions.
* i
More importantly, perhaps, even if ihe problem of internationalized terror is not brought "closer lo home" in the ways suggested above, it promises to impinge more directly on US interests and options
frequency with which terrorists have attacked Amcrtcnn clllrtm and properly overseas, the US hai been lucky in many wuyi.foreign terrorist groups have for theart eschewed jslejlng operations on Americanthose transnational terrorist Incidents that hive been authored here by domestic groups have generally been relatively minor affair'. Furthermore, the US Government hat, as previouslyarely htm the target or terrorist demands, Hence, csceptttentive (and readily accepted) airport security measures, lha quality of American life and democratic freedoms hat been little BfTeeled. And Weahlr-jtbn hut so far been spared the ugony of having iho lives of hey pollllcal leuders or lurgee they Americans or foretgn-rs. hnn| on It* decisions."While It beers note, Ih* parallel danger that commonly perceived oppurlunilles for action In connection with such event* could result in growing contact and cooperation between US-based und foreign terrorist groups falls outside the purview of this study.
with respectroad range of critical issue areas. For example, it is likely to:
as even more of an irritant in both East-West and North-South relations;
the dilemmas inherent in the politically und economically sensitive questions of arms sales and (he transfer of advanced (echnology;
potential new grounds for strains in Washington's relations with its principal friends and allies:
some of the obstacles which currently impede efforts toutually-acceptable way io cope with the dependence of Westerncountries on foreign energy sources; und
burdensome new demands on limited human and material resources.
Although, as emphasized in earlier discussion, the dimensions or the threat posed by international and transnational terror should nol be overdrawn, ihe picture outlined above is sobering. Among other things, it suggests that Ihe machinery and guidelines lhal the US and its allies have so far developed for dealing with the problem bear careful review.
There is no magic formula for endowing any given government's approach lo the problem of terrorism with the direction, breadth, and coherence required to marshal the remarkably disparate talents and resources that are needed and to weave iis response inlo the overall rubric or iis domcslic and foreign concerns. Indeed, any number of alternative courses of action could prove equally effective. Nevertheless, il bears emphasis that together wilh timely Intelligence and sound multi-disciplinary analytical support, flexibility and extensive coordination (both inler- and intra-statc) would seem to be critical lo devising andounlertcrrorisi strategy thai is bolh internally consistent and minimally disruptive lo national values and foreign policy objectives in terms of "hidden" social, economic, and political costs.
Obviously,lrategy cannot be framed in isolation. Among oiher things, its architects would need ready access to lop policymakers in both the foreign and domcslic fields as well as to the adviceroad range of government and non-government experts or Interested parties. Moreover, the necessity lo maintain some freedom of maneuver (born or the fact lhal every new terrorist incident Is likelyave its unique aspects)articularly delicate
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APPENDIX A
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
Group Characteristics
of Ihe organization or, if none, of the political, miliiury. or bureaucratic entity controlling the actors
of origin
to the government of that country
and organization
(the occupational and educational qualifications of the members and their age range)
Elementary Typology*
: j Partuutarlxtic (ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional) Nationalistic (irredentist or anti-colonial) i Ideological : Anarchism
Radical Left (revolutionary socialists, Trolskyites.Castroitvs, and other ultra-left fringe groups)
Orthodox Communism
Extreme Right
Pathological
base (extent of popular sympathy and support, links with legitimate social or political organisations, and links with other domestic dissident groups)
links (with other terrorist organizations, with internutionul or legitimate transnational organization, and with foreign governments)
cycle (date of formation, period or periods of transnational or international activity, and, if applicable, date of demise)
Event Characteristics
of incidentof act
Elementary Typology
(t and hostage
Bombing (any type of explosive charge or device, including letter und parcel bombs)
*i* not maluntly tu-hnivg.
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Armed assault or ambush (wiih or wilhoul sophisticated weapons) Hijacking (aircraft, ship, or other means of transportation) Incendiary attack or arson Assassination or murder
Chemical, bacteriological, or radiological pollution Other
status, and nationalities of human victims
and national association of physical target
nationality, and organizational affiliation of the perpetrators
of demands (publicity, prisoner release, ransom, political action or change, arms, or safe passage)
of demands (governments, corporations, or International organizations)
i
(duration of incident, identity and posture of governmentalransnational actors participating in its resolut'lent to which terrorists' {demands were satisfied, fate of human victims. iaie of terrorists, extent of property damage, and, if applicable, identity of nullons grunting or facilitating |safe haven)
Local Environmental Characteristics
repressiveness, and effectiveness of government (representative democracy, uuthorltarian, or lotuHturian)
traditions and uttitudes with respect to authority und violence
of the pbpululion
levels of popular malaise and internal strife
level of socio-economic development (including per cupitu GNP; levels of industrialization, urbanization, und literacy: and the proportion of the population possessed of higher education)
and current socio-economic growth rates (us above)
Inequities (markedly uncquul distribution of income, discriminutory practices, und systemic limits on social und political mobility)
I'M
Global Environmental Characteristics
Advance
i
mun-portuble wcuponry (development, deployment, and international trude in such weapons)
of nuclear facilities
udvances (developments uffecting both media coverugc
and tactical communications)
1 i
developments rf Interdependence
vulnerabilities (those links binding our increasingly interdependentcommercial und communications centers, transportation hubs, Internutionul power grids und pipelines, super tankers, and jumbo
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DAIE:OCIJ0ll
presently, or that may in Ihc future, offer fcusihk and potentially highly disruptive target* for tcrrorisi attack
upsurge of nationalism and ethnicitySorial and Economic Change
local effects
emigre worker concentrations
Environment
"revolutionary" atmosphere highlighted by the chullcnge to the existing world order raised by the "huvc not" nations
controversy over illegal versus justifiable political violence
in priorities and values and the emergencetrong sense of "social conscience"
dispersion and erosion of political authority
proliferation of non-state actors and the parallel increase in the number of international and transnational organizations providing moral or material support to national liberation or kftist revolutionary formation.*
agreements, treaties, and conventions relating to terrorist acts
behavior of states providing direct and indirect support lo tcrrorisi groups
contact and cooperation arnong terrorist groups -Significunt internutionul economic trends and developmentseventsfluctuations
RIVtO IBR RELEASE Mil OCT?Bit 37
TATISTICAL TRENDS AND PATTERNS TERRORIST ACTIVITY
Geographic Distribution of Terroristay
Amirici
i-i i
21
i
33
19
Eatt and North Africa
Tank F |
am
75
Amorlca uso 18
18
12
Europi Tiiims
! i
I I I
and Austnlla
Tmi t
I
BirrkiM lad ttmblAi id Aiiiutt hiiictt-- Aiiuilniliin Inei-alirt Aatik
International and Transnational Terrorist Ineldenla Directly Affecting USI loan, or Institution*
I
k ii
h1
inrinVnt*
ritiri'ii' or property hnoon lo
hern vlrl'.Timril
anvreninani marterrnrlat
Incident* .
cttlaen- ar property vtrlimliH
(Overnmitit target nl demand'
Incident*
cltlaen* or properly vlcilmlird
government UffcTl ot1 Toial inetdent*
rtllafn* or properly vleilmlied
government target of demand*
Incident*
rlilien* or properly vlellmlied
government target ol flrmaoit"
Incident*
pltlapv or property vletlmlied
government target or demand*
j ;.
Incident*
cmten* or property eleilmiied
government target of demand*
i
Incident..
HUaen* or property vletlmleed
government target of demand*
i
|
Incident*
elOaen* or properlynd
government target of demand'
Kaehlde* numeral*many of which vletlmlted US plane* or eltlaena.
* Thindoea not, of eourae. red ret moreeon* of enaea In which ranaom demand* were levied on-or were eventually at leant partially anllrtfledfnrporaunna or private olllmna.
if
APPROVED FOR RELEASE "tlATE:1
i
onal and Transnilionilnrldenln hy RrRlonal Orlcln of Iht
5
. 1
it
America)
andror*
Kaat and North Africa
.
ope
or
f 1 :
Total
I
Inlernillonal and Transnational Terrorio!Fediyeen and Non-Fedayeen by Category of
1
A II
oe
i l
13
hiHuili'. thrata national trrrorfrt attackofh'ar in'tallMlon durine Ine period* bom Mr*uclear power farllll, la Franc hy| Antleh-tilrlkc MM ft (vol Commando. It beam notr. however, lhal Argentina'- CRP did briefly occupy an uMinWhed Arernilnr nuclear ptmt* plant In Mnrrhan art which falti In Ihr calr-iory of domenlle
* InHudiw ihe only two Inruknia In whichchemical, biological or radiological agent hna: mi- irrror to dale (the nuHo-actlve Iodine employed by th' artt-.tylfd "JimIre (lueerilht" In Au.trUh.
International and Transnational Terroristand Non-Fcduyeen by
j -
'
Fedaywn or Fednyecn-
S r.
4
mm"
m
APPRQVfB FOR RELEASf lUTLDCTIMI
Indiaeifmlnile or High Carnally International or Traninatianel Terroriit Bomblngi and Armed Aiiaulia by Regional Origin ol tha Perpeuaten,
than 10
Victim-,
.ill
Auauli
AjMfrHa.
androae
19
If Eatt and North Africa
IT
...
' 1
0
j
Puree*
1
Amtfiti.
or High Caiualty International or Traninallonal Te rror.il Bomblngi and Armedby Seleeted Croup.
FartM
10
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Black StptonUr Ori.nl uiw'
1
0
fUh hpublkan*
llB-jl VViBl
0
A
ad AnaiK
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1
Peenlf Frontth* Ubtratlon of
1
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Popular Front lor la* Lfterailort
Command
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mbthlMd with mpret to th* oumbn. (aM.uilt" el tho. victim.
thr. not.btthtka, thrr.hepih. Irfondy benhada tadption It .turd Inrit, ih* leTI Olympicwakh
Indlierlmlnale oruoally International or Traninallonal Termrlil Bombinm and Armedand Non-Fedayeem
10
AwhJi
VHtiywiti to 14
30 |4
* I
Tnt.l ICS
APPROVED FDR REUASf OJtTE:1
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FOR RElEASf jiyre: OCT70I1
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Original document.
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