Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
OA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
The Soviet Statsionar Satellite Communications System: Implications for INTELSA T
ne
the soviet statsionar satellite communications system: implications for intelsat'
KEY FINDINGS
The Soviet Statsionar program, consisting ofeostationary communications satellites, is planned for deployment in stagesnowhe USSR is committed to carrying out the Statsionar program mainly to satisfy domestic communicationscommercial and military. We believe Statsionar willegligible impact on the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) and is not being devdoped as ato INTELSAT for global international commercial use.
Wc foresee important Soviet military usage for Statsionar;for strategic command-and-conlrol communications anduse; externally for linking Moscow with military and quasi-military units deployed worldwide. Statsionar may also be used by Soviet diplomatic and commercial representatives in foreign countries.
The Soviets lag far behind INTELSAT in communicationstechnology and will not achieve technological parity with INTEL-
1it prepared undo theol ihrlnlrUicrnorEraoenuH aad rkalMd by ClA'i Oflke of economic RnruriiroaOibubOMby Oa'. Often of Sara&lKupwijt, .ndUI< DVputmrM* Burnt) of late&cnx* aadAmhr wxM*rt*&xmba nbmnrd- IV NattonalAjrrxy.rfcoM lalrtaf-oc* Afrwr. AO
Fori* loarikcmtr.Nanl iBteHifron Support CeMei. aod iW An Fori* S, MBMPanmal nmunro.majarocwa.
SAT in the cuirently announced program. Indeed Statsionar satellites will have difficulty icaching even planned communication*Thh technological gap. however, need not impair Soviet ability to meet internal requirements.
Statsionar program got off the ground in5 with the launch of Sialsionar-I. about five years behind the original time schedule. Recent technical difficulties in orbit withrobably will delay planned launches of follow-on Statsionars.of the last three satellites in, andwill give the Soviets, for the firs!lobal communi-tions satellite capability, probably will be delayed beyondaunch date.
Intcrsputnik. the Communist counterpart to INTELSAT,will use some Stafsionar satellites for commercialamong its members. Although the Intcrsputnik organization will eventually have its own dedicated satellites, it could liegin operating by leasing channels onndurrently scheduled.
ewmunist countries have shown interest in using Soviet communications satellites: Nigeria. Somalia, Syria, and possibly India, all countries in which the Soviets are politicallyEventually one or more of these countries, and possibly other developing countries, may wish to use spare capacity on Statsionars to set up domestic or regional communications satellite systems.
Soviet launching, tracking, control, and ground stationappear adequate to carry out the Statsionar program. Facilities currently in use with the MoJniya program can be used to service the Statsionnr program as well.
Despite its efforts to develop Intersputnik. the Soviet Union is increasing its use of the INTELSAT system. With eomplcto access to INTELSAT services for intemaUonal communications and partial access to INTELSAT technologyonmcmbcr user, incentives for formal membership ate not great. However. Soviet attitudes toward INTELSAT appear sufficiently benevolent to make formala possibility in the next three to five years
INTELSAT officials are concerned that planned orbital locations for some Statsionars may cause interference with INTELSATin the Indian and Atlantic regions. The interference problem may require modifications in the orbital locations or technicalof Statiionar or INTELSAT satelb'tes.
discussion
trod uc lion
L The USSR recently filed technical dataew series or geostationaryalled Statsionan. with the Interna-tional Frequency ReguQition Board (IFRB) of the International Telecommunications Unionlus study of the filings was undertaken al the request of the Office of Telecommunications Policy. Executive Office of the President, to determine the scope of the program, to evaluate Sovietto carry it out. and to assess the implications of tlie program for INTELSAT in the area ofcommercial communications.
udgments cxpicssed in this study arc based on live limited information so far available. As new analytically useful information is acquired, follow-on studies will seek to reduce major currentIn particular, such studies will seek to clarify the level of priority the Soviet leadership has assigned to the program, the technicalof the Statsionar system, and Soviet intentions for using the system-Background
X The Sonet comsat program, like that of the US. isittle more than ten years old. The Soviets began constructionasic network of experimental ground stations In the, and orbited the first Molniya comsatS shortly after the launch of the first INTELSAT satellite (Early Bird) when the "space race" was near its peak. Since that time, however, Soviet and US comsat programs have diverged, owing to basicin technical capabilities, priorities, andThe US pushed the development of geostationary systems for transoceanicAlthough (he US already had one of the best developed internal communications systems in the world, communications with allies and tradingwas limited to unreliable, low capacity, high frequency (HF) radio, and to reliable, butsubmarine cable of limited capacity.
he Soviet Union was faced with an entirely different problem. Its tencHria! domesticsystem was poorly developed andfor internal use had special appeal as analternative to expensive cable and microwave systems. The Soviets favored the use of elliptical ly orbiting satellites because they are better Suited to reach high northern latitudes in the USSR andthe Soviet Union in thead no capability to launch geostationary satellites Launching geostationary satellites from within the USSR would have required use of the largestSovietwas still extremely unreliable in the.
5 Satisfied thai Molniya technologyuikablr system, Moscow engaged in
a crash construction programsatellite television (TV) coverage of (heanniversary of (ho Bolshevik RevoluUon inhe Sovietsetwork of aboutV receive-only earth stations called Orbitas. some in Ihe most remote comets of the USSR. The program was highly successful andthe Soviet Unionlaim the worlds first operating domestic comsat system.
summary of technical data on
3 Secolniyn*.
5 more thanolntyas have been launched, representing three generations of Soviet communications satelliteollowing the originalecond generationegan to appear in1 with double (he relay capacity of Ihe Molniya-l. Sinceatellites have been used primarily for internal civil telephoneand for relay of Moscow TV programs lo Ihe Orbita network. We believe Iheaiellites are now dedicatedull-lime military and governmentalhird generationatellite system, initiated inas not yet reached its full operatingheground station network also has expanded rapidly and now includes more thanrbitaand numerous military stations as wcIL All told, moreixed-comsat antennas arein the USSR atites.
he USSR announced "the formation of an in-(ernational satellite organization called Intersputntkhat organization, which includes the USSH, Cuba. Mongolia, and all East European countries except Albania and Yugoslavia, probably will not be able to provide services lo all members
it inimded to be uted, In part, tor Hotline cwnmunk-alioo^ bet-ecn Moscow and Washington
Table I
Summary of Molaiya Characleriiuri
(DaiaaiofG)
First launch Tout launches Number active NumDri ofoice channel capacity per transponder
{duplexelevision channels per tranipondw1eoeiei
Uplink (MHi)
Downlink (Mlli) Current uses
Frojcrud uies,
No.en.ber IWJI
a
t go
i
si
ss Public utaWtlon Public romnib mentions MiliUry communi-
ter aputaik Ph*H
November
GO (Ull I
llnkoao-n
QQ Operational
IfitlOJ
Public lelcxsian Pubhcconsniuiii-
Mililaif coiniiw
nkcaUpn* OCX'
InierapmniL
a<tspn,.dr- on be usedcither vole, or TV. but not both iliallink {utclbtr
cccngr
embership ha* not grown beyond the Communist countries.
Advent of Geostationary Satellites
8 While expanding and improving the comsat program fit clliptically orbiting Molniyas, thehave lieen making an intensive concurrent effort to develop and deploy geostationarysatellites. The first prototype geostationary comsat. Molniya-IS, was orbited inew months before the launch ofhe most advanced vehicle in the Molniya program. The first operational geostationary comsat. Statsionar-I, was launchedearalf later.
ven though the Molniya program is capable of meeting Soviet satellite communications needs for many years, broad usage of geostationarywould make good sense fot several technical, economic, military, and political reasons:
geostationary orbit is easier toa Mmisynchronous (elliptical) orbit,mechanisms can be simpler, anddish rather than two is required tosatellite contact.
satellites do not passVan Allen radiation belts, as dosatellites. Since extraordinaryIhe solar cells and communication IVan Allen radiation is not required,satellites can operate moreshould also last longer in orbit.
comsats may offeradvantages for the Soviets. Sincebroader coverage of the earthN latitude) than do elliptical satellites,Statsionars would be required to covorUSSR, compared with four Molnfyns;per year arc needed; and groundbeing simpler, are cheaper to build.
comsats have importantfor military communications Sinceno handover problem, reliability is likelyenhanced In coverage. Statsionars canimportant regions such as Africa, Southand the Indian Ocean not now covered
c. Because of the vastness of the USSR, which encompasses II time zones, the geostationaryoffer advantages for televisionCeostalionary satellites using multiple TV trunks arc especially well suited to achieving quickly andajor Sovietspecialized programing from Moscow to each major geographical and ethnic region of the USSR-
f. The Soviets need to develop geostationary technologyatter of national prestige, both political andeostationary comsat capability, Moscow's claims of parity with the US in space technology ring hollow.tlie USSR is committed to geostationary comsats for lntersputnik use. Failure to deliver could resultoss of face within dieworld.
The Statsionar Program
The Soviet Statsionar program, according to ITU filings, is to consist of II1 throughndill be equipped for television broadcasting only and will have no communications capability. All otherwill lie equipped for TV and(voice, data, facsimile, and telegraphy).
On paper, Statsionarormidable programajor advance in Sovietcapabilities. The program is to be implemented in stages, each successive stage building on die experience of the preceding one, while increasing coverage of the earth's surface. Worldwide coverage will not be achieved until the final stage, andplanned
The Statsionar program may be viewedet of six sub-programs, based on launch dates, coverage, and similarities in technicalinvolving one or several satellites, as follows:
2 3nd 3
4nd 7
* Soc Table IIummiry of Suiilomr cluraduiitlici
f. Statsionars, and 10
ozena-
ass
Y V
8 ? 8
s es r" ft"
!*3
PB 3 3 a
< ri ** M M
** t+ h
' i
*
o D
a a
o o
.
o o o
z
If "g
-*
i ;
* -<
: Z
* *
7 ?
Is I?
h n
v S
* J -1 .1
an
s 5
: :St-3
a
a
nil -
: k
i jI
3
^ u
= S = r
o
Q 4 O
= 5 =
**
3 2
'i
, c
- ft3'. "
ilingthe 1FTU1 stated Hutould become operational in
4 Ctrl' Khrutttlnvyammit ting lite (or several Soviet comsat programs.
' Inhe Chinese prolmlcd strongly to Moscow that radiation fromouldharmful in-(inference withelecumiminlcatiun* and broadcasting cervices.
hich thells 'he first and only satellite in the scries that lias as yet been put into orbit. However, the satellite has been plagued by technicaland after less than three months of intermittent operations has stopped functioning. The difficulties may be in the attitude control systemt was placed in geostationary position over the Indian Oceanast longitude onive years to the month after the Soviets had fiisl declared it would become* {seeollowing. AccordingASS announcement,ill be used for Soviet domestic communications and forrelay to the Orbita network. According to9 ITU filings.as to carry global antennas, which would permit the satellite to be used for external communications. Recentindicates thatas been used for television transmission within the USSR.
S(atsionjr-T.s scheduled to be placed into geostationary orbit Over Indonesiaast longitudeseet will relay televisionransmitting earth station at Cus'(near Moscow)etwork ofmcter) antennas in northern and eastern parts of the USSR- Accordinghe Soviets the transmitted beam fromill be shaped to provide coverage only of the USSR. However, analysis of the beam indicates that it is likely to spill over into northern China asill be able to receivebroadcasts originating outside of the USSR, including Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East.
s intended for use in TVto community antennas. This could be the first step toward the developmentirectsystemhatystem forTV directly to individual homes andThe Soviets have claimed for several years to be developing technology for DBS. Most recently, the Soviets stated that complete coverage of the entire Soviet land mass via Orbitas would be too expensive, andltS capability would be provided to fill in the Twits" in TV coverage The Soviets expect, probably wirealistically, toBS system operational within five to seven years.'
ndndcheduled for service. arc to be fixed in orbit over East* E) and the Indianespectively (seehe characteristics of on-board transmit and receive antennas indicate that they are designed to provide regional coverage of Eastern andEurope and the. USSH, with overlappingof western USSR. Specifically.ill cover Western and Eastern Europe, and the USSR except most of eastern Siberia arid the Far Eastxtendi coverage to most of the eastern region of the USSR except Kamchatka and Ihe extreme no theast.
We believe both satellites are intended mainly for domestic use. In addition. Statshich we believe will replaceossibly will service military as well as dvil networks.an provide complete coverage of the Soviet military command-ami-control earth station
The Soviets have stated thatill serve "Europe and thehis suggests thai the Soviets am preparing for exchanges of television programs and perhaps telephonewith some West European countries such as France. The USSR and France have been irregularly exchanging TV programing, via Molniya. for several years.
ould appear to offer anopportunity to East European countries to gain experience in Ihe operation of their earth stations prior to activation ol the Intcnputnik system. Thus, onceecomes operational, we expect an exchange o( TV programs and telephoneon an experimental basis between the USSR and East European IntcrsputnUc members.
3
oviet official. I. V. Prfrov. to wrote In in official publication ol liie ITU2 Telecomnuinictftloai loumoi.o. II, ltm.W.
loiVirov. toe at.
hese satellites noto go Into service.i lo be situated over the AdanticV, andver the Indian Oceanseeoth satellites will have globaland receiving beams. Together they will provide coverage of most of the nations in the wo*Id excluding, in particular. Mexico and most of the United States and Canada. Withndhe USSH for the first time willystemear-global Comsat capability.
We believe thats intended for use, at least in part, with Intcrsputnik. The Soviets had Indicated earlier that Intcrsputnik members would lease channelseostationary satellite located in the vicinityongitude forin the 'second stage"eostationary stage) of development of the Inlenpufnifchird and final stage. InrersputniV members are to build or procure from Ihe USSR their ownwhich will bear the "Intersputnik" label. Also, the timing seems to fit. since it is duringime period that die Intersputnix earth station nel-work Is scheduled to be completed and ready (oron i.
Cuba is the only Intcrsputnik member not covered byould provide coverage of Cuba but is unlikely to be launched for that purpose alone. Accordingoviet of-flctal Cuba will continue to use ellipticallyMolniya-type satellites, unless Intenputnik membership expands to justifyoo-stationary vehicle over the Adantic Ift intended touba link only, it may not be launched as scheduled.
In filing forhe USSR could be making provision loi eventual expansion ofmembership to the Western Hemisphere. It costs the Soviets little lo stakelaim with the ITU for satellite frequencies and locations, andit no binding obligation to implement stated plans.
quipped with global antrmus. will provide overlapping coverage (with SUtsionar-
f Africa, and (or flu-ime coverage of South America ami tin- east coast of North America. Possibly Ihe Soviets are planning lo useor communications with Soviet military and intelligence personnel who arc active in these areas.
hese satellites are to become operational. StaUiooar-o* will be located over the Indian Ocean;ver the Pacifichese satellites will transmit on regional beams,pot beam forndon global beams.ill provide transmission coverage of Eastern Europe and most of the USSR;ill extend coverage across Ihe entire eastern part of the USSR and inlo the North Pacific region. Reception will be possible from virtually nil of the Eastern
ccording to the filings, regional beams of both satellites will be used for general telephoneelegraph communications and TV. Inlo regional coverage.illpot beam centered on the Moscow area. The spot beam will be used for transmitting TV to smalleter) antennas. In general,rovide complementary coverage of the entire USSR for multichanneland TV broadcasting.
e believe this subprogram is designed mainly for Soviet domesticThe filing itself specifics that the satellites will serve "the territory of the USSR"nd "eastern regions of the USSR"he fact that both satelliteslobal receive beam couldthat these satellites will also be used forcommunications with Soviet organizations abroad
he spot beam lo be provided bys of extraordinary interest because of tite unusually small size of the earth station antennas it will serve. It seems unlikely thai the Ix-am will be used to transmit TVivil network of small receiving stations, as claimed. Thai is because small stations for expanded TV coverage,to OtherSoviet statements, aiu lo be installed primarily in sparsely populated areai, especially Siberia,
ficciin-
thu spot beam covers mainly tlie more densely populated western part of the USSR which contains the best developed cable and microwave systems for TV relay. Moieovcr. their are no small receiving stations of the type indicated in use in the Soviet civil sector, or. so far as is known, under development for civil use.
e believe that, to the contrary, the Soviets will use the spol beam transmitter of Statsionar-fi for militarymall fixed and mobile comsat antennas already exist at hradquaiters echelons of Soviet missile forces. The Soviets almost certainly have chosen topot beam (insteadegional one) for technical reasons rather than for communications security. The spot beam, though focused on the USSR, could, for example, befrom Scandinavia.
The coverage of the regional beams of6 andlso appears toeen chosen with strategic usage In mind. Thereistinct overlap of coverage in the eastern part of theegion that includes important concentrations of Soviet forces along the Chinese bordei.
Statsionarsre not well suited for Soviet external communications Although global receive beams provide excellent coverage of the Indian Ocean and good coverage ol the Pacific, communications would have to be one-wayrom abroad back to the USSR, since6ill have no global transmiton board. This limitation may be acceptable for certain typos of communications such asmonitoring and intelligence reporting.
he final threein the Statsionar series, which Arego into operationppear totrue global system. Tlteir locationsE.* West longitude will provideworldwide coverage, similar lo that ofINTELSAT system (seewill be equipped for global andand reception.
tinee satellite system would meet mostneeds for domestic and worldwideFor domestic purposes,t 'i and dlipticallywill continue to he needed for fulland TV coverage. Molniya* will be needed lo provide coverage of northern Siberia and probably also for efficient communicaiions between far western and eastern regions of the USSR; for example, communications between Moscow and Vladivostok using only Statsionars, andouldouble-hop satellite linkup.ill continue to be needed toommunity antenna TV broadcasting capability.
or worldwide purposes, we expect, andill be used for bothand noncommercial communications.these satellites could be used for com-munications among Intersputnik membersand Eastern Europe can "see" the outermost stations in Mongolia andoncommercial communications could include any or all of the following: diplomatic and covert, communications with military, fishing, and research vessels around thelobal airspace coverage for direct communications with military and official aircraft, and, possibly, future "Hotline" coverage (Moscow can "see-
most countries, including evenand Eastern Europe, arc devoting majorto their increased use ofe see little likelihood thatwill be used for internationalbetween Communist countriesWest or amongcountriesyears, if ever However. It is possible thatto further political goals, will makocapacity available to developingdomestic or regional use.
Communications Capability of Statsionars
"ovldv>
niMillmc vessels withoutaritime latetlilflorluenciesyITU Iw iiunlime tiu
filings do not describe thesubsystems to be employed on SUtswxiars.and sometimes ambiguous technicalgiven make it difficult to determine ovenwhat communications capability actuallyprovided. However, combining information in
the filings with statements by Soviet officials and other information, wc judge that the Statsionaris intended to have communicationsas described below.
Statsionar satellites will operate in the4igahertz (GHz) bands, except for theown-link which will operateegahertzll Statsionars with the exception ofill carry multipleeach0 MHz bandwidth forTV, voice, or data communications. Statsionars I,ndre apparently designed to have ten transpondersotal bandwidthHz.hroughill have onlyotal signal bandwidthHz. (It is not clear why the early satellites will carry ten transponders and later ones onlyillHz transponder.
Although the bandwidth of Statsionaris wider than those of INTELSAThey will provide far less actualcapacity. With wider guard bandstransponders and individual carriers and the use of relatively more bandwidth for eachStatsionar transponders will make lessuse of the total satellite bandwidth. Forthe Soviets plan to use both conventional modulation (FDM/FM) and single channel per carrier (SCPC) techniques. Using conventional modulation, the Soviets have stated that Statsionars will be able to handlewo-way conversations per transponder.'1omparable basis, anIVA transponder (global beam)wo-way conversations. Usingtatsionar transponder, according to Soviettheoretically will be able totwo-way voice conversations, comparedor INTELSATther modulation techniques, of course could be used to increase channel capacity.
ost Statsionar earth stations willmeterhese are standard-lias Sovietwidely deployed in the Orbita earth station oetwewk and in operational use with MolniyaTwo satellites, however.nd T. will have additional ground antenna requirements
n addition tometcr antennas,ill use one ormcter groundantennas to communicate witheter receiving antennas. The receiversetcrpiobabty will be ol low capacity, relativelyK comparedmeterrobably of simple construction, andinexpensive to build.
he reasons for the usemeter ground transmit tin)', antenna instead of themeter antenna are not well understood. The largermight be required to compensate for the low gain of the small receiving stations, or to permit an increase in the capacity per station or in the number ol stations,evel above that possibleme lei antenna.
titsionaiT willrge diametei. high gain antenna on the satellite to retransmit signalsmeter station to small receiving earth stations Themeter) receivingplanned for use withill be simple, cheap, and extremely noisy,oise temperatureaK.
launching. Tracking, and Control
he Soviets haveapability to put satellites into geostationary orbit., the USSR successfully positioned four such vehicles tu space, most recendyoviet satellites arc launched from relatively high northern latitudes, the USSR must uicoibit techniques to place satellites into geo-slatlonary mints These techniques, whk-h are
hearfb itaOoa intrant) to be osrd with StatHOturpfcritly Hated i- ITUad kai been caarwlaied frosn data ajrea on anftana gale aad
i-iMt.tei inry orbit in. hide Motnira-IS uid two lion eommiinlfntKins satellites.rid
-seer*
socnewhat more complex than direct injection normally used for thcit oilier satellite launches, have required the use of thewcrfuI
ooster technology no longerajor technical barrier for the Statsionar program. Although the earlyaunch history shows many failures.onsecutive successful bunches have occurred sinceimdi support is provided both from sites within the USSR and from ships at sea.
he USSR has also demonstrated ato track and command satellites in geostationary oibit. In the case ofrbital drift was reduced to an insignificantowever.recently appears to have developedcontrolmay have been tumbling insince has been subiltzcri
The Soviets have adequate facilities within their borders to carry out Hacking and controlfor all currently programed Statsionars. Stat-sionan can employ stations now in use for backingndnd possibly deep-space tracking facilities as wdl. Molniya tracking facilities areto be located in the western USSR al Cus' Khrustnlnyy and Leningrad, in tho central USSR at Yemteysk. and in the eastern USSR at Calenki andeep-space facility is located at Yevpatoria in the Crimea. Inumber of relatively new satellite support facilities offunctions could be intended for use with Sutsionar.
Potential Program Delays and Problems
learly. Ihe Soviets could launch and orbit all Statsionars on time; however, they are unlikdy to do so. We believe the USSR will not meet the announced schedule or reach intended levels of performance and reliability for the individual Statsionars.
e expect that the launch ofill be delayed byto two years. That is because the Soviets, followingpractice ofthorough testing of prototypes of first gen-
of.
eratioo vehicles, will not want to launch expensive follow-on satellites until current problems withre fully resolved. Delay* in tin- launch off more than two yean are also possible if the current problems withsicm from fundamental deficiencies in vehicle design.
lieatellite also could beone lo two years beyond6 launch date. Delays seem likdy because the Soviets have not yet deployed the receiving stations for use with Statsionar-T. and they probably will run intodeveloping and deployingeter parabolic antenna on board the satellite for space-lo-earth TV transmission. The Soviets aie not known to Iiave any previous operational experience with large aperture antenna systems. Recentimilar NASA satdlite,emonstrated that unfurling such an antennaextraoidinarily complex mechanicalAlthough some design data on theas been published in open literature that isto the Soviets, the data cannot substitute for the very precise engineering expertise andcapability needed toorkable system. Antennas planned for all other Statsionar models should not present any design or operationalthey arcHz typos with which the Soviets have extensive flight experience.
ecause of the high cost of building and launching Statsionar satellites, the USSR will want to improve lite useful life of vehicles in orbit before initiating an operational system. Tho operational lifetimes of Soviet satellites, from the beginning, hasarticubuly intractable problem, and it has been getting worse. Molniya-2s. on thehave lasted only ten months in orbit compared withonths for Ihe earlier Molniyas.
an Allen radiation is believed loause of the short lifetimes of Molniya satellites. Transit of the satellites through Van Allen radiation belts probably decreases the life of the solar odls, thereby reducing tin- amount ol dectrical power available to sustain spacecraft systems. This factor will notroblem for Statsionars, however, since they will not tiansil the Van Allen belli.
-Si'trRH-
Additionally, the relatively shortri average lifetime ofay be relateds oprtating frequencies.perating frequenciesHz) are considerably higher than0enerally, the higher the frequency. Hie greater the complexity of design and fabrication ol electronic compnnrnts and circuitry. We believe that deficiencies inor lubrication of microwave componentsraveling waveave led to the premature failure ofommunications subsystems. This factor could affect the lifetimes of Statsionars also, since they will operate in the same frequency range as Molniya-2
e expect thai the Soviet* will have difficulty achieving planned communications capacities on Statsionars for two reasons.
We do not believe that Statsionars. andhave ten operational transponders andsignal bandwidthHz. asthe filings. Indeed, judging fromof power estimated to be availablethat the Soviets are shooting foractive transpondersHz. the four additionalthese early vehicles probably will beadded to experiment withEven six transponders and acouldroblem sincea capacity beyond what hasto date,ccording tofiling, is designed to carry only
_ J
II In some cases tlieave imported Mwlllg wave (no's (rem the West
Soviet Use of INTELSAT
For the next few years at least, the USSR ami Eastern Europe apparently will provide for their relatively small International satelliterequirements through INTELSAT. The USSR recently completed constructiontandardouiid station (which was purchased following Ihe Nixon-Brezhnev Summitl L'vov in the Ukraine (near the Polishlmost ready lor commercial use, the Station will handle Soviet traffic lo and from the Americas through an INTEI.SAT Atlantic satellite. Inthe Soviets arc planning to funnel the North American traffic of some East European countries through the Lvov facility. The Soviets have stated that0 they plan to haveatellite voice circuits with the United States.
In Eastern Europe, Romania reportedly hasontractapanese firm for its own INTELSAT station to become operational by the endungary, which is planning foratellite voice circuits to North Americalso would like to build an INTELSAT station but may be under pressure to use the Soviet facility al L'vov.9 political pressure from Moscowungary from buying an INTELSATCurrendy, Czeclioslovakia, Hungary, andare directing their North American traffic -through an INTELSAT station In Yugoslavia thai became operational
The USSR will access theonmember basis as oflo recent information. The USSR will be charged nonmernber rates for use of the system.*0
User status gives the USSR technologicalabout the advancedhardware embodied in thecould be of some help in the development of its own satellite systems. Soviet technicians can gain knowledge of US design technology and alsowith the entire operational concept,technological gains are less than could be
Yuroalavjaember of INTELSAT.
1 1NTEI5ATfreementi provide for use ol Ihe system by imninernbris.
"
realizcd by full membership, which would give tlie Soviets direct access to work being done in Western development labs and manufacturing facilities.
nd the Question of Formal Membership
User status allows the USSR to enjoy the benefits of membership without compromising its long-standing political objections to membership. When INTELSAT was charteredhe USSR opposed the voting and membership provisions of the 'Interimnder the votinga member country's vote is weighted by its investment in INTELSAT and its investment isto its share in internationaltraffic. In effect, this requirement would have given the USSR negligible leverage in the organization,ercent interest. More-over, membership in the ITUrerequisite for INTELSAT membership. The ITU membership requirement effectively excluded mainland China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and East Germany and was politically unacceptable to the USSR.
Although formal Soviel membership in INTELSAT seems remote, we cannot rule it out entirely. Indeed. Soviet efforts to funnel Eastsatellite traffic through its L'vov facility couldcheme to increase the volume of Sovietcommunications {by counting Easttraffic as Soviet) in order to qualifyarger share of voting power on the INTELSAT Board of Governors. In addition, the ITU memlior-ship barrier has since been diminished by the fact that North Korea, East Cermany, and China have al) joined the ITU in recent years.
Certainly, current Soviet attitudes toward INTELSAT would not stand in the way ofThe hostile anti-INTELSAT rhetoric of theOi is gone now, and has been replaced by press appeals for international cooperation inactivity. There is even some reason to believe that the question of formal membership has been under active study in the USSR[""
believe that the USSR probably willINTELSAT as long as it is managed by aeven if the USSR could muster avote. Selection of an international group toprobably would make formalmore palatable. Thus, we would not expectto make any formal movet the earliest, when the technicalrole of Comsat Corporation comes up
International Prospects for Slalstonar
In its current unproven state, Statsionar is not likely to attract many non-Communist countries for internationaltatsionarsoffer potential subscribers any advantages in coverage or quality of communications over thai already available through INTELSAT. Evenwith the USSR and Eastern Europe will soon be possible through INTELSAT.asideontinuing dialogue and test program with France, the USSR has had very little prior success generating foreign interest in the use of its comsat system. Cuba and Mongolia arc the only countries outside Eastern Europe lo acquire Soviet comsat earth stations.
Indeed, il does not appear that the USSR is pushing use ofof Intersputnik when it isinternational commercialFor example, the Soviets show every intention of adhering lo INTELSAT tariffs. They have stated Ihat "communication channels shall be made available at fixed tariffsar withworld tariffs for international telephoneexpressed in goldo doubt anyto undercut, or even match. INTELSAT rates would result in heavy financial losses. That is, with more limited satellite capacity, shorter satelliteand relatively higher launch costs, the capital cost per circuit yearoviet comsat channel is likely to be much higher than that of INTELSAT.
Possibly some developing countries will be interested in using Statsionars to set up domestic or regional communications systems. This option might prove attractive if Soviet earth stations and
" 1'utrov. Utc. (il.
rales are priced cheaply enough. Aha, for political reasons, some countries may wish to use Statuonart even though formally members of INTELSAT. For example, Syria, which is now building an INTELSAT station, recently queried INTELSAT nbout the possible consequence* to Syria of Inteisputntk membership.
65the future, three countries bear watching: Somalia. Nigeria, and India. Somalia expressedin Soviet assistance in the constructionatellite earth station inoviet activity in Somajia was (and still is) widespread, and thehad already constructed HF radio facilities there. Moscow thus far has declined to provide assistance.
igeria contacted Soviet experts in5 to discuss comsat collaboration, possiblyNigeria's plans toomestic comsatThe Soviets suspended discussions suddenly initing major developments in Soviet satellite communications. Probably the So victs were referring lo Ihe impending launch ofn
igeria has one operational INTELSATand isecond one, for international traffic. In addition, Nigeria is now leasing one transponder from INTELSAT for domestic usend plans toecond one. Possibly Nigeria is considering substituting Statsionar for INTELSAT for its domestic ccerirnurucalionsill provide overlapping coverage of Africa.
ndia, which has received assistance from the USSR iii scientific space projects, apparentlythe possibility of experiments using Molniya satellitesarly the following year theof the Soviet Main Administration for Space Communicationsillingness lofurther talks. In6 India discussed with Soviet officials possible Soviet help inIV broadcasting No additional details aie available.
o induce developing countries to use Slat-siontir for domestic or regional systems the USSR could offer to sell Soviet-made earth stationsSoviet earth stations stilfer limitations in electronics, ciyogeuicx, and automat win. they ate adequate for use withood export candidate wnuldelatively new. lowi.up -it.table Soviet earthcalled MARS. Itfoot dish for duple* TV and telephony, comes in three containers, can be set up in two or three days, and is ruggrdircd. It has lieen used in Cuba, Bulgaria, India, and the USSR to provide Brezhnev with communications hack to Moscow via Molniya. It can also work with geostationary comsats according to Soviet statements. There is some evidence that the Soviets would like to sell MARS stations abroad, although they have not made this goal explicit Neither are tliete any known ordcis for MARS stations by non-Communist or Communist countries. NoIs currently available on Soviet capacity to produce MARS stations or on their cost or price.
Potential Military Uses of Statsionars
c surface. Statsionar satellites appear to be configured primarily for commercial use and for operation by the Ministry of Communicalioiis. However, we believe, based on tlie experience of the Molniya program, that whatever theand subordination tltc Soviet militarywill be an important user of Statsionir communications. For example, the Molniya-1system, which has been reported in the openpress and to the ITUivil system, is nowto be used almost exclusively by the military for comni.ind-aisd-control communications. Theystem, on file with the IFRBs believed lo be routinely used for militaty communications. Tlie Soviet militaryalso uses some of tlie Molniya-3ofice lions between Moscow andMoieover, the Soviet military is known to be interfiled in geostationary comsats. and has experimented with Molniya-IS.
nitially we would expect that some of the communications capacity of Statsionar will be given over to the military Eventually, as tlie reliability of geostationary comsats improve, the Soviets will probablyedicated military geostationary comsat system. Evenedicated system were developed, it is likely that the Soviets would con tmue using sonic of the Statsionars' capacity for military communications. Ceitainly, under crisis conditions, tho Soviet military would preempt Slot-Mm tan for their communications.
-flCC-BCT-
We believe that the SovicU will want to use at least pail of the Sutsionar system for Ihe (ollow-ing military and quasi-military applications:
CornnMrtrf-aii^Conirnf Cimmunica/iotu. We protect that by themall mobile cominuiucattofts satellite terminals will bewith Soviet ground loree units at Front and Army levels Additional users may Include Soviet naval sulfate ships, airborne command potts and strategic bombers, and submarines deployed throughout the world Geostationarys would he of major importance to surface vessels since in many areas where the Sovietsaval piesence, as In the Indian Ocean,rbiting Molniyas do not provide effective coverage.
Support. The Soviets probably will use Statsionar
rovide support forpolitical leaders during their travels abroad. l_
Collection and Support. Thesatellites can also be uved for relaying information that has been collected by Soviet intelligence services, diplomatic missions, and intelligence collection ships Similarly. Soviet and East European trawler* which perform quasi-military functions, including intelligence collection, could be expected to gain Inand coverage from the use ofsatellites
The Technical Interference Problem
officials arc verythe possibility that some Statsionars.orbital locations will be very dose toand planned INTELSATouldwith INTELSAT communications.i' recently complained to SovietGeneva, apparently without avail, that thefor interference by Statsionars, andexcessive Further, the Secretary Ceneralintends to notify the ITU thatthe otherthroughan unacceptable level ol inteiferenccoperations.
problem of interference will have toout in negotiations betweenthe USSR, as the ITU has no real powerthe issue. The ITU does not allocateorbital slots, nor can it shut down aThe ITU Space Telecommunicationsin Geneva1 specifically held thatof orbital positions should be subject tobetween all states affectedrequency for spacedoes not provide tiny measure olproprietary right. Moreover,orbital positions by ono country should notobstacle to the establishment of spaceothers- In short, since there u> nofor resolving signal interferencedisputes can be settled only by mutualbetween the concerned parties.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: