Brezlmev's Persona! Authority and Collectivity in the Soviet Leadership
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The second sentence of second paragraph on pagef referenced document should read as follows:
Soviet successes in improving the USSR's position in certain third world areashileall over US-Soviet relations, also reduce Brezhnev's vulnerability to any allegations that his policiesis the West adversely affect Soviet opportunities or unduly constrain Soviet policies in other parts of the world.
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CENTRAL INTEL LICENCE AGENCY DIRECTORATE OF INTP. LLICENCE OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
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BREZHNEV'S PERSONAL AUTHORITY AND COLLECTIVITY IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
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NOTE: During the preparation of this study ochcr CIA offices but formal coordination was not sought. Commentswelcomed by the
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CONTENTS
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
"THE HIGHEST PRINCIPLE OF PARTT LEADERSHIP" . n Theory
And in Practice: The Khrushchev Experience
THE REASSERTION OF COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP . . .
The Sharing of Authority
The Conduce of Politburo Burliness
BREZHNEV EMERGES PREEMINENT
Chairman Brezhnev Instrumentalities oE Power Preeminence, but not Supremacy
NEW FACTORS AFFECTING COLLECTIVITY
The Winter of Brezhnev's Diacontent The "Pause" in Detente The Question of Succession
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY
The Near Term After Brezhnev
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
The Soviet leadership todayollectivebody* The Politburo meets regularly to decide jointly on key policy moves. Certain topof them by no means pliant instruments ofconsiderable influence in important policy areas, and the General Secretary takes care toupporting consensus for his own oooi-tions. Nonetheless, Brezhnev clearly is the focal point of the Soviet political machine and has eclipsed the other ranking leaders in setting the direction of major policies. Hiswas confirmed at the recent Soviet Party cc:igresst where he delivered the main address and received high praise from all Soviet speakers.
The increase in Brezhnev's personal authority and prestige in recent years haa been assisted by and reflected in his control of Soviet foreign policy. Herivate secretariat to hel him conduct summit negotiations and frame policy guidelines, and he took the !ead in expanding relations with major Western His chairmanship of the Defense Council has contributed considerably to his ability tc dominate national security issues, especially SALT, and the promotion to full Politburo nemberahio in the last three yeara of all the top official*ey role in national security policy has strengthened Brezhnev's direct influence in this key area. Brezhnev's ability to protect his position within the Politburo has been even more convincingly demonstrated over the same period by the removal of four members who either had given him political trouble or hadn close! allied with him. In addition, Brezhnev hap become predominant in economic policy.
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While Brnzhnev remains cle*:My ascendant, several factors which hnvc eranrged in tlie lost two to three years bear on the distribution and exercise of power vithtn the leadership:
the reduction in Brezhnev's activity owing to health problems and the related question of political succession, and
the downturn in US-Soviet relations.
A further reduction in Brezhnev's political activity could bring about the fuller exercise of collective leadership and even more deliberatencss in decision-making. In fact, the age alone of the senior leadership (Brezhnevhe others averageay encourage some of the current younger leaders to assert their voices more vigorously on policy questions as they begin to think increasingly of ensuring their own political future when Brozh:<ev is gone.
Whether Brezhnev has exercised his personal influence on recent Soviet foreign policies out of personal conviction or in order to stay within the bounds of the existing leadershipthe narrowed field of maneuver available to him with regard to detente has entailed atoss of womentum for him politically. Yetuthority appears in t'*eof the congress to be stronger than seemed to beeveral months ago, and to the extent this factor ia critical to the next steps in US-Soviet relations. Brezhnev is evidentlyetter position than before to make his personal preferences count. And however much he or the leadershiphole nay wish to delay new policy initiatives in such areas as SALT until after the pressures of the US election subside, they also enter-tain fears that continued drift in US-Soviet relations may give stronger political<voice to Hanti-Soviet" elements in the US and further jeopardize their own interests.
"THE HIGHEST PRINCIPLE OF PARTY LEADERSHIP"
In Theory. The leaders of all Party organs In the USSR arc charged with carrying out their responsibilitiesollective spirit, which ia to be guaranteed by means of thorough discussion and joint decision-making* Failure to observe this preceptgrounds for dismissal of Party leaders at any level, Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitaky recentlyegional secretary removed for having "infringed Partyne charge being that he "disregarded collectivity in the lettlement of important problems," Stalin and Khrushchev were accusedof violating.the principle of collectivity by allowing the development cf "personality cults" centered on themselves; the former was indicted posthumously, but such charges figuredin Khrushchev's removal from office*
Collectivity has come to be valued highly because so much of previous Soviet history has demonstrated vividly the dangers of personal rule* onmon sense of self-preservation puts the Soviet leoders on guard against signs of excessive ambition by any of their number and leads them toheory of leadershio that makes the re-establishment of autocratic method* less likely. Additionally, the growing complexity of administering contemporary Soviet society makes highly personalized rule an incressinglymode of leadership. Although the Politburo retainspolitical control, the representation today within that body of major contending interests creates pressures for the sharing of power among its members.
And in Practice: The Khrushchev Experience. Although the concept of collectivity is imbedded in the political and ideological framework of the USSR, its practical application within the Politburo has varied. The basic Soviet politicalpolitical control, the mobilization of resources for economic growth, and maximum physical security for thestrong, centralized leadership* The Party chief has traditionally been permitted considerable latitude to initiate policy and manipulate the Party machinery,
and he in free to seek to enlarge his area ol political control and influence as far as hii collearues will permit himo. The lack of constitutional or Party rules defining his authority ia largely responsible for the continuing importance of personal struggle in Politburo politics and the shifts in emphasis between collectivity and one-man rule.
After Stalin died, his successors assigned different men to the topmost Party and government posts. But there was no firm agreement, formal or tacit, to deny preeminence to any single leader, and Khrushchev was able to exploit the fluid leadership conditions of theo his own benefit. He accumulatedpower nndomentua lot major policies he advocated. Collectivity suffered. His colleagues found themselves increasingly reacting to his initiatives and less able to restrain or oppose his actions and exercise power on their own.
Khrushchev was not, however, another Stalin; he needed policy successes ii order to maintain his political position. His style of leadership arouseJ dissatisfaction ntnonct high Sovietncluding but not limited to his Politburo colleagues. Hepersonally in lower-echelon Party meetings, announcednot previously cleared among the top central leadership,the public "personality cult" that grew up around him, appeared not to recognize limits to his behavior, and showed increasing disregard for the niceties of discussion and compromise within the Politburo.
These actions left his colleagues feeling insecure and evoked concern throughout the wider circle of mid-level Party leaders who felt threatened by his tarty reorganization scheme and the requirement for mandatory replacement periodicallyortion of the membership of key Party bodies. The resulting impression of Khrushchev's capri-ciousness and personal rule might not have been sufficient by itselt to do him in. But combined with policy setbacks, itore issue around which the other leaders could coalesceeeling of restoring legitimacy in ousting him/
THE REASSERTION OF COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP
The Sharing of Authority. With the memory of Khrushchev'* "errors" fresh iri "t'rieir minda, the Soviet leaders roved in the months following his ouster toarefully apportioned distribution of power anusng themselves and to alter the style and internal operations of their leadership. as agreed that in peacetime no one leader would again be allowed to holdthe top Party and government posts. Drezhnev and Kosygin took over these two positions immediately and have remained in them ever since. hird individual, first Mikoyan and then Podgorny, haa occupied the third-ranking -office, that of titular head of state. For several years the holders of these three pests were accorded near-equal public status, and they are sometimes still called collectivelyka." Foreign nolic>functions were divided at first fairly evenly among the three, and various members of the Politburo have exercisedfor working out policies on important domestic matters.
The choice of Brezhnev to become the top Party leader was probably made with the intent to put into the most important leadershiperson not likely to violate the new mutualto He had been the obvious successor to Khrushchev both because of his key position in the Secretariat, which involved broadand was second only to chat of the First Secretary, and because of hie extensive background, which included jobs dealing with agriculture and industry, in regional and central Party posts, and as top political officer in the navy.
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To signal their new emphasis on leadership ratability, the successors did ndt remove any other active member from the Politburo along with Khrushchev.* They did away with the organizational
*Kozlov, an opponent of Khrushchev and one-time heir apparent, was removed one month later, but for genuine health reasons: he hadebilitating stroke moreear before, had been politically inactive, and died early
structure* and rules that had upset many Party regulars in thend made Central Committee meetings moreand businesslike. 6 the leaders changed the name of the top Party organ from fresidiuia to Politburo and tha name of the top Party office from First to Generalto distinguish their leadership symbolically from that of the Khrushchev period.
The Conduct of Politburo Business. In addition to creating an atmosphere ot leadership stability and reducing dissatisfactions within the Party, the post-Khrushchev leaders established orderly processes for their own operationsonsciousorkable system of shared
Dccittion-mnking on major issues normallyeekly cycle. Typically, on Monday the General Secretary reviews draft proposals from the other leaders for possible consideration by the Politburo. On Tuesday the Secretariat, withmakes up an agenda of items "or Politburo con;:aeration. On Wednesday Kosygin convenes the Presidium of the Council of Ministers which discusses agenda items and prepares positions relevant to them for Politburo attention. On Thursday the Politburo meets to discuss the agenda issues and act on draft proposals. The agenda is restrictedather small number of important matters, in contrast to the practice under Khrushchev of crowding it with secondary items. Any Politburo member may raiseuc for consideration, but detailed discussion and final decision on new queetiona are usually deferred.
Individual leaders often develop proposals related to their particular policy specialties, sometimes heading commissions formed to study specific questions. Central Committee secretaries prepare proposals relevant to their respective policyoordinating the input of the appropriate Central Committee departments and government organs, the most important national security matters are taken up by the Defense Council, which consists of the top three leaders plus other top national security officials, and draws up policies for Politburo approval. In addition to the procedures geared to the regular Politburo meetings, thereormal coordination process for the numerous other flatter* that require Politburo-level attention. The secretary responsible for the policy question at issue often coordinates proposals among the Politburo Leaders.
Although this policy-making process is intended to serve the principle of collective leadership, Brezhnev is clearly its focal point and provides much of its direction. He controls the schedule of Politburo meetings* the attendance *i: them of non-Politburo members, and the content and order of the agenda. At the Politburo sessions themselves, he presides, presents issues for consideration, sums up the discussions, and expresses the consensus reached. If there is substantial disagreementuestion, Brezhnev may callote to decide the issue, if he believes that the discussion is roving against the direction he favors, he may defer decision until another time. He may even be able in such cases to sway the decision by stating his views last and using the weight of his personal authority as General Secretary. Butar as we know, he cannotlear Politburo majority,
BREZHNEV EMERGES PREEMINENT
Chairman Brezhnev. Using the advantages inherent in hisaa dc facto chief executive of the USSR, Brezhnev has emerged ins the preeminent Soviet leader. The process has been gradual and incremental, but the result is unmistakable* In, the top three leaders had received carefully constructed even-handed
public treatment. Although Brethnev had emerged5 as the main architect of agricultural policy, Kosygin had introduced the major economic reorganisation adopted that year and served0 as the principal Soviet spokesman on strategic anu* limitations policy. But0 public mention of Brezhnev in Pravda and in the USSR Supreme Soviet election campaign became noticeably more rominent relative to the attention accorded the other ranking leaders,ollection of his speeches ana articles was published.
The clearest public reflection of Brezhnev's rise has been the increased number of references to the "Politburo headed by" General Secretary Brethnev. This explicit acknowledgement of Brezhnev's position as Politburo chairman appeared infrequently in the, but3 the phrase has been normal, almost obligatory; in important public statements. It was used extensively in thetoh Party Congress, and at the congress itself Brezhnev's personal role was highlighted by all Soviet speakers. Although the authority of the Central Committee is usually also cited on these occasions, the singling out of Brezhnev clearly indicates his ascendancy over his colleagues and weakens the principle of collectivity.
Brezhnev has, however, attained prominence without violating the leadership procedures set up4 to ensure collectivity,ew instances where he may have overstepped the boundaries of his prerogatives. At some Partymostthehas interrupted speakers with impromptu comments, thereby drawing attention to himself andrait pointedly reminiscent of Khruyhchev. There have also reportedly^been instances in which he hasoreign policy initiative that was subsequently questioned by other senior Leaders as not having been previously agreed upon. For example, it has been rumored in Moscow that Brezhnev was criticized by other leaders in6 for his method of negotiating the SALT accord at Vladivostok, having in sffect come back to Moscow and requested the Politburo toait accompli.
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These example* stand out as exceptional against the general pattern of Brezhnev's frequent consultation with his colleagues. While* he does identify himself with particular policy lines, he constantly seeks to build support for them and has reportedly or at least one occasion been unwilling to override the viewsignificant minority in his efforts toolitburo consensus before reaching final drciiioni. It is apparent that Brethnev has profited from hisexample and avoided his failings. Brezhnev leads, but he treats the other leaders respectfully and does not demand that they follow his lead unqucstioningly.
Instrumentalities power, Brezhnev's personal role and prestige grew first out of his handling of foreign policy. Brezhnev took the lead in organizing the machinery needed for the USSR to play an -increasingly active role in international politics by forming asecretariat to help him conduct foreign policy and by framing toajor policy guidelines himself. Mis presentation of the "Peaceas the centerpiece ofh Party Congress lthough there were several key meetings among the Soviet leaders to make collective decisions during the Moscow summit, Brezhnev was the principal Soviet negotiator of the final SALT agreement provisions. he received special credit for the summit results, and he atone signed the agreements for the Soviet side.*
hairmanship of the Defense Council hasto his ability to come to dominate foreignnational security issues. In addition, hiswith Defense Minister Crechko has been particularlyeve of2 summit
1 *He signed as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee an unprecedented act and one quite surprising to many observers since the title ia not thattate office. By doing so, he pointedly emphasized the capacity of the Party chief to act cn the nost important matters on behalf of the nation. Brezhnev has been accorded the full measure of head-of-state heftOri during visits to the capitals of major Western states, including the US.
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that thia fact had been valuable to him politically. Theto full Politburo membership inf'poreign Miri-ter Gromyko, KGB chief Andropov, and Grechko placed the heads of importantkey actors in foreign policy-making and participants in Defense Councilclosely and clearly under Brezhnev's direct influence as chairman of the Politburo and further undercut Kosygin's authority in foreign affairs and within his own cabinet.
Even more convincing evidence of Brezhnev's ability to affect high-level appointments and improve his position on the Politburo lies in the departures engineered. Until that tine the only full members ousted4 had been old-timers Mikoyan and Shvernik, both in their seventies when they left. But in the last three years three Politburo members who had, in one way or another, given Brezhnev trouble have been eased out: Voronov, the main exponent of an alternative approach to agriculture; Shelest, the most outspoken critic of detente and an incautious promoter of local Ukrainian interests; and Sbelepin, who may have raised the issue of succession in the winter.
In addition to his leadership in foreign policy and influence
years2d has been incorporated in theconomic plan. Recently another large program initiated by Brezhnev for developing the agricultural potential of the more northern arable lands has been undertaken.
In contrast, Kosygin's economic policies have been played down and their effectiveness seriously eroded. His stricture ingainst the Party's dictating economic management decisions has given way ino Brezhnev's emphasis on Party guidance and activism in economic affaire. Brezhnev has felt free todirectly in deliberations of Kosygin's Council of Ministers and haa attacked central economic management organs for failing to implement programs and solve problems.
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Preeminence, but not Supremacy. The very basis oftrength contains implicit limits on his power. By sticking to his cautious style of consensus-building andinger on the Politburo pulse, Brezhnev has prevented the formation of organized opposition to hissition. But any effort to expand his personal ruleign.iicant degree or in any unprecedented manner would Likely disturb the personal confidence and satisfaction his colleagues have in his leadership.
Within the Party Brezhnev continues to enjoy the respect and support of Central Comraittee-level officialsegree of personal pooularity in mid-level and regional circles. But his control over Party cadres is not absolute. There is no pattern of his successfully "packing" the Politburo or Secretariat to make them pliant instruments of his will, and the influence of other leaders is still felt along with his own. In Brezhnev's absence other Politburo-level secretaries have sometimes acted as Politburo chairman (usually Kirilenko, but also Suslov and Kulakov). Kosygin, Podgorny, and Ustinov are members of the Defense Council, and Suslovowerful force in the Secretariat. rezhnev supporter, Kirilenko, is positioned as Brezhnev's chief deputy and heir apparent, individuals less obviously allied with Brezhnev have also attained full Politburo membershipotably Masurov and Grishin. The Length of time sometimes required to settle appointments to certain key posts suggests intra-Politburo tugging and pulling, with no group able to gain majority support for its choice. ew Soviet constitution andconomic plan, projects that Brezhnev has associated himself with, have also plainly run into hard going.
NEW FACTORS AFFECTING COLLECTIVITY
Several developments in the last two to three years-bear on the distribution and exercise of power vithin the leadership: the reduction ofctivity and the related quea^ion of his succession; and then detente with the US.
The Winter of Brezhnev's Discontent. In the winter ofwas out pf action for an extended period of time owigg
j oetween tne end lovemoer IVndprobably missed all but one
of the regular weekly Politburo meetings. Herip to Egypt in late December and emerged from confinement into public view onlyew occasions until March.
jThe fall
4 hadough period in US-Soviet relations, and despite the partial SALT success at Vladivostok, Brezhnev was probably disappointed over the outcome of the emigration-MFN-credits How much domestic political activity Brezhnevprivately while hosoitalized or resting at his dacha we do not know
Only one major policy decision was announced during this period. In January, responding to US legislative actions taken the previous month, the USSR renounced its obligations under2 US-USSR Trade Agreement. How much and in what way Brezhnev influenced the taking of this decision is uncertain. The USaffecting credits and emigration and the initial Sovietto them occurred before Brezhnev entered the hospital. He may have made known hia willingness to go along with the Sovieteven led the moveof either the merit
top scorst
were .several signs of renewed emphasis on collectivity in the Soviet press duringinter. In December and January there were instances where the omissionBrezhnev's name stood out, and most pointed ofajor Pravda article referring to collective leadership was published in January, Its author, P. A. Rodionov, First Deputy Director of the Central Committee's Institute of Marxism* Leninism, had published4 two other articles on this themeecond edition of his definitive book on this subject. Collectivity "The Highest Principle of Party Leadership, and he was honored this year by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, There were also
Kirilenko deputized for Brezhnev during his absence, organizing leisure activities for the leaders as well as chairing the Polit-buro sessions. However, he and the other leaders kept low political
The "Pause" in Detente* Since that winter signs of Brezhnev's preeminence have continued to be mixed with indications ofon him. At the5 Central Committee plenumin was removed from the Politburo, but the resolution adopted then contained pointed references to the dangerous aspects of detente and the need for vigilance, suggesting increased reservations within the leadership about the course of Soviet foreign policy. The resolution also seemed less laudatory of Brezhnev than was the case in3 when his report to the plenum and his "personal contribution" toward ensuring peace were noted. The5 resolution also seemed to indicate that responsibility for foreign policy was to be more widely shared within the leadership. Cromyko
gave the main report, and the Central Committee gave its approval and support to both Brezhnev and the Politburohole.
Through much,5 conflicting signals were emitted from Moscow on important questions related to foreign policy, such as how to interpret the economic and (solitical difficulties in the Weat, how to handle events in Portugal, and how to conductwith West European Communist parties, Brezhnev did push the European Security Conference throughuccessful conclusion in the summernd he received extensive publicity and credit for his role. But the aftertaste of Helsinki quickly became bitter in Moscow as the Western nations made clear their intention to stress the human rights issues associated with the final CSCE document, and Brezhnev failed toALT summit in the US beforeh Party Congress. After the5 Central Committee plenum, Shchcrbitsky asserted that: "The collective wisdom and will of our Party are embodied in the theses and conclusions of L. I. Brezhnev'sormulation that goes quite far in emphasizing Brezhnev's authority yet is remindful of the fundamental collectivity theoretically underlying Party policy-making,*
The Question of Succession* Brezhnev's health problems mayurther redaction in his activity or, conceivably, take him from the scene suddenly (he has arteriosclerosis and
*Podgorny4 referred to Brezhnev as the head of "our collectivenother seemingly contradictory formulation that both praises Brezhnev highly and recalls the concept ofin the same breath.
We are left, then, at presentomewhat curiousin which Brezhnev's authority and prestige remain high, but his premier policy of detente is resting in neutral. Brezhnev, alert to hia colleagues' mood, may himself have modulated Soviet policy to stay within the bounds of existing consensus and ensure his position. Even iT this is the case, however, the sip/nficantly narrowed field of maneuver available to Brezhnev with regard toolicy he has used more than any other to promoterominence, entails atoss of momentum for him politically.
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reportedlyacemaker), IE Brezhnev's health worsens, Kirilenko'* deputizing might well takeore regular character. As long as Brezhnev remains tn offie- and still oversees major policy affairs, however intermittently, Kirilenko would clearly remain subordinate to him. urther reduction in Brezhnev's political participation would probably mean, at leasthile, the fuller exercise of collective leadership and even more deliber-ateness in decision-making.
If Brezhnev were to leave office in the near future, Kirilenko is the odds-on choice to succeed him as General Secretary, But he, like Brezhnev, isears old, and his accession to power would notong-term solution to the problem of replacing Brezhnev. The current period thus is really one of pre-succession, in which the probable future contenders for the number-one spot are not yetosition to reach for the top post itself.
If enough time and energy remain to Brezhnev, he may be able to preside over these pre-succession moves and manage toolitical balance among various individuals and groups. The leadership changes ath Party Congress reflect thecommitment to stability, bringing the removal from theonly of Polyansky, who was made the "fall guy" for the agricultural setback. Of the promotions made, the raising of Ustinov to full Politburo membership further strengthens the representation of national security officials; Romanov's similar promotionogical rewardeader who has proved his :apabilities in handling major regional responsibilities; and the entry into the Secretariat of Cherncnko, head of the Central Committee's General Departmentong-time career associaterezhnev, buttresses Brezhnev's position in that important body. Yet, at time goes on, the other members of the topnow in place and others who may move up in the next /ear orttkely to think increasingly about ensuring their 5wn political future when he is gone. Thtf key political question *ould then become not how to keep Brezhnev's preeminence within bounds, but how to survive his replacement or, in some cases, now to become his replacement.
It it alio possible that the period ahead will sec Brezhnev attain an even stronger political position. This would be more likely if health, age, or politics were to lead to the departure or loss of influence of one or more of the other ranking leaders, such as Suslov, Kosygin, or Podgorny. Brezhnev would then stand out that much more within the leadership in terras of prestige and experience, but it is highly doubtful that their power would all flow into Brezhnev's hands, especially in light of his own reduced work pace. Some of it would probably go to other Politburo members, enabling them to assert their own voices more fully on key policy issues. And if, meanwhile, new leaders werethe top circle, some of them also would gradually make their presence felt as they acquired confidence in handling new policy responsibilitiesense of their own weight in Politburo-level deliberations.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET POLICY
The Near Term. Brezhnev's authority appears in the aftermath ofcongress to be stronger than seemed to be the case several months ago. Soviet successes in improving the USSR's position in certain relations, also reduce Brezhnev's vulnerability to any allegations that his policiesis the West adversely affect Soviet opportunities or unduly constrain Soviet policies in other parts of the world. Insofar as the next steps in US-Sovietdepend on Brezhnev'sto some extent theyis evidentlyetter position than before to moke his personal preferences count. Brezhnev, and for that matter the rest of the leadership, fear that continued drift in US-Soviet relations may give stronger political voice to "anti-Soviet" elements in the US and perhaps further jeopardize Soviet interests.
Among the factors shading Moscow's present view of the US-Soviet relationship, however,erious doubt about the US ability to bargain effectively with the USSR. Whatever Brezhnev's policy inclinations and internal power position, this belief is
bound to persist in the period leading up to the US election. The Soviet attitude toward the prospects of improving relations with the US depends greatly on Politburo calculations aa to how domestic political prcaauroR may affect the octiona of the incumbent US President and whether Soviet interests would be better served by marking time until the election is over in the belief or hopeifferent US attitude will follow.
After Brezhnev. Brezhnev's style of leadership and record make it unlikely that policy dissatisfactions will accumulate to the point of bringing him down, and although he may not tecognize the best time to leave, it is probable that he will be permitted to go honorably. There have been rumors in the past that he might be namedew post, perhaps similar to chairmanouncil of State, such as exists in some other Communist states. If he leaves with his reputation essentially intact, the leadership practices of the Brezhnev era will probably be held up as an example for his successors to follow. Whenaves the scene entirely, there would almost inevitablyf greater collectivity among the top leaders. Although tserole of the General Secretary in the Soviet system virtually ensures that his successor would become the most powerful nan in the top leadership, he would not automatically inherit Brezhnev's authority in its entirety.
If Kirilenko succeeds him, he would probablyanner similar to Brezhnev's, seeking to formulatepositions and to build support for them, but probably without as much capacity initially for bringing issues to the point of final decision or shaping the nature of such decisions by use of his personal authority. Any successor, in attempting to establish his authority, might seek to push -for decisions to show that his leadership can be effective. In fact, all the leaders would want to demonstrate that the new regime is capable of setting policy lines and taking decisive actions. But leaders other than the General Secretary would also want to make their mark, and they would be wary of permitting the top man tooead of steam.
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Since the aucccaaioo to Brethnev in likely toreater turnover of leaders than waa the case inthere would probablyrolongedof several years inwhich the new internal Politburo working style and division cf labor would evolve within the changedof personalities. In this unsettled period when theof relative personal influence is being worked out, difficult decisions would be subject to delays nnd compromises ap tne new leaders took the time to weigh extra carefully the internal political consequences of any policy choice. Their decisiona would therefore probably not be broad initiatives aimed at resolving long-standing knotty questions, but more modest actions with which they could all feel coofcrtable.
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