Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
Prospects for Improvement in Soviet Low-Altitude Air Defense
Top Secret
cw N2 1
CONTENTS
1
PREFACE
Current Capabilities and Deficiencies of Soviel Air
Defense
Improvement
High-Speed Data Systems foe Air Surveillance. Command.
and
Look-Down/Shoot-Down
Mobile SAM
AWACS
Other Significant
Prospects for
DISCUSSION
I OVERVIEW OF SOVIET STRATECIC AIR DEFENSE.
- Intelligence
A. Size and Composition of PVO St.any
B Cunenl Assessmenl of PVO Strany
14
7
7 18
18
Suiface-to-Air Missile "
Low-Altilude Capabilities
Nuclear Warheads for SAMs
Defense Against lhe Shorl-Range Attack MissileAgainsi Electronic-of PVO Stiaoy's Capabilities
^ C. Air Defense of Other Soviet Services
Page
II. LOW-ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE; PROBLEMS.
SOLUTIONS. AND SOVIET
A
Technical Problems and
Soviet
B Air...
Technical Problems and
Soviri
C Siirfaee-lo-AIr
Technical Problems and Solulioni
Soviet
D. Interceptor
Technical Problems and Solution!
Soviet
asers lor Air
F. Deployment and Operational
111 PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED LOW-ALTITUDE Alfl
Regarding Individual Soviet
Air Surveillance
Surface-to-Air
C. Prospects for Improvement
APPENDIX: NEW SOVIET AIR SURVEILLANCE DATA SYSTEMS
FIGURES
Page
Air Defense14
Cunenl SAM Coverage of thc16
Location of Soviet Ground20
Reduction of Radar Coverage for Low-Altitude22
-tap tttn*
Page
earch Capabilities of Airborne Radars23
1
New Strategic SAM System. Complex C. Sary Slingan
Missile Test Center
9 Control of Interceptors from
IO Radar Nettings (or CCI
II. CCI Operations Using Remote
ualitative Comparison of CCI Vectoring Errors and
Interceptor Search Range Capabilities
uantitative Comparison of CCI Vectoring Errors and
Interceptor Search Range Capabilities
3
TABLES
Page
I PVO13
ssessment of PVO Strany's Current Low-Aldtude
19
Air Defenses in theIS
Low-Allitude Air Surveillance Options%
Improvement Optionsow. Altitude- Air
. . 30
Vlli. Requirements for Improved Interceptor33
DC Potential Interceptor Defense Improvements
X, Forecast of PVO Strany Interceptot
XI. Forecail of PVO Strany SAM
PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET LOW-ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE1
PREFACE
This study assesses the capability of cunent Soviet strategic low-altitude air defenses and prospects for their improvement within the nextears.
Thc study is focused on Soviet low-altitude air defenses because US planning calls for low-altilude penetrations of thc Soviet Union and because previous estimates concluded that the Soviets' weakestcapabilities were against bombers flying at low altitude.
This study addresses the strengths ond weaknesses of currently deployed systems against low-altilude targets, discusses thefor improvements in low-altitude defense, and identifies operational trends and research and development activities which may indicate which paths the Soviets have chosen for the future. Particular emphasis is placed on potential improvements which could be deployedignificant degree within the nextears to improve the Soviets' capability to counter low-altitude bomber penetration of their defenses.
of this study should remember that Soviet ability to defend against bombers inill dependumber of factors which
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1
arc extremely difficult to measure. ForS bomber strike aguiust the Soviet Union would be accompanied by actions involving cither strategic forces. US as well as Soviet. Many of these actions would uffecl the success of the bomber force's mission. In an all-out nuclearregardless of which side struck first. Soviet air defenses would certainly suffer degradation from US ICBMs and SLBMs. In the event of limited uses of strategic nudcar weapons it is possible that Soviet air defenses would be left largely intact.
Thc study deals exclusively with the missions and capabilities of the current and future Soviet air defense system in thc airspace over the Soviet Union and its immediate periphery, assuming that the entile air defense system is operative. The number of bombers which would reach the Soviet Union would depend on factors not considered in this study. For discussion of these factors see, "Soviel Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through theatedinally, future developments in US offensive forces and tactics, such as (he possible introduction of advanced cruise missiles, have not been considered.
2
NOTE
This study was undertaken as part of the interagency intelligence production program to support preparation of NIESoviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through thchis study was not in finished form, its principal findings were available at the timeas completed. Thc conclusions ofeflect the principal findings of this paper.
3
CONCLUSIONS
Thc iinprnvemcnts we foresee in Soviet airairand control. Interceptors, and surface-to-airthe potential for overcoming during the nextears most of the current technical deficiencies for defense against low-altitudef the Soviets carry out the programs we have judged as likely, they will haveong way toward overcoming their deficiencies, making thc task of low-altitude penetration much more difficult than it is today. The actual effectiveness, however, of Soviet low-altitude air defenses against US bombers will depend heavily on the degree of air defense degradation resulting from missile strikes, electronic countermcasures. bomber penetration aids and tactics, and on the nature of US bomber force improvements. Neither wc nor the Soviets would be able to predict all these factors with confidence.
Major lechnical deficiencies in Soviet air defenses which now limit their ability to defend against low-altitude bomber penetrations arc the lack of:
ground-based system to provide accurate and timely air surveillance and tracking data to support ground controlled intercept operations,interceptorook-down/shoot-down capability,SAMs deployed with strategic air defense forces, andeffective airborne warning and control system for air surveillnnce and tracking. There is evidence that the Soviets are working to correct the first three of these deficiencies, but we believe it is unlikely that they will be able to make major improvements in the effectiveness of their low-altitude air defenses before
5 we believe Soviet strategic air defense forces will have:data systems in support of ground conlrol intercept operations;
1U' thii irpntl tbe trim "Imd ujsd lit ihu illituoVtk trnibl
brvaiw US bmnlieima ipniflcoRy equipped to uw ibiie utactic. The JCS "Vny..i m. "kn> allituoW* at between SODerl But lor pot-pwi rJ tanit if al SCOm kai noi bra awd ai ihr oamoa ia "kmw* ihr-fifif liaitMattlH rtngr -ould ovmlite Sovietair irUmrtlathaa
In US iipikiib aImvImi Ui rhe ICS ileliitKloflocoeapew Ihe lowrr iantr ol
6
numbers of thelogger whichimited capability to track and destroy aircraft flying below its own altitude, or an improved interceptor; and
new low-altitude SAM systemegree of mobility).
these developments would offer theignificant potential for improvement in low-altitude air defense.
We also believe that by the early tohe Soviets will have the technology to produce advanced look-down/shoot-down interceptors and an airborne warning and control system which would be effective over land. Given their historical and continuing emphasis on air defense, we believe they will pursue these developments.riority effort and depending upon the level of sophistication, such systems could be introduced in thc early to.
The Soviets are not likely to have an effective defense against the short-range attack missile (SRAM)5 and will rely on defenses to attack SRAM carriers prior to missile launch. The small radar cross sections, terrain following, long ranges, and other capabilities of prospective US low-altitude cruise missiles would confront the Soviets with additional problems in air defense.
We have considered Soviet research and development efforts on high-energy lasers and their implications for air defense. We do not believe that laser applications would have any better prospect for overcoming current deficiencies in Soviet low-altitude air defenses than the forces we have estimated as likely. Soviet research and development of lasers for air defense merit our close attention, however, for indications of unforeseen advances or breakthroughs in this rapidly moving area of wcupons technology.
SUAAMARY
Current Capabilities ond Deficiencies of Soviot Air Defense Forces
Soviet air defenses are good iigainst bomber attacksand high altitudes over thc Soviet landman. Despiteand diversity, however, it is highly unlikely that Soviet aircould copeomber force penetrating ut lowthey have no capability against the US SRAM. Thesebased on our identification of critical technical deficiencies indefense functions. In addition, Soviet air defenses are vulnerablepenelralion aids and tactics, but we are unableuantifyof degradation of Soviet air defenses from these causes.
technical deficiencies we have identified wouldthe number of weapons thc Soviets could apply againstbombers:
Soviet ground-based air surveillance and control system docs not provide accurate and timely tracking data. In thc most heavily defended portions of the Soviet Union, radar coverage, provided by ground-based radars. Is adequate for nearly continuous tracking of low-altitude bombers. However, with few exceptions, lhe radar tracking data are not collected and disseminated with sufficient speed and uccuracy for controllers toround-control led interceptCI controllers can conduct intercepts only within thc range of their on-site radars. Consequently, given thc low altitude and speed of bombers. CCI controllers are unable to direct ii successful intercept during thc short lime available.
Soviets also lack an effective airborne warning and control system (AWACS) for either overwatcr or overland operations, winch inhibits using interceptor aircraft lo attack low-altitude bombers before they enter Soviet land-based radar coverage. Thc present Mass air surveillance aircraft have little capability to detect or track low-altitude targets or to control interceptors.
strategic air defenses lack an interceptorook-(lown/shoot-downthe ability tn detect, track, and engage low-altitude lumbers while the interceptor is flying above
6
tllO lurgcl at mediumigh ullitude. Such an interceptor would partially offset deficiencies in air surveillance and interceptor
surface-to-air missiles have very short engagement ranges against low-altitude targets, and are vulnerable to offensive avoidance tactics. Virtually all of the SAM systems of the Strategic Air Defense Force (PVO Strany) are deployed at fixed locations. C. In udditiort to thc strategic air defenses, thc Soviets maintainair defenses as part of their Ground Forces and Frontal Aviation. Collectively, the size of the tactical air defense forces, which include mobile SAMs. antiaircraft artillerynd fighters, is comparable to that of the PVO Strany. These forces possess low-altitude capabilities which could improve the strategic defenses of the Soviet Union. The mobility of the SAMs and AAA could reduce the susceptibility of these systems to offensive avoids nee tactics. Thelogger. thc only Soviet fighter aircraft with even limited capability to detect, track, and engage targets below its flight altitude, is deployed with Frontal Aviation. Other tactical fighters are no better than those in thc strategic air defenses.
D. Wc do not believe, however, that the Soviets see in their tacticalolution to their low-altitude strategic air defense problem. The availability of these tactical forces for strategic defense is quite uncertain and would depend on thc circumstances of thc conflict. The tactical forces uie mostly deployed in areas from which they could mostsupport theater operations, and they would have to berelocated for optimal contribution to strategic air defense operations. Although the tactical air defense forces would probably not be available should the war beginarge European conflict, circumstances can In- envisioned in which the Soviets could augment their strategic air defenses by adding the low-allitude capabilities of the tactical forces.
Improvement Programs
K. Clearly the Soviets are continuing to improve their strategic uir defense system. Programs have been identified which offer the Soviets tho potential for reducing the fundamental technical deficienciespreviously.
Hrah-Spoad Ooto Sysioms for Air Surveillance. Command, and Control K.he Soviets have been deploying high-speed,data systems for processing and rapidly transmitting radar tracking data to weapons units. Such systems arr now widely deployed IftfCFVOSAM forces. Deployment of similar systems to sup-
port CCI units began2 and is continuing, although relatively few GO units have received these systems. Thc value of these data systems for ground-controlled intercept is critically dependent on the timeliness and accuracy of tracking data routedCI controller. To befor ground-controlled intercepti, these data systems would require sufficient speed and accuracy to permit CCI controllers to vectorbeyond the line of sightCI controller's own local radaremote vectoring)oint where the target is within range of the interceptor's airborne interceptata system with these capabilities combinedetter interceptor such as the Flogger (seeould enable the Soviets toubstantial improvement in their interceptor defenses. However, there is no evidence lhat the data systems being deployed have been used for remote vectoring. Moreover, there are differing judgments amongagencies about whether the new data systems the Soviets have begun to deploy currently have the technical capabilities for use in remote vectoring of interceptors. All agencies agree, however, that sometime0 when projected deployments of the new data systems and Flogger or an improved interceptor are completed, the data systems will have ihe accuracies needed for remote vectoring, and that the overall capabilily of Soviet air defenses against low-altitude bombers will be substantially improved.
owrv/Srioot-Down Interceptor
C. The only operational Soviet fighter withimited look-down/shool-down capability is lhe Flogger, currently deployed with Frontal Aviation and expected to be deployed soon to PVO Strany. The Flogger's look-down/shoot-down capabilities are significantly less than those of US aircraft such asithout support from ancontrol clement to vector the aircraft within view of thc interceptor's airborne intercept radar, the Flogger could not materially improve low-altitude interceptor defense capabilities. However, the combination of the Flogger and improved air surveillance/interceptor control discussed previously offers the Soviets the potential to improve their interceptor defenses substantially.
Mobile SAM Systems
H. The first new strategic SAM system since thes under development at Launchf the Sary Shagan Missile Test Center We believe the system is being developed for low-altitude air defense. All the components observed arc new and all arc transportable, including thc lower-mounted radar; however, the degree ofor mobility has not ycl been fully assessed. Thc system's three
-1amc
major componentsower-mounted, circularly scantling continuous-wave (CW) acquisitionrobable ground-mounted planar array engagement radar;ertical four-tubereliminary estimate of thr systems performance andhort in medium range, on the order ofauticalertical launch^
degree coverage without having to traverse the launcher.
I. As an interim measure the I'VO Strany could procure and deploy one of thc tactical mobile missile systems now operational, such as Iheut there is no evidence that the Soviets have chosen this option. If deployed in sufficientseveralmobile SAMs could degrade the effectiveness of bomber avoidance
1
AWACS
J. There is no evidencerogram to develop an AWACS toair surveillance and control. We believe that thc Soviets will Iry to achieve this capability, but doubt that they now have the technology for an AWACS which would be effective for overland operations. If the program receives high priority, the production and deployment of an AWACS could be initiated by the caHy to, depending on whether the AWACS has an overwater or overland capability.
Other Significant. The Soviets are pursuing other approaches for improving their air defenses, although we are uncertain about their potential impact:
is evidence that nuclear warheads are available to aportion ofndites and someomplexes. It is not known whether Soviet rules of engagement would permit use of nuclear-armed SAMs against low-altitude targets, particularly due lo the prospects for collateral damage. If the use of nuclear warheads were permitted wc would expect some increase inrange of thet low altitude. We have not conducted rigorous analyses of the overall impact of nuclear warheads on the effectiveness of Soviet SAM systems.
Soviets have under way large-scale programs involving thef lasers for military applications. Some of these arc sponsored by PVO Strany, but the specific goals and status of these efforts have
not been ascertained. Estimates of thc possible range of ground-based laser beam weapons indicate lhal onlyix-mile range could be achieved by the. Thb is much less than the range of current ground-based missiles. Airborne lasers would probably be limitedange of only two or three miles, compared to three to eight miles for current air-to-air missiles. With these limitations such weapons would not have any belter prospect for overcoming current deficiencies in Soviet low-altitude air defenses than the forces we have estimated as likely. Soviet research and development of lasers for air defense merit our dose attention, however, for indications of unforeseen advances or breakthroughs in this rapidly moving area of weapons technology.
Prospects For Improvement
L Wc expect the Soviets to continue iheir efforts for an improved air defense system, but because of the time required for the production and deployment of equipment and personnel training, no material change in overall Soviet strategic air defense capabilities is expected beforeowever, we expect large-scale deployments of systems now in evidence: high-speed data systems, the flogger.ew transportable (possibly mobile) low-altitude SAM system. Additionally, new programs employing advanced Soviet technology will probably come to fruition. We believe that5 the Soviets will have introduced improvements which could reduce considerably all four of tbe fundamental, most-critical technical deficiencies which currently limit iheir capabilities against low-altitude bombers:
combination of AWACS aircraft and long-range look-down /shoot-down Interceptors could provide the potential forbombers along coastal penetration routes to the Soviet
Union.
radars, netted by high-speed data systems, could provide accurate air surveillance information to CCI controllers. These improved nettings, combined with look-down/shoot-down interceptors, could result in improved interceptor defenses over most heavily defended areas of the Soviet Union where adequate nidar coverage exists. If an overland AWACS capability is achieved and added to this combination it could provide additional coverage in those areas where then? are gaps in ground-based radar tracking.
SAMs. if not locatable. could materially reduce the capability of bombers to avoid SAMs.
We believe the Soviets will not have an effective defense against the SRAMnd will have to rely on defenses attacking thc SRAM
carrier prior lo missile launch. Thc small radar cross sections, terrain following, long ranges, and other capabilities of prospective US low-altitude cruise missiles would confront the Soviets with additional
problems in air defense,*
* M. Thc overall effectiveness of Soviet air defenses would depend, however, on factors such as the circumstances of the attack and the effects of electronic warfare, and on developments in US offensive forces. Also, wc cannot assess the extent to which future US systems will offset Ihe Soviet improvements which we have forecast. Neither we nor the Sovirls would be able to predict all of these factors with confidence.
DISCUSSION
OVERVIEW OF SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE
A. Size and Composition of PVO Strany3
The Soviet miliiary it divided Into five services. One of these. PVO Strany, is charged with the mission of strategic defense against bombers, missiles, and satellites. The four otlier services are the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Ground Forces, the Air Forces, and the Navy.ocus on thc capabilities ol PVO Strany;eals with air defense resources organic lo other forces which could, under someplay significant roles in support of strategic air defense missions.
PVO Strany has three arms for air defense: the air surveillance forces, the surface-to-air missile foices, and the interceptor aircraft foices. The following table shows their size.
VO STRANY
adar0 men*
Surface-to-Air Missile
AMen'
InKfoeptorboul interceptor aircraft; SS.OGO men-
data do not Include thoae PVO Stranyaligned lo low feeililie*
'The uetwl BuHlur. wordsyopIuJ.Myatrtinv. whlehjiw imwluttd Ji Air Defenie of Uie Homeland. The US lolelllecnccv oHninunlty viuBly refrn lo thii force as
St run v.
B. Current Assessment of PVO Slrony
hc air defense systemormidable threal to aircraft flying at medium to high altitudes over Ihe more heavily defended portions of the USSR. However, this air defense system would be unable to copearge-scale, well-coordinated bomberemploying low-altitudelectronic countermeasurcs. decoys, ond defense suppression weapons. The factors on which this assessment is based are discussed below.
he principal elements and individual functions of an effective air defense system are depicted in Figure I. In addition to possessing the weapons which actually shoot down penetrators. the overall system must first find the enemy aircraft, track them, and then relay their positions to weapons controllers. All of these separate functions must be performed well if the entire system is to bereakdown or weakness in fulfilling any function can negate strengths in others, Any estimate regarding the prospects for an effective Soviet defense against low-
thlt report ihc lerm "low altitude" Ii used to mem tlliTudnett ubove retrain because US bomber forces are ipriif trully equipped lo use tab all (lode regimerim* ty tact be Thc ICSn- low attitudes" as lessori, "low ahrfodes" useet. But for purposes of thisinee ol SCOorenot been used ai lhelliiude" because lhe upper limits o( lbc range wuutdrt low-allilod* air deieeae capabilities in reU-Ito. to US npllortt Also. Ibe lo-cr talleet in the JCS delInl.
I ioo dim not crxompia the low rur/ ol opnatinf alWodea ol US
bwabeiL
Air Defense Functic
Pene'rarinQ Bomber
All of these leporote oil defense functions mutt be performed well if the ortocling aircraft ore to be engaged successfully.
bombers must be an aggregate of judgments of Soviet proficiency in each of Ihe essential air defense [unctions.
Interceptors
Although the flight profile of US bombers striking targets in thc Soviet Union wouldypical US bomber attempting to strike selected targets in the Soviet Union would probably fly at medium to high altitudes for most of its route prior to enteringairspace. It would then descendow altitude for penetration of defenses. Soviet interceptors would tiy to engage the bombers both before and after they reached the USSR's borders.
Individual interceptors operating against bombers at medium to high altitudes at distances greater than
m beyond lhe Soviet borders would experience extreme difficulty in finding their targets because ol the lack of adequate air surveillance and control in these areas. The Soviets have had airborne earlyaircraft (Moss) wllh limited medium- to high-altitude control capabilities for more than seven years. Relative to the amount of airspace to be defended,mall number (nine) of these aircraft have been deployed. Thc Soviet* are improving iheir capability to control and vector small numbers of Interceptors with Ihe Moss aircraft. However, the lack of anairborne warning and control system is dill the major factor which denies theignificant capability to Intercept bombers prior to entry into Soviet land-based radar coverage.
ver the Soviet landmass, against bombers flying at lo* altitudes, thc capabilities of Soviet Interceplons
arc very poor. Against high-speed penettators some Soviet inlerccplorS lack sufficient low-altitude aerodynamic performance. However, the principal deficiency is thai thc Soviet airborne Intercept radars, used for acquiring and tracking targets, function satisfactorilyto high altitudes but arcto find low-altitude targets by "looking down" below tlie interceptors altitude.*
Closely related to thc "look-down" problem for Soviel interceptors is the problem of destroying the target once it is located. Soviet interceptorsshool'down". the capabilily of an in-terceptor at medium to high altitudes to launch an air-to-air missile that can be guided to or home on andow-flying target. Withouthoot-down capability PVO Strany interceptors attempting toomber must fly at an altitude essentially the same as, or slightly below, that of the target.
The lack of an adequate means of finding low-altitude targets using equipment on board thccould be offsetontrol element couldthe interceptor close enoughomber so that the pilot could find tbe target. This would require highly reliable and continuous tracking of low-altitude penctrators by ground-basedirborne radars, translation of this information into commands, and transmission of these to thc interceptor. The Soviets havearge number of air surveillance radon in heavily populated and critical target areas, along major rivers, and in maritime areas. The site spacing of radars in these areas is such that radar coverage could be continuous and frequentlyMany of these radars have been equipped with moving target indicators (MTI) lo allow them some capability to eliminate or reduce the effects of duttcr. Nevertheless, thc effectiveness of radar coverage can be degraded severely by terrain masking when aerodynamic targets penerrate at low altitudes and when Ihese targets employ ECM and tactics to avoid detection. In addition, for tracking data to be used effectively for intercepting low-altitude targets, the radars must he netted together by advanced dataand processing
3
Thecurrentlyrontal Aviation, haiimited capability tomek. and engage
turgel* Mooepitxlily ot Flogger and Hi potential
nie In PVOei In this report.
low-altilude tracking and interceptorGCI operators rely on their own localarc usually limited in range to aboutilesofand tne interceptors arc within ancontroller's area of radar coverage for only aThis requires that control of the interceptfrom controller to controller atsites during thc course of an engagement.very close coordination between severaland pilots, given the speeds of bothand interceptors, thc chances arc poorSoviets could achieve reliable interceptsat low altitude.
Surface-to-Air Missile Forces Low-Altitude Capabilities
There are four SAM systems in PVO Strany'sdesignatedndeployed atites havingaunchers (there are0 missiles onlaunchers accommodate more than ones shown in Figurehese SAMs provide good coverage against targets flying at medium and high allitudes.
Of these SAM systems, only thcndhich arc deployed atites, are estimated to have some capability (using conventional warheads) against low-allltudeoth were designed and tested in thcndnd each has subsequentlycries of modifications which appearave improved low-altitude
Thesedium- to high-altitude defense system. Its present minimumaltitudeeet. Wllh optical modifications that may now eaist, and under optimum conditions, theould engage targets flying as tow> aseel. Successful Intercepts in thc low-altitude regime would require near-ideal engagement conditions and ranges would be very limited.
n tlie olher hand, was designed lo engage low altitude aircraft.
^support es-
*Theet me oil located around Moscow. Their lownl engagementurrently estimated loew tboutind Icrl. Theirpmtionalompletes: iheir (ow< altitude caiuhililyeet tiling ronrcntianal -iitiemk
timatcs lhal the luw-altitude capability ol lite SAO hai been improvedeet loedm from the iltr under optimum conditions.on-maneuvering target, no ECM. no terrain masking, and adequate target acquisition data. At thc^nfiimum range ofm. minimum engagement altitude iiV camera hai been added to thcadar which aid* the system In low-altitude tracking and abo serves as an electronic counter-counter measures (ECCM) aid.
Ki (here are two very significant features of thcndystems that pertain lo the overall problemarge-scale bomber penetration of the Soviet Union:
Deployed units withew eiceptiont stay at Hied sites, (he locations of which are well known
to US intelligence
systems have short low-altitude engagement ranges
Taken together, these two facts permit thc use of stand-off attack weapons, suppression, and avoidance tactics. Therefore, it is likely thatmallof those SAMs used for barrier or ore* defenses would be able to engage penetrating bomben. Soviet SAMs would potentially be most effective when used (or point defenses.
Nuclear Warheods for SAAAS
here is evidence that nuclear warheads arc availableignificant portion ofthendites, and to someomplexes.
^Jagainstwarheadsconsidered adespitedamage ilut could occur Theradiusuclear warhead could(he potential luring pmblemt of thendmiss distances inherent Inperation atthus increasing effective range. The usewjiheaili. however, would not alonepotential effectIvencss of US forces as the fixedstill vulnerable to the tactic* ofmul destruction.
Defense Against Ihe Short-Ronge Attack Missile
US strategic bomben are or willwith the SRAM, which has these
mall high-speed missile which it extremely difficult for Soviet SAM systems to detect, track, or engage. These factors make theeapon against which Ihe Soviets have no defense after it has been launchedomber.
maximum range onemi ballisticow.allitude flight profileow-altitude SRAM carrier to stay outside thc effective kill envelope of any Soviet SAM site while launching its missile
Because of its range advantage over Soviet SAMs at low altitude, the SRAM can be used to attack targets before thc bomber can bo engagedAM.when SAM avoidance may not be practical, thc SRAM can be targeted against SAM defenses.
Effectivenoss Against Eloctronic Counter measure.
US aircraft are equippedariety of systems to degrade the capabilities of Soviet radars and weapons. The Soviets regard thb "electronic warfare" equipment, which includes ECM.efinite threat to their ability lo conduct air defense. In response to Ihis threat Ihey have developed ECCM.
In general, the potential effects of electronic warfare are exceedingly difficult to ascertain. Among other factors, they depend on the characteristics of both offensive and defensive equipments and many features of Soviet radars and weapons are not known. Compounding this uncertainty is thc fact that ECM effectiveness is scenario-dependent. For example, it will vary with the relative difference In power output and the range between ECM emitters and victim radars. Additionally, the number of emitters, the numbers and types of radars being countered, bomber altitude, whether and how decoys are used, the manner in which ECM is used, and other important variables ate all factors which must be considered in assessing ECM effectiveness. For all of these reasons, tlie analysis of electronic warfare interactions has not been attempted in this study.
4-
is highly prolraMe lhal US penetration aids,ECM. willroblem to the Sovicl aVfcnscs.
Summary of PVOapabilities
summary of lhc preceding assessments ofcurrent capabilities againstattack Is given in Tabic II.
C. Air Defenses of Olher Soviel Services
In addition to PVO Strany. the Soviets also mainluin other air defense elements within lite USSR. These arc thc so-called "tactical" forces which are organic In the Ground Forces and Frontal Aviation. Generally. Ihey arc the best-equipped forces for low-altitude air defense in lhe Sovicl Union today. Moreover, as shown in Table III. in terms of sheer numbers they are of comparable size lo PVO Strany and could be the sourceignificant number ofresources for air defense against low-allltude bombers.
These forcesose liaison with PVO Strany and are capable of providing needed support in several critical ddcniive operations. The Cround Forces' SAMs and AAA are characterized by their mobility which could be employedariety of useful ways lo supplement PVO Strany's fixed SAM sites. Tactical SAMs and AAA could be used to fill in gaps in PVO Strany SAM coverage and supplement defenses near Important point targets. The mobile liAMs and AAA could make It more difficult for US aircraft to employ lhe tactics of avoidance and desl ruction. ^
Similarly. Frontal Aviation's fighters could supple-
n
J
meat PVO Strany's interceptor force, could provide replacement units for PVO Sliany losses, and could provide alternate bases for PVO Strany interceptor operations. Using these forces, tlie overall air defense system would be more effective than that of PVO Strany alone.
The Soviets are strong advocates of electronic warfare as indicated by Ihe amount of ECM and electronic warfare support measures (ESM) equipment deployed with both airborne and ground-based units of the Soviel Air Forces and Cround Forces. Those systems which couldirect Impact on penetrating aircraft are organic to Ihe Cround Forces. Some Soviet electronic warfare equipment is designed to degrade thc ability of these aircraft Io attack their targets. This degradation would be attempted by electronically jamming lhe aircraft'sILttl.ll
Eiaci numbers, deployment, and subordination of these ground-based electronic warfare assets cannot be accurately determined; however.^
"Tfcliecsc Brick. Tub Brick. Mound Brick. King Pin. sridthetrailer rad ar jammers!"
jrxtofirrned within theany of these are now locatea near strategically important targets such as centers of industry, major military facilities, and command centers Almost all of lhe equipment Is located in Cround Forces garrisons Depending upon wartime scenarios, many of Ihese ground army units would probably move to support theater operations along the periphery and outside the Soviet borders, while other units might remain in place or deploy within the USSR to support strategic defense of key areas. If deployed for strategic defense, Ihe potential dfectlveness of this equipment would depend upon location, terrain, Soviet command and control procedures, and bomber equipment and tactics.
he most important factor, however,the utility of tactical air ddense forces for defense of the Soviet homeland is Iheir availability. Thb would depend on their location, the priority of theater operations, their organiialion and means of control, and the sequence and timing of eventsomber attack on (he USSR. All of these fact on areand would critically affect the type and degree of support thc tactical forces could provide to PVO Strany The availability of tactical air defenses has been examined under four possible situations. (Il is also possible that some PVO Slrany assets could be used for theater air defensehese arc dii-
TAWLK II
ASSESSMENT OF PVO STRANDS CURRENT tOW.ALTlTUDE CAPABILITIES
RAM
Und-beeed Very poor Noi apptabb Someave euf-
ri-*if raofc hot Ut* forte
LoTi'-ftititujif Soviet
Utfca ulr^uuUrcep torque uol c*
of elTectime "Jook-
dowa" radar. Laet of
Loweltitudr eirtpeee
uei*
ShOflroeat renf* and
eeaeretiy poor petferm-aatr at le*e
kettioae arcMi
cut be avoided end ere
*"
d* of Soviet defecoes from
ICBM or SLBM attack* or tht effect* of US bomber penetration tide.
TABLE III
LOLTI TU DE AIR DEFENSES IK TBE USSR
Forces
N.A.
etutioos <not deployed)
A-4SA-0SA-8SA-ffnumber*
number *
Aviation 1
.
.
ecflUneant upon general purpote force re^uiremente In theaterA"ere tn fixed kceuone but ceo move to alternate tlte*.
ploy men l d ECM is deployed ertthe/nsy air
Deptoyrrteni Jutt 1
19
Jep Secret '
in descending order of likelihood.
xampleWarurope PrecedingBomber Attack on the USSR. If war beganon-nuclear conflict in Europe. Urge numbers of Soviet Ground Forces and Frontal Avialion dements could be moved Into Ihb theater in support of Warsaw Pud operations. At present, Soviet lactical forces are Ideally situated forontingency. Also, most of their exercises and training are In preparation for combined arms warfare In Central Europe Under these circumstances. II Is possible thatraction of the lactical air defenses in the western USSR would remain in the Soviet Union, and consequently, relatively liltle support would be available to PVO Strany
xampUBeginstrategic Nuclear Attack. In thb case thc Ground Forces could
Location of Soviet Ground Forces
be in essentially Iheir present positionstrategic bomber attack They could provideoint or limited area defense from their present deployment locationsndicate* the present locations of Soviet Ground Forces. Some, such as those along the Soviet-Chinese border and in areas east of the Ural mountains, arc not positioned for defense of critical strategic targets Relatively few are very close to principal Soviet cities such as Moscow and Leningrad Others, however, are in place for limited defense of important military and Industrial targets along ihe western and southwestern borders of thc USSR.
rontal Aviation's fighters are positioned to provide support to the Ground Forces The inherent mobility ol these fighters, however, would permitsupport to PVO Strany. At present, thbwould probably have little effect on the outcome of the air baltle because must current Frontal Aviation fighters are oo belter lhan PVO Slrany's against low-figure 3
Soviet Ground Fortes ore in place lor limited defense ot relatively lew are very close to principal cities
altitude bombers. At some future lime when Frontal Aviation lighters do achieve an improved low-altitude engagement capability. Frontal Aviation support could be very important.
30War Begin* with Strategic Nuclear Allacks an4 the Soviet* Optimize Their Strategic DeJenK for*a'Short Period. If the Soviets werethat the US Intended touclear attack on thc USSR,arge bomber attack, they couldri ii. and redeploy some of (heir lactical air delense forces to positions more advantageous lor support to PVO Strany. Evenemporary readjustment wouldariety of complex command, control, and coordination problems and related decisions which could be diflicull for the Soviets.
Technical Problems and Solutions
ffective radars are vital to thc success of air defenses because ihey are the ptlmc sensors for detecting and Hacking enemy aircraft. Most deployed radars can perform (hb function if the target aircraft ore flying al medium or high altitudes; however, when the aucraft are at low altitudes, radareverely degraded.
here are two technical reasons whyifficult for tadars to detect and track low-flying aircraft. The first Is that radar beams travel essentially in straight lines so thai lhe range atadar canimited by thc earth's curvature;hc line-of-sight limitation. The second limitation bdue to unwanted radar beam reflections from the earth's surface and various terrain features; these are commonly called "dutler" and "multipath" effects.
or ground-based radars these effects combine to limit the dbtance al which an aircraft flying ai low altitude can be detected and tracked Even for advanced radars, line of sight limits law-altitude target detection tooautical miles from the radar site.llustrates the effect ol the shrinking radar coverage for dllferent target altitudes.
lthough less affected by line-of-slght limitations, current Soviet airborne radari become severely degraded by clutter In attempts to "look down'" at aircraft targets. Typical search volumes for two lypes of airbornesurveillance and fireillustrated in Figure 5.
n peacetime, tactical forces In lhe USSR are normally controlled by commanders of the military'is. In preparation for war. however, both ground and air elements would be assigned to fronts which would be controlled by lhe general staffesult. In the situation described In this example Ihe use ofair defense assets for strategic defense would have to be done under lhe aegis of the general atafl The use of tactical air defense forces in this situation Is probably the vubiect of contingency planning on both the general staff and PVO Strany levels
he operational and technical problems could be solvedumber of ways. Resubordlnation ofair defense forces probably would bethrough some form of operational control which would allow PVO Strany to direct the tactical units without assuming administrative and logisticThis would permit the return of the lactical units lo rhcli parent organizationsinimum of difficulty. Technical problems might be more difficult to solve. Tactical unit command posts would have lo be Integrated irilo thc PVO Strany command, control, und aim mu meat ions network. While wc do not know precisely how tactical units would be integrated, we believe il can be accomplished
xampleSovieu Maitmlze Their Preparation*trategic Nuclear Attack. In this case lhe Soviets would place highest priority on the strategic air defense of the Soviet Union, and would make extensive long-term redeployments of ibeirair defense fexecs [_
elieved la be an unlikely option. However, if ilcusled.ikelyajor pari mSthertactical forces would be redeployed
Search Capabilities of Airborne Radars
Soviet airborne radon become severely degraded byrodar beam refle-criont from the earth's wrfoce. Ihe differences tn dsHler-fret- search regions for airborne olr surveillance radars and Interceptor fire-control rodors ore illustrated.
The technical problem of reducing clutter can be solvedariety of ways. The most effective ways are associated with advanced radar technology and take advantage of the target aircraft's relative motion. Clutter reduction methods arc well known to the Soviets. They possess the theoretical background to attack these problems, and have demonstrated, for many years, capabilities for engineering and production of suchor ground-based radars. However, the problem of developing airborne radars for this purpose is compounded by size and weight constraints Advanced electronicequired in order to process radar data for maximum duller reduction on-board an aircraft platform for all-aspect target detection. Production of this microcircuitry may be thc dominant factor which has precluded the Soviets' deployment of advanced airborne radars
Soviet radar designers mustwith the problem of overcoming theby the penetrating bomber force. Bytheir experiences in Vietnam, In the Middleare acutdy awaredegree lo which air defense effectiveness canby offensive ECM.
Soviet Programs
yean, the Soviets have madein their deployed ground-basedof which could result in betterlou-ullitude target* They arc aboand development lor radar improvements
advanced interceptor or AWACS with an overland look-down capability. Whether the Flogger radar uses digital processing techniques cannot be determined
he Soviets" ECCM capabilities have steadily grown over the years.
The
density and diversity oi their radar deployment also complicates ECM tactics and design.
he only Soviel airborne radar which has demonstrated any look-down capability is that currently mounted on theircraft deployed with Frontal Aviation.
only very short ranges, limited look-down angles, and small altitude separations as shown in Figure 6.
he Soviet state-of-the-art In look-down radar technology reflected by the capabilities of the Floggcr's radar is less than that required for an
odern Soviet radars are likely to have more sophisticated ECCM features than did their prcdecessori.
Ronge/Engagemenl Geometry of Flogger
Ihe flogger B, currently deployed witK Frontal Aviation, hosimited capability to detect, trock. ond engage- targets below its oltliode. The moximom observed ionge ot low aliiiude hos beenm (see
74
Ooa^trTeT"
r
J
he Soviets are also likely to have uncertainties aboul Ihe effectiveness of iheir ECCM. The increased speeds of US penetrators, Ihe use of decoys, and lhe use of weapons with low radar cross sections place greater demands on an air defense surveillance and tracking system and increase lbc advantage to the attacker Irom even modest, short-durationf lhe It defenses. The Soviets abo are likely to be* to whether or not they have identified all form, of US ECM. Thus, even if the Soviets maxlmiie their efforts to reduce the vulnerability of their air defenses, they almost certainly would not be highly confident aboul
now well the system would operate in an ECM environment Nonetheless. Soviet radarrained in an ECM environ men! to increase their proficiency under combat conditions-
B, Air Surveillance
Technical Problems and Solutions
Air surveillance combines Ihe functions of detecting and tracking aircraft, processing radar data, and dbseminallng it to many users In order that they nuylear picture of the position, direction of flight, and Identity of all aircraft Radar coverage over large areas can be achieved by using relatively small numbers of airborne radar* or largo numbers of ground-based radars, or both. Each of these two means has Its own advantages as indicated In Table IV.
f airborne surveillance radars arc to be employed, the primaryevelopmen! of thc radar Itself: ii must be capable of reducing or eliminating clutter effects in order lo detect and track target aircraft below the radar. To date, the Soviets do not possessadar. If developed andighly capable airborne radarital to the air defense system wouldigh-priority target lor offensive penetraton
onventional radars operatena of sight and arc thus limiled in their reach by tbc curvature of the earth One technique to increase the warning time fa to use an over-the-horiion detection (OHD) radar
IV
IHANCE OPTIONS
OpcreUoeial HealblUly
Fe-required lorartead. eo.erap beyond border*
ruiillj-ed> le.-aliiwde aircraft Ice relatively tool perlodi
lOable (or lease*.
mniuph eata-aeoeaaw-ieaUor. (awe oaO,
Met.tart.ef>a-hiple
decree aeeded by aut-ee-
Caa aaa kar>>
li ul baileda ol
which transmit* in thc same frequency range asradio broadcasts, using the ionosphereeflecting surface. These OHD radarsotential to be used for aircraft detection. For example, thc radar under construction at Kiev could significantly improve thc Soviet ability to detect aircraft approaching from thc Norwegian Sea at altitudes close lo the ocean's surface. Aircraft could be detected at ranges ofm outm. Warning time against aircraft could be extendedew minutes tons much as several hours and with this earlier detection more efficient use could be made of airborne warning and control aircraft and long-range interceptors, If the radar Is not disabled by an earlier attack. Though another OHD radar being built at Komsomol'sk would complement existing systems, it would provide no substantial advantage over existing systems in an aircraft detection role.
SI. Broad area radar coverage of low-altitude targets also can be achieved by using ground-based radars. In this method, large numbers must be deployed because of thc relatively short range at which low-altitude aircraft can be detected and tracked from any single radar site. Using many radars reduces thc effects of loss of Individual radars due to offensive ECM or physical destruction. ThU approach has been, and still is. pursued by the Soviets, as evidenced by thc
very large numbers of ground-based radars which are deployed.
arc technical difficulties inthe many Inputs from such an arrayradars. Track data from each radarcollected and collated quickly and accuratelytoontinuous, clear, compositeall aircraft In the area under surveillance.of collecting, processing, anddataetwork of radars toand weapons unitsimely fashionbe solvedomplex of computerscommunications equipment.
Soviet Programs
For vears the Soviets haveanual systemsystem for processing and disseminating radar data, and they have recently begun to deploy improved
An important measure of performance of these systems is Ihe timeliness and accuracy of the airdata that is disseminated to weapons units and command echelons. This, in turn, depends on many factors such as: lhe radars used and the rangesthe means of entering radar data into the
system, (he equipment and techniques used forand combining track data at intermediate echelons, the routing of data between nodes in the system, and the means for using track data by weapons units and cc^rjrnand echelons. In general, the impact of these factor* on timeliness and accuracy is aof the degree of automation In thc system.
71
he trend toward improving air surveillancecc^^
C Surfoce-io-Air Missiles
Technical Problems and Solutions
he effect which ultimately limits the low-altitude effectiveness of SAM wcaponi is the relatively short range of thc radars owing to line-of-site limitations. This seriously limits the time available for
the system toarget. In addition, ihe SAM systems must also overcome the degrading effects which clutter, multipath returns, anil ECM have on tracking, guidance, and fuzing.
tliehc Soviets have takenalleviate the problem of short engagement time,new radar nettings and data systemsolost of PVO Strany's SAMsUSSR's periphery and in heavily defendeduse these data systems.^
"^ndicale
Ihat the data flow in such arrangements can improve low-altitude tracking and increase the time availableAM site forow-altitude target.
Jamming of various components ofsystem can degrade ils effectiveness if stepstaken to counter thc jamming Inmissile systems such as thend SA-3.
radar signals reflected directlyarget and those from the target reflected from (he ground. They cause an "image" of the luigcl signal to appear below the elevation of the realistorting thc real target signal. Constructive and destructive radio frequency interference between the direct and rellccted signals result in (he iniroduction of angular tracking errors into the radar's elevation tracking circuits. These tracking errors can produce large missile guidance errors and, ultimately, large mm distances
Fuzing can alsoroblem in these systems al low altitudes. If proximity type fuzes are used and if miss distances are Urge al Io* altitudes, fuzing ranges must he large and thereanger that the fuze will function on groundthe warhead prematurely. This can be overcome through thc use of warheads with greater radius of effect, command detonation, or special low-altitude proximity fuzes.
There are good Indications thai theystem was designed from tlie outset to compensate for problems with clutter, multipath, and fuzing.
here Ls liveness
against theseuller discussion of thc escalation of ECM and ECCM In SAM systems is contained in.
Clutter and multipath effects can make accurate tracking and missile guidance at low altitudesThis is particularly true In command-guided missile systems such as thend theoving target Indicator systems are used in thc versions of both oi these lystcmi deployed In the Sovietoving target Indicator helps loarget more visibleackground of radar reflections from ground clutter.
Multipath effects are more difficult to deal with. They are produced by interference between
'Fo. dfliM ifurmmti ol thi* tcpic seeSAMof th* Eflccti-vciea
ol Sojwj Airo VaAltiomuuoldocummili do sol run mill)
lepracM th* .irwi of ilfTjcndc. participating laton ofarc (or r. alv.
J Despite lis
low-altitude features, Ihe Inlercept range of theystem at low altitudes is short and Its performance can be severely degraded in poor low-altitude tracking renditions.
Theystem, on the other hand, was not initially designed Io cope with low-altitude targets. This capability has been added In newer models of the system. Newest versionsoving target indicator system. However, it is unlikely that effective radar modifications to cope with multipath errors have been added.
In an export version of theinocular optical tracking system has beenew missile.
grc less
used wiih Ihe systemarliead whose fragment sprayess directional than the warhead used on earlier models. To prevent fuze prcfunction on round reflections, command detonation is used. Thc directional warhead helps lo compensate for
inaccuracies inherent in such commandthese
this vcnioi7ofthe system has some effectiveness as loweet.
c do not understand the versions of theeployed in the Soviet Union as well as we understand the eiport model. Unconfirmed reports In thc past haveower altitude limit ofoci for the type of systems deployed In the Soviet Union. There are indications that field modifications to systems deployed In the USSR were made in Ihendo improve performance at low altitudes. Subsequently, there
have been
reference! to an altitude limit as loweet. VVe arc not certain what the modifications involved, but they were stated to be improvements based on experience against low-flying targets in Vietnam.js jhe same terminology used when modifications htvolving lhe installation of optical tracking devices were performed on the export version. In addition, photography of Sovietites in East Cermany has revealed possible devices for training of optical tracking operators. Thus, although we are not able to confirm the use of optical tracking devices on similarn the USSft, thisood possibility.
t low altitudes, thendystems have very shnrl effective ranges and will suffer pcrfor-
options available to the Sovietsof SAMs for improved low-altitudeagainst thc bomber arc described in Tableare discussed in detail starting with paragraph
70.
TABLE VII SAM IMPROVEMENT OPTIONS FOB LOW-ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE
Optionfor the range Inadequacies ol individual
SAMi by deploying vaiily inexurxd numbers ol SAM sites UptMinid*ieodi for Urge numbers ol SAM
BJICK
Optioneiiiting mobile SAMsPVO Strany.
OptionSAM* to cover medium- indi. Iml abandon low-altitude SAM defense. Rely In (be future on advanced Interceptor aircraft and Improved air lor-vrilluncr to engage aiimfl ut low altitude*
Optionnew SAM systems whichonger range al
linr altitudes.
Optionan Improved SAM similar to (hat discussed inWth llm additions! requltement lhal it be mobile.
Optionu SAM ryitem capable of succeasfvl low-altitude engagements jg.lml the SRAM This iroaldof necessity be an ad-vuncrd technolufy system
Soviet Programs
is no evidence that the Soviets planvastly increased numbers of SAMs andas postulated ino compensate forin their operational systems. Thesec the problem as described in thisone of overcoming technical limitations.
thcic arc some uncertainties aboul theSoviet preparations, they probably plan to use
nuclear warheads on some SAM systems. Therange could be increased by relaxedin missile guidance (racking accuracy.large numbers of nuclear-equipped SAMs wouldfewer additional SAM deployments thanI. We do nof know whether the Soviets plannuclear SAMs for low-altitudeby Optiontheir use must bea possibility. The limited evidenceagaimt bomber formations at higher altitudes.lhat nuclear SAMs would give the Sovietscapability af low altitudes, but theyhe vulnerable tu avoidance or suppression.
3 could be implemented eithermobilc-SAM equipped Cround Forcesupport of PVO Strany or by PVO Stranyof existing mobile systems. As noted earlier,of mobile SAMs of tactical forces to augmenthas some serious drawbacks (see paragraphsand thc Soviets probably do not foreseeajor dementuccessful low-
^altitude defense nf the Soviet humdand. Nevertheless,
^PVO Strany couldthe transportability of (Tiend the SA-3to operate them from alternate sites duringalthough their locations, too, arc allThendystems could beunprepared sites, but this option is moreIn any case, Soviet
procurement of mobile SAMs for PVOossibility, but wc Iiave no evidence to support thb.
There are good Indications lhat the Soviets have not given up on SAMs (as suggested by Optionor use against low-altitude penetrators. They havemade qualitative improvements in their operational systems andew strategic SAM system under development.
As shown in Figurehe first new strategic SAM system since thcs under development at Launchf the Sary Shagan Missile Test Center. This site has dements which wouldew low-alliludc SAM system. Theobserved arc new and all.ower-mounted radar, are transportable. Hence, the system may be compatible withndlthough there is some uncertainty about the degree of mobility. It Is probably between rhat of thend tbe SA-6.
lthough it is Hearew SAM system is under development at Launch Complex C. it is too early to identify confidently its operationaland mission; consequently we cannot yet assess its performance Might testingissile associated with theC system has been detetfedf"
|lf the system developmentalimetable similar to olher Soviet SAMs, Initial operational capability could be reached
he Soviets could attempt toystem for defense against the SRAM but we do not believe they will succeed in achieving an effective defense within the nextears. The development ofonceivably includes such an effort, but we have no proof of this. Modifications to current systems do not appear to be for this purpose, and such nwdlficatlons -wsoujd be so extensive that they may not be practical.
The possible anti-tactical ballbtic missile (ATBM) system under development al lhe Soviet Cround Forces missile lest center near Emba could have some capabilities agaimt SRAMs. If the Emban ATBM and was designed lo cope wllh longer range, higher velocity missiles such as Pershing, II could have some capability against semi ball lilic SRAMs. It bthai It would have capabilities against low-altitude 'HAM', since the system's radar would need sophisticated clutter-processing equipment which is not required for ATBM use.
It is being developed for the Soviet Cround Forces.eployment of this or any new defensive system in PVO Strany wouldassive program of production and deployment to achieve on effective SRAM defense.
SI. The Soviets have been deeply concerned about the vulnerability of (heir SAM systemsffensive jamming As in other areas. SAM ECCM capabilities havecady growth and could now be quite substantial. f_
D. Interceptor Defense
Technical Problems and Solulioni
s noted previously, the problem! associated with PVO Strany Interceptor capabilities depend partly on the geographical area ol possible usage. Beyond Soviet borders, current interceptors are limited by poor or nonexistent interceptor control The most feasible way lo improve thb situation lies in the deployment of an AWACSook-down caoabllllv. f"
2
ie Soviets' own prevlously-thb capability and evidence that they have begun lo develop radar look-down technologp'ruggesr that anefinite possibility In the future.
he Soviets have, at times, employed ships for air surveillance and interceptor control, bui with limited success. To improve defenses beyond Soviel borders, large numben would have to he used and this it considered unlikely
ther meansof enhancing air defense operalions arc use of combat airAP) and lane control tactics, CAP provides maximum intercept range In minimum engagement time.n important adjunct lo normal control procedures which provides an airborne barrier across likely axes ol air attack, particularly in the Initial stage of lhe air battle when deployed at extended ranges from the territorial border. Lane control Is an appropriate lactic when grounderiously degraded. Itso cover relatively broad areas with many interceptors operatingemlautonomoui mode. Lane control is predicated on interceptors attacking targets of opportunity Developments in ground and airborne systems, coupled with these tactics, would improve Soviet air defense operations.
ithin Soviet borders, achievementredible low-altitude interceptor defenseombination of two Improvements:etter GCIr borne-con trolled Intercept capability and (b) an interceptorook-down/ihoot-down capability Isequirensenii related lo these two Ingredient* arc summarized in Table VIII. Broad area air lurvcillance data could be available citherook-down AWACS or from an improved, ground-based air surveillance network. These concept* arc depicted in Figuresf thc Sovieb use either of these concepts, its technical and operational feasibility will depend on thc volume of airspace in which an interceptor can searcharget compared to the errors in thc vectoring data providedCIinterceptor's search range must be large
TABLE Vltl
REQUIREMENTS TOR IMPROVED INTERCEPTOR DEFENSE
Requireata
Broad area air surveillance available to CCI tonlroller. Vectoring error*compared to interoeplor'a oa-board taareVacq out lion nog'.
Look-down acquit) lio of search range large coraparad to GCIl-i! .i. i: armament.
omooaenU
improved CoBlral of Interceptors
Improved Inlerwptor
compared to theaclfog/vector ingualitative comparison of these values is shown inuantitative estimates arc discussed in
Programs
Off. As noted previously, there is no evidence that Ihc Soviets are planning to replace their present Moss aircraft with an AWACSook-down capability. However, there is evidence that the Soviets are beginning to deploy improved data systems with their air surveillance radars and CCI elements. The Flogger. deployed with Frontal Aviation,imited capability to attack targets below its own altitude.
he Flogger was initially deployed to Frontal Aviation
L_
lthough the Flogger has not yet been deployed to any operational PVO Strany combat regiments. PVO Strany pilots have been practicing with it since4 at their advanced pilot training unit.C
v
that the Floggerariant of this aircraft will be deployed to PVO Strany in thc near future.
ontrol arrangements for interceptors made possible by improved data transmission systems and the netting of radars provide different degrees offor low-altitude air defense. Two methods of employing the data systems and radar nettings ore discussed below.
a. Imptooed Battle Management and Ltmtled CCI Support. In thb case the netting arrangements
Qualrtalwo Company of GCI Vectoring Errors ond Interceptor Search Range Capabilities Figure 12
ocreiiM .nt.ecept, GCI vectoring erron mi.il be small compared lo the search capabilities ol ihe ir.iercop.or.
serve iwo purposes Ballle managers would be presentedlearer, more timely composite ol the air situation and an improved capability tomised wrapom engagements CCI controllers would uv the data to reduce some of tbe problems ofontrol between different CCI eon-Iroflcrv Koch controller, however, would rely on his own IocjI radar for control of interceptors assigned to him This is entirely consistent with all available tlittu und would provide some improvcmenl In PVO Strany capabilities However, by relying on his ownCI controller would be capable of,on.rnl overimited area Many of rhe current problems of interceptor control would still can!
h Imprtroett Hattle Management and Remote Vectoring of Inienepton In this case the nettings would In- used lor battle management im-prnvcrnenU. hut llit* principal gain would he lo
CI controller to vector Interceptors beyond the line of sight of his own local radar This is most important insofar as future air defense im-provemenCi are concerned When combined with improved inte.ceptors. the Soviets could have tbe potential In. reducing many of the technical dif-licultiet associated with low-altitude air defense over many portions of Soviet airspace in whichtlur coverage eifists. The need for frequent transfer of control betsveen CCI controllers could be reduced or eliminated entirely Time constraints, which currently limit the capability lo conduct in-leiirpts ul low altitudes, could be substaniiallv arlaaid
'ITthe possibility of remote vectoring oftimid offer theotential means of sulrvl.ifiti.ll improvements in ihcit low-altitude air dileiiM'v. Ill technical leasibilily has been itudied in Mime detail Engineering models ol the
^have been constructed in order to estimate the accuracy and timdineu oi the tracking data provided to CCI controllers from remote radars These models are discussed in thr Appendiie
ive* are reasonably confident thattrackingthc capabilities of these systems. TheAgency believe* thai, because ofabout thete newonfidentof current eopabihlies cannot be made. Onevidence CIA believes that anoectortnt capability is unlikely al ihuFlngger's look-down search and ucauisitionbeen compared with these cslimate* of the airtracking errors. Thbontributes to our assessments ofof various interceptor and aircombinations for low-altitude defense.in the following paragraphs and inreflect potential effectivenessenign
E- losers for Air Defense
he Soviets have large-scale programs under way involving the use of lasers for military applications. Some of these are sponsored by PVO
TABLE IX
POTENTIAL INTERCEPTOR DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS
Capability ol Individual
ol Interceptor GCI Control
hoot-dowa
support from improved air sorvclBaac*
poor
look-doanSsnool-down
vectoring wing an improved air
network
ahoet-range. limited
auppoit Irom improved air surveillance
m'shoot-dow n
ihott-ranee. limited
vectoring using, an improved air
to good
0 Hi 0r,
network
long-range, look-down/
support Irom improved air surveillance
to good
on
long-range, look-do war
vectoring using an unproved air
net-ork
' Whether the indicated potential could be realised by the Sovleu baa not been award sinee the effective new ol US ECM tactics aad other penetiatioa aid. haa no* bun included In the ajalyaia.
3
knI
but lhc spccilic goals and status ol these efforts have not beenhe potential capabilities nf lasers (or Soviet air defense applications are:
aircraft by use ol laser radars.
designators lor SAM guidance.
or destruction of aircraftaser beam weapon, and
or destructionRAMaser beam weapon.
radars would be technically feasibleoffer vastly increased accuracy overradar capabilities under conditions ofand weather. Laser designators could beSAM guidance to improve guidance accuracyHowever the lack of an all-weatherthe lack of any apparent need for suchsuggest that the Introduction of laserdesignators would not overcome any of theIn Soviet low-altitude air defenses.
laser weapons couldu range of only six miles by the earlyis no improvement over thc range ofWith this limitation, such weaponsto be used in point or vital-area defenses.lasers would probably be limitedangetwo or three miles, compared to three tofor current air-to-air missiles. Even if Ihcdeploy laser weapons with muchduring the ncxl decade (there is alwaysfor technological breakthroughs),would still require thc extensive supportair surveillance and command andDeployment of these supporting systemsbegun during the past few years and is notlo be completed,
F. Deploymenl ond Operational Patterns
the three air defense arms of PVOSAMs. and air surveillance)umber ol years has been towardon the quality of equipment. Newerhave replaced older ones on less than abasis, resulting in smaller numbers of more-
U.utcgic
onflicthid
imrxf III. Anne. C.etailed
fiiuion i3 Soviel law pHig'umi.
capable intctceptois. The trend In SAMs has been to continue introducing modifications for improved, low-altitude performance by belter target tracking, missile guidance, and fuzing. In olr surveillance, the number of radars has increased slightly in recent years and there hasontinuing program of improvement. There haserious effort lo use these radars more effectively by introducing newer data systems which can support the needs of weapons employment. Such data systems have already been widely deployed for SAM*command andew years ago. similar systems began to appear in support of CCI elements.
though there seems tolearImproving lhe quality of equipmentdeploying larger numbers, thc overall sizeair defenses is still enormous and likely loso. The massive size of Soviet air defensethc large area to be defended impactslhe lead time required to effect significantthe capabilities of PVO Strany by introducingof new or better equipment.hase, it normally takes several yearsSoviets to produce and deploy sufficienttheir air defense forces. Additionally.personnel willeriod of trainingbefore they achieve rxoFicJency.
III. PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED LOW-AITITUDE AIR DEFENSF
preceding sections have describedproblems in low-altitude air defense andthose technically feasible optionsfor improvements which they appear toThese factors will be used as inputsabout overall air defenseime frame. Before expressinghowever, it is necessaryqualifications which affect the judgments.
A. Qualifications
ur judgments about future low-altitude air defenses focus no prospt-ds for the Soviets to overcome deficiencies in Iheir current system, ln reaching our Conclusions wc were unable IO subject to rigorous analysis several factors which, to the extent that theye' degrade Soviet air defenses.
Judgments Regarding Individual Soviet Progroms
Section II it was shown that thcariety of programs toin their low-altitude air defense system.following paragraphs we estimate the degreeof Soviet improvement programsears
Air Surveillance
to dale indicates lhal theto achieving good low-altitudehas been to use their esistingradars and to net them together forweapons support usingdata systems. In addition, theyindividual radars, employed towersto enhance siting, and are continuingbelieve that these approaches are likely todegree of success
etting together clusters of relatively small numbers olless thanwithin current Soviet technological capabilities and the Soviets should he able to provide adequate surveillance to weapons over the limited area covered by these radars at low altitudes. However, there is doubt whether tbe Soviets will have developed or acquired thc computer technology to centralize control of large numbers oi radars for timely and accurate low-altitude air surveillance and weapons control over very large areas.
108
Is likely that they do not yet possess the technology required lor an AWACS. However, when thc appropriate radar processing techniques and electronic components are available to them, we believe that they will develop look-down radars for overland air surveillance in thche actual production and deployment could be
initialed by thef thc program l> pursued with high priority. When deployment Is completed AWACS would extend air surveillance and control to the ovetwater approaches to the USSR and would supplement overland surveillance and control by ground-based systems
Surface-to-Air AAissiles
obde SAMs offer the Soviets potential defensive improvements, but thc inherent short, low. altitude range of SAMs would require deployment in large numbers to supplement effectively PVO Stranr's fixed SAM sites Ihc time frame for implementingeciiion would depend on the lype of mobile SAM to be acquired. If PVO Strany decided to acquire an existing SAM such as lheroduction and full-scale deployment could be achieved by the. In this case PVO Strany would beystem based on technology of Ihe, ll Is more likely that they would decide toew system such as that undergoing RAD tests at Sary Shagan (seehb. however, would mean that operational deployment would probably not begin until lhe.
here is evidence that nuclear warheads are locatedignificant portion ofndites and at someomplexes Whether use of these waiheads would be permitted for engagements against low-allitudenknown, but If It were, wc would expect some increase In effective range.
We
believe Ihat even with nuclear warheadseffectiveness of lhearginal The low-altitude effectiveness of thenknown
inally, we believe that the Soviets will not have developed orAM system capable ofow-allilude SRAMven though they possess the necessary missile technology, PVO Strany air surveillance/tracking radars would not be eipected to achieve continuous tracking of asmall radar-citts-section target at low altitude Thereetter possibility that the Soviets willystem with tome capability for intercepting scmiballbtic SRAM*.
Interceptors
Thc most important need ol PVO Stnterceplorsook-down/ihoot-down capabilityow^-altitudeire control system resembling ihat in an advanced US aircraft such as the IMS is not expected Io be achieved by the Soviets before. We do expect, however, that PVO Strany will soon begin to deploy the Flogger or ato engage targctsoelow its altitude is muclTTess than thai achieved by thc USjnew. long-range look-down/?hoot-dowh system could be introduced in new PVO Strany interceptors infti period depending on thc priority of thc program and the sophistication of the weapon system developed. Once developed, this system also might be retrofitted into existing interceptors such as Foxbat and Flagon, but it is more likely that the Soviets would incorporate these systems into aircraft as they are produced.
In any event. Soviet production rales and deployment patterns indicate that several years would be required for PVO Strany to deploy sufficientsuch interceptors. It follows that little material Improvement in PVO Strany's low-altitude interceptor capabilities is expected, however, it is expected that PVO Strany's operational low-altitude interceptor capabilities will be Improved markedly.
C. Prospects for Improvement
A summary of projected interceptor improvements, both for individual programs and combinations of programs, is given in Table X. We believe that 'the potential capabilities ol PVO Strany's Interceptor defenses will be substantially increased by appropriate combinations of two fundamental improvements: (a) an Improved air surveillance system to provide target tracking data to interceptor controllers, and (b) look-down/shoot-down interceptor aircraft.
ns the result ol improving air surveillanceontinuation of lhe ongoing Soviet program to net numbers of ground-based radars together, using high-speed data systems, in order to provide accurate and timely tracking data to CCI controllers from remote radars. When combined with Interceptors such as ther 3b) or one incorporating advancedoviet interceptor defenses
will be potentially better over heavily defended portions of ihc USSH where low-altitude radar coverage exists. However, this combination will not alleviate existing deficiencies where ground-based radars do not providealong overwatcr approaches to the USSH or over many areas of Soviet airspace for which low-altitude radar coverage is discontinuous.
an AWACS is addeduhcbe able to engage penetrators prior to theirthe USSR. An AWACS will also be capableground-based radar coveragein which low-altitude coverage is discontinuous.
Projections of luture'SAM Improvements are given In Table XI. Wc are still uncertain about lhe low-altitude range capabilities of thc nuclear-equipped SAM systems. Mobile SAMs offer the Soviets potential defensive improvements, but the inherent short, low-altitude range of SAMs would require deployment in large numbers Io supplement effectively PVO Strany's fixed SAM sites. Deployment of the magnitude required to place principal reliance on SAMs for low-altilude defense would be expensive, even for lhe Soviets, and there is no evidenceecision for such large-scale deployment has been made.
Wc believe that it Is unlikely thai the Soviets will have significantly better low-altitude air defenses beforen subsequent years, however, we foresee in Soviet airair surveillance and control, in interceptors, and In surfaee-Io-alrpotential for overcoming most of the current technical deficiencies for defense against low-altitude rubers.f Ihe Soviets carry out thc programs wc have judged as likely, they will haveong way toward overcoming their deficiencies against today's low-altitude threal, thus making thc task of low-altitude penetration considerably more difficult However, the overall effectiveness of Soviet air defenses would depend heavily on Ihe circumstance* of the attack, on the degradation of air defenses resulting from ballistic missile strikes, on the effects of electronic warfare, and on developments in US offensivewhich we arc unable to measure. We believe the Soviets will not have an effective defense against thc SRAMnd will hove to rely on attacking the SRAM carrier prior Io missile launch. Furthermore, ihc Soviets probably anticipate that developments in US forces will have
43
the potential of seriously reducing the effectiveness of their air defense improveinents
c have considered thc possibility of air defense applications of directed-energylasers and other beam weapons. We do not believe feasible applications of these technologies
during the neif decade would have asrospect for overcoming Sovicl deficiencies, in low-altitude air defenses than the improvements we have estimated as likely However, wc must be alert to the potential for breakthrough* resulting from the intenseffort in directed energy.
TABLE X
FORECAST OF PVO STRANY INTERCEPTORG-SS
Deployment jn PVO
Strany By
Deployment ol Kloecer or Large number
Limited Probably large number
HoggerP
^capability of two
down search range
priorityth* program.
Flogger. which has only limiwdhoot-down capability, is currently deployed with Frontal Aviation, and PVO Strany pilot! have been practicing with It for moreear at an advanced training school.
some modification to the present radar may oe necessary lo achieve it.
Degrt* of deployment will depend on which interceptor PVO Stranya orr 3c. An, of these options will improve potential air defense capabilities when large-scalearc achieved.
None* Probably tome
None* Possibly aome deployment Soviets
bilily for AwXCS. Thla combinationpotential for excellent air del*not eapabilitici.
Estimate based on tha leaaer of deployment! cited tor individual contributions to combination.
44
TAilLS XI
FORECAST OF PVO STRANY SAM plcOVKMfclN'rs.
fol.fWiUd prjolejiaj ia
PVO Stmi By
pfo*emffit*
of
mem
frnplete requircd
AvftiUUr io t- ufnfJKaiit portion Foi theould reault
B
of tbeites, tod io mimomplexes.
Slill not ewerUined nhenSef
toflid ditfento improve me ulj exceodi to no*.of to*-ilmtede atiitoumofi 30
tttLion
ytlrm baton tested it tUry flkeijin
Probftblv fe*
tftiuly
MbtnbeNoof PVO
$Ul . n-.* for Ck IU1
PVO Streny lAteroU mbui ftUUiWtetolui tunkoo*n. Ln're would be
eJtitudeioi>Hrteetbly note difficult.
Would mokefl ti luce peoetrtYtioo coi>
nm,, difficult tfobile ro*V
V SOVIET AIR SURVEILLANCE DATA SYSTEMS
Original document.
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