Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
Implications for US-Soviet Relations of Certain Soviet Activities
Secret-
65
une6
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
IMPLICATIONS FOR US-SOVIET RELATIONS OF CERTAIN SOVIET ACTIVITIES
recent months nevcral instances ofnotably resumption of antisatellitefailure to comply with agreed proceduresthe ICBM dismantling provisions of theand increased microwave irradiation ofEmbassyave raised questions aboutmotives and about broader Sovietthe US. This paper:
summarizes available information about these *ind other recent examples of puzzlingmilitary and intelligence activity;
suggests explanations for their occurrence;
places then in the context of overallrelations; and
addresses possible implications for Soviet policy toward the US.
conclude that:
occurrence of these activitiesnotajor shift inpolicy toward the US.
decisions to pursue most of thesewere taken primarily forand intelligence reasons. Thehave, nevertheless, been willing to
Thia memorandum was prepared under the auapiceo of the National Intelligence Officer for USSR andEurope and coordinated among CJA, DIA, State/INIf and MSA.
'XIIU'T
do things that they knew in advance* would arouse US concern. (It remains unclear which echelons made which decisions.)
activities are consistent withexpectations for detente with thewith the less restrained stance thatSoviet behavior during theor two.
remains committed to itsline in relations withwc would not rule out otheractivities, particularly in theintelligence field,the coning months.
Even at the best of times, Soviet behavior has never been entirely consistent, satisfactory, or explicable from US perspective. Recent years have seen no slackening of the USSR's overall military prograns or research and development efforts. But during the early years of Moscow's "peaceoviet fore-boarance and readiness to make tactical compromises were often in evidence. Brezhnev received Nixon2 despite US bombing of Haiphong; the Soviets opened the emigration tap in the; they toned down their anti-US propaganda to match their new image of reasonableness. The Soviet Union entered into bilatoral arms limitation agreements and began to pursue,loser economic relationship. To promote its detente objectives, Moscow may also have decided torestraint in certain military, intelligence, and counterintelligence activities.
Events of the last year or so, however, have led to some Soviet reappraisal. Although stablewith the US stillumber of advantages to the USSR, access to US grain being but one, Moscow is clearly disappointed with the trend in bilateral affairs. Since the Vladivostok summit inhe high water mark of Ford-Brezhnev relations:
2 -
The Soviets in4 found the US Government unable to persuade Congress to authorize large credits and most-favored-nation trade status on acceptable terms.
A perception of US obduracy, on the Backfire bomber and strategic cruise missile issues since Vladivostok raised Soviet suspicions about Washington's intentions to honor the understandings reached there.
The Soviets blame the US as well as Egypt for further reverses in the Middle East in5 (Sinai II) and March of this year (abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship pact).
Strong US and allied pressure on Moscow to comply with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accord has soured Soviet gains at their long-sought European Securitylast August.
The Soviets became aware that US popular reaction to their role in Portugal and in Angola was undermining USfor detente.
The rising anti-Soviet tone of the UScampaign led in6 to the administration's dropping of the term "de-tente" and further raised Moscow's qualms about the extent of US commitmentolicy of easing tensions.
5. Other instances of friction and frustration could be added to this list.
Antisatellite Tests*
6. In tho USSR resumed testing its antisatellite system. Tho last successful test of the Soviet system occurred inive months prior to completion of thegreements, which accepted the use of national technical means io monitor arms limitation accords. In2 the Sovietsarget vehicle, but failed to follow it with an interceptor satellite, raising the possibility that political considerations intervened. No further launches occurred during the followinq throe
n Onhey successfullyarget vehicle in orbit but failed four days later to complete an attempted On their second try, onhey successfully intercepted the target at theof the interceptor's first revolution.
8. The prime purpose of this exercise was toapability toatellite on the first revolutioninutes of launch) of thevehicle. All Soviet tests prior6
The technical evidence relating to these teste has been examined by the Veapon and Space Systemstelligence Committee of the National ForeignBoard. The findings of that committee State, CIA, OTA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and tiith the participation of the National Reconnaissance Office and the Defense Specialand Astronautian Center) are presented in in "An Interim Assessment of the USSH'b 6 Satellite Interceptor Testay TOP SECRET
top gkciu-t
00
involved intercept on the second rather than the first revolution. The practical consequence ofubstantial reduction in warning time and consequent shrinkage of the period available to take countermeasures.
9. Assessment of the full significance of the latest tests is complicated, howeverf""1
3
10. The resumption of the interceptor flight test program,rofile achieving aencounter, underscores the potential threat to our photoreconnaissance program. We believe that the Soviet tests in February and April more than likely were not intended toimewith US satellites. Nevertheless, Sovietat some level must have been aware of the geometry of the US satellite orbits. e cannot rule out the possibility that the time_ conjunction in the February test was intended. L
In addition, the Soviets
may in fact have known that they wereanner which could focus us attention on the vulnerability of its photorcconnaissance satellites.
11. uncertainties regarding soviet premeditation in the precise timing of the new asat tests are largely matters of degree, not ofhe resumption of testing per se is the more significant aspect of the new series, raising the larger questionwhy did the soviets,our-year hiatus, resume athat they knew would cause the us concern? this question is given additional sharpness because of the likelihood that those responsible for the ussr's anti-satellite program may have been ready for several years to carry out antisatellite tests. among the possible answers are:
the timing may be due simply to the fact that the specific one-revolution capability tested this year was not previously ready for testing.
the us is making greater use of intelligence satellites, in tactical exercises related to war fighting as well as in strategic collection. the ussr knows that us capabilities willfurther in the near term and,that the us increasingly depends on fewer, more productive satellites. this may have increased the military priority behind
the soviet antisatellite program. themay also have intended to remind the UShat moscow isosition to obstruct US satellite reconnaissance.
soviets may intend to develop an program at another major launchplesetsk, as limited evidence suggests. for technical reasons related to tracking radars,ne-revolution intercept can be made from plesetsk. the soviets may have deemed it necessary to test that capability from tynratan before relocating.
TOSGOO
hina, which last successfullyatelliteaunched three more,to be prototype reconnaissancein the second half
broadly, Soviet disillusionment with the course of bilateral relations may haveearlier reluctance to risk an adverse US reaction to asat testing.
Microwaves in Moscow
microwave irradiation of the USMoscowimilar puzzle as to why thechose the time they did to step up theirirradiation phenomenon is not new; consistenttraditional obsession about foreignthe Soviets have for years been attempting
to interfere with foreign monitoring and tosecurity of their own communications. Thereevidence that beginning in3 theytested additional equipment designed toof greatly increased strength andis possible that these signals are used intechnically penetrate the Embassy.) Until lastemployment of this greater capability That hold was evidently first hen the level of radiation rosoagain in Octoberurther increase was
reason for the decision to proceedobscure. It may have been influenced by oneof the following:
embarrassment and dismay caused by US press accounts over the past several years, but especially during the summerS capability to interceptcommunications in Moscowplusover their actual vulnerabilityand by other widely publicized US intelligence "successes" such as the Glamar Exploror and US submarine penetrations of Soviet waters.
Erosion of Soviet inhibitions no early detente expectations ebbed.
ICBM Dismantling
In late6 the Soviets officially acknowledged their failure to meet the ICBM dismantling and destruction schedule required by agreed procedures implementing the Interim Agreement. Moscow is well aware of OS sensitivity on compliance issues and last December devoted an authoritative Pravda "Observer" articleebuttal of US publiccharges of Soviet violations.that at about the same time, between late December and late January, dismantling activity that had begun earlier all but ceased,eliberate decision at some level.
The reason for that decision is obscure. Thenvolved are of marginal military potential; many of the launch sites had already been deactivated for reasons unrelated to SALT limitations. Official Soviet references to technical problems areand not plausible. We note thatof environmental or resource constraints, Soviet ICBM modernization and conversion programs continued apace throughout the dismantling standdown. Q
piid-April to mid-May indicates that dismantling has resumed and could have been completed, asclaimed, by June 1- But clear andon-complianceegotiated obligation, even if only temporary, is highly unusual Soviet behavior.
possible clue lies in the sharpSoviet spokesmen at the most recent session ofConsultative Conrnission, an element ofabsent from previous sessions. Thewere particularly exercised aboutto remove an acknowledged impediment totechnical means of verification, namelycovers used during the upgradingsilos.
The Soviets first mentioned their problem with the Minuteman shelters inhey raised the issue formally at the special SCC session devoted to compliance questions in The USto employ these temporary shelters and hasthem twice,3ince the Interim Agreement was signed in It'is possible that Moscow believed that its dismantling slowdown would prove an effective object lesson to the US, although as recently as this spring the Soviet SCC conimissioner expressly denounced any attempt to link one compliance issue to another.
Subsequent dismantling suggests that Moscow does not wish to see the SALT process disrupted. the Soviets appear dubious about the chancesALT II agreement this year and arc probably concerned that the Interim Agreement cculd lapse without a Thus Soviet officials at some level may
have been unwilling toismantling program that could eventually amount to unilateral force
of these explanations is fully nor are others which have been advanced. slowdown remains the least explicableunusual Soviet activities.
Other Activities
additional activities, falling withintime frame of the three examined above,implications for Soviet policy toward the US.*
" We have looked at other recent Soviet activities including:
Testing this year of the normally MIRVedndCBMs oith single warheads.
-- Construction last year on the Kamchatka Peninsula of an ABM tracking radar seen previously only at the ABM test range at Sary Shagan.
cceleration of conversion ofilos to the larger, more modernCBM.
Our examination persuades us that these activities probably involve routine Soviet pursuits such as improving and refining existing military capabilities. They do not in themselves appear to presage any notable shift in policy-
*6fi
Appearance at tho Vladimirovka advancedresearch center since5ew possible long-range cruise missile.
Renewed penetrations of the Alaskan airzone, beginning inyeconnaissance aircraft.
possible cruise missile displayed (the Soviets have made no effort tofrom US reconnaissance) may well represent ato US strategic cruise missile programs. USto prohibit the strategic cruise missileSovieterious impedimentew Appearance of the Vladimirovka object,
if itruise missile ratherargetdrone, probably is meant toand private Soviet warnings that USofew strategic weapon would provokeresponse.
Soviet reconnoitering of like the ASAT testing, an activity which thesuspendedumber of years,he Soviets made eleventhe Alaskan air defense zone, the last i. from an isolated flight inundertaken until last winter, when five werethe December-Februaryixth in Hay,in June (none closer thaniles off the
coast).
23. There is no obvious explanation for theto renew these flights. They may be related to generally bolder and more active air- and sea-borne reconnaissance programs by the Soviets observedthe last year.
Political Considerations
2a. There is no doubt that detente remains the official line. Brezhnev made that explicit in Februarv ath Party Congress.
c
3 The
Soviets continue to cooperate with the US on varTous matters; successful negotiationomplexon peaceful nuclear explosions is one recent They continue to urge greater collaborationange of other subjects.
the other hand, expressions oftrends in the US have become standard farespokesmen. Despite his profession of faith
in detente, Brezhnevober stance on relations with the US in his February speech and hasthat note in subsequent remarks. Soviet media have since become increasingly critical of arsher view of the Ford Moscow appears confused about the course of the presidential campaign, but is clearly fearful that US policy toward the USSR is likely to stiffen regardless of the outcome in November.
- Some Hypotheses
With this as background, severalsuggest themselves:
Pirst, we may be over-in'^rpreting the It is possible thatcent Sovietrepresent an accumulation of individualdecisions with the effectenerally moreressive Soviet stance butrior generalto that end. In Soviet eyes certain of theserradiation of the Moscow embassy, probably bear moreefensive than offensive character.
If, on the other hand, the Soviets arcremoving previous restraintsariety
" of military, intelligence, and counterintelligence programs, it mayeeling in Moscow that, in the light of deteriorating bilateral relations, decisions concerning national security matters must
TOP
7G-
give greater weight to direct Soviet interests and less to US reactions. Under this interpretation, tho troubling activities we have examined could reflect:
the policynited Politburo;
the inconsistent actionsivided
initiatives taken without full Politburo knowledge or approval, or even with no Politburo member being informed in advance.
the face of it, the Moscowbasically united on current foreign andpolicy. Brezhnev has traditionally beentoonsensus on these issues. absence of clear evidence to the contrary, it is
easy to conclude that the leadership has been
tially in step during the transition to the blunter, less accommodating policy we have seen.
the other hand, we do occasionallyof disagreement on foreign policy issues. some evidence, for example, that the Sovietdivided last summer on at least certain aspects
of Moscow's involvement in Angola. ore recent example of possible pulling and hauling in the Kremlin, the carefully drafted May Day slogans of the party Central Committee this year omitted the usual call to make detente "irreversible." The phase wasrestored to good standing in both Pravda and Izvestia, but the impression remains of differing Soviet views of the viability of detente. We have also seen suggestions that the Politburo operates less cohesively when Brezhnev is sidelined byproblems, as he has been repeatedly since In any event, we cannot dismiss the possibility that most, if not all of the troubling departures from recent Soviet practiceartial shift in the Politburo balance with respect to policy toward the US.
top
o-
ll. The Politburo-level representation of the ministries of foreign affairs and defense and of the KGB suggests that at least one Politburo member was involved in deciding on most of the activities examined. We know that the Politburo's sieveurprisingly fine mesh. Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be dismissed that in some cases military or intelligence authorities have acted without top-level approval with the leadership becoming awareor fully awareonly after the fact. The military, for example, might have been particularly agitated about the prospect that ICBM dismantling required of the USSR, but not of the US, could prove so disadvantageous if SALT IT failed that it suspended destruction activities on its own, or gave some deceptive explanation. To extend this speculation, behavior of this sort, once discovered, might have contributed to the appointment of ato succeed Marshal Crechko as Defense Minister, while we can only theorize about specific episodes of this sort, we have good evidence of recent coramunist party resolve to strengthen its supervision over the military.
Further Possibilities
32. Moscow may make some moves in the nearintended to shore up relations. Indeed in recent weeks the USSR has publicly roomphasized its interest in an early SALT II agreement and movedositive direction on the issue of throwwelght definition,reaty on peaceful nuclear explosions, and tabled data on Warsaw Pact personnel levels in the MBFR talks. Nevertheless, we can raise asumber of unwelcome possibilities similar to the activitiesin this paper that are less sensitive to US concerns. The Soviets might;
adopt additional concealment and deception measures, including more extensiveof missile telemetry.
expand active countermoasures to Western SIGINT collection.
-TOP Or.CRlVl-
top fil'.orlt
QG> 76
further antisatellite tests, perhaps at other altitudes.
raise the level of harassment of us citizens in the ussr, especially in reciprocity for anti-soviet actions in the us.
react more strongly to us destroyerin peripheral areas such as the black sea and sea of okhotsk.
possibilities could entail insubstance or degree more serious departuressoviet policy:
further instances of slippage behind their icbm dismantling obligations (which increase as they launch additional modern ballistic missile submarines).
demonstration, if not deployment,cbh.
direct involvement in southern africa or the middle east.
acceleration of soviet abm research andprograms.
we would not underestimatecapacity for ineptitude orwillingness to put themselves inof the agreed procedures implementingagreements campaign debatebehavior is difficult to interpret infashion, whatever their tactical aim. werule out similar misreadings of the us oradequate forethought in coming months.
-
top !ii:crj-t
Top Sccrtf-
Top Sceret-
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: