CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
16
The President The White House
Dear Mr. President:
I am taking this opportunity to provide youomprehensive report on the status of Agency covert action programs authorized by you under the provisions off the Foreign Assistance Act1 as amended, and to call to your attention some of the problems we have encountered in complying with this law.
As you know,equiresondition precedent that the President find that each covert action operation is important to the national security of the United States. It also requires reporting of the scope and description of the operation, notondition precedent, butimely fashion, to "appropriate congressionalncluding the committees on foreign relations in each House. In practice this now involves briefing seven subcommittees.
Leakage in the course of these congressional briefings coupled with the adverse effects of the year-long congressional investigations of the Agency operations, particularly covert action,erious problem.
Along generalish to stress that thisurbulent and troublesome period for the Agency. The intensive investigations by both Houses of the Congress for moreear now has resulted in extensive public disclosures of past and current covert action operations. Some of these disclosures occurred in the course of open congressional hearings, in committee reports andesult of leaks from the investigative andommittees. The net-result has been unprecedented and unceasing domestic and foreign media reporting on many of our nation's most secret operations. These disclosures haveonsiderable negative effect on the Agency's covert action programs and capabilities as well as our image abroad and foreign policy interest. They have caused consternation and concern among our foreign friends and allies and have provided an unending flow of information for the propaganda machines of our foreign adversaries to attack and discredit the Agency and our Government- The Cuban
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Governnent, for example, has recently translated the reports of the Senate Select Committee into Spanish and is circulating these documents in Latin America. The fundamental point is that these exposures were not the result of badly run operations. The projects were not exposed abroad; they were exposed here. If covert action is to continue to be an effective foreign policy instrument, we must improve the legislative procedures for handling these operations to insure tlioir secrecy. The end of the congressional investigations will hopefully ease this problen. We are, however, left with the threat of continuing congressional leaksesult of our obligations under.
as been criticized on two grounds. The Commission on the organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (the Murphy Commission) recommended that the requirement for the personal certification of the President bo dropped as the Commission judged it was harmful "in associating the head of State so formally with suchneport to seven congressional committees on these findings. This process directly involves at leastenators andepresentatives plus staff members. Moreover, under existing Houseepresentative has access to committee records. This broad dissemination of critically sensitive information has led to the public disclosure of every new program undertaken. Calls for restricting these reports have come from both the Executive Branch and from responsible congressional spokesmen.
S., the Senate oversight resolution, will not expressly alter. However, Senators Percy and Ribicoff have stated they will introduce such an amendment to require the report to be made to only the Appropriations Committee and Select Intelligence Committees, but prospects forill in the foreign affairs committees are Such legislation would also face stiff opposition on the floor of both Hnises.
Some of the joint oversight committee proposals introduced in the House have attempted to deal with the proliferation of reports under. .esolution tooint committee on intelligence introduced by Representative Cederberg, would amendo require reports be made only to the joint committee and the appropriations committees. Representative Biester's bill tooint oversight, would likewise require reports only to the joint committee and appropriations committees, although the bill would give the committee veto power over covert actions. Generally, however, the issue of prior congressional notification and approval for covert action has notarticularly pressing issue, and there does not seem to be nuch support for such procedures in the Congress. It is clear, however, that S.ill not require prior notification or approval of Congress concerning covert actions. This was explicitly statedolloquy between Senators Pastorc and Ribicoff during floor consideration of the resolution.
.serious damage to our foreign intelligence effort has also resulted A?nauthoJ.ized disclosure by disaffected Agency employees and >er knowledgeable officials of information related to intelligence -sources and methods. It is essential to the future success of our foreign intelligence program that legislation protecting intelligence sources and methods be enacted at the earliest possible date sine-existing law is inadequate to protect these assets. The legislation you proposed in your message ofebruary would meet this need bvriminal penalty for the unauthorized disclosure of information relating to intelligence sources and methods. It would apMy onlv to^ individuals entrusted with the sensitive information or who gain" access to it by virtue of their position as officer, employee, contfaSo? or
n^^ialJel^ionsl}ip Within the ^ited Smes^verSnt?Tnisir0dUC^ *House by Representati^fcaorJ as
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eVeraleen introduced which wouldpities on persons who disclose information whichpersonnel. Congressman Michel'so-sponsors, would apply stiff sanctions against bothCUizenSy
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overed all major covert actio!
0ther lesser ^tiJitieson-
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Original document.
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