SOVIET POLICY AND EUROPEAN COMMUNISM( PR 76 10069)

Created: 10/1/1976

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Research Study

Soviet Policy mid European Communism

JL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE OfOF POltTtCAl RESEARCH

6

SOVIET POLICY AND EUROPEAN COMMUNISM

Theratefulc many commcnta :ind suggestions which were ireeived liom other ClA olfceff dun.'ig :lic jircpnration of this study

CONTENTS

Page

FOREWORD v

PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

II. CENERAL TRENDS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNISM

A. Historical Background lo Communist

B Challenge! io Soviet Leadership

C International Conferences Mark Decline in Soviet Authority

of Communal

Ihc Central Issue

F The Present

and Ideological Impulses

In Portugal Conlraiy to Shorl-Teim Soviet

C Soviet Assessment of PCP Prospects Pessimistic

D. Ideological Influence on Soviet Policy Coals

li Efforts to Limit Involvement In Portugal

of Soviet Involvement

Accommodation lo PCP's Reduced

II. Soviet Support of "Moderate" Tactic*

oscow's Failure to Dictate PCP

J. Limitations on SoviH Influence

A Are Communist Advances Compatible with Soviet Interests?

B The Nalure of lhe PCI

C The Question of Goals

Tolerance of PCI Tactical

Tactics ! - wilh Soviet Needs

and PCI Differences Center on Issue of AutonomyPortugal Strains PCI-CPSU Relationship

PCI and

Assessment

J. Moscow's Means of Contiul Limited

K The Bottom Line

III /

Pap

V.

A. The Stupe ol Moscow's Spanish

li Origins ol Moscow's Differences wilh lhe I'CE

C. Moscow's Failure to Assert Control over the PCE

D Soviel Efforts to Split lhe

E. Soviet and PCE Interests are Contradictory

uf lhe PCF

PCF Loyalty

of PCF Reversal of

D Soviel and French Communist Interests

E_ Implications for

Til EN OS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE

SOVIET POLICY

A. Soviet*ifficult Future

li. Short-Term Problem!

C Lung-Term

ANNEX

A. Divided Soviet Counsels

li. 1'i'ln!'. of

FOREWORD

Thii sludy treats relations between ihc SovieU and the most important Western European Communis! Parties, those ol France, Italy. Portugal, and Spain. It reviews the extent to which the objectives of these Parties correspond to the Immediate and more distant goals ol Soviet policy, and examine* the limitations on Moscow's ability to control the actions of these Parties. It also focuses on the political and doctrinal problems which the tiscelf-consciously independent Western European wing of the Communist movement has caused lor Moscow, and is likely to cause in the future.

SEC FBI

SEC/ET

PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

ideological, organizational, and financial pressures which the Soviets can bring lo bear on the major Western Parties may suffice to hold these Parties in line on issues of marginal importance to them, but Moscow is unable to control the actions of even the most "loyal" of these Parties when issues which directly touch their most vital interests are at stake.

principal objective of the Westernof politicalnol fully mesh with Moscow's near-term interest intable pattern of economic and political cooperation with the West, nor with the low-risic approach to foreign political questions generally favored by the present Soviet leaders.

the evidence indicates that the Soviets believe lhat their longer-term interest in the reduction of US influence in Kurope and in the political neutralization of Western Europe will be served by the accession to power of local Communist Parlies,

This conviction is supported by their judgment that their doctrinal and political problems with the Western Communists, although annoying and worrisome, are manageable and susceptible to improvement.

Moscow's judgment in ibis regard is nol necessarily correct. In the longeris, beyond the next year orproximity to power of lhe major Western Parties is likely to accentuate their tendency lo give priority to considerations of political expediency, thus heightening tensions in their relations with Moscow.

DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

it the heaviest weight in ibe Easi-Wesi balince iJ power, and II ti (here thai any changes in ih* dividing lines, between Fast and Woihave ihc moil serious implications. These linn have been drawn nni only on Ihe basis ol geopolitical divisions, bul also on the basis of adherence to conllicting ideologic)hil latter (act which lends such significance to the recent rise in tbe influence and prospects of the Communist Parties uf southern Europe

The llalian Commimiu Parly (PCI) has advanced furthest Mi electoral successes, mtttl recently In the legislative elections ofave brought il to the verge'be "historic compromise" with the Christian Democrats (DC) which it has sought since

a means oformal roleThe achievements of the Fiench'ii Purly (PCF) ate less impressive, but in May

fell only inches short of Its goal ol pullingof Ihe Union offt. Socialist Francois

Milteirand. into ibe Elysec Palate as the President ol the French. Republic In efforts are now centered on the legislative elections scheduledheic itgain in conpinvttnn with itsajority

On ihcestern periphery of Europe, the Portuguese ami Spanish Patties have emerged after detatl't of obscurity In play an important role ia the afLmlln.ii countries The Purlugiiese coup ol4 catapulted the hithrtlo insignificant Portuguese Comrnuiiitt Party (PCP) lo prominence, initially ui lhe chief political ally ol the ruling clique of mililwy ttfficrrs Even after lhe series nf defeats il has ribsnt bed tincvhe PCP (claim considerable| tlrrnglhapacityrustrate lie progiaim id lite guvcrnincnl in Lisbon The Spanish Com'aityhile as yriillegal and less lum'olul >haiiihrr Parl.es. is Ihc ilrongesi

voice In lhe incipient Spanish labor movement and has made much progress in breaking oul of lhe political ghetto in which it had languished under

Franco

If ihc European Communis! rnovcmenl were still the near-monolith il was during much of the postwar period, there could be no doubt that these-ould redound directly so the benefit of theii However, lhe relationship is no longer so simple. The rising tide of Communist Influence in Wesii:hi Europe has been accompanied by an equally viiiMe erosion uf the unity of thr Communist movementiminution of Soviet authority over ft.

These paiulld trends liave made il much more difficult to assess the implications ol lhe rise of

tit- .'i' i'r- ,ii liUlin'iii j..- fin thr

balance of power between East and West. In ordei co male any general assessment, some specific quest.ons mjil I* am-ered

he Soviets poisest the means to iiitnpcl or induct; lhe Western Communists tu act in accordance withishei

whai eilent do the objectives of tbe Western Communists mesh with Soviet policytiih uvrr the shnrl-tcnn and over lhe long-trim"

low significant aril llie doctrinal and political pnibleim which the rising inlluenee of Western Emopean Communist Parties pose lot the

8ui iiWt

While cerium general ohservations can be made ulxnil thu slate uf Moscow's rdalioiu with Weil Eoiupc.iu Cnmmunism. Soviet (elation* with .uih at the turn Parties wich -huh (his paper is concerned cannot be filled into one mold The Parties ihrmsciics rangeunacies' fiom ihc neo-Sfalmnl PCP lo theevisionM" llulian Paily. mid the

/

historical and political foundations of theirwith the CPSU are equally diverse. Answers to the general questions posed above can bc provided only on the basis of an examination of the specific features of Soviet relations with each of these Parties.

II. GENERAL TRENDS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNISM

A. Historical Background to Communist Discord

The decline in the solidarity of the international Communisl movement and in Soviet authority over it is dramatic when viewed in historical perspective. Soviet control of the international movement at Its origin was well-nigh absolute. The Comintern, or Third International, which provided theskeleton of the international movement from ils foundation9 to its dissolutionasoviel creation. Its headquarters were In Moscow, the bulk of its leadership and staff was Soviet, and the principal condition fnr membership in lhe organization was an unqualified acceptance of Unin's famous Twenty-One Principles Thisist ol organizational and ideological rules designed to ensure that foreign Parlies were cast in the image of the victorious Russian Bolxhevik*.

And, in fact, foreign Parties were In large part mere carbon copies of the Russian Party. Such tendencies to independent thought and action as existed were largely obliterated under the twin pressures of domesticdeepened the dependence of many of the foreign Parties dependent on Soviett lor their veryStalinist purges, which struck some Inreign Parties almost as severely as they did the Soviet Party.

The abolition ol the Cominternesture lo Moscow's wartime allies, and hud no elfecl on the reality of Moscow's dominance over the foreign Parties This continued to bc virtually unshaken, as wj- demonstrated by Moscow's abilityo compel the large Italian and French Parties to siiboidinale their own political ambitions to Ihe needs ol Soviet foreign policy. Under Soviet instructions, the French and Italians dismantled the large armed resistance nnvetnenl* which they controlled and ivitivii iu conservative-dominated governments of national unity in order to enable Moscow to maintain

in good order the Crand Alliance with Washington and London.

Moscow's control was more visibly demonstratedt the foundation of the Cominfotm. This truncated successor of the Comintern formally joined the French and Italian Parties with the Soviet Party and the Eastern European clients of the Soviet Union, and was established in large part for the purpose of compelling the French and Italian Communists to subordinate their own immediate political interests to an all-out struggle against the Marshall Plan. It wasark of Soviet authority that the French and Italian Parties obediently fell Into line, thereby cutting themselves off from participation inand consigning themselves to political isolation and futility.

This was the high-water mark of Soviet authority, however.ear the monolithic solidarity of Ihe Communist world had been broken, as Titoist Yugoslavia openly defied Moscow and asserted its righl to define its own national policies. This first sctious setback to Soviet authority within themovement, which did not occur until almost three decades after the foundation of the Comintern, has been followed by many others.

The post-Stalin Soviet leadership under Nikita Khrushchev was itself instrumental in conlribuling to the growih of fissures within the movementefforts to discredit the foreign and domestic policies ol his predecessor at theh Parly Congress6 encouraged many foreign Cornmu-msls to believe lhat now they would have greater freedom to churl their own course Among them was Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the PCIormer Comintern agent, who shortly afterh Congress proclaimed the doctrine ofhich held that each nai ion al Parly should lit free to develop its own road to Communism rather than obeying the dictatesingle

B. Challenges to Soviet Leadership

Moscow has never succeeded in closing thebox opened ath Congress In the ensuing two decades, it has had to copeeries ol challenges lo its leadership launched by both Eastern and Western Communisls Each successive ihrcat to the Soviet position has contribuied to the overall process of political and ideological erosion.

whatever the degree of Moscow's success in dealing with them.

Moscow's bloody suppression of the Hungarian revoltlthough it checked the nationalist threat to the USSR's Eastern European empire, cost the Communist movement the support of many of Its most prominent adherents and led many foreign Communists In question the moral basts of Soviet authority. Moscow's success in isolating the Chinese Communists from the mainstream of the Communist movement after the open eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute9 has not completely erased the divisive effects of that quarrel. Quite apart from the relatively small number of adherents the Chinese have been able to win for the doctrines of Maoism, the major non-Bloc Parties have been unwilling to go along with Soviet elforts to formally excommunicate the Chinese. Consequently, the Chinese problem remains as an ulcer on the body of the Communist movement.

Similarly, the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia3 had the effect of shoring up the position of Soviel slyle ideological orthodoxy In Eastern Europe, but only at the cost of adding greatly to the strains on Moscow's relations with the major nonruling Parties.

C. Internolionol Conferences Mark Doclino in Soviet Authority

The successively less impressive results of the internal imal Communist conferences which have taken place sinceh Party Congress also mark the decline in Moscow's authorily over themovement. The conference of SI Parties held In Moscow0ocument whichare fully worded compromise between Ihe positions of the Soviets and the Chinese. It is more memorable as the last such meeting altended by lhe Chinese and as the sceneiolent debate between the Soviet hosts and their Chinese guests. TheCommunist Conference metive years behind schedule. It was boycotted by the most import jut Asian Parlies, andinal document which many European Parties, including the Italian^ and Spanish, relused to endorse in full

Einally. 'he recent Conference ol EuropeanPartieshich met inocument which was signed by no one. .ind. heme, binding on no one. It also (ailrd to sp'M-ifically invoke "proletarian internationalism" or

to excoriatehereby falling short o( the standards established by previous conferences. These two phrases have been used as codewords lo denote the obligation of all Communists to put the promotion of Soviet interests before other concerns. It was another mark of lhe movement's decline that several Western European Communist leadenstated their expectation that the meeting would be the last of its kind.

D. Sources of Communist Disunity

The sources of the disunity which have come to plague the Communist movement are manifold, but at bottom they all stem from the fading of the movement's international ideals. The Communist movement, from its origins as an international faith, has moved steadily In the direction ofere congeries of national Parties moved by parochial considerations of political advantage.

The Soviets themselves have given the lead to thi* trend. They long ago transformed the doctrine of "socialist internationalism" from "one for all" to "all lorone being the USSR and the all including all lhe other members of the international movement The moral authority which accrued lo the. USSR as the homeland of Communism and the dependence of foreign Communists on it for financial and organizational support combined to win the allegiance of foreign Communists to this lenel. The powerful German Party's suicidal refusal to join forces with the Socialists against the Nazi menace innd the damaging tactical shifts imposed on the Krench and Italian Communists in the immediate postwar years were alike responses to lhe needs of Soviet policy rather than to the dictates ol political reality in the countries involved.

Tin: notion thai the preservation andtlie Soviet state took precedence overn jinUiiithoul iltf:.cnnlong as the Soviet Union remained alone asonly Communis! state It has becomedifficult to sustain as the Communist Bloclo include many other slates. Theol inleresl which have troubledthese states, particularly theo;u'iS -u

Soviet lend, have further contributed to an erosion r- ii'.] wilhin tli- in- in- i! I:

hits become more and more difficult for the Soviets to

SEOjftT

tbck actions in terms of the common Interests of all Communists, riot least because their positions have come under the direct attack of othermost consistently by the Chinese.

At the same time that the prestige of the Soviets wilhin Ihe international movement has been tn decline, the prospects of some of the Weslern European Parties have been in the ascendant. The convergence of these two trend lines has contributed to the uncertainty within the European Communist movement. Wilh the vision of power glimmering before their eyes, some of thesethe French and Italian Parties, which together dominate Western. Europeanshown an increasing willingness to put theii own interestsar with those of the Soviet Union, or even ahead of them. In fact, they have begun to show some of the same tendencies to think in basically national terms as have those Parties which already exercise power. The improvement in the domestic power base of the larger Western Parties has also made them better able lo resist direct Soviet pressure.

E. Autonomy the Central Issue

The issues which divide the Soviets and these Parlies are often expressed in terms of ideological conllict. and describedtmggle between the proponents of "orthodoxy" and the supporters ofn fact, the issues in dispute between the Soviels and lhe dissident Parties of the Wesl vary from case lo case On one issue, however, the dissident Parties arc united, and it is on this issue that they have joined most efleetively lo resist lhe Soviels.

This is the issue of autonomy, or. as seen from the Soviet perspective, discipline. The dissident Westernthe Italian. Spanish and now lheinsist with increasing vehemence on iheir right to define their own interests and pursue thern wilh tactics oi iheir own devising. The Soviets, for their pait. continue to insist that lhe interests of any single Parly must lie subordinated lo the common interests of the international movement, and assert Ihc right a* the senior member of thai movement to have the major voice in defining what ihesft common Interests are

Tlus issue hasone of contention between (he Soviets and ihc dissident Parties, regardless of the degice to winch the Soviets may have agreed or

disagreed with the tactical line followed by any one of these Parties, or have questioned Its adherence lo the traditional Marxisl-Leninixt goal of class (one-party) dictatorship.

In fact, ihe Soviets have soft-pedaled Iheiras lo the ultimate loyalties of the Western Parties. Moreover, despite occasional disagreements on specific issues of political ladies, the Soviets have no quarrel wilh the genual features of the tactical line followed by the Western Parties.

Apart from local differences, this lineommon disavowal of revolutionary political and social goals in favoroderate and "democratic" program, and an emphasis on the "national"of the Parly This stance is intended to serve as the basis for the establishment of electoral alliances with Socialists and other non-Communist politicalwhich are capable together ofajority. Ittrategy of the long-haul, with the emphasis on caution and patience rather than the violent or sudden seizure of power.

Despite its points of dissimilarity with the path followed by lhe Russian Communists in their seizure of power, lhe Soviets have lent ihelr slrong Support to the general features of this line. The CPSUIhe possibilityeaceful path loafterh Congressoscow's support for the notion of forming electoral alliances with Socialists and Social-Democrats was enunciated al Karlovy Varynd was reaffirmed even after the occupation ofhiswas teaffirmcd most recently ath Congress of the CPSU innvlui'-v'< icp'.iit tohere he cited as an example for others the CPSU'sio improve iis relation* with

The Soviets have also been willing to accommodate themselves tonotthe Western Parlies efforts lo convince (heir electorates ol their national character and freedom from international commiinients Moscow's tolerance of the tactical maneuvers of ihc Western Parlies has beenidcnl in its lacil approval ol the line the French. Italian, and Portuguese Parlies have taken ln*ard

* ThrSmw' ftililtmni'ttrnioiM Ai:-Tn:uvii-^r. hiti'>rk<il antipathy lo collarlt Weill

l>(in utifojiidttl" la Mj/ch IWill

membership in NATO. All have disclaimed any intention olnilateral withdrawal from the alliance if ihey ihould come to power. Moscow's acceptance of this position has been indicated by its willingness to publish accurate descriptions of the positions the Parlies haveot surprisingly, Moscow has shown less understanding for the circumstances which have led some of thethe Spanish anddemonstrate their independence byon Soviet internal policy.

There arc other broad limits Io the supportilling to extend to the maneuvers of tbe Western Parties. One Ls Moscow's insistence that political compromise must be accomplished withoutcompromise. It is (he essence of the Soviet position thai Communists must demonstrate politicalin order to put themselvesodlion to seduce their allies, but must guard against the clanger thai they will themselves be seduced by lhe doctrines espoused by their political rivals."

Despite these reservations, Moscow's fundamental support for Ihe moderate line of the Western Parties is unquestionable. Moscow's position stems from its understanding of the requirements of the Western European political environment and from the needs nf Soviet foreign policy.udgment is to be reached on Ihe basis of the history of Soviet relations with the Western Communists, the (alter consideration Is the more important Mo*cow's efforts to reduce tensions with Ihe West and totructure of politics) and economic cooperation with the major Westerndependessening of internal as well as external tensions; hence. Moscow's present aversion tu aggressive action on the part of the European Parties

It Is the dissident Parties' conviction of Moscow's readiness lo subordinate the needs oi Ihe internallonalrather, of foreignthe needs ol Soviet foreign policy which makes them so del-TinmI'd io oppose Moscow's efforts to assert ils leadership of the movement. Memories of Moscow's

'i-.iitiiil..with PCP leader Cunlxl *hfcli appealedli. mtd Fravla on Uieo IS6

lBrulincv coupled hit luppou I'm

n Cwninuniii* and nwnm-Tit'i (Im; tlii'i- idwIJ bl "ojvtleofagnml

:-r

past willingness lo sacrifice the French and Italian Parties' interests to Stalin's political and territorial objectives in Europe have been kept alive by more recent demonstrations of Soviet egocentrism. These Include Moscow's willingness to develop its relations with the Spanish regime over the protests of the proscribed PCE and its similar efforts to cultivate Us relations with ihc French government at the expense ol the electoral prospects of the French Communists. (These incidents will be discussed In more detail in subsequent sections of the paper.)

F, The Present Balonce

The result* of the CF.CP which met In East Berlin6 were indicative of the Inability of ihe Soviels to reassert their authority over the European Communist movement. Moscow's failure was all Ihe more striking in that the Conference had originally been conceiveda vehicle which would enable Ihe Soviels to achieveeassert ion.

While the trend toward disintegration within the European Communist movement is clear, It is much less clear what stage Ihe process has reached. The mere fact that all the major European Parties, including those most outspoken in their assertion of independence, chose to otlend the Euiopcanis prool that the ties which link the Communist Parties are still in existence, even though weakened.

The dissident Parties cannot turn Iheir backs on the international movement without threatening the unity of their own ranks. Thisrincipal source of such leverage over the Western Communists as (he Soviet Union retains The Soviets, on the uther hand, iced their link with the European wing of the Communist movement Io confirm the legitimacy of their own system and iheir policies This is both psvchnlogkally important and essential to the internal standing of the Soviet leaders.

I he main achievement ol tlie European Conference was to endorse Moscow's pursuit of detente with the govern men Is of the Weil as compatible wilh the it'teresls of Western Communism. This Ihe document did in fulsome detail It went beyond this to'oad consensus of support for the main outlines o: Soviet foreign policy, including Soviet disarmamentcjil< and the essentials of the Soviet position on Kufoiseaii security, the Middle East, and southern

Africa ll is thb broad coincidence of views lhat permit* the Soviets lo retain Iheir conviction lhal Ihe maintenance of theii rWatiomhip wilh theParties of the West i> on balance in iheir interests, howcvei annoying and troublesome may be some of the actions ol some of these Parties.

While these general observations apply to Soviet relation* with all of the dissident Parties each of these Parties responds more lo the unique circumstances which it faces than to any general rules of behavior. From lhe Soviet perspective, there is no single or simple solution to the problem of dealing with these Parties

Al lhe same lime, the Soviet leaden' effort! lo function as the leaders of Ihe interna tx> rialmovement are complicated by the need to fulfill their primary function as national leaden. The immediate interesls of the Soviet state do not often coincide with the demands of the international movement

III. PORTUGAL

and Ideological

The difficulties which the Soviet leaden face in reconciling their role as national leaden with claims to leadership of the international Communist movement have been evident in the Soviet response toin Portugal since ihe coup ofhey have had to balance iheir diplomatic stakeelaxation of East-West tensions in Europe against their ideological com milo fostering radical social and political change in the non-Communist world Their actions have demonstrated the degree lo which ideological commitments have been diluted by diplomatic necessity. and. conversely, the limits imposed un Soviet freedom of action by ideological and domestic political needs

in Portugal ContrarySoviet Interests.

II the leadris uf the Soviet Union were moved solely by considerations of immediate diplomaticinvolvement in ibe internal crbrs which hai gripped Portugal Since lhe overthrow of lhe nghtist Carta no regime4 would have had httlr allure for them Portugal he. httlr to offer in lhe way of

miltt.n> economic, nr political advanttMin-USSR Conversely. Soviet involvement in the attaintale which wasember of lhe At Untie Alliance and historically, culturally, andember of the Western Wodd threatened lo place an Intolerable strain on Moscow's relations with the Westn fact considerable evidence that Ihe Soviel leaden shared this conclusion.

Moscow's lack of economic Interest in Portugal has been amply demonstrated over the past two year* The eiistence of the Communist-influenced and generally pro-Soviet military government which ruled from4 to5 hud no upptcciublr effect on the levels of Soviel trade with Portugal Even after the conclusion of several highly ballyhooed trade agreements. Soviet exports to and imports from Portugal in5 amounted to no moreercentercent of the Portuguesehe fad is lhal the Portuguese economy, wilh its heavy dependence on agriculture, has very little to offer the Soviets.

Neither have the Soviets displayed any interest inilitary presence in Portugal In spite ol lhe rumon which circulated5 of such an interest in acquiring naval basing rights in the Azures, there is no evidence of any concrete Soviel approaches In ihe Portuguese. Although it cannotluded lhat Soviel naval pi miners had some interest In Portuguese port facililies, It cannot have been very gte.it. given the priority assigned to tbe promotion of Soviet interests in lhe Eastern Mediterranean

Al any rale, il cannot have been great enough lo justify Ihr risktrong Western readion which might have threatened the whole structure olelations. There Is ample evidence that the Soviets took this possibility seriously. They were at pains during the height of the Portuguese internal crisis5 to persuade Western officials lhal they wne not responsible for lhe actions ofwhich had attempted tonfluence on the ruling mililary clique to purge IK political opponent* Irom government and thethai ihey hud no inleulion ol intervening in I'urluguesealfairs The fuel thai trie Portuguese crisis and Western starringSoviet intervention both peaked lust as the Owfcfi-nce on Securilv and Competition in Europebout lo convene in Helsinki umloubt-edls wnsilnml Ibe Sovid leaders tn the danger lhal a

Western reaction against Portuguese developments could icsulletback (or their European policy.

beyond Ihc prospect of Immediate diplomaticther, mure fundamental, considerations of argued againtl an open Soviet involve-meni in Portugal Geographic location was not least among ihem Portugal was far dblanl from Ihe bases nf Soviel power, and close to those of lhe West

A judicious assessment ol the local balance of power apparently led the Sovieli lo concludeom mum tl government could not be maintained in Ihe face of Western opposition

ate

iiini in5 lhal the US would go IO unusual lengths in the wake of the Indochina debacle to prevent the emergenceommunist regime in Portugal. More Importantly, the estimate concluded lhat the US was fully capable of achieving its objectIill view presumably was shared by the Soviets.

Indeed, at times (he Soviet leaders openly hinted that Ihey expected Western Intervention in Portugal Itre/hnev, for example, teporlcdlyest German leader in5 thai he could not understand why the West had not intervened in Portugal al the fiisl sign of unrrut. He added lhat ihis would have born accepted by lhepubliclyPortugal "belongs" in tliecamp *

C. Soviel Assessment of PCP Prospects Pessimistic

in any caw. lhe Soviets apparently had Utile faith in ihe ability of ll" Portugueseo maintain themselves iu power whatever lhe extent of Western intervention Soviet views uf therospects- in contrast tn (hove of rn.iuy WesternHnged with pcsilmisin even when the Portuguese Party was al the apogee ol lis power Thus, inime when lhe PCPin the

Ailitatingovieton the side of the Portuguese Communists was the ambivalent reaction of Western Communists to the rise of the Portuguese Party. Some of the mosl important ol Ihesethe Italian andcriticized the revolutionary mlli-lantc of thewhich threatened lo undermine -iheir own efforts to present themselves as moderate and "democratic" movements. Moscow's support for lhe PCP was certain to complicate its relations with these Panics, which were much more important than the PCP both because of their size and because of Ihc greater strategic significance of their countries.

D. Ideolocjicol Influence on Soviet Policy Gools

As suggestedober and cynical calculation of political intcrcsl would have led the Soviets to shy away from any direct involvement with the PCP. That they did not can be attributed lo ideologicalneed to justify their policy programs before their own political constituencies in ideological terms.is need can bc seen, for example, in their efforts to justify their pursuit of detente wilh ihc Westontribution to the world revolutionary process. Thistandard theme of Soviet spokesmen, who argue lhat detente, by lowering lhe level of East-Weil lenii'Jtiv increases the political acceptability ol Communis: Parties to non-Communists and improves their prospects for political gains "

This claim helps explain lhe attention and support Moscow accorded Ihc PCP. By5 it had become lhe most conspicuous representative of West-en European Communism, and was cites) by lhe Sonets as an example of how Soviel policy facilitated CiitTimunit! advances in lhe Capitalist world. The Suvlei leader* were particularly in need of some such demonstration ul that time to make up lor the pvychnlogtial setback represented by the fall of theregime iu Chile in Septemberhis

l. I! ii...

t" iiuesliuii the possibilitypeaceful" mad toinenot ulthat> hiiiii weakness lav in his failure to weed his

I act wim icdiutck: "iiiii

lo tne ovi

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Soviet Pony Secretary. Ponomarev (middle) greats Portuguese Porty leader AJvaro Cunhal (left) at the lower's orrivol in Moscow ai the headortuguese government delegationespite ihe appearance ol Ponomarev olairport, the visit produced on agreement to play down lh* links between Ihe iwo Parties.

out af pnsllium of power belore they could coalesce against him. and in hts unpreparcdness to use force against them This conclusion no doubt inclined Moscow to respond lavorably lo the PCP, which showed no comparable reluctance> to lake the offensive agaimi its rtvali

Even without the eipeitence o( Chile. Iheortbodony of lhe PCP would have attracted Soviet support The Portuguese Party, both More and after its appearance on Ihr Portuguese political stage, has dislinguubed itsell by its uncntical support of tbe Soviets on both ideological and policy questions It has backed Moscow on every one of lhe key issues which have divided lhe CommunistSino-Soviet quarrel. Cicchotlovakia, and Moscow's claim to leadership uf lite Communist movement Moreover, the PCPs earlyprovided welcomer lhe Soviels in their running debate with the dissident Parlies ol lhe Wait, serving as "proof that loyal support for Moscow was not inciirupalible with political

*t> Sccrmity and tnlc mammal.href.

II N l-ni lli-

iiicmphhead dfhexa

ril iUUiiiriHl line."' I'urliiUHv IK" dcnibl. hud

"inconsittcnt*ittn)tii rd,i and Spui'ih in

nr.!'

E. Efforts lo limit Involvement in Portugal

Moscow's reluctance from Ihe outset to needlessly )eopardife ill Marions with the West was visible in its efforts loow official profile during the height of the Portuguese political emit The behavior of the Soviet diplomatic community In Llslvon--diplomatic relations were established onunetailored tocac of nonlnvolve-ment. Despite (he presenceoviel diplomatic complement of aboutn Lisbon, the Soviet Ambassador and his staff did their best lo Hay In the background This was evident in iheir failure to develop any form of special relationship with the leftist and pro-Sonet Vasco Concalves. who served as Premier from4 Ior ro put themselves forward as advisors lu the(loinmomits With similar discretion. Soviet foreign Minister Cromyko's foreign pulley reportoviel Central Committee plenum In Aprila time when the Portuguese Corn nm null had launched an effort to ouit th'ir rivals from thebarely touched on Soviet reUtiom wilh lhemosement. and failed to mention Portugal at all

Moscow also did ils best lo plat down the links between the Portuguese Party and the CPSU and ot^ie* Parties It was officially announced, he

thai lhe PCP leader, Alvaro Cunhal. on his return to iJsbon on. had come from Paris, when in fact he had merely changed planes there on his way home from exile in Eastern Europe. On another occasion. Soviet officials are reported to have intervened toro-PCP demonstration by the Austrian Party.*

tance was reportedly endorsed by the Portuguese Communists themselves, since, besides helping to protect the Soviet Union's diplomatic position with the West, it served to enhance the domestic political appeal of the PCP as anmovement. According to one report. Cunhal asked Moscow in4 to avoid any overly demonstrative support for the PCP.*

Even Soviet press coverage of the Portuguese revolution was tailored lo de-emphasize the Soviel Involvement in Portugal. Soviet reportage initially was limited to factual reports and replays of PCP statements. In fact, lhe first direct Soviet press commentary on developments in Portugal did not appear untillmostonths after the revolution.'

F. Extant ot Soviet Involvement

The Soviets remained committed to this stance of ostensible non involvement until lhe summern practice, Moscow's assertions of noninlerest in the affairs of post-revolutionary Portugal had always been compromised by lhe sleady flow of Soviet money to the PCP. The precise amourils of the Soviet subsidy are unknown, bul they were enough to make Ihe PCP relatively affluent in comparison with Its political competition (as measured by such tangible criteria as the number ol posters, sound trucks, and lull-time organizers visible in electoralhe Soviets look care, however, to confine Iheir delivery of funds to clandestineractice which helped support Iheir hands-off pose.

Soviet behavior changed during the period. when the Portuguese Socialists and Centrists, emboldened by their success in the April electionsonstituent Assembly, seized control of Ihe streets and began to shr up popular resenlmeiit ot ihe Communists Moreover, they were successful enough tn cause the Soviets to air publicly their fears that another 'Chile" which would result in the total

destruction of the Communistin the making.'

Thb prospect was sufficient to stir the Soviels from their pose of noninvolvemcnt. The obliteration of the Portuguese Parly al Ihe hands of itsa Chile, would have undermined the Ideologicalof Soviet detente policies,he claim that these policies have paved the way for radical political and social change in the capitahst world. More importantly, the destruction of the PCP would have damaged the prestige of the Soviet leader most closely associated withSecretary Brezhnev.

The change was most immediately apparent In the harder line taken loward the Portuguese Socialists in the Soviet press, which until July had balanced criticism of their anti-Communist actions wilh pleaseturn lo Ihe alliance with the PCP. Now the Soviet organs went overrontal assault on the Socialists. The leaders of the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP) were charged wilh having "deserted openly" to the ranks of the anti-Communists.'

Al the same time, the Soviets became more activesupport for the PCP. Whereas only aearlier Ihey had discouraged publicol foreign Communist support for thenow began to organize manifestationssolidarity" wilh the PCP. The lies!this came onuly, when Pravdathe Belgian Communist Partyfor European leftists lo lendto the cause of the PortugueseIhefficial' wen: ci'ao activeinternational support for the PCPa denuncialiou of Western interferenceinternal af fairs of Portugal which appeared inCommunist newspaper Volktttmme onreportedly was printed on Ihe direct ordersErrihasss. in Vienna '"

The Soviets coupled these efforts with equally energetic diplomatic elforts to block Western aid to the opponents ol the PC P. Theyoncerted

an example, we !hr "OtMrvti" wiiek-liichir, Piaoda mi IS5 "ObmW noted flatly thai "th*

.

llirolioMiJ (lit littiil coup ill Chile" ThehyliAC ilie'A

lum<iI Ki indicate that an anidr icprornti tin-il'lr.liiif uf tl rgwurtiMM

effortissuade European Sociallsls from continuing their support for the PSP against the PCP. Even Third World Socialist leaders were asked to use their "influence" with ihc Portuguese Socialists."

The Soviets alsoew willingness to polemiclze with the West on the issue of intervention In Portugal. They charged that Western support for Portuguese anti-Communists constituted intervention in Portuguese Internal affairs and was in violation of Ihc CSCE agreement. The Soviet press first leveled tills charge In earlyew days after the CSCE summit had

G. Soviet Accommodation loeduced Status

That Moscow's goals were limited and confined essentially to preventing the destruction of the PCP became apparent with the resolution of thecrisis in the fallhis process proceeded in stages. In September, the pro-Communistof Premier Conceives was forced out and replacedew lineup dominated by the Socialists. In November, the government charged Ihewith Involvement In an abortive leftist coup, and used thisretext for moving against the remaining Communist positions in the government and the bureaucracy. This process culminated infter PCP setbacks in the legislative elections in April and the Presidential elections In June, when the last Communist cabinet member lost his positionesult of the Socialist Party's decision loinority government.

Moscow has accepted this process with notable equanimity. Once anti-Communist street violence abated and It became clear that the Communisls. even if humbled, would survive. Soviet policy retreated from the advanced positions II had occupied during the summeroviet pressof the dominant Socialists gave way to appealsunity of the left" based on an alliance between the Socialists andn effect, the Soviets have returned lo the position of ostensible noniuvutve-menl they occupied before

tbey have now turned the job ol maintaining liaison with the PCP over lo

ie yivctnolthro*ti fcnu.l.reatly to Ihe Oct cam! km in their rphitj.ua "iih tht

ctiaii

'Moderate"

lhe Easthe use of the East Ccrmansutout makes dear their Interest in obscuring their links wilh the Portuguese Communisls.

H. Soviet Support of Tactics Consistent

In fact, the resolution of the Portuguese internal crisis, even if af least temporarily In favor of the Socialists, has permJlled Soviet policy to return to its original channel. Except duringoscow has consistently backed the formationuniled front" of the PCP and the Socialists and other left-wing political elements on the basisointly acceptable program of political and economiche intention Is to maximize the Influence of Ihe PCP. which is supposed to make use of Its superior discipline to dominate any such coalition, while reducing the risk of precipitating another internal crisis. It is unlikely that the decision of the Portuguese Socialists toinority government will induce Moscow to turn away from this objective

Soviet supportautious political strategy based on the construction of political alliances and the careful, step-by-step pursuit of social and political(act.trategy similar in many ways to that pursued by the dissident Italianbeen remarkably consistent. Il was al the hear! of lhe initial Soviet reaction to the April coup, and it has been since maintained in the face of both political prosperity and adversity for the PCP.

is MiryK

During the initial phase of the. power was sharedbetween lhe junior and generally leftist military officers who had engineered the coup, and relatively conservative senior olficers and holdovers from the old regime. Moscow's recommendations to the Portuguese Communists were indicated when the Soviet press approvingly noted the PCP's conclusion that the fluid political situation demanded "an extremely flexible hut at lhe same time cautious policy, became haste and miscalculation may leadoss of alloscow's main emphasis was on the need to unite the forces of Ihe left against Ihe prospect of counter re

"Fur riitmplr. lhe article Ur V.

motl ihr jiiumal Ntui TimetisSSV4

Ihr net phase Septembervas one in which lhe apfMicntof lhe POP dramatically brightened The conservative Coneral Antonio de Splnola wai replaced in Ihe Presidency by the much more ambiguous figure of General Francisco da Costa Comet,eftist government with heavy Communist ic|wrsentatirin was formed. The PCI* wai emboldened to launch an offensive aimed at purging its rivals from Ihe media and lhe apparatus of government. The Communist efforts were alio aimed agamit the Socialists and other non-Communis! supporters of lhe revolution, and amountediscarding ol Ihe "united front" tactics it had previously pursued.

Thore is considerable evidence thai lhe Soviets did not share the belief of Ihe PCP Ihal its basei of support in Ihe mililary and in labor were strong enough lo enable it to hold power against the oppoiltion of all other organized political forces. Significantly. Moscow's fint authoritative public statement on Portugal, publishedead article inontressed the importance of maintaining lhe unity of all "democraticarnedplit in the forces of the left would pave list wayictory ol "reaction and fascism '

The collapseight-wing coup effort in5 had ihe effect of increasing Ibe confidence of the PCP The PCP moved to consolidate Its control of the pren und broadcast media, and began to demand punitive action against alleged "counterrevolutlon-aries" Moscow esprcssed vocal support lor the Portuguese Communists, bul showed Ui nervousness by repealing its public winnings against any action which mightplit in llie forces of Ihr

I Moscow's Foilura Io Dictole PCP Strotegy

vidence thai Mmcow privatelymuch more eipboi and bioeghl considerable pressure to

bea' in an effort to dissuade lhe PCP from actions which wihild icvuli in its political Isolation

lhe Sovielisbon warned Pirmieiew days after llie failure of the March coup that the mill of decree-.

walh*i imliut any tflm inW

ht -null nw-ii the4 Of Bo*

involving profound polii.nl and economic changes should beoviel officials reportedly gave Ihe same messageCP functionary in Moscow later in ibe month.11

Moscow's warnings were wiihout any apparentbul ihey were borne out by the reaction which began to build against the Communists afterThis campaign, led by Ihc Socialists and moderate military officers, focused on efforts to oust Ihc goveinmenl of Premier Goocalves. and by August had developed irresistible momentum

Again there is evidence lhat Moscow's admonitions wcie ignored by lhe PCP. Accordinglandestine source, the SovietsCP delegation in mid-July that ilistake for Ihem Io lie their fortuneslosely to tbe highly unpopular Vasco Concalvei. Al lhe same time, ibe Soviets made another effort lo persuade the PCP lo make peace with the Socialists on lhe groundserpetuation of iheir feud could cosl the PCP iho support of military officers grown weaiy of political

Nonetheless, lhe PCP continued lis war with Ibe Socialists and ill support ol lhe Vateo Goncilves goveinmenl up lo the very eve of the hitler's ouster onugust. Only ihc unbroken series of political setbacks llie PCP has suffered since5 have brought il backourse of action more in tine with Moscow's preferences (or caution and carefully phased advances.

J. limitations on Soviel Influence

Moscow's apparent (allure to Impose Us tactical preferences on the Portuguese Communists5 Is allmore noteworthy in view of the fact that the cards appear to have been stacked in Moscow's lavor. The PCI* was distinguished by its unblemished record ul vopport for the CPSU and Its dependence on Soviet

upport Vet Ihesehile quite

sufficienteniure its backing for lhe mam lines of

' Il 'in In; jiftiolprriiftl rrwrvallimlJm penudaiul* nwrti luJ tW "tn m aww> 1

uMnal Imams al nippuri nl 'lu-

ll. illliuc i iljl!

iiiiln1 Snvivii linn; brrn eiiii'ir*l> raluctam lowaajpta ra tar Parwi

nM Sy-Wfc. ajardwalatoV

i rWii.

Soviet foreign Jin) domestic policy and the Soviet interpretation of points of doctrine, were not adequate to compel it to give up what il irgardrdhance to take power The behavior of the PCPt well as the more publicised dissidence of the French and Italians, ii indicative of lhe problems which the erosion of discipline in the Communist movement can pose for Soviel policy, regardless of lhe degree to which the CPSU and these Turtle* mayommunity of purpose

IV. ITAIY

A. Are Communist Advances Compatible with Soviet Interests?

Moscow's relations with the PCI confront Itroblem of an entirely different order of magnitude

Despite theii occasional differences with the PCP, the Soviets have had no reason to question the basic identity of purpose between themselves and the PCP In luly they must eventually confront ibe question of whether the triumphajor West Europeanassuming It can be brought about without causing unacceptable damage to Soviet foreign policyin tbe ultimate interests of the Soviet Union. The Italian Party, unlike the Portuguese, has given Moscow grounds to question Its Leninist credentials

o sign that the Soviet leaders have serrouily faced up lo lhe problem, andardly

surprising that they have not done so. For them even to raise the question would be to place in doubt some of the central assumptions of the Sovtel system, including the validity of tbe Soviet systemodel lor political and social organization and the vitality of the Leninist ideology they represent

Events, however, may force lhe Soviets to face up to Ihe question The advance* regbtrred by the Italianhe legislative elections of6 have made il the near equal of the DC, withercent ol lhe vole7 percent The outcome has beoughl it within range of the "hnirjric cornpromise" with the DC width has been lis proclaimed goal? The PCIrand coalition in which it would vliurc power on an equal basis with Ihe DC Moreover, this coalition may have already begun tu tale shape in lhe Chamber of Deputies and Senate, where the PCI now holds seven important committee chair'niinsliiiis

B. The Nature of the PCI

The PCl's advances are potentially troublesome for Ihe Soviet) because of the nature of the Italian Party. In some importanl respects, II differs from the traditional imagelnist Party ll Is not lhe Partyighly disciplined and conspiratorial revolutionary elite,ass Party with somewhat looser standards of organizational discipline ll it not an avowed enemy of "bourgeoisarty which has prosperedarliamentary system and whose hopes for power are attached lo thai system, and which, moreover, has publicly insisted on its commitment to lhe preservation of that syslem

Whereas tbe central question for Italy's Western Allies is lhe extent to which Communist participation in the Italian Government would threaten the bases of Italy's constitutional system and alliancethe central question for Moscowessentially the opposite. To what degree has the PCI'sin that system weakened its commitment to lorce fundamental changes in Italy's domestic and foreign political alignments, and would this commit-rnenl be further weakened by participation io government9 Would, inCI Strengthened by parlii qulton in government servehannel for the inirusion of "subversive" Western Ideas inla the Communist movement or into the Soviel Union itself*

C. Ihe Question of Goals

The central Soviel concern is with the reliability of the Italian Party's commitment lo the traditional goals of orthodox Marxism-Leninism The most important ol these arelistedeading Soviri ideologueecent"the economic and polllicul power of the monopolies' and in* pie men ling "profound democratic reform* in the government andn mure straigh(forward terms, lhe Soviet* mustommunist Parly mult be commuted to Ihr ultimate imposition ol one-party Communist control sivet lhe government.nd all other iiutlluttoni ol public life

There is no doubt that the Soviet leadership harbors vfiiuui misgivings about the PCI leadership's commit-

Kr [niernatlonl Cnminuaisinsiirmrof Mmiim-Unirann.nf ihr journal, rlie U'oitia.-ow! ike

WatM

incut tn these goals

Soviet official* have regarded Enrico Bcrlinguer's leadership wilh considerable suspicion since ils inception. Tbey suspect it is motivated more by considerations of short-term political advantage than by revolutionary commitment, and that it is in danger of completely losing sight of its long-term goals."

Soviet doubts cannot have been eased by Berlin-gucr's repealed assertions that not only will the Italian road lo Communism differ from that followed by the Soviet Union, but the very shape that Communist society will assume In Italy will be different from that which it has assumed in Ihe Soviet Union. In Bcdingucr's words. Italian Communism will reflect the "deep-seated democratic traditions" of Italy, and among other things, will be characterized by asyslem. trade union autonomy, freedom of speech and religion,ixed economy combining elements of central planning and freeltogether, itolitical vision far removed from the Soviet system of absolute one-party rule, and polen-lially dangerous to the stability of the Sovielif Berlingucr means what he says.

Theowever, are not certain that he does mean what he says. Distasteful as it may be to the Soviets, Berhnguer's line is perfectly acceptable to themactical gambit designed to bringinfluence to bear on the government. This at least is how sonic Soviet officials appear to understandand to represent it to their superiors.'*

oviet Tolerance of PCI Tocticol Line

Indeed, the Soviets have not objected lo the PCI's tactics Specifically, they have not opposed the PCI's advocacy of an "historic compromise" nor its pledges

the constitutional system and

The Soviels have shown no inctirialiyn to attack the fundamental tenets of lhe PCI's domestic line even when relations have been most strained, as in lhe period after lhe PCl condemnation of the occupation of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet position at thai time

1 t

Department of the Onl-.ilarty of the Soviet Union (CC/CPSU).

-alii>K'.-ei'<i> the CECP InRt.li., UIY

Me was harshly critical of the PCI's stance on Czechoslovakia which he characterizedoreign policy of expediency. Rathct than criticizing the domcslic line of the PCI, however, the official demanded an intensification of the tactics ofwith other political forces. He stressed the need for the PCI to work for unity of action with all leftist lorces in the country, including Catholics. The PCI was at all costs to avoidivisive force in the country.10

This endorsement was reaffirmed the following year, as it has been periodically since then. Moscow treated the PCI's triumphs in the regional elections of5 and in the6 national elections as proof of the efficacy of these tactics. The regional elections were hailedgraphic example" of the successes which Communists had been able to win by allying themselves with non-Communiststruggle for commonrezhnev similarly endorsed the most recent successes of thewhile warning thai it must take care not to lose its revolutionary character."

E. PCI Todies Coincide with Soviet Needs

Indeed, when the Soviets have taken Issue with the PCI on specific issues of Italian domestic politics, it has been lo chide the PCI for adventurism and stiess the need for caution and "statesmanlike" action. Thus, during lhe Italian economic and political crisis in Ihe springhe Soviets repeatedly warned lhe f'CI against any action which might "aggravate" lhe crisis. Brezhnev mode it clear to Berllngueriiceiing in Moscow in March of that year that the USSR's interesl in good political and economic relations wiih the West demanded stability in Italy."

Similarly, the Soviets reacted with concern lodivorce referendumhich pittedand olhcr secular orea nidations agaliulSoviets

argued lhat PCI support lor the right ol divorce would serve to isolate it from those Catholic bouigeois circles "hose suppotf il needed to attain its objectives."

Insofar as differences on the tacllcal line followed by ihc Italian Communists have been the source of

.pmh oii.-iincrrio-

iIn- Til. Cvminltin Congress, -Iiith crmnciiicit llv dortiioe

He CliC* i'. flt'lm.

.Iilluulfic between ibetn and Ihcbeenftcn as not Ihc "'modriatiori of the Sovtcli which hut Item al Ihr tool of II. Moscow's apprehension aboul lhe consei|uenccs (or Soviel policy interest* of political or economic imijbilily in Italy has been expressed in Wiim termi lo lhe PCI, and has fed lhe suspicion Ihal Moscow would be only loo ready to socrlllce Iheniercsls lo ils own.

rezhnev went so (ar as lo suggest to Berllnguer3 thai in Moscow's eyes, Ihc "historic compromise" could go loo far. Brezhnev hinlcd thai lhe Soviets would not hie Io see ihe PCI move beyond the stage of influencing Ihc llalian government lo Ihe stage of actuald pa turnovernmentould cause uneasiness In the West and might damage tbe prospects for

Moscow's Initial reaction lo6 elections hasixture of approval and caution, and il has Specifically avoided supporting full-Hedged PCI par ticipalionoalition government. This Is an indication that Soviet support for the PCI's cflurlt is Kill keyed lo its ability lo avoidomesltc or international political upheaval Moscowown political needs have had the ironic result of aligning it behind Ihc caulinuieader for whom, as already noted, they have in olher respects little regard

F. Soviet ond PCI Difference. Center on Issue ol Autonomy

One of lhe reasons the Soviets have been unhappy with the leadership ol lhe Italian Parly has been ibe increaiing propensity il has shown lo openly enrne out against Moscow on foreign policy Isiues in which Iti interest* are directly at slake. The two areas in which Soviet and llalian Cornmunisl interests most directly conllict involve relations wllhinmun.itthe PCI opposes Moscow's claims loand within Westernlhe PCI doe* nol share llie hosttbty ol the Soviels Knv.vd all institutions ol European unity

The former has been by lai (he mini serious source of conflict between lhe two Parties, al leas! up to this point llie issue is autonomy. The Sonrii still mil to .iungate to themselves lhe right lo rule on Ihc appropriateness of the policies of lhe PCI. as of other Pjitiei The PCI for ill part has openly tctuted this Soviet rlforthen lhe final testament uf

PCI leader Palmira Togliairi publicly made the case lor "polytrntiisin" in the international

The Soviel occupation of Czechoslovakia8andmark in lhe development of Ihe PCI's leslstaiice to Ihe CPSU'* claim to authority over the Communisl movement. The PCI nol only denounced the Soviel invasion, bul rejected ibe "Brezhnev Doctrine" with which the Soviets sought to justify their actions. The latter claimed for Moscow the rlghl to intervene in defense of Communism whenever andhreat to Itsairo with obviously dangerous on plication* lor theof other Parlies.

At the same lime, the position that the Western Parties have taken on this issue puts In question lhe enllre basis of Ihc Soviet position in Eastern Europe. Berlinguer's explicit reference lo Czechoslovakia al lhe Eait Berlin summit made il clear lhat the troublesome issue of the Soviet role In Eastern Europe, even if dormant, is not dead.

Moreover. Berlinguei linked the PCI's criticism of Snviet actions in Czechoslovakia lo the "more general problem" of.Ihc "relationship between democracy andhereby implicitly railing Ihe threat that llie PCI might go on lo take issue with Soviet actions in defense of orthodoxy elsewhere, perhaps even in the Soviet Union The PCI heretofore has been consciously chary of challenging Soviet actions in Moscow's own sphere, bul there have recently been some cracks In its veneer of caulion. Moscow undoubtedly look note of the PCI Parry newspaperiiu'i reference to an appeal for support io the participants in the Easl Berlin summit from Audrey

Salhrxov and olher Soviet dissidents.

the Sovieis had already protested in latejl decision Io permil its Parry press lo rcp'ini items critical ol the USSR which had previously appeared in olher newspapers."

I he tame concern for autonomy lias beenfor PCIo Soviet eflorti lo move again! lhe Chinese within the Communist dioveuirnl lhe Italians have little sympathy for Maoist doctrine, bul have (irmly iculled any action which might lettriel lhe light uf any Parlyetermine III own count autonomously The effort by the Italians and other ilisudcnl Parties lo obtain assurances that ihr CECP would nui be used by the Sovieti (nr anii-Chinrsc

SECfET

was ii piincipalhe two-year delay in (he onivocation of the East Berlin meeting.

G. Portugal Strains PCI-CPSU RtJohonship

The PCI line on Portugal directly contradicted that of the Soviet* Thearticularly ils suoress in banning the PortuguesenocrBts alter the Marchcoup attempt,irect impact on the Italian scene, where thp PCI's hopeshare of power depended on an alliance with the llalian DC. The PCI reacted wilh public disavowals ol ihe PCP's actions and with an openion wilh Mario Scares, the leader of lhe Portuguese Socialists and the principal enemy of lhe PCP. The gulf between tfie Italian and Portuguese Parties was marked by the PCI's attendance al the PSP Congress in5 and its absence from the PCP Congress three months earlier

However, the PCI's differences wilh Moscow did not reach theiiuntilugust, an articleoviet ideologuearodov. the editor of lhe Prague-based journal PwhUm o) Peace and Soita/ism, appeared In Pravda. /arodov directed his attacks against unnamed "modernwho he charged, were unable or unwilling to rccognlM- ihe existenceevolutionary situation. He asserted ihal when Communists had aof actual strength, as distinct from electoral strength Ihey ihould use it.n effect, charged thai "some" Parties had confused means wilhnd had given up revolution In favor of Iransient parhainrnlary advantages. His comments were rlrarls applicable to the Italians, who had criliciud lhe PCP for its efforts lo overturn the results ol (he rlecliniis in which il had been defeated *

The liming of the article also suggested that the Italians were intended lo be among tbe primary addressees of /arodovs strictures It appealed in Pravda lhe dayCI delegation arrived in Moscow loi talks with lhe Soviets, wilh Ihe problem of Portugal at the head of theCI official later alleged thai lhe delegation travelled lo Moscow to intrrcedr with the Soviets on behall and al the behest of Ihe Portuguese Socialists"

uuthuiiiuim-w nl :hp article -ai imiiiaUrd rlieiflien (WiSim-rrecKid <hi avihorn'r!:ii)(

The results of the Zarodov article were much more significant than lhe specific nature of his charges. These had been heard more than once before in the course of Moscow's intermittent debates with the dissident Communists. This time, however, they had the effect of accelerating the PCI's theretofore tentative efforts to dissociate Itself from some of the most repiessive features of Soviet doctrine and practice. These efforts have grownholesaleleast inthe kind of one-party regimes established in Moscow and the Warsaw Pact countries. The process was capped by Bcrlingucr's assertion In East Berlin that the "models of socialist societies followed in Eastern European countries" have nu relevance for lhe countries of Western Europe

H, The PCI and Eurocommunism

Of even greater import for the future of Soviet relations with lhe PCI and European Communismhole was the impetus the quarrel over the Zarodov Iheses gave to Ihe Italian Party's efforts toole of regional leadership. Within two weeks ofSeptember meeting wilh Zarodov, Berllnguer and the PCE's Marchais had met In Paris for consultations. They met again in Rome onovember

Tlie fruil of these consultations was containedoint declaration released the samelimilar declaration signed by the Italian and

' Iht ktf pusages nl this document are wixth quirting lu In ihu ipinj lo/ democioty) allf thtdtmoi-ianc bourgeon tenolutiom endfuggfei of /Mihem led by lh/

m/rUnf elan muif be gua'anlred and drurliiprtf Thu appkrtihtijiii of thought and eipreiuoi oj lhe pirn, autmbbi-uii;v'i)fnj"i. ihe. fjtitiam io demotuuau. the free mourimrir of

people a< hvmenl-rW. thelrlixlU llje.

lheeo>nptete freedom of niiremo'* of wenii u/ ilidi.fhi and of farm /i'wWpji'ihoI. cultural' and amine f'tedam 'ihtnd Italian Communtiti declare themieliti in facfi ofiiMhrv of politicalf the rigAi io tiliimce ond

oirriuKv of oppoalum ol the lite formation aid the

oj ihe dciotraric alternation of mafoMitt ande iitulantu aad de.otaiiatie funi.ixom of ihe uati. ami or nie mleixndeMe vi jmiice

The fCI and PCP onifnVbh condition' offmw id (Piarifid'i rficrr pamion It not tatiKal bm from

iheu illinium iij tht tpKifit trbjet lint and hliloneol ceneVieni of

onifM* and iheu ionilrfe<arion of internationalnte

Spanish rties in July in its reaffirmation ol (he two Parties' commitment lo parliamentary democracy and disavowal ol authoritarian intentions ll was much more significant than the fotiuci document, however. In lhat Ihe French Party had traditionally functioned

as an ally of lhe CPSU and as the PCI's chief rival (or leadership of the Western Parties. The tactical alliance

of these two mass Parties, by far the most important In Western Europe, if It endures, could well do mortal

damage to the CPSU'i efforts to maintain ill authority

over lhe movement in the West.

The unease which the document aroused in Moscow was demonstrated by the failure of Ihe Soviet press to mentionerse TASS release Issued onovembci noted only lhat Ihe French and Italian Parly leaders had met for talks on "questions of mutualhere* has been no further public comment

Even before this, the increasingly Westernorientation of the PCIroblem for the Soviets. The Betlinguer leadership of the PCI professes lu sec its own future and that of Italy In lhe contestocialist Europe, but it is the "little Europe" of the European Communitiest supports and participates in the Institutions of the EC, and has increasingly tended lo reduce its participation in Soviet-dominated Internationa) organizations in favor of participation In Western EuropeanIt is an active and constructive participant in Ihe European Parliament. Il has changed its status In lhe Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions ftom lhat of full to associate member in order lo qualify for membership in the European Trade Union Confederation, and IItaunch public supporter of the EC. It has also turned Its attention lo improving rrJatiom with the powerfularlies of Northern Europe

I. Moscow's Assessment

The Soviets have reacted to these developmenti wilh some umblvalcncc. On lhe one hand, ihey have been disturbed by the anti-Soviet overtones of the PCI's efforts lo easl itselfuropean imarr. particularly its tendency to Ireal both Ihe US and the USSK equally us outsiders in Western Eutope. On the other hand, they haveonsiderable willing-neu to accept ihe maneuvers of lhe PCI as unpleasant neccssil.es imposed on ll by the iealili.es of it* political environment

They can take some comfort in the fact lhat In its internal organization, ike PCI ii itill structured on recognizably Marstst-Leninist lines, emphasizingconlrol from the lop. Thisey point to Ihe Soviet leaders, as demonstrated by their propensity to privately lecture Italian leaders when they detect signs of slackness in the Italian Party's control of its subordinateespite some reservations on the part of thehenternal standards still seem acceptable to them.

J.

Beyond thii, their tolerance fot the PCI resls on Iheir conviction that Ihe esparuion of the influence and power of Ihe PCI are in (be long-term strategic interests of the USSR. One veteran Sovietrecentlythe Soviet view of the impllca-tinni of PCI oi PCF- participation In goeafMnaai for the stratrgic rivalry between East and Wot in unusually candid terms. He saw both military and political advantages fat Ihe Soviel Union. In his view, the "operational plans" of lhe NATO Alliance would be upset" andeft-wing breakthrough would strike straight at (the) backbone" of lhe EC."

Moscow's Meons of Control limited

Moscow's difficulties with the Italian Communists are compounded by its relative lack of leverage over them The channels of influence which are usually at ilsealing with foreign Communist* are in the case of the PCI either partially or completely blocked

Moscow's role as the paymaster of the internationalthe case of the*PCI hasess effective instrument. Soviet financialill imoortenl to ihc PCI. hut it Ii nn longer vital

. the relative importance of Ihe Soviet subsidy lo the PCl budgei has shrunk According to the mint iccent information, it ha* varied between5 million annually in teceol yean At the same time Soviet financial assistance hai become relatively less important. Soviet contiibotions have remained relatively stable, but the PCI'* own financialond contributions, income from Party cnlrrprises. and subsidies (mm the stateew political financegrown The estimated Soviet subsidy4hare some* hat Icsn thanercent of lhe annual acknowledged

SEC

olhe limited eflcctlvcricu oi money jwa* demonstrated when (he SuvWIt alifmptcd to put it lo use after lhei.iihe Soviel occupation ofeow's threati to reduce itior Ihr PCI. and some actual culbackidid not cause the PCI lo abandon ils opposition lo lhe Crcchusluvak occupation.

A second traditional channel of Soviel Inlluence ovi't lhef otherpfcscncc of reliable "friends" of lhe USSH wilhin Ihelran increasingly less helpful factor within lhe PCI Ucrllngucr has steadily placed his own allies in pnililon* nf influence and authority within ihr Party since becoming Secretary Ceneraln Ihc process, many Meacow loyalists have been eased oul Thii prncess peaked alh Congress of Ihe PCI in5 The pro-Soviet Armando Cotlula was dropped from ihe Party Secretariat His departure apparently left Ihe Soviet* with no dependable and wcll'pluced supporters at the top levels of the PCI. According to one report, officials within theDepartment ol Ihc CC/CPSU wete reduced to hoping lhat Clniuiiew member of the PO Secretarial, could be cultivatedsuccessor" to Cosiulu *'

A IiojIi.ol Soviet Influence wiihio the PCI. Ihr loyal I) lo the USSR of man* ofct ive.liorm the Isavr of lhe PCI. is by noegligible factor The otlhodoi Marnst-Leninists, who are variously eatiinated toercent of lhe Party mcinhiiship *erve tonoiihe leadership of the PCI from direcl clashes with ihr CPSU The PCI leadership apparently is Inking direct acllon lo deal with this problem of dual loyalties within the ranks of the PCI.

iwo offlcitils of theho were in attendance at Ihev1the If tl. rwmplainedof the Steady drop in participation by PCI members in political training [for/aim conducted by lhe CPSU According io theCI participation at this time is practnallv nl.t Ixrih the Soviets anil Italians are undoubtedly aware, will eventually weaken lhe ties between Moscow and Italian Communist

- fi ii- ihc iy-'Ai

'h. tli-iiiii.-ioin,i,

K. The Bottom line

In Ihc lesthe Sovietsmore lhan Italy's Wnlnncertain which PCl is Ihe teal one Neither can they countbring able lo dclrrrnine the ivurse of developrnenl within tlie PCI They can only-as llicy Killthe ultimate alms of the Dalian Party correspond to their own goals, ond lake such action as they can to maintain the link* between the PCI and the CPSU and to bring lo bear lhe influence which remains lo them

V. SPAIN

"The defente of lhe Soviet (Inton and lhe iocialux ivilem In itsn obligationFrom an official history of the

"Moiovw, where out dreamt /fail began lo com*ongind of Home for ui We ipoJc of ihe great October Soeiokti Revolution ai if II were Chrlffmaii luni the period of Our infancy. Today we have growne rvre beginning lo lose the characterU-liaSantiago Cntillo. Secrelary Ceneral of ihr PCE, speaking at the Eail Berlin Conference of Communist Parties In

A. The Scope of Moscow's Sponiih Problem

These two citations mark the path traversed by the PCE in the courseew years, and nie suggestive of the difficulties which the Soviets face in dealing with lhe PCE. These difficulties are both more and less vrious than llmv ihey must confront In coping with the PCL

They are mote serious ia thai the PCE hasoutspoken and consistent in its refectioni authontaiian practices and dmtrinesPCI. and al least equally determined into Moscow's efforts lu assert itsIhe movement Along with ihe PCI. it was oneopponents ol Moscow's efforts to

ocument which would serveiinding statement ol principle in East Berlin

They are less trriuus in that Spain is intrinsically less important than Italy, and the Spanishoth nv.ch smaller and muchmm imwer thanilian WhileIndian Party has already

become in many ways an unacknowledged pailovrrnmenl with tbe Chiiitian Detnoeiatl, thePMty has set to win the light to operate legally in Spam Its comparative weakness means that the Soviets air nol under Ihe pressure ol time to resolve the differences between them

rigins of Moscow's Differences wrth the PCE

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia precipilated the firsl open rifl between ihe PCE and the CPSU. even though there were earlier signs that Ihe PCE had begun lo distance itsell flora the CPSU The most significant of these were ihc close and friendi* relationi maintained between lhe PCE and the Romanian Communisls in lhe,ime when relations between Bucharest and Moscow were al iheir nadir.

The Spanish Party's gradual disaffection from the CPSUroduct of both internal and externa] factors. Following the failure of an experiment with terrorist luetics Inew Parly leadership undei Cenecrclary Santiago Carlllo Solares decided Ihal the PCE's only chance for success lay in collaboration with the other potentially anti-Franco forces in Spanish society. This shift coincided wilh lhe turn away hum Cold War confrontation begun under Khrushchev, and was encouraged by the Soviet leader The PCF. leadership was shaken by his ouster innd was slow to warm to his successors

This inauspicious start to the rebtionshtp between the Spanish Communisls and the icigning Soviet leadership proved toortent of thing! to come The PCE's domestic situation and the political tactics thb seerned lo dictate tended lo bnng them into alignment wilh the more "reformist" elements of Westernthedistanced Ihem fiom lhe Sovieti Relations between lhe two Parties were lurthcr aggravated by Moscow's persistent inclination fo put the interests of Spanish Communism second to the needs of Soviel diplomacy, as demonstrated by indications of Soviet interestiplomatic rapprochement wilh the Franco regime0 Ihe Sovietsommercial office in Madrid which ha* exercised quasi-diplomatie functions)

Following theublic denunciation of ihe Soviel mlri vent ton in Czechoslovakiahe

difference* between the two Parlies rapidly expanded to include most of Ihr points al issue in the Communist movement The PCE opposed Soviet efforts lo ostracize the Cbinrsr and defended China's nght tu define its own policies, and it has continued to take vigorous issue wilh Moscow over Crerhoslovakia Along with the Italians. Yugoslavs, Romanians, and other dissident Parties lhe Spaniards also lefused to fully endorse the document of the International Communist Conference9

The resultslenum of the Ccntial Commillee of the PCE in3 dramaticallyjust how fai the process of deterioration hadeport submitted lo the plenum and later published as an article by Manuel Asearaleose associate of Carillo, amountedirtual deduction ol independence from the CPSU. Il broke sharply with lhe Soviets on issues of both domestic and foreign policy.

Soniiago Corillo Solares, the belligerently independent leader ol Ihe Spanish Communist Party.

On the domuslic front, it wont well beyond advocacyactical alliance with other anti-Franco(he Soviets couldrenounce the goalingle-party state and to proclaim itself in favor of "democratic socialism" Even more strikingly, it renounced the concept of "an official philosophy" and pledged its support of an "open ideological struggle between all democratic trends '* It asserted that to do otherwise would be toew regime toolice state. It went on lo repudiate "the specific features of other revolutions and Ihe particular experiences of other Communistn words which were clearly directed at the CPSU The PCE went on to enunciate Its support forruly Europeanhis it definedEurope which is nol subject to the Atlantic burden but which maintains good relations with Ihe IS. as with Ihe USSR and China and other crwnlrtes"

Finally, the PCE document elevated its suspicions of lhe Soviet commitment to Western Communism to lhe level of Party dogma. Il proclaimed the need to struggle against any tendency "lo Identify coexistence with Ihe 'statusnd detente with the freezing ofxisting social structure in Ihcl went on toumber of specific Soviet actions which contributed to its fear lhat Moscow was indifferent lo the cause of Spanish and other European

The Spanish Party has gone on lo demonstrate Its disaffection with Moscow in deeds as well as words. The PCE hasirm supporter of the Portuguese Socialtance marked by Its attendance at lhe PSP Congress and its failure to appear at ihr PCP Congir-si. and il hits worked quietly to rally support lor Ihe PSP in Ihe European left.

C. Moscow's Foilura to Assert Control Over the PCE

Thn iosI-Czc huilovat experlooerj bai dotnOD-straled lhat the PCE is effectively beyondeach, rwn though it hasa for effort to crush the Spanish dissidents At first impression, the levers available to Moscow would appear to have been sufltcicnl lo bend the PCE lo ils willi in lhe IMOl the PCE had had con*nlerable success in meeting its own financial needs from contn butlm gir-at need uf Ihe technical and logistical support which enabled it to function as unorganization within Spam press and broad-

2 !J

SECRp

casting facilities, housing, jobs and office facilities for its militants abroad, aid in establishing cover for clandestine activities, and courier services For this assistance, the PCE was heavily dependent on the Soviets, their East European allies, and the Ihen-loyallst French Party In addition, many veteran members of the PCE and of the dvil waroyalty to the Soviet Union Others, induding the civil

war heroine and current honorary Chairman of the PCE, Dolores Ibarurn (Laad lived in

exile in the Soviet Union and received stipends from

the Soviet state.

The uiilial Soviet reaction to the PCE'sof its actions in Czechoslovakia was an attempt to force the PCE into submission. Subsidies from the CPSU and other Bloc Patties were cut backliut not cuta reminder to the Spanish of the CPSU's control ovei lhe financial resources of the PCE Accordingne teport, Soviet Politburo member M. A. Suslov violently reminded Santiago Carilloeeting8 thai the PCE was "only living hy the grace of the Soviet Union and its Communist Party

D. Soviet Efforts to Split tho PCE

The most serious threat to the PCE was not the cutback in Bloc funding, whichonsiderable eitent was offset by the success of fund drives conducted by the PCE among European lefhsts and by contributions from sympathetic Parties, including the PCI. Soviet sponsorshipissident. pro-Soviet faction within lhe leadership of the PCEuch more serious danger Nevertheless, lhe initial effort failed, and0 Ihe leading pro Soviets had been expelled from the PCE. Three olGarcia-1asper. Aguslin Gomez de Segura Pagola. and Enriquejoined together toew. "authentic" Communist Party which eventually adoplrd lhe name, the Spanish Communist Workers Party (PCOE).

The Soviets lent the dissidents both malerial and moral supportesult of Sostet subsidies, the dissidents were able loival publication to Iho iillici.il organ of the PCF. and toignificant organirational effort Moscow alioiheir efforts lo proselytize the large and influential Spanish Communist exile community within the USSR On tho other hand. Soviet support had dirtlnct limits, and Muscow was parsimonious

SEj*6T

lo arouse frequent complaints from Lister and other dissident leaden.

Still more significant to the ultimate defeat of the dissidents was the Soviet failure to formallythem as the "true" representatives of Spanish Communism. Indeed. Soviet support to the PCOH was seriously restricted by Moscow's reluctance to force matters to the stage of an open and complete break with the PCE. or to be openly Identified with an effort to split the Spanish Party.

As already noted. Soviet funding of the official PCE, while reduced, was not ended. Nor did contacts between the PCE and the CPSU cease. Even during the very months when the struggle between the Santiago Carillo group and the pro-Soviet dbsldents was most tense, both the PCE and the CPSU carefully keptacade of fraternal cordiality, for example, by continuing to meet occasionally.

The PCE leaders' motivation in contributing to this charade was simple. Tbey did not want to give theretext for ending all forms of support. Moscow's motivation was more complex. Itstorontal attack on the PCE may have reflected concern at the impact this would have on relations with other European Parties, including the French Party, wilhin which the PCE enjoyedsupport.

Perhaps the most important factor in Moscow's caution was Its lack of confidence in the ability of Ihe dissidenls to achieve their goals. The Soviets made tt quite clear to the leaders of the PCOE lhat an increase in Soviet support was contlngeril on their ability loolid political base. According to one report, the Soviets would have preferred that the Livicr-Garcia-Comci faction remain in the PCE to influence the Carillo leadership from within, and regarded their open defiance of Carillo and his adherents ashe Soviets reportedly inlormcd Ihe dissidentsossibly at their founding meeting in Augusl, thai they would lend then lull support to them only if they succeeded In controlling the organization of the PCE Congress scheduledowever, not only was this not accomplished,3 the PCOE itself had been overcome by factionalism, and two of the original three leaders had been again purged The factionalism wilhin the PCOE made il clear to both the PCE and

2

the CPSU that the PCOE waserious rival to the official Patty.

Faced with seemingly incompatible alternatives, the Soviets have followed an erratic middle course tn an effort to avoid any irrevocable policy commitment. Thus, In4 they, took public issue with the policy position adopted by the PCE Ihe previous September, charging among other things that it "reeks of nationalism" and "lacks one ounce of proletarianlmost simultaneously, however, they undertook moves designed toormal reconciliation with the PCE.llness in4 evidently acted to spur the pace of Soviethese bore fruit InCE delegation headed by Carillo and Aicarate visited Moscow for talks with Soviel leaders. The talksaper confirmation of the "notmallia-tlon" of relations between the two Parlies In the formoint communique which pledged both Parties to contribute to an improvement in relations and to the "voluntary coordination" of their actions. It also pledged both Parties not to support "splilters" within the ranks of the other, which in effectoviel pledge not to continue its support ol the Lister group.

The reconciliation was more apparent than real, however. Notably, the Soviels have acted covertly lo keep the Lister faction in operation. Although they have avoided direct support for the PCOE, the Spanish dissidents apparently have continued lorickle of support from other Bloc countries, who are clcaily acting as Moscow's agents in thisThe East Germans had earlierimilar relationship with the official PCE when the Party's relations wilh the Soviets were still frozen.)

E. Soviet ond PCE Interests Are Contradictory

Even though in some ways the political line of lhe PCE conforms to Soviett least in its emphasis on moderale, "democratic" goals calculated to sooth the ansieties of Spain's neighbors, the Soviets have ample reason to question whether its long-term objectives arc in line with lhe interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviels must bc particularly disturbed by the Spanish Party's advocacy of diplomaticbetween the US and USSR, and by its critical views of ihe main lines ol Soviet foreign policy. On this hitter point, it goes well beyond the PCI. which.

El

RFT

matlcn nol immediately pertaining; lo its owns generally supportive of Soviet foreign policy iKxiilions. The PCE. on the olher hand, has questioned the Soviel rationale for Fast-West detente and Ihc relevance of this Soviet policy for the goals of West European Communists.

Moreover, the PCE has been at least as critical of Soviet actions in Eastern Europe as it has of the US role in Western Europe. It has coupled its demands for an end to the US military presence in Western Europe to an equally explicit demandoviet pullback from Eastern Europe. Carillo has even gone on record, asm* interviewhat he would not be disposed to demand the withdrawal of US forces from Spain until Soviet forces had been withdrawn from Czechoslovakia*

Nevertheless, lhe Soviets can sec little immediate alternative to efforts lo moderate their dispute with (he PCE. The mere fact that Ils prospects have improved under the monarchical government of Juanif is now deemed likely lo be legalized in Ihc foreseeableheightened Moscow's interest in settling their differences.

Their ability lo succeed in fhis effort, however, is questionable, not least because Ihe immediateof the CPSU and the PCE arc quite different. The Soviets arc inclined, by reason of theii strategic rivalry with Washington, to strive fo enhance their political and economic influence wilh theirst step, this demands the establishment of full diplomatic relations, which have not existed since the Spanish Civil War. The PCE insists that Moscow must make any diplomatic rapprochcmenl with Madrid contingent on Spanish government concessions to lhe PCE. Any Soviet gesture toward Juan Carlos in the absence of such concessions will inevitably embitter its relations wilh the PCE

Against this immediate incompalibilily of interests, the Soviets can only persist in Iheir efforts to wear down the PCE's truculent independence. As one way uf doing fhis. accordinglandestine intelligence source, the Soviets are now promoting contacts between loyal' Parties and the PCE" In the last analysis. Moscow is reduced to pinning its hopeunc favoublc evolution within the PCf leadership alter iho departure of Carillo if this hope should be unfounded. Moscow is likely to lend even less weight to the interests of Ihe PCE than if now does, with

predictably negative consequences for Its relations with that Party.

VI. FRANCE

A. Importance of the PCF

Moscow's relations with the PCF are infinitely more important to it than its lies wilh the PCE, and the cleavages which have suddenly appeared between the PCF and the CPSU are of correspondingly greater significance. Unlike Spain, Franceajorpower and hasrimary target of Soviet diplomatic overtures since theJ0s.

Moreover, the French Partyuch greater domestic political factor than the PCE. Thereeal possibility thai the Alliance of the Lef! in which it Is linked to lhe Socialists and lhe small Radical Left Party mayajorily in Ihe legislative elections scheduledhe state of relations between lhe CPSU and lhe PCF could therefore come loearing on the state of relations between the French and Soviet governments.

The PCF is important Io Moscow for one additional reason. Along with the PCI. if is one of the mainstays of lhe European Communist movement. In contrast to the PCI. Ibe French Party has heretofore been distinguished by its orthodoxy and loyalty to Moscow Much of Moscow's past success in its struggles lo preserve its authority over the Western European Communist movement has depended on Ihe support of Ihe French Party The increasing readiness lhe PCF has shown lo align itself in opposition, lo the Soviets since5 has correspondingly seriousfor Moscow's positionis the main body of Western European Communism The link Ihe PCK has forged with the PCI. if it should endure, raises the prospect that Moscow may find itself isolated from bold ihe Asian and Western European wings of Communism

B. Post PCF Loyalty

With the exception of an interlude. when the PCF momentarily joined other Western European Parties in opposition to the Sovietof Czechoslovakia, the PCFoyal ally ol lhe CPSU, and frequently as ils agenl in maintaining discipline among the Western European Parlies. It proved willing1 to Cut

back itsof theprincipal patron it had been until thatthe behest of the SovietsAt tbe Brussels Conference of Western European Communist Parties inhe PCE was instrumental in excluding the anti-Soviet faction of the divided Creek Communist Party from the cooference It directly attached the Spanish Communist* on the floor of the conference -rcpoct-edly at the instigationPSU official" As for Portugal. PCF chief Mar chau engageditter polemic5 with the Italians and Spanish on tbe issue of (heir "Interference" on bchall of the Portuguese Socialists.

The traditional guidelines for PCF behavior in the international movement were reaffirmed in2 by Jean Kanupu. the PCF official with overall responsibility for foreign policy Kanapa reportedly told an audience ol PCF officials that the primary duty nf the PCF was solidarity with the countries of the Soviet Bloc, and first of all with the USSR itself. Anti-Sovietlstii. according to Kanapa, was to be regardedrime."

The PCF was an equally reliable supporter of Soviet policy objectives beyond the sphere of the Communist movement In regard to the two principal great power rivals of the USSR. Marchab hasitter critic of the sins of Maoism, and has been equally harsh in criticizing France's political, military, and ecooomic links with the US and Ihe other members of the Atlantic Alliance Even on issues of more immediate relevance to France and the PCF. the French Party's views have generally coincided with Soviet policy positions This has been evident in the Party's attitude toward European economic integration,contrasl to thehas beeneluctant and critical participant In the Institutions of the EC

C. Significance of PCF Reversal of Course

Almost ovetnlghl, Ihe relationship between the PCF and the CPSU has changed dramatically. The PCFs entenle with Ihe PCI In the fall5 marked Its shift ftom the roleeliable agent of Soviet influencetrident pnrponcnt of national

The uKsdcnness of (he reversal was exemplified by the change in theosition during thei'. negotiations for the June summit of European Communist Parties in East Berlin When the negotia-

tions began in4 the PCF was still adhering to the pro-Soviet hoc Its position changed drastically during meetings held in October andhere it suddenly emergedritic of (he document prepared by the East Or mam and ibe Soviets Indeed, by the spring6 it had reportedly become the most recalcitrant of all the dissident Parties in dealing with the Soviets, and it* objection* reportedly were ihe last to be cevercome

Similarly, the PCF has emerged overnight from the status of an apologist and defender of the Soviet systemritic of Soviel violations of "humantd Congress of the PCF innd in the presence of Soviet Politburo member A. P. Kirilcnko. Murchals ventured to open hb address lo the Congress wilh an attack on the SovieU for "unjust and unjustifiable acts of repression against Soviet citizens "M

Tbe same Congressove to formally drop the French Party's cnmmltmenl to Iheof thehb hoary ph rase has been symbolic of the French Party's commilmentoviet-style one-party dictatorship As such, it was clearly out of phase with the PCTi efforts to sell itself

The French Comrfiunitft prasent ovation 'o osioeioiion -ilh the Soviets i* oofeceni doit. In2 photo. B. N. "onomorev (laioraces French Conwwiit leader torques< the ope-Hitg ot onPom. The- octr- q> lor Wtt. Zoo/odnow me Firs-f olDroonmeni ol ihe GQCFSU.

to the French electorateroponent of democratic change, and its elimination is an entirely logical step. In fact, as sudden as was the PCF's turnabout in. it had its roots in the PCFs longstanding efforts to convince the French electorate of its "national"and democratic character. These efforts date bad, to, and were responsible for such earlier phenomena as the PCFs criticism of the Czechoslovak Invasionhat is new in the PCFs position is its determination andhange to which Moscow's persistent dbregard of PCF interests has contributed heavily.

The PCF actions represent an attack on doctrines which are central to the Soviet catachism. In this, as in their open criticism of the workings of the Soviet system and in the obduracy of their newfound opposition to Soviet leadership of the international movement, the Freneh verbally have gone beyond the Italian Party. The PCI's positions have evolved more slowly and are more consistently with their own pasi. and they have less need to assert theirin dramatic terms. The PCF, on the other hand, most take drastic action lo overcome the credibility gap which afflicts it. The commitment to democratic freedoms on which it has based its electoral platform since the lurrnation ol Ihe Alliance of the Left2 is in sharp contrast to the dictatorial structure of the Party. The contrast was demonstrated vividly In the very action by which the Party moved toward disavowing Ihe "dictatorship of lhe proletariat" at its lasttep which, radical as it was, was nonetheless adopted "unanimously."

D. Soviet ond French Communist Interests Conflict

tf>

If is highly questionable whether anything of significance has happened to the internal character of ihc French Party. What has changed, however. Is the PCF'l deteimination lo pul its own interests ahead of Ihose ol Ihe international movement ond the CPSU In many ways. Moscow's present difficulties with the PCF arise because of its consistent subordination of

Ms of

Soviellivei. (he Soviets have made theof good relation? with France one of the pillars of their policy toward the West Unfortunately for the PCF Moscow's interest .in good relations with a

conservative government in Paris has becomeincompatible with the advancement ofinteresls io Fiance.

The Soviets have never hesitated in choosing between the two. During the reign of dcCaulle, theyirtual prohibition against active and open Communist opposition to the General. The Soviets justified this prohibition on the grounds that dcCaullc's foreign policies served the interests of the USSB and the workinghe Soviet position has remained virtually unchanged through lhe Pompidou administration and even into the presentof Valery Ciscard d'Estaing. It has been qualified only to the extent that the ban on Communist opposition to the French administration is to be maintained only insofar as the French administration perpetuates the foreign policy line ofn practice, this has meant no signiFicant change, although the Soviets have been critical of some elements of Ihe Ciscard government's foreign policy, such as iUshow of interest in improving relations with the US "

Soviet intervention in French Party affairs has been directed not merely at hobbling the PCF's opposition to the government, bul even on occasion at actively undercutting Ihe French Communists. This was clearly the case during the French presidential electionshen the Soviet ambassadorell-publicized meeting with Ciscard, much lo the consteruation of the Communists and the candidate of the Left Alliance. Francois Mitterrand of the Socialist Party. This undercut the PCF's efforts to portray Ciscard as annd possibly may have tipped the balance in an election wonazor-thin margin

Moscow's coolness toward the electoral coalition ol Communists, Socialists, and la-fl Radicals2 was evident Irom the very beginning M. A. Susiov. win. led the Soviet delegation lo Ihe PCF Congress inonspicuously failed to men ion this coalition in his address to the Congress.

Moscow's interest in good relations with the Ciscard government help* lo explain its attitude toward the Left Alliance, but the Soviets also have lessreasons to be critical of if Privately, they have critici/eu il to other European Communists on the grounds that it was basedweak" agreement which conceded loo much to the Socialists They have specifically warned thai the French agreement is noi

lo berototyiie Im similar agreements In other Western Europeanhe SovieU have traditionally made iheir support ol" coalition politics conditional on (he dominance of the Communist Parly within llieondition which has not been met in Prance, where tlie Socialist Party has replaced lhe PCF as Ihr leading representative of the French left Moscow's unhapptnen with thbggravated by in distrust ol Mitterrand, who In the past has been loudly critical of Soviet policies in Eastern Europe and at home.

The net eflcct ol Soviet actions was to force the PCF to face up to the possibility that lisdid not coincide with those of the Soviet Union. The lint signs of the French Party'sof its relationship with Moscow appeared in the aftermath of4 presidential elections. In two articles which appeared in June, the PCF newspaper L'HumanUe. attacked the theses advanced earlierovietumunlU asserted that "ilrave error" to suggest as had the Soviet, that "coeaistence will suffice In solve the great economic and social problemsountry likehe Soviet leadership, ratlin than lhe Soviet academic, was Ihe obvious target of L' IIiimanl'e's strictures, and Ihe clear implication was that Ihe PCF was becoming restive in the face of Moscow's inclination to subordinate French Communist interests to those of Soviet policy

Nevertheless, the differences between the Iwo Parties might have sub-nded for sume lime if the Zarodov article had nut forced lhe French into open disagreement wilh Moscow The initial reaction ot Ihc PCF was lo dismiss the article as "unimportant" and of no relevance to lb* situation in France. Thb nonchalance could not be sustained in lhe face of the strong public reaction to the article in France, and widespread spcculatiiHi lhat lloviel move to turn Ihc international movement back in the diiccfion ofwhich threatened to do serious damage to the PCF's cleetnrai appeal

and everywhere In contrast to its behavior after previous flare-ups. tlie PCF thii lime hjs shnun no

disposition lo bark down from its posilioni. According to numerous accounts, the PCF leadership, is now convinced that Ihc CPSU has no interest In seeing it In power, and some leaders are prepared loh the CPSU

E. ImplKOtiooi for Moscow

The fact lhalittle evidence lhat anything of significance has changed In thenternaless important to Ihe Soviets than it is to France's Western neighbors or to the FrenchThe crucial point foi the Soviets where the PCF is concerned It that their authority has been challenged, not whether the challenging Party is democraticlhe Chinese orin its internal organization and purposes.mple evidence that lhe Soviets lake lhe rebellion of the PCF very serlouslv and are determined lo oppose it.

the

Soviets Intend to surreptitiously support the French government's efforts against the PCF In Ihc hopeeakened PCF will once again be farced lu turn to Moscow for support

In all likelihood, (he Sovieli have been encouraged lo act by ihelr belief lhal considerable opposition to the new line of the PCF crisis within the French Parly. There are numerous, il generally vague, reports of distal bf art ion with the duett ion Marchab has given Ihe Parly, both within the leadership aod the rank aod file, and of nervousness on the partrena is and hiioscow was able lo ute Ihc same sort nl sentiment to good effectHl9G9 to loinpel the PCF to cease its criticism of Soviet actions in Crecb-nlovakia

uestionable wbctlier Soviet actions will have thr same effect Ihis time Wilh tin prnqiert ofa legislativenly based on the Alliance oleal possibility, theteonsiderable

C

I cm is in stayhe end. the success of Miwwi effortstrend of developments wilhin the tie rood m

-

If tlie PCF should (arc budlr in the ncilif the Socialist! ihould con pmfil more ftom their Alhoiicc than is possible thatffort may

5C(

sevei

Impact If the French Communisls dowell at the pulls toragmatic Justification forctions, it is difficult to see that the Soviets are likely to have much success in bringing him back into line. In that case, Moscow's machinations are likely to have thethey did in thereinforcing the French Party's determination to pursue its own interests without regard for the wishes ol the CPSU.

VII. PRESENT TRENDS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE SOVIET POLICY

A. Sovietsifficult Future

As Moscow looks ahead, it can be certain of little except that ils relations with the Communist Parties of Western Europe are sure to become even more complex than Ihey are presently. The Impulse toward autonomy on the part of lhe most important of these Parties is based on hard political realities, chief among Ihem lhe recognition by Western Europeanleaders that their interests are not served by close identification with the USSR. Even "loyal" Parties such as the PCP arc in the process of learning painfullyose identification with the USSR is not advantageous politically. Equally important to the future of Moscow's relationship with the Western European Parties is the mounting confidence of their leaders that defiance of the Soviet Union no longer carries with il Ihe ihreat of internal schism. The significance of this feeling of self-confidence among Ihc Western Communist leaders can be seen in the French Patty's abrupt switch from dodlity to

Thus, Moscow is no longerosition to assert the proposition (and to gain Ihu acquiescence of the Western Parlies for it) thai what serves lhe intcresls of the USSR serves the interests of the olherurther consequence is that the Soviets will be laced wilh increasing frequency wilh situations in which they must choose between thdr immediate diplomatic inlcrests and iheir long-term goals. Vet, while Moscow may be uncomfortable with this situation, it is clearly

ni. condition ol

open polilicdi strife or schism with Ihe major Western Pari! would subject the Soviet! to attack rm both their Eastern and Western ideological Hanks, as well as complicating lhe primary political objective of

maximizing their influence in Western Europe Moreover, the differences between the Soviets and even the most revisionist of the Western Parties should not be exaggeraled. Despite the Western Parlies' assertion of their autonomy, they continue toroad community of interests with the Soviets, particularly on questions of fordgn policy. This is especially true wilh regard to the Third World, where the Soviets and the Western Communists come together in opposition to "neo-colonialism" and support nf" natural liberationIn lhe Middle East. Southern Africa, and Southeast Asia. In Western Europe, they aboommon interest in reducing American political and economic influence, even though the Western Parties no longer want toimple substitution of Soviet power for that of the US,

The ideological bond which unites the Soviets with the Western Communists is not to be dismissed. Even the most nationally minded of the Western Commu-nisl leaders Sees himsellember of an ideological community in which the Soviets are the most senior and powerful member, andorresponding gulf between himself and the most leltist of socialists. The power of this sentiment Is best demonstrated, even thoughomewhat different context, byTito, whounning quarrel of almost three decade's duration, has been unable lo separate himself from Moscow once and fur all

B. Short-Term Problems

PCI; The contingency with which Ihe Soviets are mosl likely to be laced in the next year or two is the participation of the Italian Party in government, but this would not necessarily cause Ihem any serious problems. The PCI fullyreasons of itsinterest inead-on political confrontation and possible political Or social upheaval within Italy, and Its careful pun-tit ol powerseem to be fully in accord with Moscow's pieferences

Phis says nothing about Ihe Soviet reaction to the PCI's use oi power, il und when it should acquire it Moscow, no doubt, would react badly if the PCI. in power, should choose to remain true to its cleciotal oimimtnienls and preserve Italy's democraticand links with the West, and if il chose to promote this line as an alternative to the Soviet system Similarly, lhe Soviels would be unhappy if tile

SEC^T

PCI should go so fat in Ihe direction of allayi American suspicions as toundamental change in its foreign political orientation. However, the Soviets cannot be certain, any more than Western observers, of the PCI's ultimate behavior. In the interim, they seem disposed to give it the benefit of the doubt.

On the other hand. Moscow would not be unhappy if the PCI failed lo gain formal entry into the government. Its doubts about the reliability of the PCI arc serious enough that it might welcome an opportunily to avoid putting them to the test. However, it is hardly likely to come out in open opposition to Ibe PCI's entry Into the government, no matter how serious its suspicions. To do so would do further irreparable harm to Moscow's claim to leadership of the movement.

PCE: The Soviets are facedifferent problem in Spain. There they would like to normalize their relations with the monarchist government, but this would leave them vulnerable to charges that they had "betrayed" the still illegal PCF, The besl solution, Irom their point of view, would be to induce the Spanish governmenl lo legalize the PCE before the establishment of diplomatic relations.

They are unlikely lo do any more than the minimum in promoting Ihe interests of the PCE, which in their eyes has been the most obnoxious of all the dissident Parties of the West. Rather they appear to bc pinning alt their hopeshange in the policy line of the PCE alter the departure of the aging Carillo leadership In the meantime, the PCE is not likely to improve its position to the point where the Soviets would have to face up to the implications of having it in power. At present it Is generally considered toelatively narrow base of support, well underercent of the electorate.

PCP- The Soviets were undoubtedly disappointed when the PCP was dropped from the government Inut ihey appear in general to be satisfied wiih theresent situation, in which il retains strong bases of strength in the trade union movement and in the south Moscow's preference all along has beenong-term strategy of building political alliances, rather than for an isolated Communist governmentrecarious grip nn power. Thistralegy which has now been imposed upon the PCP by the force of cite urns lances.

PCF: The problem they face in France isthe most troublesome- Not only has Ihe French Party adopted an abrasively anli-Soviet line,contrast to Ihe ItalianSoviets see It as being in danger of domination by the much larger Socialist Party. Most serious of all, the PCF has begun to push the Soviets to choose openly between th#fr commitment to good relations with the existing government and their commitmenl to the prosperity of French Communism. This has the potential oferious embarrassment for the Soviet leadership.

This latter circumstance probably helps explain the contrast between the Soviet efforts to undermine the leadership of the PCF and their tolerance of Berlin-guer. who has made no such demands for the PCI. If the CPSU's campaign against Materials should fall, as it well might, the Soviets again would face the inescapable necessity of choosing openly between state interesi and Ideological commitment. Whatever they choose lo do, it will be costly for them.

C. Long-Term Prospects

Despite the difficulties they face, there is no sign that the Soviet leaders have altered iheir conviction that their long-term interests are tied to the expansion of Communism in Europe- The best evidence of that is their continuing commitment to keeping lhe international movement in being, and their.sufc.rcwa support of even those Parties with which they have the most difficulties

This is not to say that the Soviet Judgment Ii correct. In particular, the postwar history of the Communist world suggests lhat the Soviet leaders' view of iheir ability to manage the Weslemis overly opltmistlc, and based more on ideological assumptions than on rational calculation. Only in Bulgaria, where unique ethnic, historical, and cultural links exist, have the Soviets been able to maintain their authorityfraternal"in Ihe absenceilitary occupation furce Once in power, if this were to happen, the Italian. French, Spanish, or Portuguese Communists would be likely to allow national and parlicularislic Interests to dominate in their relations with the USSR, thus following in the path already taken by the Chinese, Yugoslavs. Romanians, and others.

Even without participation in government, lhelready well advanced, and ii showing signs

ramalic acceleration, as witness the Spanish Communis! leaders' public dismissal of "proletarian internationalism"unccpt which has outlived its lime, the French Communists' move lo renounce the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as the statedof the Parly; and the PCI's restatement of its commitmentulti-Party system and rejection of the Soviet system as totally inapplicable lo Italy.

Thereeal prospect that within the next few years the Communist movement will experience another historic split, and one of potentially even greater moment for the Soviet Union than the break with China. The schism with China crippledinfluence over the Asian wing of the Communist movement and plunged itonfronfalion with another great power rival, but posed no ideological threat within Eastern Europe and Ihe USSR itself where Maoism has had almost no appeal, even to dissidents.

The Soviet Bloc is not likely to be equally impervious to the attractionsess rigid and easier-going Western European variant of Communism akin to democratic socialism The most serious threat to Soviet and Eastern European orthodoxy has always come from the right, fmm the direction of liberalf one or more of the "revisionist" Parties wins power in the next year or two. or morehare of poweroalition government,evelopment would inevitablyew legitimacy to the "revisionist" doctrines they espouse. In fact, some Soviethistorian Roy Mwlvedyev. foralready taken to citing Western European Communis! doctrines to justify the democratic reforms ihey advocate for the Soviet system.

The financial and organizational instruments at Moscow's disposal are probably adequate to hold most or all of the Icssei Parties in line for the next few years, but it is unlikely that Soviet threats or pressure will be enough to compel the larger Parlies to reverse

present course The

a nd Ma rr

ih

Spanish and Italians have Pility to wllhsland Soviet rtsumahly would not have rw course if he had notis ability to withstand Soviel pressure II pressure tactics arc employed, their most likely effect is to further embitter relations between the Soviets and the dissident Parties

Another option for Moscow is to formallyihe Italians, French, and Spanish leaders and lo allempt to spill iheir Parties. It is probably cnllrely within its power loreakaway by one or more pro-Soviet leaders, but it is unclear what significance this would have in teal political terms. Evenio-Soviet breakaway group should carry an appreciable sharearty's membership wilh il. this would not be of major significance unless it proved capable of challenging the "revisionists" at the polls.

The temptation for Moscow to launch an open assault on one or more of the dissident Parties must also be tempered by the knowledge that it can no longer effectivelyissident Party. As long as the entente which has developed between the Spanish, Italians, and French endures, this possibility will be effectively foreclosed.

In view of the inadequacy of the weapons at their disposal, the Soviets are likely lo have great difficulty in mustering the resolve necessary to undertake forceful action against the Western dissidents.the assumption that rising Communist influence in the West helps to tip Ihe East-West balance in Moscow's favor will continue to induceoscow.

Still Ihe SovieU must at some point retaliale against direct altacks. however inadequate the means at their disposal There seems at theair chance that this point will be reached within the next few years, given the electoral advantage Wesleinleaders see in challenging the CPSU Unless lhe PCI should suffer serious reversals in the ncxl year or so. or the PCF lose ground in8 elections, the outlook isontinued deterioration of Moscow's relationship with these important Parties.

Anyumber of quite possible developments could serve to acceleraic the deterioration inrelations wilh the Western Parties One such possibility wouldit ual ion in which the Soviets were forced to use force to maintain their position in Favlerr. Europe This would Inevitably force the Weu-crn European Communists into denunciationsoviet actions, und an intensification In lhe ot Moscow's polemics with the Western Parties would be entirely predictable. Soviet meddling in Yugoslav affairs after lhe passing of Tito would have lhe"same result Similarly, if any of the Western Parties should Identify itself with "anli-Sovicl" positions as a

participant In government, this wouldoviet reai turn ai would any fundamental alteration of thelation> between the Western Parties and Washington

Moscow'* response to provocation will be all the more extreme if it perceives iti direct Interest! to be threatened Thn dearly would be the case if Ihe Soviets believed that the virusevisionism" had taken hold In onr or more of the East European Parties or the CPSU, or il should finally perceive lhe action) of Western European Communists asdetrimental to Soviet Interests

Under such circumstances, the Sovieti would be likely to couple an offensive against Westernwilh pressure for an ideological crackdown in Eastern Europeampaign could spill osr-to dlect Easf-Vsesi relations in generalis quitewere lo reverttate of Cold Wai ddrruivrness and move to restrict East-Wet exchange* In order to block the spread of the infection Neither logic nor Soviet history provides any grounds In doubt that Ihe political suiviva) Jnslttiet ol lhe Soviet leaders would take precedence over any particular policy interest, including Brezhnev's"Peate Program."

Several developments which couldrucial impact on the changing relationship between lhe Soviels and ihe Western European Parties are almost certain to take place within lhe nnl two to five years The abilily of lhe major Parties lo convert their stance of "moderation and "independence" into political gains will be tested in the immediate luture, in France by8 legislative elections, and in Italy by the

ability or Inability ol lhe PCI over the neil year or two to continue opumllng its political iulluencc in the faceeak and demoralized opposition. If either Parly should seriously stumble, this would provide ammunition for the Soviets and the moren -uti within ihnr own ranks, and possibly cause the Italians and French lo retreat from their present positions Continued gains, on lhe other hand, ate likely to conliim them in their present course and strengthen the pia.ilion* ol the leaden who have brought ihem iherc.

Crudnl events beyond lhe bonier* of Western Europe will also lake place during thl* period. Tito's days aie clearly numbered, and we have already made reference lo the strains which Sovietugoslavia would Impose on Moscow'* idatton* with the PCI and other Western Parties Finally, changes which will affect relations within the Communist movement are almost certain to occur in Moscow Itself Most, if nol all of the men nt the top of the Soviet hierarchy, who range in age from, are likely lo be gone The arrivalew generation of Soviel leaden will inevitably Impart new nuances and tactical shifts to the direction of Soviet policy, even though Ils main lines may be undisturbed Any changes which new leaden undertake, even if not far-reaching, could prove lo be unsettling lo Moscow's relation* with llie Western Partiesew Soviet leadenhlp, al least in its initial period in power, will enjoy even less claim lo leadership within lhe international movement than the Brezhnevthus opening the way lo further self assertiveness on the pari of the Weslern Parties

ANNEX

THE CPSUi INTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS

Soviet Counsels

The preceding sections have treated Soviet policy as if it were the productnitary actor This, ofot the case Soviethe product of many individuals and many Institutions, which among ihemonsiderable spectrum of opinions and Interests. This spectrum Is clearly much narrower than It Is In more pluralistic states, but it is nonetheless real. Policy is the final productomplci bureaucratic process In which competing interests are balanced, melded, and occasionally overridden

The ambivalence and occasional contradictions which have often characterized Soviet policy In the areas here discussed are inroof lhat Soviet counsels arc divided as often us not. On occasion Soviet officials have been in open disarray, as in the aftermath of Zarodov's Pravda article Some Soviet spokesmen tried to dismiss (he articleistake One Soviet official In West Germany went so lai as to say lhat he and "other senior Soviet officials" disavowed tlie aillrle

of Disagreement

There is some evidence concerning Ihc poilicipanti In the leadership debate and the views Ihey represent Onarch, shortly alterh Party Congress, the sensor Part* MlcoJoguc. Politburouslov. publicly condemned so-called "national" and "regional' forms of Communism as tendenciesharmful to the cause of lhe woiking class Suslov's remaik* were clearly directed al the Italian. Spanish andlear escalation of lhe more nuancrd views expressed by Bredincv at ihc Parly Congress

The contenlMHii nature of Suslos'i helligerenr remarksdemonstrated the nest da> when Ptavda deleted (hem hum ils summary of his speech The implication lhat Suslov's remark* had gone beyond the Politburo consensus, und presumably beyond the

limits favored by Brezhnev, received some indirect confirmation onpril, when KCB chief Andropov spoke for the Politburo on the occasion of the anniversaiy of Lenin's birtheputed Politburo moderate despite hb secutltyasserted that "sectarianism" was asanger to Communism asndropov's equation ol Ihe sin of the overly ardent revolutionaries with that of the overly cautious practitioners of political maneuver seemed calculated lo right the balance upaal by Suslov.

Some accountseeting between Berlinguer and Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Suslov. and Ponomarev during the Party Congress indicate lhat dlllerences between Ihe Soviet hieraiehs were openly exposed to the Italians Accordinghese accounts. Ihe Italians found Bie/hnev much more sympathetic to the laciical exigencies of their situation thanhe quarrel would appear to be between those who. like Brezhnev, are prepared to minimize docltinal differences lor the sake of politicaland (hose who. like Suslov. ate opposed to any doctrinal backsliding.

It is nonetheless much easier to identity lhe Issues lhan the participants in this internal debate The issues emerge in the media and in the comment* of Susie!lbert often only incompletel* and in disguised loim The key participant' -those officials who occupy policymaking positions- almost never express iheir personal views for the public rcoord

The main Issues involved arc clear Thepoint nf doctrinal dilferencr* is thr question of whether thesome Sovier propagandistsdecisive rnsis"esult of the combined impact of political, social, and economic dilficullic*

II capitalism is indeed in crisis the West has movedre revolutionaryevolutionary stage Thb in turn wouldurn from the conciliatory

SEC 9

set

appropriatere-revolutionary phaseid for power appropriateevolutionary phase of devetopcnenl The amwrr to llu' question would also dictate the attitude lo he taken Inward political or social upheaval in the West If Ihe West isevolutionary phase, upheaval must be regardedosilive light. Il not,egative light

Sharply divergent positions have been staked oul on theso and related questions in the Soviet press and journals Zarodov's militant article was striking for Ihc prominence lent it by it* publication in Pravda and by Breihrsrv's tacit endorsement Ideas similar to those expressed, by Zarodov have maintained their gripizeublc portion of lhe Soviet apparat, that faction labelled as "neo Stalinist" by Its opponents The opposing viewpoint aho has been expressed'

Zarodov disposes of the question of assessing the piesenl stale ol capitalism wilh Ihc assertion (hat lenlti had described the present age as aera Consequently, there is no question of bmiting lhe goals of lhe revolutionary party to those appropriatereliminary historical phase Limited "icfotinisf goals have meaning only insofar as Ihey serveprologue to socialisthere can be "no 'wall' between the democratic and socialist stages of revolution In thend socialist revolution is only possible under theol the "party uf Ihc proletariat "

Articles byalkin (in QutMom of Phd-uophu innd T. T. Timofeyev (in QueUumi of Phtttnoph* in5 and inu In lhe5 issue) and an unsigned editorial article in lhe5 issue uf puerriuni of Phitotophy have putiarply dislmcl position Where tlie doctrinaire Zarodov and com|>any insist lhat lhe doctrinal purity of the Communist Parly must take pirvcdence over the formation and preservation of political alliances, the "moderates" argue that the formation and expansion of broadly based "sociohe most pie* sing need ol the prevent time Where the doctrinaire ideologues emphasize lhe need to push Irom the "democratic"lo the Socialist slage ol lhe revolutionary process wtrhou! undue delay, the moderates insist that those who belitllet Clnefihr InoiiuH ef tW World

Waehenttnei>t T t suboKbiMtr. A A

CaUdn

K

lanceefinite and prolonged stage of the 'general democratic" Struggle arc guilty ofand "left-opportunism."

It is possible to treat these differences as mere matters of nuance. The "moderates" do not deny the necessity of eventually moving from tbe "democratic" phase lo the phase of socialist revolution, nor do lhe doctrinaires leject the need for broad political alliances in the Initial stages of (he revolutionary process.

It is in the differing attitudes concerning Ihe ugnificanee ol the various political, economic, and sociological difficulties said to comprise the "crbn of capitalism" lhat fundamental philosophicalbetween the two groups can be found It is not limply lhat (he moderates dispute the notion that lhen the brink of revolutionary upheaval Not even Zarodov made ihal assertion. It Is that the moderates challenge Ihe assumption that the collapse of bourgeoisinitilutions in tho advanced capitalist countries would redound to lhe benefit of Communism They cite the lessons of Hitler and Mussolini to argue that the most likely beneficiaryevere crisb in the West would be tbe extreme right According to Calkin. "Tlie greater the instability of tho slluulion (In the Wesl) the giealcr lhe 'social yearning'trong hand able lu restoreurthermore, he argued lhat under certain"umilar senlinsents couldart of the working class "

Tirnoiryri has made the same case In his article in the May issue of Quetllcmt of Phihtophif he pointedly reaffirmed the relevanceey Ihests ol the Seventh Comintern Congress. "The workersumber of capitalist countries 'must choose specifically today not between proletarian dictatorship and bourgeoisbutourgeois democracy and

Tlie mnsi far-ranging development ol the theme lhat condition* in lhe West are not propitious fnr Communis) advances was made in an unsigned editorial which appeared In ihc Augint tssuc of QnntUmt of Phdiaophv This not only endorsedw thai fascism rather than Communism would emerge lhe victor fiom any period nf major social upheaval in the West, but concluded thai the most effective obstacle to the Inuiuph ot fascism was the ruling liuurgeoisie. which was "vitally mln

se

protecting the "democratic forms" il had created In contrast, the working class was markedly susceptible to the "social drmogogv'of fasciim

The joint inlerests ol all "progressives" demandhoM against lhe commonpseudo-revolutionary and fascistare often Joined both on the level ofpropagandist ie formulations and inMoreover, the editorial concluded thaiwhich applied within theof the West also applied to the world ashole "The solution ofthe

cooperation ol hrterogeneous socio-economic forcesorld-wide scale and assumes their acceptancepecific system ol mutual obligations."

The contrast to the views put forward byof the Zarodov stripe dearly is both real and substantive, and is indicative of the differences which exist among Soviet officialdom. The fact lhat (he Questions of Philosophy editorial was released for publicationugust, the very day that Zarodov's article appeared in Pravda, ts alsof those difleirnces.

It Is also clear that the docrritiulres have hud the better part of thu intramural struggle in recent moiithi Whereas Zarodov has been received by Bre/hnev. the editorial board of Pmblemi ofvhy has been the subject of frequent critical scrutiny by Patty officials The same August issue which

contained the artscJe quoted above abo featured tbe transcript of one such critical review of lhe Journal's performance

Nevertheless. II does not seem that the struggle has been resolved in favor of rigid orthodoxy. Signsill in Ihe direction of dogmatism have not been accompanied by any evidence of concrete Soviet supporthiftore revolutionary posture on the part ol the Western Parties. Despite Brezhnev's reception of Zarodov, hb behavior at Ihe CECP was markedly conciliatory To tbe contrary. Sovietdistinct frominclines in the direction of relative moderation.

Moreover, Soviet spokesmenore direct involvement in policy have continued to show restraint in their public utterances Thus, V. V. Zagladin, the Deputy Chief of Ihe Interrutional Department of tbe CC/CPSU.ather subdued note In two recent articles (in the5 issue of Working Clan and the November issue of Ourslfont ofagladin indicated that the "crbts of capitalism" was to be regardedrolonged illness ratheroken of imminent collapse. The immediate task was the removal ol lhe "objective und subjective difficulties in the path of the formation of the preconditions tor socialist revolution" (emphasis added) Brezhnev himvelf endorsed thb position in hb report toh

Congress, noting that Communists did not expect tbe

"imminent collapse" of capitalism.

ECJET

Original document.

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