-Top
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE ASSANITIZED
Trends in Soviet Military Progratns
cBi4Jt"-
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trends in soviet military programs
PREFACE1
This memorandum is designed toroad overview of ^trends tn the evolution of Soviet military forces, weapons,ons. and operation, It cove, developments from the mid-
ak"
umummaryare most critical to an understanding o
aspects of force development. Readers are direcled to the following mU.onal intelligence documents and the Defense Intelligence W
Throughact Forces Opposite NATO"
art
NIKSoviet Naval Policy nml Programs"
G (in preparation) "Soviet Military Policy in the Third World"
IIM (in preparation) "Soviet Civil Defense"
We have updated the data presented in existing estimates in some cases, but we have not attempted to redo all the analyses that went into Hieir preparation. We believe that we have adequately reflected all major changes that have taken place since these estimates were issued, but there arc some points where new developments have not yet been Hilly analyzed. Some of the basic estimates on Soviet forces are in die process of being revised, moreover, and this may result in judgments somewhat different from those presented here.
This memorandum is divided into four sections:
-utlines overall trends in Soviet military programs, and presents our general assessments of the Soviets' achievements in the development of their forces.
Section II summarizes the major trends in the development of the various branches of the Soviet armed forces, and Section IIIimilar trealmcnt for various categories of weapons syslems. There is some overlap in the material covered in these two sections, which are designed to provide different perspectives on the overall pattern of Soviet military development.
Section IV describes the interacllon of the individual components of the Soviet forces in the accomplishment of various peacetime and wartime missions, as the Soviets seem to perceive them.
This memorandum is focused on the Soviet military establishment and it docs not discuss other Warsaw Pact forces in any detail. Developments in the East European forces were considered during the preparation of the paper, however, and arc briefly noted in those instances where they have an important bearing on Soviet military policy and programs.
CONTENTS
Pi'ge
1 MAJOR TRENDS AND
A Strategic
ft Theater
C Naval
hird World
E Advanced
V Soviet Delcmc
EN OS IN
A Command
B Ground
C Air
D. Naval
E Strategic Rocket
and Mrmle Defense
DcFcnte
TRENDS IN WEAPON
A Pohcy and
C Manned Aireralt System*
D Naval
Combat
F Spat*
G Electronic Syilems
H Chemical/Biological VVcapon*
-fog -Sc*
ftrga-
IV MISSIONS AND
A Peacetime
istant
V Wai in Europe
C Wm WHh
E. General Nuclear
figures
Page
s
ds in Selected Aspects ol Strategic Forces
Estimated Soviet Eipenditurcs lot Defense.
Investment and Opening Eipenditurcs for thermed
Branches and Manpower of the Soviet Armed55
Command Authorities: Transition to Wartime
Centralired Operational Conlrol of Soviet Forces in
Location of Soviet Cround Forces Diviilons,
Growth of Soviet Cround and Tactical Air Forces
The Soviet Tank and Motor,red Rifle45
rowth In Soviet Fronlal Aviation5
Susiel Frontal Aviation Combat Radius Contours. European
Distance Conloan fiom Long Range Aviation Home and
Staging
Operational Strengths of Soviet Fleets,
Crowth of Soviet SLBM
Soviet ICBM and MHBM/IRBM Complr-es,
oviet Ballistic Missile Early Warning and Ac<iuisition Radar
Cutrent Sltalegic SAM Coverage and Interceptor
Soviet Weapon Systems
oviet Ballistic Missile
Soviet ABM Characteristics and Interceptor Test
Antiiatellile Manuever Sequence
Currently Deployed Soviet Strategic
Crowth in Soviet Slratrgie
New Tactical Ah Defense
Ci -ih of Surface-to-Ait Missiles on Soviet
Naval Cruise Missile Characteristics
Page
oviet Air-to-Suifacc Mbtlln
2S.ng-Range and Intc(mediate-Range
Ri .i. Chara of Soviet
Soviet Military Transport Aircraft
Soviet ASW Aiiciaft
Soviet Helicopter
Majot Soviet Surface
lltitic Missile
35 Recent Soviet General Purpose
ubmarine Quieting
Soviet Armored Fighting
Soviet Sell Propelled Artillety and Tactical Surface to-Surface
rend* in Soviet Space5
Operation* uf Soviet Cental Purpose Naval Force* Outside
Home Waters.
tables
Page
Soviet Cround Forces.6
Soviet Frontal Aviation, August
Soviet Military Transport Aviation.
ng Range Aviation.
Soviet Naval Forces,
Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces Operational Launchers,
Soviet Alt and Missile Defense Forces,
m
trends in soviet military programs
MAJOR TRENDS AND ACHIEVEMENTS
I. During ihe pail decade there hasubstantial growth hi overall Soviet militaryTheic have been significant developments in all majot romponenli of the aimed (orccs and In their command and contiol lystem. While (heir are still aieai in which clemrnlt of the Soviet forces have serious deficiencies. .are others in which they ate ahead of the US The impressive developments of the past ten >ean signify the del et mi nation and-htch the Soviet leaden seek to meet the threats andhe oprm (unities they perceive
A. Strategic Forces
2 The capabilities of Soviet strategic offensive forces have grown dramatically since ihe. The tapid growth tn Soviet intercontinental and submaiine-launched ballistic missile forces In thendundamental shift in the strategic balance From an earllei position of clear inferiority, the Soviets haveough equiv-alence in strategic power when compared with US forces (seet Ihe same lime, they are pressing ahead with programs designed to impiove the quality of ihe form (hey possess. These programsourth generation of ICBMs with multiple independently taigrted rrentrv vehicles (MIRVsfc Stealer thiow-weight, better accuracy, and more survivaWe silos; construction of ne- ballistic motile submarines -rthange missiles; developmentobile ICBMew mobile Intermedijte range missile, and initial deploymentew Umber Additional new or modified ICOM and SLBM systems are under development, but have not yet reached the Might test Hare
3 The Soviets oho have mode vigorous and continuing efforts to Impiove their strategic defensive capabilities, but wllh much less success than In the case of offensive capabilities:
They have deployedti-ballistic missile (ABM) system capable of defending Moscow against light attacks, and Ihcy have developed an anlbalHIilc mnnle systemon-nuclear intercept capability
They have maintained and improved their ealeraiv* air defense )yilctn.
They have given considerable attention to ASW capabilities in (heir naval construction programs
They have developed an ambitiousefense program under military control
They have mountedRAD efforts lelaled to direeled energy weapons and ASW srnsors.
Despite these rosily programs. Soviet strategic defenses still have critical deficiencies:
The Moscow ABM lyticm would provide little protectionassive attack
The aif defenses could not rope with aircraft using low-altitude penetration tactics or high-performance air lo miiles
The ASW forces would be unable to prevent most Western SSBNi from launching their missiles
lop fowl
Il J* apparent thatoviet leader* *ec na contradiction between Iheir policies ol detente and arms limlliilion negotlnlion* and llirir continuing buildup ol strategicheir programs for stralegic force* continue to be vigorous and broad inespite the fact tiuil the USSR has alreadyowerful deterrent as well as recognition as the stralegic equal of the US.
Director. Defense Intelligence Agency, ihe Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Depaiiment of the Army, and tlteiHo il Chief of Staff.Department of the Alt Force, believe the preceding dlscunion undentatet Soviet achievementsis fh* US They Kvold note that an entire new generation of at lean eight tfategic offensiven advanced develoiiment or lest; that Soviet general purpose forcer haoe been mbitantlallyespecially In the oteai of'firepower, mobility, and chemical, biological, and rtecttontcwarjcnrand that general wat survival programs, defense standing, and duectrd energy weaponshove aheady pmcredrd well beyond earlier expectations and are now Impinging upon (fie military balanceumlrer of areai In terms of the dynamics of mangle balance, they believe the USSR's overall war waging and survival capability is now substantially greater than eitunaled. Monover. they believe that improvement! in Soviet war waging potential are proceeding wilh far greaier momtatum than is tme for the tree World.
heater Forces
the, the Soviets have carriedajor expansion and renovation of their general purpose ground and air forces, and there have been important changes in the organisation, liaining. and operations of these (orcrs The Soviet ground and tactical ait forces have been substantially expanded and modernized and we estimate that the manpower in these forces now Hands al moreillion men The grourjd forces have received new armored vehicles, more aiflllery, and greatly improved air defense systems The tactical all foices have received new aircraft wilh greater payload andhiflraditional air defense orientationroader range of offensive a> well as defensive missions Soviet ground and tactical air Inrcc. weapons Systems have become Increasingly sophisticated Some of the newest aircraft models are roughly comparable lo opcialional Westernand somethe new ground forces equipment is superior.
hese developments reflect Soviet responses lo changing concepts of the likely naturear in Eutope and to the clvallenge of worsening relationshina The icsult hasignificant improvement in Soviet capabilities lot theater-level warfare in both nuclear and non-nuclear contexts
Soviet military planning appears to be based on ihe beliel that Warsasv Pact theater forces now in Central Europe arc not only capable ofATO attack In the early daysonflict, but arc also capable ofon-nuclear offensive Into West Germany.
The Soviets evidently arc prepared, if necessary, toaud offensive in Europe without piior large-scale relnlorcement with ground forces from the USSfl. and ihey have developed high-risk plans for nonnuclesu air strike* against NATO'* air and nuclear forces
The Soviets also have substantially increased the nuclear strike capabilities of their theater forces, providing them with new options for limited nuclear warfare at the theater level and reducing- -their dependence on USSR based nuclear forces.
They have deployed sulfxrieril forces along the Sine-Soviet bolder to contain any likely Chinese attack and lo undertake llmilcd offensive
S. The Soviet Union's willingness- andto maintain its force level* in Central Euiopeong period and at considerable expense can be partly captained In terms ol protecting the USSR against perceived threats from NATO andpolitical control in Easternowever, the sin* of the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces in the forward area, their doctrine of the oflensive. and the across-the-board elforts to Improve the capabilities of these forces lead us to believe thai these forces are intended to provide dear conventional superiority in the region, to impress Western Europe with the reality and proiimity of Soviet power, and lo primit major offensive action in the event of war.
he Soviets appeal committed lotheir own foices In the legion together wilh
c.l
(Ik: thciicr (yifo iU divisions, tanks, artillery, and umibtil uiti-tiiii. The Soviets do not. however, separate Europe from flic larger context of iheealer and strategic forces available to the USSH and in Ihe West. Given this larger viewo balance, they prob,ibly have htllc confidence that they can cither foresee or control the courseonflict with NATO and are therefore inclined to be very cautious in considering the use of their military force in Europe*.
The buildup of Soviet forces along (he Chinese bordct in Ihendcflectcd Soviet preparationsariety of contingencies in the faceotential threat The basic posture of the foresdefensive, although Soviet exercisescenario in which they quicklyounteroffen-sive into China. It is conceivable that under certain circumstances, notably political disintegration in China following Mao's death, the Soviets might intervene militarily. Barringontingency, however, wc believe thatirect threat to the security of Soviet Icnitory would be likely toajor Soviet military action against China.
In connection with the Soviet drive to maintain superiority of forces in Central Europe and along the SinoSovict border, there is ample evidence of fuither technological improvements in Soviet theater forces. To reverie this trend wouldajor change in policyolitical leadership with different priorities and the power base lo overcome current institutional positions
he Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Deportment of State, believesxaggerate the USSR's confidence in it, theater forces against NATO. He concedes tlust the Soviet forces are formidable, but notes (lint thereersuasive body of evidence that:
The Sovtets are extremely conservative in their reckoning of the balance
They behece they have reason to doubt whether their forces could succeed In carrying out the kind of massive offense which Soviet strategytar in Europe requires.
The Director of INR believes the Soviets' objectives for improving their theater forces have been based upon specific Sonet perceptions of deficiencies for their mission mther ihan upon an abstract notion of preserving an existing advantage or on the expectation thai marginal increments to their forces would have much polilicol impact INR believe, that the principal Soviel objectives in force improwniciifs havebeen to deal with three main problem areas-
The Soviet,ontinuing to ptovidc tnofc modem aircraft to Frontal Aviation in order to reduce the risk? in the Initial air operation against NATO.
As they have mooed to contemplate theof limited nuclear war. the Soviets have evidently seen themselvesisadvantage in their ability to use nuclear weapons In close proximity to the battlefield. Evidenceube round,ubtiloton air-delivered weapon, anduidance systemollow-on to the FROC suggests that the Soviets are attempting toattlefield nuclear option.
Concerned over developments in Westernweapons, the Soviets have been deploying more tanks, examining ways of suppressing anhamtoi fire, and experimenting with forms of maneuver which enhance survivability of tanks and armored personnel carriers (AfCi) on the battlefield.
C. Novol forces
ver the past decade there have been major developments in Soviet naval policies as well as significant improvements in Ihe USSR's navalIn addition to the emergence of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleetrincipal component of the Soviet strategic forces, the Soviet navy has evolvedorce oriented almost exclusively to the defense of Soviet coastal regionsorce with growing capabilities for combat In more distant areas The Soviet navy continues to have imporlanl defensive missions, but It also has been increasingly used lu support Soviet foreign policy in peacetime.
relatively little need to protect extended sea lines of communication or to project pos*cr ashore in distant areas, the Soviet navy has concentrated its efforts on capabilities tothe ability of US and Allied naval forces lo
t
d project power lo distant
Since the, the Soviet navy has dramatically extended its. operations beyond its home waters,ajor navalin the Mediterraneanonspicuous but less powerful presence in the Indian Ocean.
Its capabilities lot these missions have been Significantly improved by the Introductioncries of larger and more sophisticated surface ships (now including ASW alicraft carriers) as well as submarines and aircraft.
The increase In Soviet naval activity over Ihe pasl decade has been one of the several factorsvc contributed to the USSR's superpower image. The Soviet leadership presently seems to support the conceptalanced navy which, while retaining its emphasis on defensive missions, can cattyariety of operations in peacetime as well as in wartime.
The Director. Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Department of the Amity, the Director of Naval Intelligence.of the Navy, and the Militant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe that paragraphso not adequately reflect the dynamic transformation of the Soviet navyrimarily defensive forceimited strategic strike capability to an open ocean force capable of performing, to varying degrees, the traditionalof major naval powers.
D. Third World Activities
Soviets also have made Increasing usemilitary resources to support their policies inWorld.
They haveote ambitious policy for the use of the Soviet navy by deployments into areas far beyond past operating atcas.
They have developed military aidajor tool of their foreign policy interests, with primary present concentration on the Middle East.
Their military airlift capabilities haveignificant role in some critical situations.
The Soviets have experienced setbacks in some of Iheir efforli to extend their influence In ihls way. and there is evidence of sonic opposition to expending resource* on these pmgioms Nevertheless, the Soviet* aie continuing to use their military resources to further their interests in the Thud World.
Technology
Soviets have long accorded high priorityand development on military weaponrelated Icchnologics. In Ihe past decade theand industrial establishment hastheevelop and produce aol sophisticated military systems. Theconcerned about potenltal USIhe area of new type* of weapons which couldstrategic balance, and they areIUD programs of broad scopevigor. Program* which bearwatching include efforts related toweapons and to ASW sensors.
Defense Spending
Estimates of Soviet defense cxpendilures have recently been ievi*ed on the basis of new information, much ol which is Hill being evaluated. The discussion in this seelion is based on the interim findings of the Central Inlclligence Agency and the dola presented ate subject lo revision.1
Soviet defense expenditures in rubles are estimated to have grown every yearnd growth has been evident in all of the major resourceoperating, andosts. The average annual rate of growth inasercent {seehe annual growth rate. however, wasercent, reflecting primarily Ihe deploymentew generation of strategic missiles (seeistorically, the rate of growth in total Soviet defense spending has increased during periods when the USSK reequips Its strategic forces with new weapons and has tended lo decline as these programs reach completion
The Central Intelligence Agency now believe* that Soviet defense spending absorbsercent of Ihe Soviet gross national product, whereas
5
ihe Cla ,tpoittSpr.id.iig InayA 1Mb, OmparistM ofand een).
iotni.
j<tburly estimated thai defense tookUOM of CM" ill*efeme tnielhgaxce Agency, and the Assistantf Staff. Intelligence. Oe^.tment of the Air Force, believe thatentage of QNP devoted to defeaserotdd be mtnlamldh,he re-iscd nl.matc doeshat the proportion of Soviet CNPcormttitled to defense pihasthat the appre-cation of (his proportion has changed It implies that Sos-iet defense industries ate far less efficient relative to other sectors of Ihe economy than fo.me.ly believed, and Hut Soviet leaden have been moie willing than previously believed lo forego economic growth and consumer satisfaction in favo* of militaiy capabilities
uch work remains to be done in assessing the impact of military spending on the Soviet economy ami its implications for Soviet policy decisions. We have seen no evidence, however, that economic ciisiileuHons are deterring the Soviels Iromol their defense
ing the present pace and iii.igi
effort
H. IRENOSIN FORCES
M Thiseiiy describes the current status and baiK Lends in the desetopmenl of ihe various branches of the Soviet armed forces (seet should be read in conjunction with Section III. which addresses the same Overall pallem of developmentifferent perspective.
A. Commond Structure
he Soviets have devoied high-level attentionong-term and expensive program lo enhance command and control capabilities throughout the aimed forces. This programelief that buttle management capabilities .sillecisive influ encc. especiallyontest between forces of
and Manpower of the Soviet Armod
Ministry ot Defense i
LO
B
General Stall"
iV-
comparablc strength The Soviet) stress thai forces and weapons must also be effectively controlled in peacetime at weft a* in wartime, if they aie lo serve the national policy object!for which they wnc created.
he ultimate decision to employ Soviet forcesh the Politburo, cither collectively or in some subsel such as the Defense Council (seehe decision would be implemented by the national militarySupteme High Command--through its executive arm. Ihe Ccneral Staff. The political leadcrship-miiinly in the person ofwho is bolh Chairman of the Defense Council and the ptedesignated wartime Supremecontinue to dominate all aspects of the political-military command structure."
2o. The General Staff exercises centralizedcontrol nver the Soviet aimed forces (see_
"iThis
arrangement provides the national potlticaT and military leadership with lapid. reliable, and secure communication! for the control of all Soviel forces, and efforts arc being made to bring EasJ. European forces under ihe same integrated system
3
hilereferred Soviet choice, this highly centralized system increases the high com-
Command Authorities: Transition to Warti peacetime
wartime
national political authority
embers
defense council
flreihnev (Chairman)
Kosytjln
podgornyy
ustinov (minister ol Defense) Oltiers
politburo'.
. -
o"embers
f defense
Shi
military authority
minister
op defense
military council
Of Collegium
high command
Supremeecretary)
^ !
a
s&tXZiifai:.
staff I
armed forces
4
' ' i.
Ceiit.at.jed Operational Control of Soviet Forces in war
cc-nnnicoDHhm
it'd'i
c
m-c
"i!
i i
I I
n Cmhm
n
c tv
the seivice commanders, and many lower echelon commands. In addition, two command cruisers entered the navy in the, airborne command posts arc being deployed for manyand mobile communications units serve almost all echelons of command.
span of controloint where it might not he able to cope effectively with widely dispersed and fast-paced operations. There has beenP
iversification and redundancy have long been characteristics of Soviet command and controlsvhich make extensive use of various means of communications. The overall effectiveness of these ^stents has improved substantially in recenl years.
3
efforl to retain centralized control over strategic planning and critical decisions while decentralizing the execution nf operations
oviet doctrine places an emphasis on the survivability, mobility, and combat readiness of command and control elements.ardened command facilities have beenfor major headquarters, including those of the national political and military leadership, the General
>
Iol
"con"illions Satellites 11 n".iri,; nipillly Old,
. has supplemented high frequencyfor long distanceallous und added much needed message-liandling capacity
doctrine emphasises the Importancein handling iatge volumes of datarral'timc support for decision-makingmanie Soviet) havi durirconceptual work on the automation ofand hnve field tested elements ofProgress in this area has been retardedrents and the state of Soviet computerbut we believe automation efforts areeffective. The Soviets have attemptedapplicable Western technology
B. Ground Forces
The Soviet army currentlyorcectivc divisions at varying strengths in its peacetime ground forces (see Table I) These forces aic highly mcclianiied.otal of0 tanks, and arc deployed to cover all of the USSR's land borders The heaviest concentration is oriented toward Western Europe,uge component facing China (see Figure 71
Since the, the Soviets have carriednjur expansion and renovation of their general purpose form,uilduporce of someivisions along the Si no-Soviet border as svell as Strengthening of (he forces facing NATO. We estimate that the manpower in Soviet ground and tactical air forces now stands at moteillion men (see Figureide range of newly developed weapon ssstems of increased sophistical ion has been intro-
TaBLEI
SOVIET CROUND FORCES.
CO
ni .
lanV
MiXiviMd Rife Oi.'iiiaiu
Aitbcnr
1 Inctmfct cmiilint. nimbai suppgit. and semce pcnonnrl and nondivituinaltaffs, idnuniiliarlvc unlit. inri ruin-
ing until
clmrtl in the siiiiic itc'iod. and the high prO)iur|ion ul oft lei model equipment that formerly prevailed has been considerably ieduced These changes have not only expanded tlie ure of Soviet forces but havee them more balanced and operationally flexible, with significantly improved capabilities for both nuclear and nori nuclear wailare.
he numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, and air drfense -eapom in Soviet units have beenincreasedriety of oilier changes intion and equipment have brought niton! linger and more capable lank and motorized rifle divisions (seche Soviets also have maintained and modernized their aiibomc forces Technical improvements, particulaily in air defense and artillery weapons, and improvements In the design of APCi have contributed In greater thenter force capabilities Sophisticated and highly mobile ground-bated air defense systems are being assigned to the ground forces in large numbers, and this has enabled tactical all forces to direct more ol their resources lo olfensivc missions. In addition, motor transport capability has been added not only lo supply ammunition lor the added weapons, but also to inipiuse overall logistic capability Theseart being introduced as elements of long term and ongoing programs Consequently, ground forte unitsixture of old and new equipment, and" some units in ihe USSR still have substantial shortages ol selected items suchCs and trucks
oilier Warsaw Pad55been reorganized,modernized, anil have assumed greaterin Pact military plans. Improvements inhave generally followed the Soviet lead,have tended to lagew years.
C. Air Forces
section covers the threeMilitary Transport Aviation, andA viaihe Soviets groupas the Soviet Air Forceselements ol Ihe Soviet aimedand Aviation of Airinelow.
I(ajafaf Av^sjo*
he Sosietsotal ofombal aiicraft in their tactical air forces (seehere
{mm
Location ot Ground Forces Divisions
13
aint
Growth ol Soviet Ground and Tactical Air Forces Manpower" %urC8.
II
SOVIET mo. AVIATION.0
Ai-.
VIIC-2J
ICH
B
.F.
T70
-
'Chsngei in ninpsvm ovti limr tit piiropiltf flutiht huitr.s- oppiifle ChinaBin uiMtfierf wildolnOthe lue ol Sivnt fintig Ititcif the.
IC-JI
O
. FiihW.
Cud A
T'oicfionldf
AUnall
i.io
Tit
ir;
been sonic growth in the number of aircraft deployed over ihe past decade because of the buildup against China, bul the lorces opposite NATO have been relatively liable In numbers. In the European theater oilier members of the Warsaw Pact could supplement these forces withimilar tactical aircraft. These totals do not include lighten assigned to national air defense commands or trainers and combat reserve aircraft.
he most significant change in the tactical air forces ha* been the acquisitionew generation of "capon systems. >vhicheparture from previous Soviet practices. New aircraft such as ihe Fitter C, Flogger. and Fencer have substantially improved paylnad-iange capabilities and moreavionics systems. At the same time, the Soviets have beenariety of new tactical weapons, including short-range air-to-surface missiles and cluster munitions. In addition, Ihe introduction of ihe Foibal has provided, for the firstigh performance multbensor reconnaissance aircraft.
hese new developmentshiftraditional air defense orientationroader
range of offensive as well as defensive missions. But the lull realization of these possibilities It still some way off. Despite (he deployment of new aircraft with capabilities similar to th* better Western aircraft, the maturity of Soviet tactical aircraft still have short ranges and low paytuadt and lack the sophiilicated weapon systems and avionics of US tactical fighters and atlacli aircraft. Nevertheless, the capabilities of Frontal Aviation clearly are changing (see Figures.
M In addition to ihe Introduction of new tactical aircraft with Unproved payload-iange capabilities, the Soviets alio have increased the number of nuclear -capablc aircraft in service. This would permit more
The Soviet Tank45
9.
Soviet Motorized Rifle45
best copy available
fM
s
Tanks
I^SSSSfl
-
in (lie conduct of nuclear warfare in ICurope The Soviets also have providedr shelters for almost all of their tactical aircraft deployed in Eastern Europe
Militait Xiampoii
ilitary Transport Aviation (VTA)otal ofircraft, primarily medium-range turboprop(see Table III) This force is organired and well trained for missions on the periphery of the USSR, but does not match the USbility io provide long-range heavy hit support Oeptojmenlewmport. theas begun, however, and this will increase long distance hfl capabilities The airlili capabilities of VTA are supplemented by Aemflot. which could double the Soviet capability to airlift troops and hashat could be used to transport bull cargo
TABLE HI
H
SOVIET MILITARY TllANSPORT AVIATION,
IL-TflIM it Cub .
tori
rincipal mission of VTA Is the delivery of airborne assault force* Other missions iiscfudt move-menl of troops, equipment, and supplies and ihe transport of nuclear weapons In recent yean the peacetime responsibilities of VTA have eipanded to include such tasks as the delivery of military and conomic aid materials, logistics support for Sovietastern Kurope. and disaster relief missions.
wBffls.nft
I hew activities have inuvidcd valuable experience (or VTA nulls, at demonstrated by their growing coinpc-tence in such operations as ihe aerial rcsupply ol Arab lo-ces .luring and alter3 fighting and their missigns to Angnla during the civil war.
iorifl (tonne Anob'on
ong Range AviationA( consists ofombers, missile carriers, reconnaissance aircraft, and tankers (see TableRA aircraftajor rule in the peripheral areas, providing capabilities for non-nuclear as well as nuclear warfare. LRA also continues lo function as an clement of the Soviet intercontinental attack forces, although its relalivc
TABLE IV
SOVIET LONC RANGE AVIATION,
M Type Bison
TIMtS
TU-I6
l'U-2z
i
1i Bitnnat lankrn
' Trie lolal* do nor Include- 'bom bOO similar bombrt liroft Otiigrird lit Ihr navy In tin If. inOnnaitunir. nod mining roles.
importance in (his role has declined Over ihe years as Ihe ca|uhililics of missile foices increased
I.RA's Dear and Bison long-range bomber force has been virtually unchanged during the past decade It lias been neither modernized nor significantly reduced in numbers..
The Inleirnediate-range bomber force was partly modemired innd, although the total number of aircraft in service declined somewhat, Some ofintage LRA Badgoi* which still comprise the bulk of the forces were upgraded by being equipped with air-tc'-surfacc missiles (ASMs) in ihe,ew bomber (Blinder) was deployed during the same period Despite these changes, however, the overall force is aging and becoming increasingly vulnerable toair defenses.
introduction of ihe4ew phase inof LRA. The Backfire is awith an extensive capability lot use inand naval missions, and it also hasoperations against the continental US (seeWc are agreed that its Introduction portendsimprovement in LRA capabilities forbut (here are differing views withinCommunity about Soviet intentionsit in the Intercontinental role.
4j. The prffantMrMt ol the Backfire is alsodiffering views within therouafyiu which ll Koiike Central Intelligence AgencyI furl, wlien flownubsonic,mission0 poundhat an umejueled radius ofOOrange ofr
preod In CIA's figures
reflects different assumptions about the aircraft'i) The Director. Defense Intelligencethe Asiiriont Chief of Staff. Intelligence,of the Air Force, after eUcnsive reviewdo not accept ihe CIA reanalysii ascontinue lo estimate Backfire'shigh altitude radiutand rangerespectively, with a
ound bomblood These differing assessments are currently under review in the IntelligenceThe subject of Backflie's performance will be addressed al grcalei length in ihe forthcoming. "Soviet Forces lor IntercontinentalThrough the
D. Navol Forces
he Soviets describe nuclear submarines and naval aviation as the mam striking forces ol their navy, but they alioarge surface lurce (seehese forces are divided among four major fleets (see. Their capabilities have been substantially improved by the introduction of new weapon systems over the past decade, although the rumbei of ships has not grown and has even declined slightly in some categories Duilng this same period Ihe Soviet navy has acquired new missions, expanded ils upciations in distant areas, and conducted lurgcr and more complex training ej.eicises.
The strategic attack role of the navy grew significantly in thendilh the deployment of modern SSBNs. The navy, which once hadmall force of surface-launched missiles, nowalor component of Soviet strategic attack and deterrence capabilities (see.
During this same period the Soviets continued to modernize their general purpose naval foices. Systems designed to counter surfacelarly the USan early priority, and in more recent years special attention has been given In the ASW problem both against SSBNs and general
sovitr Naval t'OiiCES. mid-me
Mo/a- iutfair
fl Cmii*
Coirlm..,
Cruisers
Dntrojrn.
n
BT
Minor Sulfate Cembeieau
Itfa
...
-
Dlrwl
Ctisr-al.
niraBBal
59
157
SI
. . . Tl
A-oro/
vi'taj
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purpose submarines Amphibious assaultand the navalabo been modernized, although theymall component with limited objectives in the overall structuie of the navy There has been some Improvement in capabilities for providing logistics support for deployed forces,this apparentlyomparatively low priority
rends in the development of ASW forces have included the introduction of new types of ships, submarines, and aircraft, as well as improvements in sensors and weapons (see paragraphswo largeav. ASW helicopter carriers entered service in the, and the new Kiev-class aircraft carriers also are believed torimary ASW' mission The cruisers and destroyers built sinceii designated as "large ASW ships" by Ihe Soviets, and the moie recent types have been armed with antisubmarine missiles. The newer classes of attack submarines aho have improved capabilities for ASW missions, and new land based
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SO Anticarrier force! relying on anluliln cruise missiles were already well developed by the mid I'JOGS fno liiive been further Improved. Soviet Naval Aviationubstantial number of aiicrullajor role in anticarrier operations. Older naval bombers have been equipped with new air-to surface missilci. and with the new Backfire bomber the navy will be able to conduct strike minions over all the major sea lanes to Europe and over much of the wrslern Pacific. Other significant development! for anticarrier warfare Include the introduction of sub-mcigedtnunchcd cruise missiles for submarines, and improved ocean surveillance capabilities through the introduction of new aircraft and satellitesystems. In addition, some new surface ships, including the Kiev-daw aircraft carrier, have been equipped with anlbhip missile*.
SI. The development of 'he Kiev-class aircraft carrieroveieater role for Soviet aircraft at sea. This trend began wilh the deployment of the two Mcalva class helicopter carriers in thehile bothoe ship cLuse* arc oriented low aid ASW missions, Ihe Kiev is capable of operatingTOI. fighters which could be employed in air defense, fcconnaissance, and perhaps limited laclical attack missions.
F. Strategic Rocket Feces
Strategic Rocket Forcesotal ofUMaunchers under construction, beingot off-line for conversion) 3nd almostandaunchers at deployedTable V| and. The ICBM forceapid buildup since thehorter-range missiles had already reachedoVployrrient5 The Soviets continueforward with efforts lo modernize the SRF
ICBM force surpassed that of the USof launchers0 and2 when Ihe SALT ONEadditional fixed ICBM launcher!This quantitative growth wassteady efforts to improve the quality of the force,generations of missiles were developed and
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deployed For etample. while the construction of silos for thendeak in the, the Soviets already -ere workingew geneialion of ICBMs to narrow the qualitative gap between the US and Soviet forces.
The effectiveness of the ICBM force has been increased wilh each new generation of missiles. Hard-target capability has improved through increased accuracy and higher wa/head yields, and more flexibility has been achieved as the new systems have increased ailmuth coverage increase* in the number of waibeads were achieved as multiple warhead reentry vehicles (MRVs) were introduced In the, followed by MIRVs which are now being deployed.
The survivability ol the ICBM forces has been greatly improved by the construction ol hardened silos and command posts. The force ol theonsisted primarily of relatively vulnerable above-ground Launchcn Almost all of the force ii now in silc. and measures to improve the hardness of these installations are continuing.
wt-
Iill II1IIM lorces. in etmliusl. aicld. vulnerable, ands thani.iiict oflare cm pi need in tiloi. ilihimgh in recent ycais protective icvetinrutx haveif the iofl siles The missilesUic back lo ihe, bul ihehe inntltrni ration of these loiccs was offset somewhat bysitgiunent of target* on llie in ri;i'i'. of the US"it lo perhaps as manyCBMs beginning in the. In addition, (he Soviets haveew mobile IHBM. Iheilh an accurate MIRV payload. and thb syxtcm is expected lo be deployed sales this yeaicaily licit year. Theie is evidence lhal this system will be extensively deployed, significantly incicnsing So-vicl peripheial missile attack capabilities In terms of range, the number of targets which can be engaged, and the damage which can be inflicted. The Dltctor. Oefente Intelligence Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Oejrartmenl of the Am Force, agree that thet cutientlyUM, but believe the1 the potential for delivering meaningful iiaytoads lo ICBM ranges. They tumid note that if the Soviets reduced the payload ofy on* or lino RVs. or if they used the6 payload, thecould reach mrgett ui ICBM rangesorem).
ver the past decade, in sum, the SHK has acquired the capabilities to back up (Is earlier designation as the premier component of the Soviet aimed (o'ces. It now has impressive capabilities for both inteicontinental and peripheral Strikes, and is pressing on with fuilher eflorts to acquire more powerful and survivable lorces, although ihe total number of launchers Is expected to decline slightly. Programs are now underway to convertaunchers to new ICBM systems.aunchers ate now equipped with new missiles, mml of these with MIRV warheadsesult of this continuinghe ihtow-weight of the Soviet ICBM force and the number of its independently latgelable warheads arc bolh incieaslng Owing in part lo these changes, but largely to the improved accuracies of the new syilrms. the Soviet ICBM force is acquiring an improved capability to destroy US Minuteman ulos.
F. Air and Missile Defense Forces
he Soviets continue Ihe emphasis on defense of the homeland that has characfcilied their military
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planning since WoiUI War II. They have been morlerniring their air defenses, expanding their capabilities lor early warningissile attack, conducting research and development on ABM andl hie systems, and continuing research on advanced technologies for defense. Current lorces include limited ABM deployment and an snlisatdlite system in addition lonterceptors and0 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers suppotted byarly warning and giound controlled inleioepl (CCD sites (see Tablen addition the national air defense forces ol ihe other members ul the Warsaw Pact operatenterceptorsAMs.
ABM Dc'enter
ien lij ureiind M.
he ABM system deployed at Moscow would provide little defenseassive US attack, but could protect the cityairly wide area of the Western USSRmall-scale attack The Soviets have not chosen to deploy the additional ABM
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.md inincepfon allowed by the ABM treaty Theyre of the limitations of conventional ABM techniques and the pace of ABM test firings has declined. Nevertheless they are continuingfforts. The Soviets also arc improving theii ballistic missile early warning capabilities by expanding the coverage provided by their radai network and by experimenting with satellite and over the horiion early warning systems (see
Aii. DilMin
GO.1 the Soviets have had aninlri'i'plor lyilrm which can conductengagements of satellites over the USSRbelowm. and theyimproved the capabilities of thishey alsorobablesystem under development that could be low altitude
satellites
Aii De'eniai
he USSR has an eitcnsive air defense system, but it has critical deficiencies which seriously limit its effectiveness against low-altitude penctiaton (sec. Most of Ihe currently deployedMrJ SAMs were designed lo counter the medium-to-high altitude bombei and standoff missile threats which writ evolving in thend. The continuing process of modernization of these forces has included the ckpioyment of improved types of mimics and advanced fighters, the introduction of new data systems and other improvements In the command and control structure, and the deployment uf miiii'iH warheads for some SAMs. The new Hogger interceptor now entering serviceimitedlo deled. Hack and engage targets below its own altitude On ihe whole, however. Ihe current form slill have only limited capabilities against the low.altitude threat, and virtually no capability against high-pet for tnancc ASM* like the short-range
fop Sr.VIBi
-ii|,nk missile. Sprxih'c problems include deficiencies in llu- Hum .mil com rial innr.lil.il trackinglil> GCI vectoring, and the lack olcapabilities In the interceptor forces
G. Civil Defense Programs
s urn) of ils gcncial war survival strategy,has an ambiliouS civil defense programIhe MOD and Involving the key elements ofand national economy. Sovietplanning Is focused on the development ofol shelter construction, ur-
Imn rvacoaiion. industiial protection, andoth militaiy and civilian unils trained to rcstotc vital set vices and essential production. Other elements of the Soviet program for svar survival include economic mubllliatlontrategic stockpiles system, and an indoctrination program fur the genrral public
oviet publicalioiis give the impressionnmprehensive and dynamic civil defense program that couldafor Impact on the ability of the USSR touclear exchange While the extent lo which Soviet plans have been implemented remains uncertain, intelligence source* confirm ihe existence of substantial eflotls In some areas, especially infor party and government officials. Recognizing Ihe role of civil defense In ensuring successful operations hy the armed lorces in nuclear war. the Soviets nvri. the civil defense structure wholly subordinate to the MODnd measures arc being taken lo link civil defense mote closely with the training and operations of the armed foices.
lans for evacuation of ihe urban population received then grealot emphasis duringore recently, the Soviets have modifiedegree their policy of mass evacuation of cities by placing somewhat greater emphasis on constructing shellers This change has been reflected in the growth of construction of permanent sheltet facilities to protect civilians in selected urban areas and at industrial complexes which would be subject to direct attack
hile we have evidence of the Soviets' efforts to carry nul their plans toroadly based, military-controlled civil defense system, we arc unable to dcteiiniue Ihe full extent ul the piogress they have madevtn with additional information no the Soviet piugrarn. il will be difficult to measure accural dp how soil the system would luiKlion in iiiKtur war. and even more difficult lo judge Sovietl.
RENDS IN WEAPON SYSTEMS
his section describes the basic characteristics of principal Soviet weapon systems and outlines the main trends in their development
olicy ond Progroms
lie USSR has long accorded high priority to research and development on military weapons systems and telated technologies, Including space programs. The Soviets are well awnte of theof basic scientific research and ihey support it i'.i:uslThey also have devoted major resources to build up industrial technology In supportoals for the military and in space. They have decreased, bul not eliminated, their dependence on foreign technology In suds key areas asand computers
he Soviets have attached Increasingto (losing ihe lechnological gap since theecent Soviet statements reflect specialto the impact of technological developments on the strategic military balance The Soviets apparently bdieve that only the appearance of new types of weapons is likely lo alter the cabling itralcgic balance. They are concerned by the potential US developments in this area, and are themselvesrogiams of broad scope and considerable vigor in fields where significant and perhaps novel weapon systems may emerge,
n their approach to weapons development, the Soviets have traditionally vmphaslced long-termdevelopment of existing system concepts or narrowly focused efforts lo develop specific types of systems While some of their progiams have involved innovative concepts and someeir deployed systems are technically advanced, they have tended to corscentratc on programs thatteady defined near teem product.
n recent sun. however, the Soviets have evidently embarkedreeder range of exploratoryrograms This would give the Soviets increased flexibility in future weaponsetter base lor ihe evolutionary development of
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f Soviet interest intcchuologicnl cimccpl? aic in the areas o( ASW seniors and dircclcd-enrrgy weapons In bolh cases the Soviets have an extensive HAD effort in progress, even though the potential in terms ol practical weapons development is uncertain The ASW ellorts involve investigationariety ol techniques^
J Efforts possibly related to the development of direct cd-energyinclude extensive basic research in areas that would support the development of charged-particle beam weapons, high-energy laser systems, and non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse generators. Some of the bner work is being done under sponsorship of the aii rlefense forces, but the development of any of tliese systems for practical applications In the ucai trim it considered unlikely (The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Department of the Ateelieves that the Intelligencenorteiflirsafirig' the impetus of Soviet directed energy programs and that these programs couldajor, if not decisive, impact on the strategic balance)
- trend towardD has been accompanied by continued efforts in the evolutionary development of dining systems. Major new weapon systems deployed during the past decade are shown in Figure IS. and systems Currently under development are outlined in Ihe following sections of this paper.
B. Missile System*
his section covers all msjor types of missile systems except ASW weapons and antitank weapons (seeelow),
SaAif* Msvtes
oviel ballistic missile programs are chamcler-ixed by (he evolutionary development of successive generations of new systems (seeoth land-based and sea-bated systems haveimilar pattern, and new systems of both types are currently being tested.
I l. mil ni; ,
relatively poor accuracies, slow leaction times, andfor live mostlaunchers Missilesnduced in the, in eontiast, were more accurate and piovided substantial improvements in reliability and throw-weight capabilities. Pre-launch survivability also Increased sharply, as large numbers of silo basedndCBMs were deployed and ihe submerged bunchLBM entered service.
7G.aw further Improvements in accuracy and llirnw-weight as thendCBMs were deployed and the navy received the long-range. MBV warheads abo became available for some ol ihe missiles deployed earlier, and the new land-based systemsIRV capability. In addition, thend SS IH ICBMsold launch technique in which the missile is ejected from the sito before ihe inotors rgnilc This would permit the Soviets to refurbish and reload the slkn more rapidly than lor missilesot bunch technique. While the cold launch technir|iiei could be used toefire capability, there is no evidence that the Soviets are now capable of rapidly retiring missiles from deployedndilos The Auiifant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Departnseni of the Al* Forte, believes that, based on historical precedent and other factors, future deployment of resources to-suppott the refire capability of thend SSI8 should not be dmountrd.
TI. Another major ballistic missile introduced since theas theScaleboard) SOO-nm land-mobile system deployed in support of the ground foices ihe Soviets also have developed anderies of shortiange missiles for battlefield support uses The Utcst system ofhich has |iiil begunhas an ineitial guidance system that makes it significantly more accurate than the earlier rockets (the FHOC series) which were unguided
ngoing progiarm include work on the solid propellentCBM. which can be filed from sili' or mobile launchers, and its dens-alive, Iheobile [HUM. which it about ready lo enter service, the tnting of variants of thendhe testing of two new SLBMs. at least one of whichIRV payload. and the testingossible io1low-on (or Ihe SSI? In addition, there it evidence that other new systems
IS.
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arc In an earlyf development. The Soviet* also begun developmentactical antlshlpseil on IheLBM. tiot this system (ihehai not been tested3 and probably has been abandoned
ABM Systems
n addition to the limited deployment of the ABM-lb missile intioduced8 (see. the Sovietsew ABMrT "Jxginning in, bul thcte hlTbcen Fteductlon In flight tests ol these systems in the past two yean They have continued to work on ABM-associated radars, however, and ihere is evidence of work on an anlitactscaJ ballistic missile system. (The Antiianr Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Deportment of the Air Force, oUo behevei that tht SAS surface-to-air mtttlle could easily be modified toeemtnal ABM defense capability )
AnliiofeKfa Syilemi
he Soviet nntisatclhte missile system which became operational1 could intercept satellites in orbits below0 nm) during the second revolution of the interceptorive-year lapse in flight tests, the Soviets resumedtests of this system6 In two rests this year
Soviet ABM Characteristics
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ABM Interceptor Test Firings theyapability toow altitude satellite on the inteiceptor's first revolution, which would substantially reduce warning time of an attack (see
ace-to Air Missiles
he Soviets haveide array of SAMs and have made significant advances in this area Originally concentrated on strategic systems for anllhomber defenses, in recent years the Soviet efloit has emphasized the development of tactical systems lo delend ground and naval forces There has been increased effort on the improvement of low-altitude performance, especially with the new tactical systems
boutercent of the strategic SAMs currently deployed arc of types which were designed in, but al) of the deployed systems have been moderniied during their lifetime (see Figureshe Soviets also introduced one new strategic SAM. the long-rangeew low-altllude strategic SAM Is under development Recent evidence confirms previous indications that at least somendites now have nuclear warheads, there were earlier indications that nuclear warheads might be available lor some SA-ls
ftl Anothei significant recent development in SAMs has been the number and variety ol systems provided for the ground forces (see. First introduced in quantity in thend, these tactical missiles combine with modern antiaircraft gun systems toutually supportive and highly mobile air defense system for aimy units in the field
imilar but less eitensive deployment of new missiles (and gum) hat improved the ait defenses ol naval surface lorces (seeAMs have been filled to all new major combatants and some smaller warships Thus far. however, the navy has notong-range SAM lhat would provide good aiea defense capabililies
Civile Muilet
he USSR took an early interest in (he development of cruiseit tally focused pnmanly on the antiship mission, the Soviets haveariety oJ ASMs ami surface-to-surface missiles (see Figures
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Developments in the ASM field include the deploymenl olndissiles on LRA and naval aircraft. The ranges of these missiles varym and they can be armed with either high explosive or nuclear warheads.
Surface-lc-surface cruise missile developments have been centered on the antiship rolein antiship missiles include the introduction of Ihehend Ihe6
8S. The Soviets Ate not known lo have any program iiinip.ir.ililetrategic cruise inUsdu. projects. They couldarge long-range cruise missile ss'ith rcliitivc-ly poor accuracy, but wc believe thai the technology requiredmall strategic cruise missile with high accuracy is not available lo the Soviets al this lime.
Jo<fi<ol Air-fo-Sur/ore Miiiifet
he Soviets are active in the development of tacticalommand-guided version ol thehort-range missile is believed to have become operationals did thehe first Soviet anliradialion missile developed for tactical use. The first short-range misiile with electro-optical guidance, thes under development
C. Monned Airctoll Systems
The Soviets haveteady program of evolutionary development ol most types of manned aircraft. The new aircraft introduced since theave been increasingly sophist idled, and some of the latest types aic roughly comparable in speed, range, maneuverability, and pay load to Western types deployed several years earlier. They arc still inferior, however, to the new generation of aircraft now being introduced in Ihe West.
The most impressive developments have been In the area of itrikc-oiicnted combat aircraft, with Ihe introduction of such ads-anccd types as the Backfire bomber and the filler C. Flogger. and Fencer (see Figures. These developments have in hit anilpgraded ihe offensive potential of Soviet airpowcr. Improvements in defensivehave been less Impressive, but included the development of the Flagon 3nd interceptor variants of the Foibat and the Flogger. In addition, theTOL aircraft for Ihe navyew departure In Soviet fighter development.
Transport aircraft types haveattern of steady improvement with the introduction of such airoaft as6 heavy jet transport following earlier turboprop-powered types (see. However, the Soviets are still behind the US in heavy, long-distance lift capability.
Noteworthy developments in other areas include the introduction of modern liicd-wing ASW aircraft during thend, although there
Tep
New Tactical Air Defense Weapons
arget tracking radar inwilh iiim gum. It was introduced in Soviet regiments in theor improved low-altitude protection from tactical aircraft and helicopters.
Theobile, mediunt-tohigh altitude surface-to-air mitsile system which entered service in the. It has been assigned at army and Front level to replace ihe SA-2.
Theew mobile amphibious SAM system which is just entering service. It il expected to olter air defense coverage belowoverage and beyond the range ot Hiei is being introduced In some divisions as an alternative to the SA-6.
missile system introduced in rise. It Ism antiaircraft guns al the division level.
O
Theonsists of an amphibiouscout vehicle modilicct to carry jmjll SAMs-similarhen the, it ooeraiei in conjunction with the0 provide low-alt iluoe protection for regiments.
lion include the Kics-.lass currier, ihelass cruisers, and the Kiivak Hassol ihrse units lealuie an emphasis on ASW and Itir iiol the Kiev das*
adds anotbci dimension lo Soviet navalhat olTOI. aiicialt. Newly constructed surface ships continue toiding Soviet stiess on heavy initial firepower, with less concern for endurance and sustained combat capability.
he Soviets have begun significant although as yet limited programs for the construction of modern naval auiihaiiet to provide at sea support for their combat foices Currently, however, they still use Inefficient replenishment methods which make their ships vulnerable during refueling operations. The Soviets- and Ihe fates and Easthaveumber of new but relatively small amphibious landing ships Since the, and Ihe Soviets have continued to introduce new designs (or the modernisation of theii large coastal and nilneswceping force*
Svbmormri
no known current programs of this nature (seehe Soviets also have deployed new ASW helicopters, and ihey have Inlluwed (he US lead Inelicopter-gunship for ground force supporl (see.
ew lighten are currentlyThe Soviets have alludedollow-onbomber pro>ccf. buthave no firmonrogram.
ovo) Systems
progress in naval weapons systemsmarkedillingness to adopt novelan overall pattern of evolutionaryRackedliong program of basic researchtechnology, the result has been anin the quality of naval weaponsoOs
Sur/ore Combolorirj
Soviet shipbuilding programsa series of modern and. Major types currently under construc-
Tlie stralegK attack capability of the navy wasthe introduction oflass8 (seehe subsequent introduction of (he I) classes marked further advances in this field There are indications that an even larger SSBN may be under development.
Three types ol nudear powered attack subma-naes are under construction (seewo of|I-are variant, of designs that became operational in the. TheA class-was first launched9 and the program appears to have suffered engineering and production setbacks, bul is nuw proceeding.ais probably represents the most advanced Soviet elfort in this held, and il appears to be designedmall, high-speed, deep-dising submarine with improved ASW capabilities The Soviets also continue toieselpoweied attack submarine,lass.
ol passive sonar capabilityquieting, the Soviets have emphasisedand speed in theii submarine designs.high self-muse of Sovietcontinue* toerious handicap, astheir vulnerability to acoustic detection
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sssicrtss and (educes, Ihe effectiveness of their own sensors (see
ASW .v, , .,
addition lo eflorts toward improvedother ASW sensors, ihree advanced ASWduring thene is amissileoming torpedo, andIwo aic submarine-launchedtorpedo and oneuclear depth(sec.
Arrvoiiced Verti'dei
Soviets have devoted considerablelo ihe development of surface-effect ihipiadvanced concepts wilh applications Inof nasal missions Several differentsystems have been tested. Including onela'ge vehicle thai has been underal7 (see Figurehe Sovietstin active air cushion vehicle (ACV)untie ACVs already have enlcrcd naval service.
E. lond Combo! Systems
systems for the use of the Soviethecoene increasingly comince lhaand have been produced in quantity As Inof tactical fightersheof relatively simple and unsophislsealedit no longer appropriate (see
r<snai
omeears after theof2 and afterfforts, the Soviets lscg;ui serin prnductiouew inesliiini tank,2 It has (ccrnlly been nlriitilied with Susiet units in ihe USSR Production of the new tank isto inctrasc markedly in llieye.ir nrallow ine. the Soviets lu deploy2omplete and reliable technical di'srripti'in of iln new tunk is iml yd mailable, but it IMiibalily ii faster jikI better .irmed than preterit Soviet ijuks li is hkrly that itS mm nr larger .Mii->llin. and iinptuxcslnrossisliy iimJmIiIi 'I armor.
ArmoredCc-mbol
he HMI' amphibinui armored infantryhicle was lirsl sern in thend began In appear in substantial numbers during thet Is an especially versatile vehicle, superior lo operational Western counterparts The BMP and theC are replacing olderCs. and the Soviets hareollow-on to theeries The Soviets also areew airbunie assault vehicle, the AMD. which significantly Improves the antitank and ground mobility capabilities of the airborne forces.
AiMhxy
mm self-propelled gum were first idenlified in the Soviet Forces (seehese weapons have superiormobility and provide grealei piotection for their crews than do lowed cannons They also are especially well suited for supporting fail-moving armored attacks. Limited evidence suggestshird new sell-propelled gun may be under
ecently acquiied evidence suggests that the Suvicls either have deployed nuclear artillery round) or e'pect to deploy them soon. Other artillery developments include the reappearance of old model heavy artilleryhowilzersm mortars Evidence also indicates that the Soviets are now producing protimity fusts, whtch will make Soviet artillery considerably more effective against light armored vehicles and troops without overhead cover'
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KievAircraft Carrier
a'Kir. m
he Soviets have continued to develop nr-lypej of antitank missiles and are deploying them in loige numbers. These include systems mounted as an integral part of the armament ol some combat vehicles as well as man-portable and hrllcopter-launehed missiles. Follow-on antitank systems with improved guidance and increased range are eipecled to enter service in the near future
Ait Defense Systems
omments on the significant Improve me nil in ground force air defense system* appear in paragraphs
F. Spate Systems
rom its inception the Soviet space program hatilitary orientation and the majority of ipace vehicles have had military missions Operational systems introduced since theaveuccession of photographic and Hint reconnainance satellites, and there hasrowing use of communications satellites in the last few years. Since thehe Soviets also have intioduecd radar and Flint satellite systems that can provide general coverage of surface ship activity in selected ocean areas, and in some cases limited targeting data can be provided directly lo naval units armed with antiship missiles. The Soviets also appear to have begunatellite system with the capab.lily to provide early warning of ballistic missile launches In addition, Ihe ongoing development of the Soviet manned spaceelieved to be oriented toward military applications (seeAntisalcllilc systems are covered in
G. Electronic Systems
III. During the past decade the Soviets have improved the quality of their military application! of electronics systems. Although still well behind the US in such important areas as integrated circuits and
"lop Ami
computet technology, they huvc nevertheless made sul.iljiilial advance*umber of area* ol mililaiy significance
Soviet* have long been *trongwarfare, in both ihe offensiveood evidence that aof new electronic counter measuresM)count crmcasurc* (KCCM) equipmenlinlroducvd in recent years.
The ground forces have large numbers of mobile jammers, with the equipment required to lam all ol NATO* communication* in addition to aiiera It navigation and bombingnd possibly theii terrain-avoidance radars.
The air force* hateedicated ECM support aircraft tod a* standoff and escort jammers against early naming and fire controland associatedombers and an increasing number of fighter*M equipment for self piotection
The naval forces alsoarge quantity of KCM equipment, especially on their newer major surface combatnnli.
a related area, the pail decade alsotion ol more secure and turvivabic comI ionsnd ihe Sonet*recentlyIntroduce encrypted lirlrinelry in some missile ftrVU program* The Soviet* also hove made steady but not spectacular progress in the development of active and passive sonarnd underwaterirtlernv Other significant advance* in the electronic* area are reflected in Ihe introduction of more sophisticated navigation and fire control systems lor the new tactical aircraft. The Soviets alsotrong program in electro optics, with application* to night vision devices. SAM guidance, "smartV target acq unit ion, and airborne laser rangefinder*.
H. Chemical/Biological Weapon*
IK The Soviet*ariety of systems capable of delivering lethal and incapacitating chemical agent* We believe that they possess substantial itocVi of tone chemical agents, bul the amount cannot be estimated with any confidence There i* goodthat toxic chemical munitions ate available to the Soviet foiccs inropc.
he Snvicl fotce* muld opciale much more effectivelyhemical-biological-radiolngical) environment than could NATO forces. The Soviets haw developed CIBR delemive organisation* with specialised unit* down to the tcgimenlal level (or technical reconnaissance and decontamination The training of these unit* includes the use of tofic agent*
Soviel Armored righting Vehicles
2 MKumwith nimm)
S'tOO IUUI
BTHimonwlouiomeodcinkr.
,ir Cltll Sid's. The Sin iris have cftCftlrni Ji*l ground . .i-
Cipiipuicnl sisch asmil perhaps nrw links and some irmls air ccjmpprd wilhillialion and protectiveSimihily. must new Sovietareetl Id trpcMlCHH environ-iilrnl. Us mo sonir .lircraft Tin- Soviets also have (icplmrilijnlily ilfiimi.iiniii.iliiin and chemical ireonnyprs nm pswsewrd by Western hxers
ll ihi- Warsaw Part countries Imst signed Ihe international agrcnncul prohibiting the development, prixhrclmn storage, and use of biological weapons There is gimd evidence thai, in the past. Ihe Soviets conducted ritensive research no biological agents and protective techniques and they have facilities that could belo male hinlngical agents Soviet exercises and available dncumentaiy svritlngs, hnw-ever, have not rcflcclcd offensive use of biological is eupons
(V. MISSIONS AND OPI RATIONS
his seclion discusses the opcialions and Interactions of ihe Individual components of the Soviet armed forces in the accomplishment of vaiious peaciand wartime missions. Il attempts to present an overview of the manner in which the specific functions of various lorces would fit into an-ovcralt stialcgy. In doing so. it focuses on the Soviets' perceptions of how Iheir lorces should beas indicated by doctrinal writings, exercise activities, deployment patterns, and systems char adaddition to assessments of cutfenl Soviet capabilities to pcrlonn specific tasks.
IIS. The presentation of Ibis material Is necessarily somewhat asseilive. due to the summary nalure of this paper. This should not be taken as an indication that the basic patterns outlined are immutable On the contrary, there are areas in which the Soviets themselves seem uncertain, oi prrpatcdariety of contingencies, and our information on Sovietand capabilities Is uneven. Major areas of uncertainty or divergent opinion within the(Vxnrnrr. jiiitv are noted in leal, and more detailed discussions ot the evidence and alternative assessments aie contained in the basse NIE* on these forces.
WOiQG-W-
mm SP Gun
mm andmmropelled artillery pieces were developed in the, probably to help Pact artillery units keep pace with rapidly advancing armored
units. They alio provide greater protection for their crews in
both conventional and nuclear environment!.
Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missiles
Theith In wheeled launcher is animprovement of earlier versions ot this sysicm. Its maximum rangem and it canonventional, chemical, or nuclear warhead.
Scud-B
Thes an evolutionary improvement ot earlier versions ot this system, lis maximum range ism and It canonventional, chemical,uclear warhead.
Scaleboard
The Scaleboardobile long-range guided missile tystemauncher. Its range is *oo nm and iluclear warhead.
*r
A. Peacetime Opcrotions
tig. Tho loiiliiic peacetime operations of most clrmcnl* of the Soviet lorces arc ditcctcd primarily toward training (or cnmbalf course, but the Soviet navy has acquired active peacetime missions as welt. The extension of Soviet military aid to Third World countries also has become an increasingly significant (actor in Soviet foreign pollev iniliatives in recent years.
Novel Opc'o'ioni
outside of home waters byforces expanded rapidly in the last half oland stabilizedigher level in the(sechis buildup, in part, reflectsof the area ol operations into theand Ihe North Atlanlic. Innaval operations in more distant areas aremanifestation of the Soviet navy's grossingan instrument of state policy. The Soviet navythis way. been used to advance foicignincluding the establishment of ain res|ionse to international crises.
he North Atlanlic. Norwegian Sea. Mediterranean and Pacific. Soviet naval activity is concentrated primarily on training for operations against Western navies. The Mediterranean naval presence also supports Soviet interests in the Arab ssoihl. however, and gives the Soviet navy an image of equality wilh US naval forces. In the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and West African waters, naval activities arc essentially political in nature, although ships and submarines also are deployed periodically toounterbalance to Western naval
Polilical use o( the Soviet navy involves "showing the flag" visiuromote good willavorable image of the USSR, particularly inorld countries lhai generally favor the USSR. Soviet naval (orccs also have been used in low risk Situations in support ol sympathetic governments. For example, in ihe spring0 the Soviets made prolonged port calls al Mogadiscio. Somalia, to demonstrate support (or the local government which svas in danger ol being overthrown.ccasions, the Soviets have used demonstrations o( naval power in concert with diplomacy lo obtain the release of detained crews of their merchant and fishing vessels.
he USSRhas posilimud lisunits in crisis anas in an al tempi to discourage Western naval initiatives in such situationse Aral)-Israeli wan7he Jordanian crisisnd (he Irido-Pakistani war1 The augmentation of Soviet naval forces off West Africa during the Angolanprobably was intended In inhibit South African or US naval initiatives in the area In so using its forces, tho Soviet leadership apparently seeks to deter ihe US from action by polling (he burden of tho ne.st move and possible escalation on ihe Western fnrccs. In fhr> crises to date, ihe operations of Soviet naval forces hasp been carefully monitored and direclly controlled Iron. Moscow, suggestinge Soviets appreciate the risks involved.
IM. Operations in distant areas have beenby tho development uf overseas facilities in Mime ureas to support Soviet navaleries of naval suppoit facililirs.ruise missile handling and storage site, have been built in Somalia. Tho ili-vi-lopmcnl of extensile naval facilities also was under svay in Egypt before the Soviet expulsion, and less olabnrale facilities .sere begun in Cubahe Soviet navy also has established communicationsuba and Somalia, and periodically deploys reconnaissance or ASW aircraft to Cuba. Guinea, arid Somalia
id
Military aid programs have developedajor lool of Soviet foreign policy interests during Ihe past decade, after less successful earlier efforls. These programs often involve Ihe presenceizable Soviel military assistance group in tho recipient country and are closely linked to Sovlei political objectives in Ihe area. In addition to providing opportunities for extending Soviet influence, these programs have diminished Western influence in some areas
Military aid activity increased substantially in theoncentration in the Middle fvastcin Arab nations. This expanded ellort has been accompaniedrend toward the provision of more mndern sveapon systems, which generally require more technical advisers.
The Soviets have had setbacks as svell as successes in their military aid activities, and there is evidence ol some opposition to the expenditure of resources on ihesc programs. Despite Such disappoint.
I6.CO0
he Gail o4 Soej
* Cmnig tAvwjmimm*iiVi
-lop
at ilic,
Soviel* continue an ntiporlu unite approach lo ihe useiI.ii, aid lo (utlhci iheil own initial*
iilanl Inlervcnliom
he Soviet] hove developedgrowing capability (or militaiy inteivcntion in Thlid World conflicts. In those situations inocal power hai invited ihcm. In the past decade they alio seem to have shown less constraint about such Involvements. They have only limited capabilities, however, lor intervention in the (nee of significant opposition
The moat common form of Soviet imtctvenlion has been the provision uf logisticsandlocal force* Opctalions of this nature have included the large-scale elloils lo resupply Arab forces after73 wars and the support provided to the Cuban expeditionary forces in Angola "Ihe long-lerm support for North Vietnamese forces aha falls in this category In tomeoviet airhft ca|tabili1ie* have played arole in critical situations.
The most substantial direct commitment of Soviet cunib.il forceshird World conflict in recent years was the ileployinent of SAM and fighter forces to Egypthe Soviets were careful not to provoke combat,eir presenceignificant impact Onevelopments. Theof the force* to Kgypl was unopposed militarily, although there were.some casualties from Israeli air activity while the forces were there.
In ihe absence of ngnificant opposition the Soviets also could introduce element* of their airborne force* and tactical air forces to assist their clients in somesing till its aircraft VTA could deliver one airborne division, or possibly the assault element* ol two.istance ofautical mile* in one day after the forces had been alerted and assembled Some of the newer Soviet fighter*,haverange to leach the Middle tail on non-ttopuch operations would be constrained, however, by the problem ol obtaining overflight rights and providing the requisite ground faciliiie* and logistics support These problem* would be compounded as the distance from the USSR increased, as would the difficulty of maintaining adequate command and control.
tin! tunc lo marshal theirassets, ihe Suvieli could scnllft largeconsiderable distances, if unopposed Mostuited for such an operation are normallyhowever, and ihe Sovleti are not well preparedMake this kind ol operation on short notice.
capabilities to intervene In distantsignificant military or naval oppositionThe amphibious Lit and assault capabilitySoviet navy i* neither large enough notthe ships necrssajy to support aashore against opposition. The USSHships for helicopter assault ot for nir cover duringamphibious assault, and the Soviet* wouldpressed to maintain tea control in most partsworld. The Kiev class aircraft carrier ha*fot air cover, but wc do not believe thaiconstructed for this purpose, nor wouldgreat capability Past Sovietof client* have not encountered directThe Soviets probably do not sec ihenor do they seem to be building, force*in dlttanl areas againstRather, they appear lo place greaterusing ihcii military and naval force*other power* from inlcivcmng
C.Wor With China
basic posture of the forces
buildup of Soviet forces along thein thende((reparation*ariety of contingenciesfaceotential threat, prom the Soviet polnla rather large buildup has been requiredprovide for the physical integrity of0ile) Sino-Mongolian sectorthe nairowness of the band ofterritory along the frontier and the proximityTrans-Siberian Railroad to theboth requiicd that the buildup beairas close to the border, so that the Sovietsa Chinese allMk and push Chinese force*ihe railroad could be cut (tee
iVC.l
efensive
1
-ittp CeenH
3
arious motivations arc conceivable (or major Soviet military action* against China, but considering the rlikitep would involve,irect threat to Ihe security ol Soviet territory would seem likely to niggerove. In the highly improbable event that bolder skirmishes continued after local Soviet actions, the Soviets could move across the border in considerable strength. Limited objective military operations in Manchuria and Sinkiang could be underlaken topressure on ihe Chinese leadership Deeper penetration v. involving niobiliralion of additional Soviet forces, seem unlikely due to Ihe risks of protracted war. Moscow might perceive an opportunity for such action, however, in the contingencyhina sharply divided by an internal struggle for power In this case, the Soviets might intervene with the aim of supporting oraction more favorably dispersed to cooperation with the USSR, or ofuppet regime in one or more of the border regions.
n any conflict with China the Soviets would be especially concerned about the spectttwo-front war. with the feareavy Soviet engagement hi China would lead to aggressive moves by NATO Conversely,adical improvement in Sino-Sovict relations, the Soviets piobably would feel compelled lo maintain strong forces along the border evenATO-Warsaw Pact conflict
D. Wor in Europe
oviet concept* of the naturevar In Europe have changed in the past decade, and the Soviets now capect that a" NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict probably would begin, with both skies using only non-nuclear weapons I
J IrTc Soviets' planning is based on (he belief that tucy could quicklyon-nuclear NATO attack, go on the offensive, and achieve early successes in penetrating NATO'sThus, the Soviets probably would continue to use only non-nuclear weapons as long as possible, although lliey believe NATO would eventually have to use nuclear sveapont to halt the Pact offensive
tr
-top
i lilyapidly advancing offensive svuuldheavily on lank forces. If ihe Sovieli were ever forced lo conclude lhal their tanks were unable lo penetrate NATO defenses, ihey would lure lo rethink their strategy and contemplate radical redesign of their forces
significant change in thewar concepts is lhal Ihey now consider itPact operations including majorbegin prior to the large-scaleIntend to conduct with ground forces fromUntil about the niid-ISCOs, theto conducteinforceinenl inwar. This change Q
^nay have occurred because ihe Soviets no longer count on having the time for piior teiOforcc-ment. and also because ol the danger that such action could be counterproductive For example, it intfjlri cause NATO louildup ol its own lhal wouldagainst the Pad's Initial numerical superiority of lorces in Cciitrul Europe Tlie Soviets may also believe lhal the reinforce ii wot process is not as severely threatened by NATO nuclear attack as it was in earlier years This change in dodnne does not nccessaiilyhange in Soviet preferences, but mayrudent planning assumption.
of lite Bureau of IntelligenceDepartment of State,ifferent view
orst case rather thanof initiating rioiNiillw.
Vnulenee seems to fit better with the hypo the sit that the West struck before the Sodrd ccxdd reinforce than with thehaiit chose lo delay reinforcement. Moreover. ISR'i impression thai the Soviets nou/if reinforce, if they had the choice, iota ttrengthenrd by the ojierotion into Cserhoilo-until)hen ihe Soviets showed them-telvei much more conservnliur withouttheir forces than matt Western experts thought they needed to Qg.f"
l is clear lhal while the Soviets might choose lo reinforce from the Soviet Union before conflict, they arc picpaicd, if necessary, lo initiate an offensive without prior Intgc-scale reinforcement. Thisof Pad offensive concepts has impoilant warnings foe NATO, as we no longer can be confident lhal ihe movementivision force fiom the USSR into Central Europe would take place before an attack In addition, we know that Soviet doctrine emphasizes the importance of using concealment and deception measures to achieve ladical sutpnse Beforeoordinated, large-scale offensive, however, the Pact forces would requirepreparation for attack. Besond the preparation of the alWck force, some preparation of other forces and ol Ihe Pad nations for war would .tlimm certainly lie made, and ihese together with political Icnsinn (which the Soviets assume) would provide at least some warning andong-tcmi warning ol (he increasing likelihood of hostilities.
n.1War Optrathm
Soviet doctrine indicates thai Moscow'sin ihe eaily conventional phasesATO war svould be the dcslroction of enemy ground, air. and naval forces, with special emphasis on NATO's nuclear weapon and delivery systems and major command and control systems. This would be done lo disrupt or wealen ihe nuclear counterstrike thai woukj be expected and lo assure that the nuclear phase would occur under conditions more favorable lo Ihe USSR
The Soviets would eiped Central Europe to be ihe ilecisive ihealecarge-scale NATO-Warsaw Pad confhd Whdttci ihey would launch Ii iall along NATO's flanks concurrently with any campaign in Centtal Kutope Is uncertain. We believe that the Warsaw Pact has the means lo conduct limited, but not general, offensive operalium in Scandinavia and southern Europe svhilecarrying out an offensive against the NATO center We judge llntt early Pact offensives toward Ihe Turkish Straits arid northern Norway are more likely than in the other (lank Areas Recent evidence docs
not uveal Soviel IntentionsI lit? curryingad ollensiic lulu hi.iiThe Soviets might piefcr mil to iiivulvr lite French in the conflict becausedent r'erxh nuclear capability would inert ate tlte risk of nuclear escalation
Jhc Main viei ol Operation!
ihe Soviel military evidently believes that Pact (round lorecs ate superior to NATO's. They alto believe that Pad theater forces now in Central Ftirope are not only capable ofATO attack In the early daysonllict. but are alio capable ofon-nuclear offentivc into Weil* Their primary obiectivei in central and wrtlrrn Europe would be to destroy NATO forces in West Germany and the Benelu* countries, and using airborne and amphibious foreei against key Danish islands in conjunction with ground attacks through Jutland, lo assist ihe Pact navies in gaining control of the Baltic Sea and assuring passage from the Bailie to the Ni.rlh Sea
> Theiobably consider thaiair forces could blunt or perhaps even hallground offensive Because of this,assive,e airthe initialphasear, aimed
al destroying NATO's tactical air forces and other nuclear systems and facilities This attack would be conducted by tactical aircraft, and by bombers of Soviet Longe Range Aviation and possibly Naval Aviation It would be supported by eilensivewarfare operations. Civen the deficiencies In the capabilities of most Pact aircraft and In pilot training and the prospect of heavy losses, the all-out nature of this scheme would makeighly liiky operation hi success would depend heavily on suiprlse to ensure that NATO's air defenses were not fully prepared and mobile nuclear systems not dispersed.
No-or OperohoKi
aval opciations arc seen as closely related to war developments on the Eurasian landmais as well us to requirementstrategic strike against the US and (or the blunting oftrike against the USSR. Soviet naval strategyATO war would be
See paiaciaptior 'IvrlDurvtw of ihe fl'iiouce uid finci'i-h, Department ol Slile
sensitive lo ihr ciitinmljncci under which the saw began Whether or not the Soviets achieve IhcilI scenario- in which their forces coordinate ihe initial attack on NATOwould seek to establish sea control within an area which svould include not only tire Black and Baltic Seas but also the Barents.and eastern Mediterranean Seas as well
he Soviets piobably would seek lo attack Western aircraft coiners and ballistic missileanywhere within range of their forces The Initial attacks probably would be timed to coincide wilh the planner! strikes against land targets by tactical aircraftA NATO ASW forces abo would be targeted in the early tlagn of conflict to permit Soviet submarines lo deploy lo their forwaid operating areas moic effectively. Naval operations would include extensive me of offensive and defensive mining.
v.il operations are likely to be more successful against surface targets than againstSoviet capabilities for combating Westernirst priorityeilensive reconnaissance assetsombination of air. submarine, and surface foreei armed with antiship missile systems Coordinated tlriket against carrier forces piobably would be at least partiallyon the sue, composition, and location of the Western forces, whether the Soviets used conventional or nuclear weapons, and whether-ere achieved Soviel ASW forces, on the other hand, almost ccilainly would be ineffective in preventing submarine operations within theBarents, and Mediterranean Seas, and would have dillKuky even in defending themselves against Western attack submarines. Similarly, the Soviet naval air defense systems piobably would nol be adequate in the face of NATO air strikes.
pero'iOAi
he Soviets also could conduct combined land, air, and naval operations againsl obledives on NATO flanks Their amphibious capabilities, and those of their allies, are primarily tailored for such operations They probably would seek to scire or neutralize NATO installations in Norway duiing the early phaseonflicl and to mount operations against Creece and Turkey to secure the Turkish Straits. In both of these cases the primary objective would be to support the forward deployments ol Soviet naval forces. In
ralions against northern Italy, intended to secure the southern flank of lad fixm attacking West Germany, might he launched fmm Hungary thtough Yugoslavia or Austria.
Chtmitol Warfare Option
oviet military doctrine place* chemical warfare in the category of "weapon* of man de*lrurtlon" along with nuclear and biological wrap-on* The Soviel* control chemical weapon* in the Pail countries, and the first use of chemical wcaponi would require Moscow's approvalossibility. however, lhal chemical weapons might be used iindependently by the Sovids before nuclear weapon* were employed.
the whole. Pad lorces are much belter equipped and trained than NATO forces to ooerateflU environment
Jtherc is good evidence that chemical munitions are deployed with Soviet forces In Eastern Europe
Ihe Pact forces mightonsiderable tactical advantage by the use ol chemical weaponson-nuclear coiillid However, the Soviets would have to weigh thai advantagehe rbfcATO nuclear response
cotohe-i
heie are uncertainties in our appreciation of current Sovid nuclear dodrine and we lack inform* lion by which to judge the circumstances in which Soviet political authorities would decide to use nuclear weapons against NATO forces Inannot confidently predict how ihe Warsaw Pad would reactATO initiation of nuclear war. hut we lodge that the odds still favor rapid escalation once nuclear war began in Europe.
NATO's iiiilitil use of theater nuclear weapons were selective and limited, we could not confidently predict the Soviets' response Hut Ihey have been broadening the range of options available to them for responding They might continue (surely non-nuclear operations, or they
^nightassive theater nuclear
is possible (hat they would
respond wrlh limited nuclear strikes of their own they have considered this alternative
- The Siwid* believe, hosvevcr. thai once nuclear weapons are introduced by either side the risk nl rscalaliou is very great, because the side ihnl makes the first massive strike would have the advantage. Thus, (he likelihood of on attempted preemption wilh massive. Ihealer-wlde strikes would increase greatly
dodrine does not appear lo sup|iort the notion of nuclear war al sea during conventional hostilities in Europe Sovid naval forces have the capabilit* lo engage inonflict, bul there ist deuce [
If Sovid plans for hmiicd nuclear war al sea Once tactical nuclear weapons had been introduced, however. Soviet naval force*use them widely in attacks with antiship missiles and ASW weapons
idespread nuclear operations al the thralrr lesel wouldigh potential for escalation lu intercontinental worfore. Soviet doctrine does not reflect the some distinction belsveen stralegic and tactical missionsometimes made In the Wcsl. ond Soviet stralegic planningroader range uf forces to cover targets in peripheralhis has an impact on evolving Soviet concepts of the nuclear aspects of theater warfare and the linkage between theater war and intercontinental war
- Available classified Sovid writings are vague with icgard to the issue of nuclear escalation from the European theaterS-USSR intercontinentalchange, but unclassifiedcontinuea ratter ire such escalation a* likely.
Tl* quantity of nuclear deliystems in Eastern Europe has been incrcosing. and tins would enable the Soviets lo conduct nuclear warfare in Europe at higher intensities before ha.ing to use USSR-based systems There Is. houever. no dircd evidence that the Soviets are seeking an alternative lo using their USSR baser! nuclear foicesarge scale theater war
A large-scale theater conflict would diredly involve at least some element* of the Soviel strategic forces. Naval rspcrationi. lor example, probably would result in some action between
and ASWven if both tide* died E. General Nucloor War
oviet strategy rt bawd on the permit* thai nuilrar war is possible, and thai ihe USSR should be prepared to lighl and winW. Soviel doctrine stresses Ihe importance ol war-fighllrig capabilities, aivd the Sonets view deterrence and warpabahiic* as closely coupled The concept of mutual assuredfiiiable ami lasting basistable strnlrgic nuclear relationshipci been doctnnails accepted in the USSR. Soviet political and military leaders probably view the concept ol mutual assured destruction as an Operative reality al the preterit, but (he basic premise of Soviet strategic doctrine seems to be that it is possible touclear war. defeat one's enemies, and emerge from: without suffeiing irreparable damage
he Soviets apparently believeeneial nuclear war probably would be relatively brief, with the outcome decided by massive nuclear strikes. While their classified 'wirings ncknowledge the current dominance of offensive over defensive technology, they recognize that this situation could be altered Despite an emphasis on ihe decisiseness of massive nuclear strikes, they also Kress ihe importance of active and passive defenses, and Soviet doctrine does not exclude ihe possibilityrotracted nuclear war.
Reodinm
hile allowing foi the possibility of surprise attacks on the USSR. Soviet doctrine implicitly rejects the idea that war is likely to begin without warning to (hem. On the conliary, Soviet doctrine specificallyhreatening period during which rising political tensKHis would trigger increased readiness sn the opposing lorces This belief is reflectedeadiness posture that is markedly dllfcrent from that ol US strategic forces in some respects Most elementi of the Soviet strategic force* normallyelatively low slate of alert, but are organized and trained toigh stale of alertew honri Thus, for example, the SSBN lorce normally hasmall portion ol its units at sea.ubstantial portion of the units in port are required lo be ready to put lo sea on short notice
Comeofcn and D'" pi ton
ISO Soviet doctrine accords cnusidrrdbletu the use of cuncculmenl and deceptionIn achieve strategic objectives. For many yean ihe Soviet* have been engaged in various forms ol eoiiccahnpiit and deception adivilies. including ilisiiilnrinalinn. relating to their military forces We believe thai they wouldehberale and widespread eflnii lo moik lire statu* ol their (nice* during the perioduclear war. In an attempt tu Increase the survivability of their forces and In ilegrede I'S capabilities lo obtain *lralcgic warning
Offensive Operorioni
he Soviet*at preempt ion is the most advantageous option if they conclude (hat nuclear war is inevitable If they were to preempteriod of extremely high temions in which they had maximized thru readiness, they would probablyull-scale preemptive attack using the hulk of their strategic arsenal They would probably holdortion ol Ihe force, however, lor use against high priority imgi-ls nol destroyed in the initial attack, for pou-attack bargaining, and to deter attacks by third count ties
he Soviets probably are confident that they can monitor changes in the readiness of enemy forces with considerable accuracy and promptness We are uncertain, however, whether they expect to obtain unambiguousnf an enemy's intention lo launch strategic weapons In addition, in view nf the risks involved in initiating hostilities, the political leader* who have the final authority might not be easily convinced that the time to preempt had come.ituation of mounting tension, however, we would expect al leatt the ICBM force to be at an increased level of readiness, permitting ihe USSH toetaliatory strike with large numbers of weapon* with minimal warning
eview of ihe evidence concerning Soviet missile targetingonsistent emphasis on counlermilitary mission* which encompass not only enemy military force* but also element* supporting (he overall militarysome strategic industries. The llrtl wavereemptive strike need not cover all of these target categories, a* the primary objective would be the destruction of those weapon*
itl
ould uthrrwiso retaliate Ait initial attack on enemy strategic lini'i lot 1'iiiinplr. might tcly mainly on situ-based ICflMs and SSflNs deployed svilhinheit target* (including i) claw miines in or near hemic purl) Subsequent attacks probably would he dirrrtect against leu lime mgenl la'gets.
The Soviets ate nidcntl* cotiMdering ihe implication* ol US wrapons-eninliisiiienl policyfur limited uses ul strategic In'ces In the few thrmetical discussions in jvaifjhle Soviethctc Is scant suggestion thai limited strategic nuclear operations at the inleicontinental level are being planned. In their writings and statements, the Soviets haveejected the possibility that cither the US ut the USSR would be able to eiercise restraint Dace nuclear weapons had been cmpluscil against its homeland There is evidence, however, that the Soviets could belimited nuclear employment conccpls into their military doctrineheater war
Mcasuies to increase the readiness of the strategic oVhosivc forces would begin during the prewar periud ul tension, and all elements of the strategic defenses almost certainly would heigh level of alert If svurfarc at ihe mlental level svrre preceded by conventional nr theater-levelconflict, some slialcg'C defensive forces would already have begun active operations Naval ASW foices probably would be deployed to theii fow-ard operating aieas.esample. while many interceptor units and some SAM balieiies probably would have moved to reserve aiilitlds and alternate filing sites
wilh Soviet forces fully alerted,Status ul strategic defensive capabilitiescause ciie concern from the Sovietirst We evlimair that theystem wiu.ld prewide liltle pmtectioeianivr .iH.nl. that Soviet ASW foices would be unable In inllicl sigollirattt altiilloo on Wcilcm SSBN foices. nisei that Soviet air defenses could not adei|iutrly enpe with low-altitude penetrations byns. even after allowing for preemptive Cormier force strikes by the Soviet strategic attack fences.believe that the defensive lotces could not prevent massive damage to the USSIt. and thai the Soviets would share this belief.
foisive De letter
oviet doctrine culls for passive defense preparations lo be acceleratederiod of tension, and such preparations almost certainly would be stepped up in the event ol theater-level hostilities Full implementation of Soviet civil defense plans, howes-ei. would complicate attempts to achieve strategic suiprise Thus, the Soviet leadership couldifficult choice between all-out civil defense ellisrls and attempts lo achieve suiprise through concealn irnt and deception
oviel passive defensedefense programs nod the hardening of important militaryprovide some protection against nuclear strikes, but we do net believe that (his would prevent massive damage lo ike USSR The Soviets would proltably etpect their civil defense lo be able toolitical and economic cadic and to contribute In ihe survivability of the USSRational entity. Soviet civil defense planning seems lo be based cm ihe assumption lhal effective defenses are feasible, but we ate uncertain as to the USSRs actual civil defense goals and rspcdatiom
Original document.
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