CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS8
Soviet Union-Eastern Europe
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SOVIET UNIONEASTERN EUROPE
Thii publication it prepared lor regional specialists in the Washingtonby the USSRfatten Europe Division. Olfice ot Currentwith occasional contribution* Irom other office? within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual article*.
CONTENTS October 1, 6
Background on Gromyko's Call for
Talks on the Indian
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Bucharest's PCC Meeting Now Deferred
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Tho Soviets and the
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Background on Gromyko's Call for Talks on the Indian Ocean
Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement at the UN on Tuesday that Moscow is prepared to talk to "other powers" about reducing outside military activity in the Indian Ocean is probablyactic to put the US on the defensive rather than an expressionenuine Soviet goal. The advantages that would accrue to the USSR from an Indian Ocean arms control agreement are considerable, and if they are serious about pursuing then, we expect that they willthe US bilaterally.
Gromyko's offer comes on the heels of other signs of Soviet concern about Washington's success over tho last year in mobilizing sentiment of the coastal countries against Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean and in persuading these countries to grant the US military additional access toSoviet activity. The Soviets are especially concerned about the change in policy of theof Australia and New Zealand, which allow
port calls by US nuclear-powered ships. They also fear that the US will replace the British when they
withdraw from Gan in the Maldives and from Masirah in Oman.
Despite General Secretary Brezhnev's denial at the party congress last February and again during Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to the USSR in June that the USSR had any bases in the Indian Ocean, most of the countries in the area accept the fact that Moscowase in Somalia. The Soviets probably calculate that by coining out publicly in favor of talks on the Indian Ocean they will put the onus on the US for buing insensitive to the concerns of countries on its periphery. They may also hope to strengthen congressional opposition to any further expansion of US naval activity in the Indian Ocean.
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Moscow's enthusiasm for the idea of arms control in the Indian Ocean seems to have waned considerably since the Soviets first approached the US about the idea ofoint declaration "limitingbases and fleet concentrations in the Indian Ocean* in.
For one thing, acceptance of special restrictions for the Indian Ocean wouldangerous precedent that could erode Soviet positions at the Law of the Sea conference and on freedom of the seas.
For another, the Soviet navy probably does not relish the idea of restrictions on its activities and especially would not want to engage in talks on the Indian Ocean while the USSR is in an inferior bargaining position. The navy would probably also object to the idea of talking only with the US as long as significant French naval forces are located in the Indian Ocean. (OfflMrTrfflMTUL)
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h Birthday
Soviet party secretary Andreyh birthday last month was saluted with appropriate honors, including the publication of his Collected speeches and articles. In garnering his second-"Hero of Socialist Labor" award and official praise for his speeches, Kirilenko has caught up with the other seniorSecretary Brezhnev, President Podgorny, Premier Kosygin, and partySuslov. All except Brezhnev have already celebratedh birthdays. Brezhnev, whose honors came early, will ben December.
A review of Kirilenko's collected works in -Pravda on Septembers not yet available here, but the embassy reports that while it reservedpersonal praise only for Brezhnev, Kirilenko is depictedise, experienced leader ininternal party affairs, economics, andpolicy. Earlier reviews of the collected works of other leaders were also laudatory, and Kirilenko has apparently received his due.
As Brezhnev's unofficial deputy, Kirilenko still seems the most likely interim successor in the event of the General Secretary's sudden death or incapacitation, and these almost obligatory honors do serve to draw attention to his favorable position in the hierarchy.
With his second "Hero" award, he joined agroup entitled toust erected in his hometown. Brezhnev's was unveiled with somein Hay, Podgorny's with less publicity last month. ave not yet ap-
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Bucharest PCC Meeting Now Deferred Until November
A Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee session will now apparently take place in Bucharest in November or December. Earlier reports hadit would be held in late October (staff Notes,.
A high-ranking Romanian official in Bucharest recently told the US ambassador that the PCC would meet in November "in anylthough the dates were not yet firm. The Soviet political counselor in Bucharest has confirmed the November date, but added that the gathering might come as late as He hinted that Brezhnev is likely to tie an official visit to Romania on either end of the session. Both sides have reportedly agreed toexchange visits of high officials,rip by the Soviet leader has been rumored for several months.
The main topic, according to the Romanian, willeview of strategy before the Belgrade CSCE follow-on meeting The group reportedly will also consider earlier Romanian proposals for"periodic consultative mechanics" at the foreign ministers level. The Romanian official stressed that both topics fit in with Bucharest's desire to emphasize the Warsaw Pact's political rather than military aspects. He added that he doubted that the group will discuss basic changes in the Pact's military structure.
Romania's proposals to establish "periodicmechanics" may be an attempt toeported Soviet proposaltrong Soviet secretary-general. Bucharest is not averse todiscussions of foreign policy, but has persist tently resisted the formation of supranational bodies that might seek to dictate Romania's foreign policy.
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Tho Romanians have complained about Sovietto play down the significance of the Belgrade meeting* and will probably welcome the chance toEuropean security topics. Bucharest and Moscow interpret the Helsinki accords differently, but will probably be more willing than in the past to find common ground in hopes of preserving the surface calm that now prevails in bilateral relations. (fififtlaB
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USSR-Hungary
Tho Hungarians are pleased with Moscow's choice of Boris Sevykin to head the Hungarian section of the Soviet party Central Committee, accordinglandestine source. They believe that Sevykin, who has served more than four years in Budapest, is more favorably disposed toward Hungary than was hisLeonid Mosin.
Mosin's removal in early August may have been prompted by the publication in Pravdaf an article unusually critical of Hungary'seconomic reform. The article, which wasapproved by Mosin's section, expressed satisfaction with the current situation in Hungary, but criticized earlier "erroneous views" andmeasures" that had "reduced the party's leading role" in the Hungarian economy.
while the Soviets have in the past been uneasy about Hungary's economic experimentations, they had heretofore refrained from direct criticism in the press. Budapest probably regarded this actionreach of inter-partybecause it came long after Hungary had taken steps tothe party's pre-eminence in tho economy.
The source claims that Kadar engineered Mosin's removal during his meeting with Brezhnev in the Crimea, but Mosin had, in fact, been transferredess prestigious job outside the apparatus at least two weeks earlier.
The Hungarians' anticipation that Sevykin will be more tolerant than his predecessor could beWe have one report that tho Soviet embassy in Budapest haaore skeptical view ofdevelopments than has Moscow. Sevykin was the number-two man in the embassy and presumablyand in shaping- that opinion. MMtwikP
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The Soviets and the West German Elections
Soviet relations with West Germany are central to Moscow's policy toward Europe and its policy of detente. The Federal Republic's size, wealth, and position in Europe make the matter of who runs theital Soviet concern. As the West German election campaign goos into its final days, theUnion has gone out of its way to demonstrate that itictory for the ruling Social- Free Democrat (SPD/FDP) coalition.
The most dramatic Soviet gesture in support of the Schmidt government was the announcement on Septemberhat Soviet party chief Brezhnev would visit the West German capital, probably late this year. The invitation to Brezhnev had been extended and accepted in4 during Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow, but during the following two years, Soviet relations with the West German government fluctuated and tho visit was repeatedly postponed.
Soviet concern that the progress made in their relations with west Germany in theight be undermined was evident in the period following the European security conference last year. Among the targets of Soviet comment was Ministeronservative Social Democrat, who has advocated building up the West German military in the face of growing Soviet strength and hasthe force reduction proposals advanced by the Soviets at the Vienna MBFR talks. The Soviets were also disturbed by tho increasingly critical attitude of Foreign Minister Genschcr, the leader of the Free Democrats, who has insisted that the bilateral legal assistance, cultural exchange, and scientific-technological cooperation agreements under negotiation apply to West Berlin as well. As preparations for the West German electionquickened last spring. Ambassador Falin openly admitted that he could baroly tolerate the foreign minister and implied that one advantageictory
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by the Christian (CDU/CSU) parties in the October elections would bc the selectionew man for that position.
The Hay Note
tatement handed simultaneously to Schmidt and the world press onhe Soviets said that "certain quarters'" who question West Germany's Ost-politik cannot be strictly categorized by theirlabels. In other words, the Sovietsthat there were "reasonable" politicians in the Christian parties and that they could workreasonable" CDU/CSU government. The statement called those who raised the specter of overwhelming Soviet military strength agents of the West German armaments industry and promoters of larger West German military budgets. The choice for Westthe statement concluded, was either peace or war.
In milder terms, the Soviet note reiterated Moscow's desire for disarmament', peacefuland closer bilateral cooperation with West Germany. Even though the Soviets implied that they could workDU/CSU government, theyapproved the efforts by the ruling coalition to improve relations, in the Soviet view this would have been "simply unthinkable"9 when Christian Democrat-led governments "wereor, perhaps, not all willing" to pursuecooperation with the USSR. Ifcircles would stop trying to frustrateMoocow promised in the note that it would be ready to move on to regular politicalprobably on the French model; additional treaties expanding bilateralimplying progress in the three negotiations stalled on the Berlin clause; and increased exchanges and trade.
The Campaign
Having made its position public, Moscow lay back. The Westrnia were concentrating on domestic issues, and tho Soviets realized that
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no good purpose would be served if by their actions or statements they called attention to the ruling coalition's somewhat tarnished Ostpolitik. Butwas not quiescent. It stepped up the number ot approvals for exit visas for ethnic German Soviet citizens, promoted trade fairs in West Germany^and West Berlin/ and let pass minor incidents on the transit routes to Berlin. The steps were designed to be helpful to the ruling coalition, as well as to demonstrate to the West German voter thebenefits of good relations with the USSR.
As the campaign heated up, the Christianshifted the emphasis to foreign policy andthe Schmidt government of having given much away for little in return. They promised toGerman interestsorthright way if. elected in October. The opposition's accusations were given particular pointumber ofon the west German border with East Germany and East German interference with buses loaded with young Christian Democrats en route to West Berlin to demonstrate against the Berlin Wall. At the same time, the Soviets contributed to the upsurge of negative publicity on relations with the East byharp protest against plans to allow West Berlin to participate in the new Europeanthat would serve the European Community.
Even so, Soviet support for East Germanon its borders and on the transit routes was fairly low key. The Soviet statement on the European parliamentareful defense ofSoviet legal positions rather than the opening sallyarger campaign directed against West Berlin and West Germany. Moscow's caution on the neuralgic Berlin question was alsohe delay of six days before any commentary was issued in support of the East German interference with travel to West Berlin, the less than authoritative medium in which it appeared, and the brief time allotted for further commentary on this subject.
After additional meetings in West Berlin at which CDU/CSU officials and politicians challenged
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the Soviet view of West Berlin's ties with West Germany, the Soviets felt compelled to respond. Theyeries of attacks on the CDU/CSU, in particular against CSU leader Strauss and CDU Hesse leader Dregger, whom they called relentlessof an anti-communist, anti-Soviet, cold war line. Conversely, commentary hostile to Genscher ended. Instead he was elevated to the status of statesman alongside Schmidt for advocating continued adherence to Ostpolitik.
Soviet Ambassador Falinighlymeeting with Genscher on Although Falin gave Genscher no sign of Soviet concessions on the three stalled treaties, backed East Germany's actions during the summer months, and reiterated standard Soviet positions on Berlin, he sought to keep the atmosphere of the meeting calm. lie urged the promotionreasonable atmosphere" around West Berlin, and if Genscher worked for this, he said, the Soviet Union would be his "bestollowing the meeting it was announced that the West German and Soviet foreign ministers would confer in New York in late September. Both sides conveyed the impression that new developments in bilateral relations would be discussed.
For the Soviets, the West German elections were nothoice between the forces ofand those of light. Even while they were speaking and acting in ways helpful to the ruling coalition, the Soviets continued to criticize the government and keep open lines of communication to the opposition. After all, the Soviets, too, could read poll results. Human nature may also haveart. Within days after his fence-mending talks with Genscher, Ambassador Falin was once again defaming the foreign minister, for whom he seems toenuine dislike. Of moreFalinordial meeting with achristian Democrat politician to registeruncertainty about the current views of the ruling coalition and to reiterate Soviettoconstructive" policyDU/CSU government.
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Tho resulting uproar from the Social Democrats forced Falin to apologize and to convey anpicture ofest German relations in an interview appearingonn newspaper. Falin said that the Genscher-Gromyko meeting in New York wouldew exchange of ideas, and that he foresaw no difficulties in reaching agreement on the three stalled treaties as long as the solutions were "based on the Quadripartite Agreement.'1 ovor Berlin, he said, should not beand the ties between West Berlin and West Germany could, in fact, bo developed, so long as the ground rules were followed. As additional balm to the aggrieved Social Democrats, Falin indirectly criticized those CDU/CSU politicians who persist in
the "hardly constructive" tactic of reopeningthat have been solved and insisting on solving insoluble problems in relations with the East.
The Soviet media supported Falin's gestureseries of successively sharper attacks on the CDU/CSU, with party leaderpecific target in the barrage. One particularly sharpreferred repeatedly to the "wild" attacks, full of hatred, on the East made by "Strauss and his satellite Kohl" and predicted the Christian parties would be defeated in the elections. Other commentaries, citing Western press reports that linked Strauss with payoffs from Lockheed, flatly charged the CSU leader with corruption.
After the Elections
Having made their position clear, the Soviets have reduced their coverage of the elections to bland reportage focusing on the benign effect of the impending Brezhnev visit and tendentiousfrom statements by leading West Germanand from the West German press. Theof the Brezhnev visit listed Schmidt as the host, conveying the impression that further progress could be made in bilateral relations after the elections. The Soviets probably feel that this exercise in atmospherics cm do Schmidt no harm,
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and if, as they think, he pullsarrow victory, they no doubt believe they will beoodto guide the course of bilateral relations along more productive lines.
If, contrary to Soviet expectations, theparties win the day, the initial Sovietwould be to back off until cabinet posts are filledovernment program emerges. Thewould undoubtedly exploit those contacts in the CDU/CSU they have cultivated over the years. They could also use the planned Brezhnev visiteans to explore the new government's attitudes toward the East. If the situation seemedthe visit could always be postponed. Even though CSU leader Strauss, whoikelyfor the Minister of Finance post, isdisliked in Moscow, the Soviets wouldcut off their anti-Strauss propaganda while they see how he behaves in office. Similarly, should an incident involving West Berlin or East Germany take place, the Soviets would react very cautiously,harp eye on the CDU/CSU The cardinal rule in Moscow's foreign policy is readiness to deal with whoever is in power, regardless of past feuds, if there ishred of hope of gaining some advantage. Soviet-German relations have frequently seen thisin practice in the past, and there is no sign Moscow will deviate from it *frpr the election re-turns are in. t
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