7
8
HEMORAHOUH
SUBJECT: The Horo Kidnaping and Italian Politics
One of the list govenwents headed by the veteran Christian Democratic politician Aldo Horo spanned th- period from the breakup of the old center-left coalition4 to the electoral surge toward the Conraunlsts The transitional nature of horo's government led Italian politicians to dubbridge to the unknown". Now, the kidnaping of the party leader by the Red Brigades terrorist organization is forcing Italian politicians toew political abyss. The manyraised by the case could lead to fundamental chances in the country's politics.
Six weeks after the kidnaping, an air of uncertainty and distrust pervades Italian political life. This results In part frombsence|_no one else is equipped to play his stabilizing role in Christian Democratic internal politics and in the party's relations with the Coarunisrjj It also reflects widespread frustration over the government's nabl.ity to find Horo.
Horo was abducted Just as tha Christian Deraocrsts and Ccesnunists completed two months of delicate negotiationsew governing formula. Although the talks had produced an agreement under which the feesauhists support Prime Minister Andreottl's Chrlstlen Democratic minorityIn parliament, many contentious details concerning relations between the two parties still had not been spelled out.
Preoccupation with the crime has since prevented anyone from addressing these outstanding Questionsystematic way. (Vhcn politicians do take up such Issues, they will have to deal with two emerjingthat work against each other and contribute to the confused political atmosphere. On theand, the emergency nature of the situationushing the Christian Democrats and Ccesnunists
toward closer cooperation. On the other hand, distrust and tensions are growing between the two parties])
with he Investigation.
(S. Andreottl has consulted the Camuntsts closely In
he Ii
.omtunlst chief Beriiiiyucr aim uuiur party leaoers. inciuqinqmember responsible for security affairs, are InJ
1
:ontact with the Christian OcnccratiC-leadershlo rcoar Ing. In addition.
some members of the caoinet, aitnougn prooaoiy not ranooiri, pun "ttrcohsult directly with their counterpartshe Communist Party before completing major administrative actionsT)
6. At the same time, relations between the two parties are marked by growing tension. The Comnunlsts. for example, have been publicly critical of the government's lack of progress In the casefand,
have bluntly told Interior Minister Cosslga to move more vlgorOuTTT
against the terrorist
S
. for their part, the Christian Democrats
rgeoming series of local elections trurc tne toatnunlst Party's antagonise toward the security forces years ago was the direct antecedent of the current political violence. This is bound to touch an exposed nervehe Comnunist Party, which publicly adaits to an earlier complacency about left-wing violence but argues that terrorism has Its real roots IrLthe government's long neglect of fundamental social and economic problemsj
8. The tension reflects the absence of Moro's steadying Influence both on Ms own party and on Its relations with the Commists. Moro's fine-tuning of Christian Oeirocratfc-Cooeaunlst relations was one of his major contributions to Italian politics.
Increasingly, however. Italian politicians are saying the humiliating letters Moro has written from captivity have finished him politically, whether or not he survives physically. That conclusion seems premature, but It will nevertheless stimulate Increased rivalry and maneuvering among Christian Democrats anxious to succeed Moro as party chief and to assume his role as front runner in the December presidential election. It seems likely also to encourage renewed activity on the partubstantial group of the Christian Democrats who want the party toolicy of confrontation with the Communists but who were outmaneuvered by Morohe finalf thecrislsJJ
The Christian Democrats hive not said tuch officially ibout relations with the Communists stncj the kidnaping, other than to stress their refusal to go beyond the degree of collaboration represented by the arraneeswits on which the Andreoitl governmentased. fBut the Christian Democrats' resolve In this regard Is contingentariety of developments, not the least of which Is the cHitcone of the Horo affair. Ifrags on or If /lolence escalates, tougher law-and-order measures say be required, and the Christian Oemocrats will need Corrrnunlst acqulesence to enact themj
Moreover, the Christian Democrats still have no realistic alternative to collaboration with thefact underlined by the recent Socialist Party congross. The Soc1al1sts--the only party that could give the Christianon-Con-nunlstIt cleareturn to such an alliance any time soonxtremely unlikely.
The local elections set forill also affect Inter-party relations. The elections will Involve aboutercent of thefirst significant sampling of voter sentiment since the Communists' unprecedented gains6 pirliamtntary elections.
As such, the contests will bt studied closely for some indications of how the country has reactedie period of Christian Democratic-Communist cooperation that beganonal sense with the Installation of Andreettl's previous government two months after6 election.
If the Communists lose substantially, the Christian Democratic hierarchy will be confirmed in Its belief that the Corjnunists' growing Involvement In government decisionmaking his tho beneficial side effect of hurting them at the polls. Butesult would alsoilemma for the Christian Oemocrats, because It would cause theto question whether they can afford further cooperation with Andreottl, who will clearly need their help In the months ahead^
O5- ceinunist gain on the otherconjunction withhristian Oemocratlc lossurther gravitation of the voters toward the two large parties at the expense of the smallerease some of Communist leader SerHnguer's internal party problems and cause the Christian Democrats to reassess their strategy.}
16. Of the many questions raised for Italian politics by the Moro kidnaping, the most important clearly centers on the effect the affair
is likely to have on the internal cohesion of the Christian Democratic Party and on Us ability to remain Italy's major political force.
So far, the affair appears to have accelerated two trends that were already threatening to lirmoblllze the Christian Democrats. On the one hand,as Increased the Internal party -trains that Moro worked so hard to keepheck. At the same time. It has made It even more difficult for the Christian Democrats to credibly use ant1-Communismnifying force. Many Christian Democrats had become more open to cooperation with the Connujnlsts even before the present emergency set In and the longer it extends the more difficultill be for those who remain opposed to that cooperation to make their casejy
All of this seems likely to further weaken the Christian uenocrats effectivenessoverning party. And the persistence o' present trends could ultimatelyolitical vacuum that would oraw the Communists into greater governmentalthough they are not pushing hard for them at the momentj
Original document.
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