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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unavffcortod DHdowr* SubkKl to CrMnd SancK
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China's Defease Strategy and Force Posture
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Key Judgment**
Theave identified thes their meat dangerous potential adversary and havearge portion of tLeir forces to meeting that threat. Tbctr small but growing nuclear forces could deliver weapons on targets throughout Asia,ew warheads could reach the western USSR. China's Large conventional forces could quickly overwhelm its small Asian neighbors; they have major sbortcouiincs, however, and wc believe they would have difficulty against the Soviet Union. Taiwan, or India. Tbe forces pose liulc direct threat to the United States.
The nuclear test program Itgs far behind that of the USSR ind tbe United States but ha* provided Peking with an effective weapons research, development, and production capability.
China has an ambitious space program that emphasizes the development of earth sat dlnapjj
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China'* conventional forces comprise moreillion men, making them tbe second largest in Ibe world. These forces maintain an essentially defensive posture. They lack sophisticated weapons and have seriousio firepower and mobility.
Tbeasically en infantry force. It haj rdaiively few tanks and lacks tbe antitr-ik iulded miuilra to blunt in attackodern armored force.
Tbe Air Force has thousands of com bet aircraft, bat most arefighters- It lacks modernformance aircraft and suchweapons as air-to-air and air-to-ground mwsika.
The Navy isoastal defense force. It has few major surface warships end is deficient In such areas as antisubmarine warfare and air Wfense.
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The Chinese recognize their military shortcomings and have committed themselvesong-term program to improve and modernize the armedt places equal emphasis on improving the quality and combat skill* of troops and acquiring modern arms.
Becausenoi develop sophisticated weapons quickly, the Chinese have recently shown considerable interest in buying advanced conventional weapons and technology from Western Europe Because they ire short of funds, they probably will buy only limited quantities of arms, while acquiring the technology and licensing rights to produce modern arms domestically
The Chinese and Sovietsarge portion of their armed forces along tbe disputed border. The Chinese are more fnunerouso I, but the Soviets have substantial advantages in fiitucwtr and mobility. Both sides maintain an essentially defensiveSoviet forces close to the border, the Chinese well back fromonventional war wouli be risky and costly for either side.
The Chinese are no match for the Sovietsuclear exchange and would be overwhelmed if hostilities escalated to that level. However, their nuclear forces could devastate Soviet urban areas in the Far East and make it difficult for auryrriag Soviet forces to sustain operations.
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Tbe Chinesetrceur defensive posture opposite Taiwan. They could devastate tbe Island with their nuclear weapons, bul we believe they are unlikely to do so. In conventional forces their advantage is abo overwhelming, bat their ability to bring those forces to bear on Taiwanlimited; they lack tbe amphibious and airlift capability necessary to mount and sustain aa
Peking, hu several military optioninvasion that it couldTar-aua: -.
A blockade of Taiwan and the Offshore Islands (Quemoy and Main).
Assault on (and, probably, capture of) tbe hearily defendedl.la ndi.
of tbe lightly ucfended Pratas Reef andlands. The high political, ecccomic. and military costs of these actions deter Peking.
CONTENTS
vii
t*
PREFACE
This Intelligence Assessmenteview of Chineseand programs, recent developments in both,omparisoncapabilities with those of the Soviet Union and Taiwan. It isto be an exhaustive analysis, but rather an overnew forwho do not require detailed knowledge of weapons systems or orderFor more extensive treatment of the Chinese military, the readerto the forthcoming
vil
The Chinese have one of the largest conven-tionil armed forces in the4 million men. They do notirect military threat to the United States, bat they could attack US bases and US allies in tbe Far East. Peking considers tbe Soviet Union to be its mostpotential adversary; about half of tbeare arrayedefensive posture toSoviet threatAnother third of
the forces are locaTeoTaTong the coast, where Peking continues tohreat. Most of tbe remainder are located in central Chinaeserve;ew units are in western China and Tibet.
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China could overwhelm its smaller neighbors. Against tbe Soviet Urum, Taiwan, or India, however, its conventional military forces would be hampered by inadequacies in firepower,and logistics, as well as by geographic and topographic factors.
The vast distances inrulvcd and the quality of the Soviet forces along the border would allow the Chinese to make at best only shallowinto tbe USSR. Tbe Taiwan Strait is Mill an effective barrierhinese invasion o. Taiwan. Tbe difficult terrain of Tibet would limit any attack against India. Indian troops would be defending their own territory over lines of communication much shorter than tbeif tbe Indians were determinei; tbeould not be able to mount and sustainffensive through Tibetorce large enough to defeat Ihcm.
f^ploiwwi. fee Defense
To counter an in-.ader with superior firepower and mobility, the Chinese would employ distance and terrain. Tbey do not intend to give up territory easily, but hope to wear down the attackers as they try to drive through successive lines of increasingly stronger forces. Tbe Chinese continue to emphasize dispersal, redundancy, and other passive defense measures to improve the survivability of military industriea andelements of the armed forces.
Tbe sheer size of China's standing armed forces compensates to some degree for their inadequacies. Moreover, tbe vast mobilization potential would prorid'j considerable resourcesrolonged war. China hasillion lightly armed men organized into para-
res mm
military organizations. They could be usedto wage guerrilla warfare, support regular forces, and maintain internal security. They
specific areas. Tbe best equipped regionalhave more artillery fire support than the Infantry divisions of the main force. Some of the regional divisions man elaborate fixed defenses, which have been established on most of tbe major avenues of approach.
Moat of tbe ground force equipment produced by China's arms industry is based on older Soviet designs. Though unsophisticated by US andstandards, tbe small arms, tanks, andare rugged, reliable, and generally adequate
Tbe Chineseide variety ofprotective equipment for chemical and biolojrical defenses, and they emphasize its use in training. They have the industrial base and technical competence to produce chemical war-
China it weQ aware of its mililaryand sinceS has renewed its efforts to improve and modernize its armed forces. The long-term program places equal emphasis on improving tbe quality and combat ikilU of troops and on acquiring modern arms, Tbe Chinese cannot develop sophisticated weapons quickly, and theyradual weakening relative to the Soviets unless tbey begin arming their farces with modem weapons. Therefore tbe Chinese are interested in buying advanced conventional weapons and related technology from Western Europe. Tbey cannot afford to boy everything tbey need, however, and havetrategy of buying limited quantities of modern arms outright and, in addition, acquiring tbeand licensing rights to produce and d< -clop them domestically.
Purchases of European military equipment arc unlikely to have any major impact on Chine's force capabilities soon. China would need many years to field modern weapons in large numbers, toupport structure to sustain them, and to train personnel in their operation. Because most of the weapons they are seeking are unlike any tbey now have, the Chinese would need to make major changes in their force structure before tbey could effectively integrate theInto operational units
Units stationed along the Sino-Soviet border would get the new weapons first. Modemwould enhance their effectiveness, but no single weaponthe relatively limited quantities that China is likely to acquire from Westernsignificantly change the current military situation on tbe Sino-Soviet border.
The Bna-Wa* MJfttary ftciamc*
China has identified the Soviet Union as its most dangerous potential adversary.ubstantial portion of their forces along the border; both keep their forces in an essentially defensive post are;onven-tional war would be risky and costly for both.
linese conventional forces could make only shallow incursions into Sovietforces and strong fixed defenses are capable of halting an invasion. Soviet troops invading China would meet forces that are organized, equipped, and deployedonnaclear defense. Wc believe the Chinese wouldeasonable chance ofoviet conventionalbefore it reached tbe North China Plain.
Should hostilities escalste tc tbe use of nuclear weapons, China would be no match for the USSR. Nonetheless, if they could launch their nuclear forces, the Chinese could devastate the Soviets' urban support bases in tbe Far East and
Military capabilities on both sides of thehave been improvedeliberate pace, with only modest increases in the size of the forces. These improvements often have taken the form of constructing fixed defenses andand increasing equipment inventories. The Soviets have also improved their logistics.
We expect both sides to continue making qualitative improvements in their forces. Both will add more and newer equipment and improve their supporting infrastructure. Tbe Soviets areecond trans-Siberian rail line, well back from the border, i: will improve their ability to support their forces, but wc do not expect it to be completed before.
Tho ChWTatwon Military Balance
China alsotrong defensivealong its eastern coast, opposite Taiwan (seeesides having an overwhelmingin conventional forces, the Chinese could completely devastate the island wiih theirweapons. We believe they would not use nuclear weapons, however, and their ability to bring their conventional military power to bear on Taiwan ia limited. They do not have the amphibious or airlift capacity to mount and sustain an invasion on the scale that would be necessary, and they have not yetigh priority to developing that capacity.
Aheatv Ta lin.di
If they invaded Taiwan, the Chinese wouldelatively uicdera, V. irt ai
For their part, the Chinese are upgrading and adding to the number of tanks and artillery pieces, as well as forming some new units. They are also improving their fixed defenses andgreater fire support to regional units manning those positions.
ime, becauseew airfields are within fighter range of Taiwan, iftc eventual victory in the air would be costly.
The Nationalists have fewergggggSKombat
aircraft, but moat of them are armed with air-to-air missiles and are more modern than those ofa. Nationalist pilots are better trained and wouldeavy toll of Chinese fighters and bombers. Nonetheless, China's sheer numbers would1 eventually prevail, and the Nationalists' air force and moat of their ground-based air defenses would be destroyed.
China has several military options short of Invading Taiwan itself but has been deterred, so far, by the political, economic, and military costs. Tbe naval and air forces could blockade Taiwan and the Off shore Islands (Matsu andaipei would need help to breaklockage Tbe Chinese could capture the strongly defended Offshore Islands, but this would be an extremely costly operation. To capture tbe lightly defended Prates Reef and Pescadores Islands, on tbe other band, would requireomparatively modest military effort
Original document.
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