Indications and Warning
Of Soviet Intentions
To Use Chemical Weapons
ATO-Warsaw Pact War
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
20?
.rail
INDICATIONS AND WARNING
OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONSATO-WARSAW PACT WAR
PREFACE
This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on indications and warning of Soviel intentions to use chemical weaponsar with NATO was requested by the Under Secretary of the Army, the Honorable WalterBerge. It discusses lhe problems of identifying unambiguous indicators of Soviet preparations and intentions to use chemical weaponsonventional war, wilh focus on the first use of these weapons.
The memorandum was prepared under the direction of the Acting National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces. It was drafted by the Central Intelligence Agency and reviewed by an interagency working group with representatives of CIA. the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligenceof the Departments of Slate, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force Members of the Strategic Warning Staff also participated in its preparation. The group was under the joint chairmanship off"
the Office of Strategic Research. National
Foreign Assessment Center.
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Key
I Soviet Policy and Doctrine Regarding Chemical Weapons
II Soviet Forces for Chemical
CBB Training and
in. Soviet Concepts (or Chemical
IV. Soviet Operational Planning for Chemical Warfare
12
V. Potential Indicators of Soviel
Planning
Implementation and Execution
Detection During An Attack
Conclusions
VI. Selected Indicators of Soviel Intentions Concerning
Chemical
SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS
The overall likelihood of obtaining warning of an impending Soviet chemical attack is low. Most of the planning and preparatory activities leading up to such an operation arc generally consistent with wholly conventional operations or are not clearly distinguishable from preparations for nuclear warfare. Some indicators, such as release authority and fire orders, might provide clear warning of Soviet intentions to employ chemical weapons, but the nature of these indicators is such that we cannot rely on obtaining them. We have greater confidence in obtaining warning of the impending use of some type of weapon of mass destruction, either nuclear or chemical, than we have in the likelihood of detecting activities clearly associated with chemical weapons alone.
Four primary categories oflogistics, release of weapons, and implementation andexamined in this study. Each offers potential indicators which vary in their detectability as well as ambiguity.
If standard Soviet operating procedures arc rigorously observed, planning offers few indicators susceptible to detection. Planning is limited toew selected staff personnel^
xploitation of highly placed human sources might yield unambiguous indicators, particularly if the Soviets consulted their allies, but we cannot rely upon obtaining such information, j
en if indications of planning for chemical operations werehey would not be unambiguous because general planning for operations would include contingency planning for chemical, as well as nuclear operations, even though neither weapon was intended to be used.
C
3
The release, lhe authorization by lhe political leadership to use chemical weapons, and its transmission through the Centra! Staff to militarywith the issuance of operations orders and implementingbe the clearest indicators of impending use.
3
The implementation and execution of plans and orders for chemical opcralions would involve numerous activities, but most would be ambiguous. In general, the closer to the battlefield this activity occurred, the better the chance of detection, although the time between detection and actual use might be very short.|
[Communications intercepts, photography, and human sources wouldprovide varying probabilities of detection of these indicators.
In sum) the preparations which would be taken in any case for operations in contaminated environments would tend to make it more difficult to arrive at judgments concerning Soviet intentions to employ chemical weapons. Among the varied activities anticipated priorhemical attack, few. taken alone, wouldlear indication of Soviet intentions, although the detectionarge number of ambiguous indicators might provide timely warning.
Considering the relatively low probability of detection for most of the indicators identified, our capability to obtain timely warning is Questionable. Some indicators could, if detected, provide longer warning times than others- Those indicators concerned with long-range logistics preparation* or specific information from Soviet contingency
2
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INDICATIONS AND WARNING OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONSATO-WARSAW PACT WAR
Section I
Soviel Policy and Doctrine Regarding Chemical Weapons'
Soviets are clearly plan nine (or the contingency thatchemical agents would be usedar between NATO and tbe Warsaw Pact Theyontinuing vigorous program to equip and train Pact forces for operationshemical, biological, or radiological (CUR) environment. In addition, they haveariety of modern nerve agents and have the delivery systems and tactics necessary for the large-scale offensive use oi these agents, bul we do not know tlie size or the composition of the Soviet stockpile of chemical agents and filled munitions.
Soviets arc signatories of theeneva Protocol, which prohibits tbe use of chemical weapons, although they, like most other signal or fv have reserved the tight oi retaliation Beyond that we have no direct Information on tbe Soviets' policy lor use of chemical weapons and must infer theii intentions about the circumstances in which tliey might use chemical weapons from their writings about the likely natureuture war in Europe andf""
Because these source* do not directly addieak the question of Warsaw Pact first use of chemical weapons, there is uncertainty about Soviel policy in this regard.
Soviets categorize chemicalthey do nuclear and biological"weapons of mass destruction" whose initial use must be authorized at the highest political loveL All of the Pact's operational stocks of chemical weapons and
agents are believed to be under Soviet control in peacetime- Some arc stored In Central Europe. The control and release procedures for chemical weapons arc not necessarily lhe same as for nuclear weapons, and there is some evidence that, once released, chemical weapons would be subject to feweron subsequent use than nuclear weapons. In addition, peacetime security over chemical weapons appears less rigorous than for nuclearnd is believed to be as much to prevent hazardous exposure as to prevent unauthorized use.
have neverfensivc.
n the extensive body of available Pact writings dealing wilh the likely natureuture war in Europe and addressing the broad strategic and operational considerations for conductingnuclear, and chemical warfare, there is no discussion of Pad intentions or plans to initiate cliemical warfareonnudcar conflict. In other writings which deal wilh tactical and technical problems of combat without explicit reference lo the overall situation. Pact writers do treat the use of chemical weapons extensively. Pact field training for offensive and defensive chemical operations continues.
the Pact
offensive, first use of chemicaT weapons by before lhe use of nuclear weapons.
hatever the circumstances of initial use, once offensive chemical warfare had been authorized, tlie Pact's employment doctrine would lead it to attempt to achieve surprise and to employ chemical weaponsarge scale In the hope of catching NATO troops unprotected. Prime objectives, lor example, would be to disable airfields, nuclear and logistic depots, and
command and con (rat facilities. Other Important objectives might include reduction of NATO's anti-armor capabilities and air defenses or stoppinglandings.
Once widespread nuclear warfare bad begun, any constraints on Pact use of chemical weapons due to fear of escalation would disappear and the question of whether or not to use them would be largely tactical. Pact writings on theater nuclear war usually assume that chemical weapons would be used also. In such circumstances, chemical weapons aie thought lo be valuable complements to conventional and nuclear weapons, because their effects can be morethan conventional weapons but they present fewer troop safety problems and produce fewer obstacles to friendly troop maneuver than do nuclear weapons.
With respect to the question of Soviet policy on the first use of chemical weapons there are three views within the Intelligence Community. According to onet is unlikely that the Warsaw Pact would Initiate offensive chemical warfare before the advent of nuclear war. The agencies holding this view base their judgment on the evidence cited above and on llvcir assessment of tlie risks and benefits which the Soviets would consider in deciding whether to use chemica] weapons)"
8 These agencies recognize, however, that Pact first use of chemicals before the onset of nuclear war cannot be entirely excluded. They believe that tlie circumstances most likely to cause the Pact to initiate chemical warfareonventional conflict would be one in which the Soviets saw little possibilityuccessful Pact outcome without chemicals and were prepared to see the conflict escalate to nuclear war. In deciding, the Soviets would likely weigh the advantagesuperior Pact chemical warfare capability, and the potential value of the surprise and sltock effect on NATO troops, against the possibility that NATO would retaliate with nuclear weapons. In addition, the Soviets could not be confident that the
TIk IxjUi.ii of ihu wmi are the Central Intelligent* Agenev
and thentrlltgenee and fleteo'eh. Department al State
to NATOhemical attack would be sufficient to justify the risk of such an escalation of the conflict
ccording to the secondheretrong possibility that the Soviets would initiate chemical warfareonventional conflict The agencies holding this view point out tint the USSR is well prepared to operateoiic environment, and they judge that it also possesses the resources to wage offensive chemical warfarearge scale. These agencies recognize trial |
impact on the efficiency with which the Pact could exploit its chemical warfare capability. They believe, liowever, (hat the followingwould be more likely tooviet decision on first use of chemical weaponsonventional conflict:
The Soviets might view the risk of NATO nuclear retaliation to be less significant because of their own nuclear capability, or they might conclude that NATO would not respond with nuclear weapons to Pact first use of chemical weapons.
Soviets probably appreciate lha employment ol chemical weapons at the outsetonventional war could facilitatelon of NATO defenses and permit the high rates of advance which they believe necessary for victoryhort war.
They probably recognize that, as in nuclear warfare, the element ol surprise would offer distinct advantages to the first user.
might ice their eilensive capability in chemical watfare as providingecistre advantage in an area in which NATO could not calch uphort war.
These agencies believe thst in the final analysis the overriding factors governing first use of chemical weapons by the Soviets would bo their assessment of NATO's chemical warfare capabilities and theadvantages they expected to gain from such
The hMfrt of AU dfto art the Defeat* InttUteeace Aetrtev; the Netttrnal SeewUv Agencv: thr Oveaot oi h'eoelepartment of ihe iVaev: ond the AatUetu Cktel of Stall.
Intelligence. Department o) lhe Air Forte.
ccording to the thirdhe evidence lends to the conclusion thai (he Soviets are likelynitiate the uie of chemical weaponsonventional war with NATO. The holder ol Ihii view believes that the Pact considers chemical munitions to be tactical weapons, and that the extensive Warsaw Pact training for operationshemical environment and tbe very large number of personnel and equipmentunctions are clear evidence (especially in the absenceizable chemical threat from NATO) of both Soviet intentions and capabijities regarding theof chemical warfare, f
3
In addition, he would emphasize that Pact tinely engage in artillery firing and small unit maneuvers in full protective suits, which is highly effective training for operationshemical environment These considerations persuade him that the Warsaw Pact has succeeded, through the invest-
ment of resources and time. Inhemical warfare capability of unprecedented size and scope. Considering this capability in conjunction with the inherent military advantagesurprise use of chemicalexample, penetration ofdefenses, neutralization of key targets, and disorganization of theholder of this view concludes thai Pact leaders are likely to initiate chemical operationsonventional war with NATO.
II. The ioregoinft judgments notwithstanding, for the purposes oi this memorandum.s assumed that tlse Soviets decide to use chemical weaponsormATO-War saw Pact war in Europe. Soviet first use of chemical weapons represents the most demanding warning situation and is the focus of tbe memorandum. Chemical attack involvingnuclear preparations would provide greater opportunity for warning, and once nuclear weapons are used, it Is generally agreed that chemical weapons might be used at any lime thereafter.
Section II Soviet Forces for Chemical Warfare
The Soviets haveroad-based research and development program for chemical warfare (CW) since World War II, and they remain in the forefront in CW technical knowledge. Pact forces generally are well equipped and trained to operateolt environment. Pact ground forcesariety of systems capable of delivering chemical agents which would enable them to cover large areas of the combat zone from the forward edge of tlse battle area to atilometers beyond. Airdropped munitions provide the potential for large-scale strikes against NATO, especially against enemy unclear delivciy targets. Naval weapon systems alsoheater chemical warfare capability against ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage sites, and amphibious landing operations.
Production
o facilities in Warsaw Pact countries have been positively identified as currently producing toxic CW agents in militarily significant quantities, although
TI* hUdet ol 'All oWw li lhe MaHani Chut o! Stall fat InfJUgttue, Department of lhe Army
several in the USSR and some of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries have historical associations' with CW agent production and may still be engaged in this activity. The nature of CW agent production is such that positive Identification of production facilities within an industrial chemical complex is virtually impassible without knowledgeable human sources.
Is no question that the Soviets andEuropeans either have produced or are capabletoxic agents. Inasmuch as theiraie already handling most of the rawto produce these agents. We believe thatchemical industry can easily produceto maintain current Soviet reserves ofagents, plus whatever additionalrequired to replace agents consumed bydeterioration. The quantities Involved arcsmall, and large-scale production ofnot be necessary.
Stockpile
tlse present time theren the USSR believed to be associated with
llic storage of CW toxicillrei munitions, otack of evidence precludes determining the lire or composition of the Soviet CW agent stockpile, however. Because we know that the Sovietsange of tostc agents and delivery systems and tactical docliine for their use. and because wc have fragmcniaiv evidence on some field dcpols for chemical storage, we do not doubt lhat they have operational stocks, including some In Eastern Europe We believe these include nerve agents socfc as CB (satin) and CD (thickened and unthickeneds well as older types ol agents such as hydrogen cyanide, mustard, and lhe mustard/lewlsile mixture. Research lelating to incapacitating agents, such asnd agents closely related tolso continuing, but Ihcre is no evidence that any agents of this lypc arc stockpiled.
oviet systems for the dissemination of toxic CW agentsapability to altack designated targets in almost any tactical or weather situation. The means of delivery, shown in tableocludo hulk-fill artillery and mortar shells, multiple rail- and tube-launched rockets, chemical mines; warheadi for free lockets over groundactical ballistic missiles and possibly cruise missiles: aerial bombs and possibly suray tanks: and naval chemical munitions.
he variety of Soviet chemical agentsapability for attacking protected and unprotected
n the open and for producing residual contamination on equipment and terrain. Targets in the immediate pathoviet advance probably would be attacked with nonpersistent CW agents dcliveied by tube and rocket artillery and aerial bombs Some Soviet chemical bombs arc fitted with adesigned lo provide optimum area coverage
arsaw Fact mllltaiy writings indicate that fragrncnUtion-chemical shells, which disseminate the liquid agent fill almost entirely as vapor and aerosol in order to cause casualties quickly through inhalation, are Idled with CB. mustard, and probablyCD. Thickened CD is abo probably filled in aerial alrburst bombs and missile warheads to produce casualties from the toxic "rain" effect. Warheads lor lite KBOC and Scud filled with thickened CD and fused to burst at high altitude are planned loasually rate of up to SO percent among unprotected personnel In an area as largo as one-thirdquare milequare kilometer) for the FROG and two-thirdsquare milequare kilometers) for IIm Scud. Tbe casualties would be caused primarily by skin penetration of the toxic, thickened CD "rain."
ocket artillery would be used to blanket Urge areas with the aonperiutent agents CB and hydrogen cyanide, the Utter where Immediate occupation of the area after the chemical attack is desired. The blister agents, mustard and musta id/lewisite mixtures, are
Seloerod Warsaw Pact CW Agents and Weapon Systems
Nerve Thickened soman Sarin
Vesicant (blistering) Muslard
Thickened mustard Thickened lewisite Mustard/Lewisite mixture
Thickened mustard/lewisite
mixture Systemic:
Hydrogen cyanide
Munition
Ii'i- in mm)
(walgtil in
Wtthaadi
FROCM-24
M-24
TOP tact HIT
in aerial and ground munitions fuzed to airbursl for uuuimum aica containlnalion with the toxic liquid. They would be used against personnel in the open and to contaminate materiel and selected areas of terrain, especially on the ases of defensive operations Croundbunts of thickened blister agent munitions would be used to achieve very heavy contamination of smaller areas. Chemical mines are usually filled with blister agents and would be used alone or interspersed with antitank or antipersonnel mines
CBR Training and Equipment
oviet research in chemical, biological and radiological warfare has been extensive. The Soviets possess large quantitieside range of equipment, much of which Is of recent design, for useoxic environment. Extensive training lo its use is integral to military exerciaea for all Soviet and East European ground, naval, and air forces These aaae training procedures and protective equipment would enable the Soviets to operate on the offensive as well as on the defensive within the tone areas of combat. Equipment and training for chemical protection are combined with that for biological or radiological protection and the special CBIl troops arc responsible for these three types of activity. Al present there are0 personnelecontaminationeconnaissance vehicles assigned to specialized Pact CBR defense units If all current, active Pact ground, air. and naval units were brought to full strength, lhe number of Pact CBR personnel would double.
BB protective equipment supplied to the individual soldier Is judged to be adequate to protect
himoxic environmentatter of hours oi even days, depending on the nature and concentration of the contaminant The Soviets have developed field protective shelters equipped with ventilation systems providing air from which both tone particulate mailer and toxic vapors have been removed Air purities!ion systems (filler and positive pressure) are being installed on armored personnel carriers, tanks, and some ducks. The Soviets have several types ol decontamination trucks lhat can be used forof men. lerrain. and equipment, including clothing and weapons Agent detector kits and automatic alarms are available in adequate quantities and are capable of rapidly detecting all standard lethal Western and Soviet CW agents. As with otherritical weakness is the problem of timdy detection ol the presence of nerve agents
The Pact has formed CBR defense stations at moat of its air regiments to help these forces operateonUmlnated environment. Individual protective equipment and several type* of decorrtaminalion stations and vehicles for personnel, equipmenl. and aircraft have also been deployed al most major air bases. Routine training is conducted in CBR defenso which includes alerts and eiercises-
Some classes of Soviet naval ships have been equipped with positive-pressure citadel* and filtered ventilation lystems to permit them to operateBR environment. Soviel naval ships have wash-down systems to enable them to remove CBR contamination Some classes of merchant vessel* and Landing ships also have been constructed with CBR protective systems
HI Soviet Concepts for Chemical Warfare
The Soviets view chemical weapons as useful and effective under all combat conditions. They believe that in many situations the combined use of chemical weapons with conventional on nuclear weapons would be more effective than the use of any of these weapons alone. The Soviet* realize that because of the unlquo possibihlies for defense againstcontrast to conventional and, especially, nuclearis of particular importancehemical attack They would strive to strike as
many targets as possible slmultaiieously. to avoid the increased defensive posture which would result from the dissemination of warning of attacks in progress
he Soviets expect the initial use of chemical weapon* to produce very high casualties (as high asercent) among unwarned, unprotected, and poorly traineden against warned and protectedthey expect to obtain ilgnificantn IS tierccnt casualties) Furthermore, they recognize
that (or some targets, such as logistic facilities and aircraft maintenance and servicing areas, merely forcing personnel to wear full protective clothing continuously couldeleterious effect on enemy military operations
To obtain the desired high levels of casualties against tactical and operational targets, the Soviets would employ large-scale strikes with very high concentrations of chemical agents. They consider multiround rocket launchers, whichigh volume ol firehort time, to be the best weapons for delivering chemical agents on battlefield targets The combination of laige numbers and generally high rates of fire makes Soviet tube artillery another effective means of attacking tactical targets. Artillery strikes would occur in short intensive barrages. More distant targets would be attacked with FROGs. Scud missiles, and aircraft.
Soviet targeting priorities for chemical weapons are identical lo those for nuclear and conventional weapons;
Nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems.
Airfields.
Headquarters and other command and control facilities.
Missile and artillery units.
Maneuvci units.
Reserve formations.
Logistic installations.
Tlie use of chemical weapons against specific targets would be conditioned by the Soviet view that these weapons are most effective for attacking personnel under cover, suppressing nntiarmor defenses,reserves, and paralyzing logistic activities For targets in an axis ol advance, live Soviets believe that large-scale use of chemical weapons would enable them to cause casualtiescale similar to that produced by nuclear weapons bul without creating obstacles which would hinder their own operations or destroying facilities they might wish to capture intact
Sovietsariety of persistent andchemical agents. According to Sovietnonpersistent agents would be usedoviet axis of advance andthe Soviets desired lo occupy. Persistentbe used In atlack most airfields and logistic
faeilllics, as well as to screen the Hanks of friendly forces. Persistent agents would also be employed against ships and amphibious forces afloat, while nonpersistent agents would be employed against amphibious assault forces on the beach. Nerve agents would produce the most casualties for tlse lowest expenditure of munitions Fast-acting, rapidlyhydrogen cyanide, which Is lethal but less toxic than nerve agents, would be used on important targetsoviet axis of advance. Blister agents would be employed against installations and materiel andontaminate terrain.
is some evidence that chemicaldeployed with ground and tactical air regimentsWe do not know the extent of thiswhat changes would occur during preparationsIn any event wc expect the Soviets tosecurity procedures for chemical weapons at
authorization for use ofprobably be in the formeneral releasebe disseminated through normalThe initial use of chemicalarge-scale strike, plannedat the front levcL (See inset.)subsequent use of nonpersistent nerve agentsnonnerve agents delivered bylaunchers and artillery might be delegatedas division level. Use of persistent nervecouldarge areaonsiderableof time, would be controlled at armyIhese weapons liad been used, there wouldstrict control over their use than would be thenuclear weapons.
In therontombined orms organization, usually consisting of three lo five groundnumbering three to five lank or motorized rifle divisions; on air army ofacticalnd those naval and oitborne elements necessary to accomplish the mission of lhe front. The ground forces ol lhe front also include numerous separate combat and combat-support elements such as tank, artillery. missile, and air defensearge service-supporten woukl provide the front with transport, maintenance, engineering, supply, and medical support, as wel as resuppty of items ranging from onvnunilion to fuel and missiles. Ihe front itself would totalen after futAltliough not directly comparable to any Weitern organization, the front would be simitar to the NATO army group in size, level of command, and function.
TOP SCTftC*
Section IV
Soviet Operational Planning for Chemical Warfare
operating procedure* call forat all levels to plan for the use of all weapons at theii disposal, whether or not the use ol those weapon* has been authorized. Initial Soviel fiie planning for any operation, therefore, would be likely lo Include consideration of the possible use of both chemical and nuclear weapons. Soviet plans for initial wartime operations are prepared in peacetime and would be reviewed and updated In detailrisis which threatened to escalate to hostilities with NATO. Contingency planning also would probably Include consideration of tbe possible use of chemical weapons.ar which began wilh conventional weapons, Soviet procedures would still call for chemical weapons to be considered In the planning' of each subsequent operation.
In this section, we describe tbe official procedures for operalional planningoviet combined arms army, as presented in Soviel writings. Other echelons, both higher and lower, contain analogous staffs and would be required lo engage in generally similar activity for tHdr operalionalThe procedures outlined below arc illustrative ol the planning that might take place for an initial chemical attackeriod of combat with conventional weapons alone In combat situations, actual planning procedures might depart considerably from those described here.
Upon receipt of orders the commandernmbined-urrns army would call in his chief of staff, chief of operations, chief of rocket troops and artillery, and his political adviser. With tbe help of this group, tho commander would determine the nature of the operation and its impact on his command, andasic concept for conducting it. According lo Soviel procedures, preliminary orders todivisions should be issued within two liouis lo alert them for planning and preparation.
Acting virtually simultaneously, the chief of staff would be required toroup made up of the chief of operations and the chiefs of the various brunches of lhe coml>at arms and special troops and
services. The function of this group is to determine the support requirements for lite operation. Its work is supposed to be completed within two hours to coincide with Ihe finallzation by Ihe commander of his concept of lhe operation. After issuance of the commander's concept, up toours would be allocated for detailed planning by the chief of staff, who Is assisted by the chief of operations, the rocket troops and artillery staff, and the operations group of the tactical air army.
group would prepare theplans for all combat situationsconventional, chemical, and nuclearof the operation such as rates ofand supply would be considered.be made for the use of all availableincluding aviation, artillery, and missileswould be fully coordinated with the stafffront level.
Support plans would also be prepared These would include sections on reconnaissance, protection against weapons of mass destruction, and chemical weapons and materiel supply. Reconnaissanceoutine combat activity; however, the Soviets plan to carry out reconnaissance specifically for CBRThis reconnaissance would be performed by specially trained personnel who would determine levels of CBR contamination and designate safe areas and corridors without leaving their vehicle. Thesehich are specially equipped lor such use are included in Ihe standard inventory of reconnaissance units, and would be deployed well forward even in purely conventional operations. Equipment andfor chemical protection are combined with lhat for biological or radiological protection, and the special CBR troops are responsible for these three types of activity. One of lhe tasks of these troops would be lo ensure lhe proper allocation of the army's chemical defense assets in support of the general operation.
Soviet procedures call for strict security during the planning process. Until the initial planning is completed and preliminary instructions issued lo division commanders,andful of members of
the headquarters staff would be included in the process There would be no briefings conducted within the headquarters When completed, the operation* plan would be signed by the chief of staff and chief of operations and approved by the army commander Specific plan* for the various combat arms and ipeoal troops would be signed by their respective chiefs alter com ma ndP"oval
W An overall coordination plan, or set ofinstructions would be maintained al the army headquarters. Divisions would be sent pertinent attracts or main points of tlie plan only. Instruction* would be issued by the commanderpecific sequence, and would include procedures for the
coordination of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons Dissemination of orders and coordinating instruction* to lower echelons could be effected by the Soviets' extensive communication network which includes courier, fandline. or radio mean Effort*o be made to mislead opponents by the issue of fabe order* and information by both radio and wire communications.
he planning process described above would apply lo any Soviet operation Some planningchemical weapons would take place befote anv operailuu, although such planning would be mote detailed and intensive before an operation In which the use of chemical weapons was actually intended
Section V
Potential Indicators of Soviet Intentions
Original document.
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