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Brezhnev and the Politburo
,
"it!! nteUtttnca fltencv ational Fatten Aaztumtrtt Center
Ket) Judgments
'Collective leadership'
a the Soviet system requires the maintenanceelative equality of the Politburo's members and the preservation of the autonomy of the Politburo agairist encroachments from outside or within.
Brezhnev has substantially reduced this equality by:
the' Politburo, thereby diluting the influence of individual members, and bringing into it narrow specialists as wellumber of his close j
;* i
Compartmentalizing the Politburo, especially by strengthening the State DefenseiCouncil of which he is Chairman.
Elevating the Secretariat and reducing nonsccrctarics to little more than second-class members of the Politburo.
I
Brezhnev has also encroached upon the Politburo's autonomy by:
Convening the Politburo irregularly, making it easier to manipulate.
Using his discretionary authority over Politburo business (setting agendas, circulating proposals, and summing up Politburoto strengthen his personal influence.
Acquiring2 an office within the Kremlin, in the government building where both the Politburo and the Council of Ministers hold their meetings, and from which previous Soviet rulers have governed.
Undermining the principle of tenure by ousting his opponents.
In the yearsrezhnev's authority relative to the Politburo's has appeared to fluctuateccording to the state of his health and the fortunes of his policies^ the basic trend, however, has been strongly
upward. Brezhnevsed 'his power cautiously in making policy, but the Politburo has taken a' number of hard decisions, such as to reduce sharply the growth rdte of investment and toigh priority for agriculture despite lagging production in heavy industry.
The sharp Irise In, the cult of Brezhnev in recent years attests to the strength of his political position and his capacity to compel his colleagues to
, acknowledge his authority. Nevertheless, despite his colleagues' participation in the rites of the Brezhncv|cult of personality, It cannot be ruled out that they, like Khrushchev's colleagues, may bo conspiring against the party's leaderj Brezhnev is!probably less vulnerableonspiracy than was Khrushchev, however, because he recognizes the danger and is guarding
against it.
Fa'iiing jati ctTectJvja conspiracyhysical collapse, Brezhnev is likely tb'cxert strong jinfluenbe in Ithej Politburo for some time, and he may even enhance hlsj power before he finally loses it.
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PREFACE
I
j
The author'of this assessment,is scholar in
residence withOffice of Regional and Political
Analysis. The paper presents his viewsroblem that is the subjectcontroversy in tho Intelligence Community. Besides contributing loit presentsof the operations of the Central
Committee Polilburot that in recent years has not been systematically employed in analyses ,of Brezhnev's influence in the Politburo.
Brezhnev and the Politburo
i Debate over' tho extentts ofpower centers on thdquestionjof histo influence the deliberations of theisia recurrent problem in analyzingsince the balance] betwecnjjtheof the general secretary and theauthority of the Politburo has! varied:In Soviet history. In1 the initial phases ofthe balance has generally "favoredover the general secretary, but withof time tbe balance has tended to shiftof the general secretary.ijThlsjsuggestsPolitburo is vulnerable to' encroachmentgeneralV
! ! >R. Hkli M. A I
What are the reasons for the Politburo'sand what are the instruments available to Brezhnev, as general secretary, for exploiting this vulnerability? What is the extent ofpresent influence in thehis paper will address these
k
onvenient buan lUtooriUlirt ilody| ofcompiled Inhortlynew iherp and steady rjae which bu
Whileiiedy
concluded (hat the USSR wu at that time fovtrned by in oligarchy centered la toe Politburo, It dceerlboa certain practice* whkh. It can be Inferred, threatened the nlailvt 'ttualtty ot Ihe PcJltboro'a member* (hence Ibelrell a* theutonomy. The existence of thru praetkes3 potntod dp Ihe vulnerability of the Politburoan oliairchleil body.ltcue-Jon of the Politburo at an olliarehlctl body and what la needed for lu liability, toe Myron Rwhj PoliticalSuccit-ilon In tht USSR (Columbia Unlreriiiy.lao, Myron Ruih. How Communht Slam Cnantt Tkttt Rultri (Cornell Univeniiy
, Equality ;"
Full members of the Politburo areequal, but2 substantial inequalities in practice were evident. Those working outside Moscow usually did not attend Politburoand sometimes were not even polled on matters before the Politburo. Only the most senior Politburo members were consulted on some key issues; others, including full membcis residing in Moscow, were ignored. And some Politburo members were taxed with trivialthat placed substantial demands on their time without enhancing their influence on policy.
There were other reasons for inequality in the Politburo. Its members, particularly the less senior ones, were deeply engaged inthe affairsarticular psrty orinstitution and had limited lime available for examining the most genera! policy questions. Brezhnev may not have exaggerated when heestern statesman in0 that most Politburo members did not speak at its sessions, but onlyew months after he said this, the size of the Politburo was increased from II2 of whom were Moscow based and regularly attended its sessions, making it even less likely that all members attendingsessions participated actively in itsFive of theseoscow-based fullperformed specialized functions for which they had been preparedpecialized career and thereforefound it difficult to master all the materials
relevant to deliberations on the diverse agenda.
(This was true in varying degree of Kulakov,
Pclshc. and Grishin, and.f Grechko
and Gromyko.)1
Another important explanation'ofsenior members of theupparCnt almost from the beginning !ofPolitburo, Was the differenceof the members to the partyto territorial party organizations.in the Politburo in itself conferred noset tasks for the party, according toactually little could (be accomplishedor political work without) theEarly in' the1Premier and Politburo, memberdraft report on industriala section dealing with parlyand party tasks in Implementing the
Brcznncv strongly objected to thejsection:
sfentral Committee, maneuvered move his major rivals from the Secretariat Urcngthcn hls'domlhancdof tint body.,;
j Autonomy
It was necessary to maintain ihe boundaries of he Politburoollective body, if it were to
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ForrnetUm la the twllni of tbe Politburo Ku beenwreril_
Liiibuiu mcoinga In mo earlyi nebe. periodrrhal, and bevame even mora formal aflor the and cloaked inlMeraitl
aintained and Informal dUciUilon be-woen memben of Ihe Politburo ware held, only In ipcrwnal WWling!."
There should be no mention in this section of party work. This' is ourhe Central Committee's [Brezhnev .presumably has in mind the prerogative of theof the Centralnd not (sic) for any statesman!of our government, f. Brezhnev's view prevailed.;The end result, in lime, was to reduce nonsccretariesjto little more than second-class members of the [Politburo. At the same time, Brezhnev; as General Secretary
to re-and to operate as on oligarchy.actice. however, the lines were blurred. Full (voting) members were not set off from others within an exclusive circle. Attendance at Politburo meetings, for example, was not restricted lo full and candidate members, but included the junior secretaries of the Central Committee and certain party and government officials who attendedoreover, the distinction between voting and consultation was often lost during the interval between Politburo sessions, when the Central Committee's Genera! Department coordinates the views of interested parties on measures before the Politburo.
The external threat to the Politburo'showever, was derivative; the chief threat was from within. The Politburo needed someone to direct the process of makingcall meetings, circulate proposats, draw up agendas. It might be supposed that this function could be effectively performed either in rotation, ormallut as the syscem evolved during Brezhnev's tenure as General Secretary, it was he who took over the task. Brezhnev prepared Politburo sessions and introduced such strict rules that he was able totrong influence on its deliberations, perhaps even to infringe on the Politburo's control over its own deliberations.
. 'Cui.-ently. Flnl Deputy Premierho moil notable eumpte of regular attendanceovernment official who li not on (he Politburo.
* It teemi poulbio (hat In pen timetriumvirate has been tingled out for prominence within Ihe Politburo (for example. Malcnkov, Berla. and Molotov, following Stalin'a death, and Ka-menev, Zlnorlev. and Stalin, following Lenln'at has been Jointly rciponilble for managing the Politburo'l affalri. IfIhh hai noturable arrangement,
Members who wanted particular problemsaccording to2 study, were obliged toritten request three days in advanceee'-'ng, and Brezhnev selected agenda topics from these submissions. No subject could be raisedeeting that had not previously been placed on the agenda.ew problem emerged during Politburo discussion, itswas generally put offubsequent meeting. Brezhnev, when he was present,at Politburoonsensus was
sough! on (he subject discussed, and, according to Brezh.lev's own testimony, after he judged thai one had been reached, his formulation of the consensus was usually accepted. No votcj could apparently be taken without Brezhnev'safter the vote, his signature was neededalidate the decision. When ho corisensusj couldajority vote prevailed, but,to various Soviet leaders, this rarely happens.
no dissenting vote has been observed.members who do notroposition abstain fromhus preserving the facade of unanimity. While these practices:gave order to the Politburo's procedures and may haveits work, their effect was to place narrow constraints on the initiative of individualand to limit the Politburo's capacity to govern itselfollective body. !
The Politburo's autonomy as an independent deliberative and policymaking body was also at risk, potentially, from several PolitburoThese included Commissions' on Industry and (apparently) on Agriculture, and, moslthe Defense Council, which had majorin security affairs. Politburohad been used by Stalin to subvert the nolitburo's collective authority, and Brezhnev may have usedfar moreand with due regard toa similar purpose While the Defense Council's measures were subject lo formal approval by the Politburo, members of the Politburo who did not serve on the Defense Council may hove lacked theinformation and involvement in military affairs to set aside its recommendations. In any event. Brezhnev, who chaired the Defensewasosition to cxcrl strong influence un it. and he may also have beenosition to restrict the Politburo's involvement in theCouncil's affairs, j
The povcrs awarded the General Secretary, or arrogated by him. to order the Politburo'sy have been thought safe in Brezhnev's hands. His modest demeanor and, at least in theears, his lack of self-assurance, made ft appear that Brezhnev was no Khrushchev. Yet thereanger that the substantial powers allowed Brezhnevanage the affairs of the Politburo-could also be used by him to manipulate it. The vulnerability of the Politburo was the greater since it lacked its own permanent staff; external staff support was provided by the Generalof the Central Committee, headed bylose Brezhnev prolcge.
Since the requirementstable oligarchyough equality of the oligarchs and the autonomy of the oligarchical body, there were grounds to question whether the Soviet Politburo in/ would be able lo preserve whatever oligarchical powers it possessed intact against the encroachments of an ambitious and determined General Secretary. Brezhnev's ambition andas well as his skill in political maneuver, arc undeniable. Having prepared the way ath Party Congress inhen three close associates were chosen to the Politburo (Shcherbitskiy, Kulakov, andrezhnev in Ihe next two yearsin removing three major barriers to the growth of his power. These protective devices, which had been established in thefter the removal of Khrushchev, called for:
Regular sessions of the Politburo.
Denial of an office lo Brezhnev inc the Politburo meets.
Tenure for Politburo members who did not violate the Politburo's rules.
Brexhnov Dlirupll thoof Politburo Proceedings
For the Politburo to be effective, certainfunctions must be performed bymust be set, discussions summarized, extraordinary sessions called when necessary, and the like. If ihe Politburo is to functionollegia! body and if its members ore to participate uctivcly in its work, these tusks must be performeday that gives order and regularity to the Politburo's proceedings. If meetings arc often convened suddenly and arbi-
iithout adequate time lo distribute the relevant documents lo allow.them to be read. Politburo members necessarily will be illto lake part in discussion of the agenda questions or perhaps even lo vole knowlcdgcably on,them. This would be particularly true of members who have no executive responsibility
uestion under discussion.
i
The holding of regular meetings of thedocs not necessarily mean that theoperates as an effective collegia! body, but the failure lo convene ordinary sessionsegular basis is bound to impair the functioning of the Politburo. Recognizing this, the Soviets, in both public and private comments on ihcof the Politburo, have for many years given support lo the notion that the Politburo convenes frequently and regularly: it is said to meet every weeket lime (Thursdayareful preparation by the Secretariat {said io meet on Tuesday) and ihe Presidium of the Council of Ministers (said to meet onThe reality, however, is more complicated
c
until1 the Politburo di regulnrly
JThc annual number of knownmeetings declined andlow level during the next three years 'f
Why this irregularity? Brc/.hncv. as General Secretary, is known to be responsible for setting the date and time of Poliiburo sessions. The irregular scheduling coincides with the period in which Brezhnev's authority n. the Politburo manifestly increased and his relatively good health enabled him to maintain an active sched
r
1
in thai bod> li* Poliiburo* 11
f<lina> ol ihc PolitburoKnrutrxhr* and InIS mom hifcii* mdoiiirni irtd iiirfiiUr Ihiibctamrrquait. aKhovth li uni more lile'j thai mtetir.fi of ibr ^pinboroetihai Km Th* Mriwii
Poliibu'omcl In ici'lcnnciApril IS'I ieilin*.o( IMPMertt (f'ceiivr
r
inii MaiMm-dtiffttim ol th* Centralnd|Offrom
Brezhnevremlin Office
In the early years of Brcrhncv's tenure as head of the Secretariat, his sole office, just us those of Stalin and Khrushchev in the early years, was outside the Kremlin. It washort distance away in the Central Committeeon the llfth floor adjacent to the meeting room of the Secretarial. The Politburo conducts its affairs inside the Kremlin, in the Council of Ministers building. Brezhnev therefore was obliged lo come to the Politburo for its regularly scheduled meetings.
Brezhnev evidently came to believe that ihe distance of his office from the Politburo's mcct-ing placeandicap in his dealings with the
Politburo. When, in theBrezhncv became increasingly involved in diplomatiche could plausibly argue that heremlin office in which to receive Western statesmen, who rarely wcie allowed entry in theommitteeinally, on the occasion of President Nixon's visit to Moscow inrezhnev acquired jan office in| the Kremlin! adjacent to the conference room where the Politburo meou. j j jj!
' Once .he had the office, Brezhnev stressed its symbolic importance.ress conference iwith Western1 journalists whoareto visit the Politburo conference room, for example', Brezhnevhe question. "Why does the work of the Politburo take place in thehis was not art invention of hb'own, he observed,radition that had originated in Lenin's day and continued to theActually, when the tradition originated, Lenin wasihead of the government, and it was natural for meetings of thethough it was'a partybe held inside the Kremlin,oom adjacent; to Lenin's office in the government building; although the party'sin the Central Committee building! later became the decisive political center.|ihe tradition was maintained of holding Politburo meetings in the' room where Lenineld;n another occasion, when Ambassador Stoesscl made his initial call on Brezhnev, he was told by Brezhnev that it had been Lenin's custom to hold Politburo meetings in theustom that had been maintained, and this was1 why be had an office there as well as In the Centralbuilding. (Brezhnev said nothing itoStocssel about having to' waIt'alrnost:eight years to acquire his Kremlinncewas established In the Kremlin, the Politburo came to him for Its'meetings, gatheringin his office before moving into thePolitburo room for the formal meeting.
Brezhnev's acquisitionremlin office strengthened his position with respect to the
J
Council of Ministers as well as the Politburo. His prolonged physical separation from the Council of Ministers during his first eight years ss the party's senior secretary may haveentral Committee decision, adopted when Khrushchev was purged, that it wasnt" to combine in one person the duties of party" first secretary and Chairman of the Council offterlthough Brezhnev remained outside the government, he used his new vantage point inside the Council ofbuilding to concern himself increasingly with governmental affairs, not only in the conduct of foreign affairs but also, though more cautiously, In the administration of the economy."
Brezhnev's Kremlin office thereafter wasplace of work
The evidence suggests (hat afterhen Brezhnev acquired his Kremlin office, he did not attend Secretariat mee(ihgs regularly and left supervision of the party' apparatus lrrgely to other members of the Secretariat, particularlyhile it would beto suppose.that Brezhnev nd longercmcil himself with the affairs of the Secretariat, hoj apparently, distanced; himself {even further from the daily work of tho central party! staff. What arrangements Brezhnev made to safeguard his. interests within the partyho {depended increasingly on Kirilenko, or; relied on'other secretaries (for example, Gherncnko) to keepye onnot known;ffectiveness may be]crucial,orprolonged tenure in1 office, j. I-
ej |: '
Breihnev Undermlneienure Principle
The strongest barrier to encroachment on the Politburo's autonomy was probably! the tenure principle, which was late in succumbing to
; Brezhnev's assault. According'.to this tacit under-standing, which has been operativeime
[during each Soviet succession, members who had not violated the. Politburo's rules could not be
;oustcd(fromWhile lu'riiembcrs were pro-
jtectcd in this way, Brezhnev'was obliged to be cautious in dealing; with Individual opponents who had reason to suppose their positions in the Politburo were secure. Not .until the springid Brezhnev succeed in expelling members ifrom tho PoHtburolhen, [perhaps, did
'1 This can be Inferred from tbe snul Interval of severalollowing Initiation of each ancctuloa beforeof tbeWitfcurnj^ve bcea "Polled. Alknowkiieable Sovlet|C/-Implied ihia alao when bejhypothalaed to American Interlocutor! that Shclat'i ouster from tbe Politburo Inave been due to hii rtaaUoootleettro decision. The arrcttand elocution of Lavmtlfy Oerla in IMS, tbe able clear aaceptlap.
can bo attributed to the apedalidrcumiUncei of hiiover Ihe politicalhichhreatcoliraiUfa, (The; departure df Mlkoyan andtho Politburo followlnfd Party Congressnd. In part Ihe realityetirement bccauie i ,
Politburo members find it necessary lo weigh carefully the danger of persistent opposition to Brezhnev's will leading to their removal.
At this point the cult of Brezhnevew stage. After3 purge of Shelest and Vororiov, members of the Politburo were obliged In their public speechescknowledgespecial position in (he Politburo. Theformula referred to tho Politburorezhnev. (Until then, onlyclosest proteges, men like Kunoyev, used then alternative formula that was widely employed by Politburo members andto acknowledge Brezhnev's preeminence credited the country's successes to "theof the Central Committee, the Politburo, and Brezhnev personallyThisIs not altogetherisof "cult of personality"ractice for which Stalin and Khrushchev had been condemned once they were no longer in office.)
The men added to the Politburo when Shelest and Voronov were ousted were the government ministers responsible for state security, defense, and foreign affairs. Government leaders, rather than party officials, may have been chosen for_ the Politburo by Brezhnev in order to broacen the Institutional basis of his authority. The menndropov, Grechko, andevidently were personally close to Brezhnev, and after entering the Politburo they seemed toKosygin and Podgomyy as Brezhnev'sadvisers In times of internationaln the Middle East crisis that arose several months after the Politburo shakeup, for example, Brezhnev appeared to consult more closely Wilh the new Politburo members,they were not yet members of (he Stale Defense Council, than with Kosygin andwho were members. Podgornyylost all of his leadership positions, and
"These appointments alto had tbe effect of placing men ia the Politburo who were preoccupied wilh administering government organliallorii and therefore nol at likely loffectlre participants In tbe full range of the PolUburo't activities.
Kosygin56 evidentlyttend sessions of the State Defense Council.
In the yearsrezhnev's authority relative to the Politburo's has appeared tosomewhat according to the state of his health and the fortunes of his glides; the besic trend, however, has been strongly upward. The caution exercised by Politburo members3 in opposing Brezhnev presumably has beenreinforced by the removal of three more rrcmbers of the Politburo (Shelcpinolyanskiynd Podgornyy,otal of five ousted in the interval3
The cult of Brezhnev's personality continued to burgeon. Increasingly "the instructions ana conclusions" embodied in Brezhnev's publicwere held to be binding on partyand state and social institutions.after Marshal Grechko's deathrezhnev's name became more closely associated with the military establishment: he wasto the highest current rank in the military forces; his resounding military titles (Chairman of the Stale Defense Council, and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces) were made public; and. as in previous cultsoviet leader, his mililary qualities andwere acclaimed, including the award of an undeserved "Order oforld leader was trumpeted, and he was held upodel Communist to be emulated by the young. Books by or about Brezhnev, which first began to appearlood in celebration ofh birthday6 and in connection with his assumption of the office of Chairman of the Supreme! Soviet Presidiumis war memoirs first began to appear innd soon republican and regional meetings were being heldampaign to make Brezhnev'seans of studyingmobilizing the masses, and so on.8 May Day celebration raised hisotch higher, honoring himuge portrait carried at the head of the procession and with large floats that quoted his speeches, referred to his travels, and cited his books.
The sharp rise in the Brezhnev cult isSome Western observers, however, question its significance. They deny that the enhancement of the Brezhnev cult resultstrengthened position in the Politburo, arguing instead that the cuh isevice by which Brezhnev has compensated for his failing policies and faltering health. But this ignores the fact that the cult of Brezhnevost from the Politburowho practiceit elevates Brezhnev abovefrom the regime itself. After the debunking of Stalin and Khrushchev, cynicism about published praise of the Soviet leaders is widespread. Expending this currency on an aging Brezhnev, whose infirmities and poor public performances arc displayed regularly on television, will assuredly depreciate it further.
Yet this currency, like esoteric communication generally, performs an important function in the Soviet political system: it serves to orient those who are active in Soviet politics. The culteaderey element of that leader's power; it conveys to middle and higher levelough notion of the respect they must show that power, both in performing the rites of thecult and, what is more important, inhis policies. For Politburo members to inflate Brezhnev's cult when they believe his power to be on the decline, therefore, would be to engageillful deception of the higher levels of the Soviet leadership with the effect ofup Brezhnev's authority at the expense of their own. Indeed, the elevation of Brezhnev has been accompanied in some measure by reduced deference to the Politburo, which recently has had lo share its public imageolicymaker with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (now chaired by Brezhnev) and,esser extent, with the Council of Ministers. It follows that ifmembers publicly defer to Brezhnev'sand eulogize his leadership, they do so because they are compelled lo, and onlypower could compel them. Hence, if the
cult of Brezhnev is thriving (as it assuredlyt must be because his position in the Politburo has
i'i j
Assuming that Drezhncv has' strengthenedposiUon^faashis increasedin the conduct of Soviet policy, or hasplayed the role;of ajm^Utorjandobservers' have suggested that:coitseiwus'in thePoUtburo,ajprocess
of-the- roadhaped by pressures jfronv bur&ucraUC mterestgrou^ in this,!but the. notion that the Politburo has taken no bold decisions is not borne out by the record. Particularly, in the last few-years, the Politburo hasumber.of hard decisions forconsensus probably wasi lacking. (It also] appears likely; iallhoughi evidence: is no: abundant, that the adoption of these decisions required the full weight of Brezhnev'smong the decisions on difficult questions were: i! Ado the slowed growth of the econo-Jmy by sharply reducing the growth of invest-
in the .Tenth Five-Year 'Plan! ratherkhan mating,major cuts in the growth of
consumption ori .
Brezhnev's policy of giving jagri-iculture high priority, allotlng itjover aof the funds for ihvcstment-Ubout the same share that it had received in theyears -whenunds jwere 'much' more' abundant.ortion of the [investment funds jalloted agriculture to neavyreceived substantial suppert from vested
nterests in heavy industry!but wasTcJccted.
growth ofinds for civilian heavy, industry inj the [Tenth Five-(Year Plan. This ;hos oeenVreflected in the weak performance of the stecUjcncrgyJ and machine building: sectors of the [economy. It seems likely that;the responsible officials in heavysecretariesj ministers, 'and; enterprise managers/Western
observers have considered! the Strongestgroup: in the /USSR- next to defensebeen pressing throughout Ihc first half of the plan periodiversion of funds from other sectors to heavy industry to improve its economic performance; but it appears that so far, at least, the Politburo has resisted.
Increasing Soviet involvement in Africaifficult decision because iteparture from the more cautious policies of the past andiversion of funds to provide increased support for Cuba and new support for Soviet clients in Africa, and may not have been supported
While it' cannot be proved that these decisions emanated from Brezhnev personally, they are not the kind of conclusionsivided Politburo could readily arrive at withoutominant member.
If it is granted that Brezhnev occupiesposition in the Politburo thatto compel other Politburo members toextravagantly and permits him onimpose major policies on his reluctanthow secure is that
"ThUrueI cut during Ihcfim decade,a unlikely that the principle wisobwrved by Stalin In lie tart yeanale
Even now, some of Brezhnev's coll' agues,they are obliged publicly tomay be conspiring against him, justcolleagues conspiredhile practicing the rites of hisconspiracies are notoriously difficultfor observers as well as for theare grounds to suppose that Brezhnevvulnerable than was Khrushchev.almost oblivious to his danger;hearge part of his days (fromto one-half) outsideabroad or in inspectins thein the provinces. Brezhnev, on!
careful to remain in. or
nev nas also taken pains to place past associatesey posts as deputies to Andropov, the head of the KGB. While Brezhnev's physical disabilities may encourage his colleagues to conspire to remove him, he is doing what he can to make such an enterprise difficult and dangerous.
Failing an effective conspiracyhysical collapse, Brezhnev is likely to exert strongin the Politburo for some time. He may even enhance his power before he finally loses it.
This assessment wo-by
Office of Regional and rotmcat Analysis. Questions andelcome
Original document.
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