Soviet Civil Defense
Soviet Civil Defense
Key Findinei
Civil defense in the Soviet Union is an ongoing nationwide program under military control. The Soviets' strategic writings Integrate civil defense into their military strategy. It is parteneral scheme of the likely origins, course, and consequences of nuclear war. The Soviets' experience in World War II and their traditional emphasis on homeland defense reinforce their interest in civil defense. By developing an active and extensive civil defense, in conjunction with their other defensive and offensive strategic programs, they hope to convince potential enemies that they cannotar with the USSR. If war shouW occur, the Soviets seek through civil defense along with other means to assure survival of the homeland and to leave the USSRtronger postwar position than its adversaries. Civil defense is meant to contribute tn the maintenanceunctioning logistic base for continuing military operations, to help limit human and material losses, and to help enable the Soviets to speed recovery from the effects of nudear war.
The Soviet civil defense program isrash effort, but its pace increased beginning in the. Civil defense activities are directedationwide civil defense organization consisting ofull-time personnel located at all leveb of the Soviet government and economic structure. While improvements have been made in virtually all facets of the program, it has been marked by wide variations in implementation from area to area and year to year. Bureaucratic difficulties and apathy on the partarge segment of the population have retarded implementation In the past, though in wartime such problems would probablyustained effort has been made to provide blast shelters for the leadership and essential personnel. Programs to protect industry by geographic dispersal have not been implementedignificant extent, however, and there is little .evidence of hardening of economic installations.
The Soviets regard the specific objectives of their civil defense program to be:
An ability to protectleadership first, the essential work force second, and the remainder of the population third.
An ability to protect the sources of economic productivity, to assure the continuity of economic activity in wartime, and to permit the restoration of productionuclear attack.
An ability to sustain the surviving population in the period immediatelyuclear attack, and to prepare for longer term postattack recovery.
We nave assessed the state of Soviet civil defense preparations with respect to these objectives
Protection of People:
Leadenhio; The Soviets probably have sufficient blast-shelter space in hardened command posts for virtually all the leadership elements at all levelsome of these shelters are harder than those available to the general population. All fixed leadership shelters which have been identified arc vulnerable to direct attack, but we assume that alternative arrangements are available to protect at least the top leadership.
Euential Work Force: Shelters at key economic installations could accommodateoercent of the total work force. However, Soviet plans do not call for sheltering the entire work force.risis, nonessential and off-duty workers would be evacuated. Only those revdrftt to maintain essential production would remain behind to be sheltered. If one-half tbe total work force is dispersed, fromoercent of the remainder could be sheltered.
inimum ofoercent of the total population in urban areas (including essential workers) could be accommodated at present in blast-resistant shelters.he percentage of the urban population that could be sheltered would rise tooercent, assuming no change in the present rate of shelter construction. Despite the scope and pace of shelter construction, the absolute number of city dwellers not afforded such protection5 will increase because of the expected population growth in urban areas.
The critical decision to be made by the Soviet leader* in terms of sparing the population would be whether or not to evacuate cities. Only by evacuating the bulk of the urban population could they hope toarked reduction in the number of urban casualties. An evacuation of urban areas could probably be accomplished in two or three days, with as mucheek required for full evacuation of the largest cities. These times could be extended by shortages in transportation, other bottlenecks, or adverse weather conditions.
Protection ofonomtj: Soviet mnmn Io protect the economy could not prevent massive industrial damage. The Soviet program for dispersal of industry' appears to be offsetontrary tendency for investments in new facilities to he Inside or near previously existing installations. The Soviet measures for protecting the work force, critical equipment, and supplies and for limiting damage from secondary effects could contribute to maintaining and tutoring production after an attack. We expect some improvements in the level of protection for the economy, but any radical change in its vulnerability to nuclear attack is unlikely
Postal tack Recovery: The operating elements of the civil defense program as wellubstantial number of the civilian populationumber we cannot estimate with confidence) have received training in rescue and recovery operations such as administering first aid. clearing rubble, decontaminating, and providing emergency repair andof power. With at least several weeks to build up reserves and distribute supplies of food and fuel, the Soviets could probably provide adequate supplies to sustain tbe relocated and surviving urban population in the period immediatelyuclear attack. Nevertheless, the coordination of requirements with available supplies and transportattoiiomplex problem for Soviet planners even in peacetime, let alonearge-scale nuclear attack. We have not evaluated the potential for continuity of the Soviet government or the USSR's long-term ability to recover from the effectsuclear attack.
Costs: While total civil defense costs are unknown, cost estimates have been made of three major elements of the Soviet program: pay for full-time civil defense personnel, operation of specialiied civil defense military units; and -heller construction. The cost of these elements6 amounted toillion rubles, lessercent of the estimated Soviet defense budget If these three elements of the Soviet program were to be duplicated In the United States, they would have cost about S2 billionith about three-fourths of this representing manpower costs. (These estimates should be considered rough approximations. They are affected by uncertainties both in the quantitative data on civil defense programs and in estimates of prices.)
Effects, of Civil Defense: In analyzing the effects of civil defense on levels of damage and casualties the Soviets might sustain, weypothetical attack against high-value military and economic targets. The Soviet population as such was not deliberately targeted. For the purposes of this simulation weingle retaliatory attack immediatelyoviet first strike Our analysis in effect tends toworst case" for retaliation. For example, various times were assumed to be available to the Soviets to make civil defense preparations, rangingew hourseek or more, while in each case opposing forces were assumed not to have
S
progressed beyond day-to-day alert. In reality, Soviet efforts to ma ii miivil defense preparations couldotential opponent to place its forces at increased level* of readiness.
The effectiveness of civil defe in reducing casualties In the USSR and in coping with the posUttact -nod would depend primarily on tbe time available to make final preparations before an attack. (Tbe analysis considered only those casualties that occurred during tbe first month following an attack and resulted from prompt nuclear effects and early fallout) Using the results of the hypothetical attack under the assumptions referred to above, we estimate that;
Under worst conditions for the USSR, withew hours or less to make final preparations, Soviet casualties would be wellillionarge percentage of the leadership elements would probably survive.
The critical time for preparation appears to be about two or three days, because only by evacuating could the Soviets hope to avert massive losses.ew days for final preparations, casualties could be reduced by more thanercent; most of this reduction would be due to evacuation, the remainder to shelters.
Under the most favorable condition* for the USSR,eek or more to completeacua Hon and then to protect the evacuated population. Soviet civil defenses could reduce casualties to the low tens of nuUlora
While many of the essential personnel sheltered at economic facilities would probably survive an attack, the Soviets could not prevent massive damage to their economy and the destruction of many of their most valued material accomplishments.
The casualty levels noted above could be increased if, for example, the attack came while an evacuation was in progress, if the size of the attack were larger, if the attack were stretched outonger period, if it were directed against the population as such, or if the evacuation were less expeditious than planned or impeded by adve-se weather or transportation deficiencies. In assessing (he protection afforded by their civil defenses the Soviets would talce account of these uncertainties.
The Soviets almost certainly believe their present civil defenses would improve their ability to conduct military operations and would enhance the USSR's chances for survivaluclear exchange. Thev cannot have confidence, however, in the degree of protection their civil defenses would afford them, given the many uncertainties attendantuclear exchange. We do not believe that the Soviets' present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately to expose the USSRigher risk of nuclear attack
Present evidence does not suggest that in the foreseeable future there will be any significant change In the Soviet leaders* judgment that civil defense contributes to war-fighting and war-survival capabilities, nor that their uncertainties about its actual effectiveness would be lessened. Thus, we have no reason to believe that the Soviet leaders' perception of tbe contribution of civil defense to their capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict will change significandy.
discussion
(.ml defense In Ihe Sovieti onexnia ruKuawtde program under military control. The Soviets' Uthii'Integrale civtl drinat urto ibeir irufaDiy Wralcgyuteheme at ibe likelyourse,cumequenccs ol nuclear war. TV Sovw-u' eiperiences in World Wuheir traditional emphasis on homeland defense reiaforce their interest In civil defense By developing sn active uvd eitcnave Civil detente program, inlih (hetr other defensive and offensive vtralrgic programi, ihev hopt lo convince any potential roemy thai it cannot winwu with tbe USSR. The Soviets seek, Uvrooab civil defease aloog witfa other mnn lo assure the survival at the USSRar don occur and lo come outronset postwar pmition thin theirmleurt lo contnbute Io ihe maintenanceunctioning logistic base of operations by tegular armed forces lo win ihe war. to help limit human and material loam, and lo help enable the USSR lo speed recovery from ihe conseaueocB of wu
his Mud* focuses on ihe USSR's mil defense objectives and the progress ibe Sonets ue making toward achieving them. It ima some at tbe effects of Soviet civil drlense prepariliom in reducing casualties and damagearge-tcale nuclear attack. Becamedo not know much about the consequencesarge-scale attack on the functioningodem, industrialized society, the ttiadv deals with thai relatively brief period followingstrike during which ihe most obvious effectsuclear exchange would be apparent. It dor* not awn the Soviets' portcapabilitiesonduct military operation* or their longer term prmpects for political cohesion and reconstitutKtti of the economy.
e have attempted lo describe the Soviet programay lhat would allow for an avwumciit of the confidence that ihe Soviet leaden place in tbedegree ioetr civil defense make* then feel more able to -ilhsundtrategic nuclearrincipal effort hat been to analvte what the effect of an attack on ihe Soviet Union wouldanesa the degree of protection provided (or tbe leadership, for the economy, and for the population
Priorities, and Poce
civd defense program to br
An ability to protectleadership first, the earn till work force locorvd. and Iheof the population third.
An ambtv lo protect the sources of eeonornic productivity, lo assure the cootimarvartime, and Io permit the reWoeation of productionuclear attack.
An ability to sustain ihe surviving population in ihe period immediatelyuclear attack and to prepare for beans term postaltack recovery (See the tabular on below.)
5 In terms of actual prtontin tbe Soviet program appears lo hew closely lo what its otgamwrs have declared their mteniionse. The first priority is lo protect people In support of this part of the program, the Soviets have built blast shelters. eUablished relocation sates, and developed evacuation plans. The
ObjaciWos and PmH* of Soviet GvJ Dwfwue
Priority Tub
Honam Objretlw*
(Voaxow ol Human tad orarwn ol
Ifcflnnngdopmai of
altering mdat In* or-
aortratag Uoiwheal wppUsml lUfgwoaa al gfaj
mtm
Ripri iMtoo ol indiMnal lactkua
ami aady aardrnlag el
Imutlioona ind Iiaajwlil Ofau nbnliia ol nmn i
few
itocktK&ag umnmunah
(AgtaphN doprraal ol induftry
Prepuatooa ol mlHuty aid ctvtJ dc-
lorauuora
Training in nam* and mnvoiy
rrepannoai lor datnbultai el lood
earatkri wpoba
second pnoniro maintain thr conOnuitv ol economic activity tn wartime Nlueh ol the action on (ho pan of the prom-am appears to have been directed toward providingfor (he work force Thr third priority, "liquidation of the consequences of an enemy illicit" involves (he Ira mire< subUaMial number of the civikan porwbt-an in posurlach oprrattons soch as admirtbtering finl aid. deanng rubble, dreonUmirvattng. and provMling emergencyand restoration nl power.
6 The pace of the Soviet civil defense proaram is affected on the one hand by commitments of ihe leadership to realue progress in peacetimeand on tbe other by the reluctance ol some minindustrial managers, and local officials lo dedicate scarce resources lo what thev regardreondary requirement and by apalhy toward civil delenaerae segment of (he pubfac Whilerash effort, the pace of the program iiKteasrd in (heivil defense preparations arc continuing, but ihe client of im pie mental ion of civileasures varies from arearea.
cat in thai large orgaruiatkaa. But law fact thai (he agaruaaboo exists, deapuc Ms proMeoss. and the factagrearbeing made inward full ulmeot of the vea of the dvil del erne program give Soviet civil defense leaders some confidence in their ability lo function aa required. On (he whole, (he Soviets' view of their eivsl defense orgimratamal arurture pnfcablyavorablebelter thanas before tbe military assumed control of it in (he.
he Soviet lenders' emphasis on civil defem-she offers tbe potentialoster favorable popular atbrudea toward the Soviet lyuem, to desssonstnte leadership coocero for (he people, and to lend credibility to ralb foragainat poteoliaJ enemica. Nearly every Soviet dtiten receives civil del row* matructioo elthrr in school or through training courses, lectures, andal places of work. Ptabhe atntudes aboutuclear *ar remain skeptical, however, and there is evidence that many people do not take the program seriously. Revertthe Soviet people would respondirections from civil defense authorities.
pan notion
ublicly recognitcd. highly ilructured. mill-lary-controlled civil defense organiialion eiisb at all levels of the Soviet governmeoi and economy. wtfh the head of every organixalion desrgnated "chief of civilhe nationaled by General of Ihe Army A. T.eputy Minuter of Defense Full-time civil defense slaffs exist at each echelon of the Soviet administrative Uructure na-bonal. republic, oblast. ciiy. and rayon, as well at al al significant economic institutions and enterprisn
he operating elements of Ibe Soviet dvil defensethat would carry out postarge number of military civil defense units, coenmunscahons elements, and civilian dvil defense formaoons We etfimate the number of full-time civil defense personnel to be more. Counting all dvilian units andaccording to guidelines issued by Ueneral Altuninhe total number of people in the program would be upwards ofumber thai irictudea many perfunctory participants.
he peacetime effectiveness ol ihe civil defense organization suffers al limes from the icfuctaoce of industrial officials to spare Labor and other resources for civil defense and from misunderstandings between dvil defense officert and Soviet Oviliam In wartime, increased centralization of authority would probably reduce many of ihe bureaucratic inefficiencies inner ftotoction of People
iadenhip. Whenspeak of measures for (he protection of the leadership, we refer not only to the top national leaderdiip but also toarty and lovrrameni olftciab at the national and republic0 party and government leaden at kray, oblast. dty, and urban rayonanagers of key Installations; and0 members of civil defenseeople in all
hroughout the Soviet Unionattern of shelter construction for this leadership ll consists of hardenedelters near places of work and relocation sites outside the cities Hardened command pac have been constructed near Moscow and at other siles Some of these shelters are harder than thoae available to ihe general population. The palleri of local shelter and rdocation tiles extendi from do*eriitoent ministries lo party headquarters and obbst and caty governments and includes sitesjor industrial enterprwei as well While we do not know much about exact amounts, itbable that those shelters generally have some lOuij-.'a of food, medicine, protective equipment.li alions. and other supplies for their prospective-upants
IJ The Soviets probably have wf fKirni command postn apace for viitually all ihe IrauJership ekments aa defined in this papei (ibat is,his ratimaic lakes into account
space required for supplies, communications, and work area. All fixed leadership shelters which have been identified would be vulnerable lo direct attack, but we assume thai alternative arrangements an available to protect at least the top leadership
EnnraaJ Feraofuiet Soviet plans (orot menOal personnel include sheltering at their places o( work and relation of off-shift personnel outnde of likely target areas. The Soviets could probably shelter aboutoercent of the total work force at key industrial instailaQooi. This assumes shelter occupancy factonquare meter orquare meter perthat are mentioned Inl defense roanuab. Tbe actual percentage of on-duty workers that could be shelteredrisis would be considerably higher. Only those required to maintain essential production would remain behind to be sheltered If one-half the total work force Is dispersed, fromoercent of the remainder could be sheltered.
Pop* /ion. Soviet plans call (or moving people to in place blast shelters as well as for the evacuation off popuianon from urban target areas. Assessments of the effectiveness of this part of the Soviet program are highly dependent on the scenario chosen, but tentative evaluations are possible. Nationwide the Soviets have probably constructed more0 blast-resistant shelters (including those at economichat can protectillion toillion people, depending on whether the shelter occupancy factorrquare racier per person. This Is roughlyoercent of the total population In cities of moreeople. We are confident that more extensive analysis would result io an upward, not downward, adjustment of this figure, but we are unable to say by how much.
Some additional protection would be available io the Soviet popHabon in tbe form of subway runnels and stations. The Moscow subway, for example, hasnderground statJoro and moreilometer? of tunnels. We estimate thatersons could be shekcred in (he station aresi and four tunes that number in the track tunnels,otal ofoercent of the population of the city. This total Is In addition to the number that could be sheltered In the previously discussed shelters. The five other operating subway systems In the USSR could provide an additional increase in Ihe total sheltered population. However, we have not included subways in our estimate of total shelter capacity because the subways could be intended for evacuation and because of our uncertainty about the existence of life-support systems In the subways.
We estimate thatoercent of ihe people in urban shelters would be adequa(ely protec(cd from the blast and other prompt effectsuclear attack that was intended to maiimiac damage to industrial and military targets On the other hand, evacuation of the bulk of ibe urban population would be uecmarv in order toarked reduction in the total number of urban casualties.
Soviet writings state that tbe order to evacuate cities would be given during (he "specialperiod of high termors and increased risk of war. This order would be disseminated to ihe public vra the mass media. Individual installations would use available means lo notify personnel of ibe time and place (or staging their evacuation Factories, offices, schools, or bus and train stations would serve as embarkation points. According to Soviet planners, the population would haveew hours lo prepare for an evacuatioo following (he order to do so. On (heir arrival at assembly points, people would board buses or trains, or would begin walking toward their previously assigned relocation areas. Those persons desti nrd for remote areas would be evacuated first to intermediale points, where they would rest and be fed by local authorities. There It no evidence that evacuation eierctses In large cities Involving tbe actual movement of people have been practiced There is evidence of small-scale evacuations and numerous exercises primarily involving civil defense staffs.
Theoretical studiesange of limes necessary to accomplish evacuation, dependiragon the availability of transportation. For evacuation employing motorizedtrucks, trains, andto four days would be required for the last group of evacuees lo reach their re local Ion area. If the evacuation were carried out oneek or more would be required to evacuate the larger cities- Using! jme combination of mctonied and foot transport would reduce the required tune to lesseek Unusually severe weather could slow the pace of evacuation andocal decision ta evacuate On an average, two or three days would probably be required lo evacuate the maior portion of the Soviet urban population.
Soviet planning recognizes that (he evacuated portion of the population must be provided fallout protection. Plans and some materials exist for upgrad-ins existing structures and constructing hasty shelters in rural and exurban areas. However,ractical matter, the bulk of (he evacuated population would initially have about (he level of protection afforded by upgraded basements and Interior rooms of standard Soviet rural structures. Under Ideal circumstances.
o evacuate urban arevs and to modify existing structures and construct hasty shelters, the evacuated population could be afforded huh levrb of protection.
protection of tho eeone-ny
lana for protecting the sovwt rctrrom,umber of compsemeotary measures, mt all of which are lo be -aim al any individual We but which could appl* selectively defendingartime economy these measures include
sheltering prrwnncl at installations in the event of attach.
dispersalonton of the work forceeriod of crisis.
emergency triors mm of certain imtauationa
geographic dapersal of no. instaoatsona
harder-pa of po vocal structures.
hasty hardening rjveasures when an attack is imminent, such as sandbagging uf equipment andarth around structures.
rapid shutdown of equipment.
n thetr programs to protect the economy, the soviets have given first pnonty lof personnel at ecorsocaac facilities their plans for rwctectusg the work loree are related directly to the importune of the plaee of work both in terms of its output and its contribution to poalattack recovery. some industries and other enterprises will continue lo functionwo-shdl basis, with one shdt dispersed outside of urban areas and the other protected in blast shelters at or near iu installation. some enterprises ate considered rsorseaacnna! and will stop operations, and ethers will bat relocated in time of crista
be soviet program for geographic dispersal of irsdostry rs. as far ascaoot being implementedtgimficant eiterrt
new plants have often been built adlacrnt io major editing plants.
eiisllng plants and complexes have been ex-panded in place
no effort has been made to npand the dounce between buildings or to locateuch aas to minimuw fire and other haiards in the eventurlrar attack.
previously open spaces at fuel storage nlrs have been filled in with new storage tanks and professing unit'
the value of overall productive capacity has been increased proportionately more in previously locaied silos than in new areas, raising even more the vulncrabdlty of industry to attack.
ittle evidence exists that wouldomprehensive program for hardening economic installations published soviet dvil defense guidelines acknowledge the high cost of such measures and eiphcrtly stale that they are to be earned out only when economically feasible the soviets appear to have given greater emphasis to rapid shutdown of equipment the emphasis in this scheme seems lo be on protecting vital equipment and installations from secondary damage triggered by prompt dfert*uclear attack, such a* ignition of combustiblei. and on facditaring longer term recovery of installations after an attack.
th* measures the soviets have takentheir economy would not proerrtfrom an attack designed lo deslruvfacilities. at best. soviet leaden andplanners are probably confident lhat.shutdown and emergency re pa in bvwork force, limited production al slightlydamaged lites could be restored soonattack. we have not assessed the soviets'to recorairuct their ettnomy.
postottock recovery
soviet! characterize recovery aetktticspottatlacfc period as measures lor theihe comequences of an enemyehow effective soviet civil defense wouldsuch poalattack operations as rescue andrung the uirvivlng population, andcontrol there I, evidence, however,ptepilations for ihe postattack period
onet plans require that rural cirtl defense staffs and formations prepare for protection of livestock and growing arras fiom fallout, with emphasis on wfeguarding the current harvesf in the ussr, food storage and food processing ate activities performed ouuide urban areas of greater thanopulation in addition to the normeacetime leveb of food supplies noted above ground, there ate burled or semiburwd food storage facilities outside urban areas. abo. food storage in the ussr varies araaonaily we are uncertain how long the surviving population could be sustained on the undamaged food stores after an attack.
upplies of petroleum product, and coal in ihe ussr would last loronth al preslrikr
rxxaumptvoo levels. Reduction of these mcplies by nudeei attack and ibe dinupboo of local distribution could be offset by energy conservation measures, alternate fuel wurccs,ecrease in industrial demand Sufficient stocks of fuel would theretore probably be available in the near-term pouattack period lo sustain tbe Deeds of ihe surviving population.
In the immediate posUttack penod. treatment of trauma (wounds and broken bones) and bums would create the greatest burden on those who possess specialized medical skills. Treatment for radiation sickness and relatively minor tfljunct could be provided by those who have received civil defense first-aid training. Nevertheless, Soviet civil defense medical preparations would be unable to cope with Ihe levels of casualties which large-scale nuclear attack would inflict on the civilian population.
The Soviets' capacity to continue production in the pastattack period depends not on'y on how mnch of the critical production equipment and essential work force survive, but also on the on-hand Inventories of raw and processed materials. Attacks against industry In general would reduce the overall level of supplies on band, but it Is likely that supplies would be available at undamaged Industrial facilities to allow production lo continue for several weeks following an attack. The adequacy of straienx reserves for conHnu-ing productiononger period, however, would depend on the survivability and ratorarion of transportation and electric power systems.
The distribution of essential suppliesastattack period wouldifficult problem for the Soviets, They have made some effort to ensure survival of tbe ttaruponation system through such measures as preparations to disperse equipment and to establish stockpiles of rolling stock. They have also organized civil defense services and formations in transportation enterprises and have constructed blast shelters at critical points in the rood and rail transportation systems. Nevertheless, tbe ccordination of requirements with available suppliesom pies problem for Soviet planners even in peacetime, let alonearge-scale nuclear attack on (he USSR.
The operating elements of tho civil defense program as wellubstantial number of the civilian populationumber we cannot estimate with confidence) have received training In rescue and recovery operations such as administering first aid. clearing rubble, decontaminating, and providing emergency repair and restoration of power. With at least several weeks to build up reserves and distribute food aid fuel, the Soviets could probably provide adequate supplies lo sustain tbe relocated and surviving urban population Ln the period immediatelyuclear attack. We have not evaluated tbe potential for continuity of the Soviet government or the Soviets' long-term ability to recover from tbe effectsticlear attack.
Costs
e are unabW to estimate tbe total annual rasa of Soviet civil defense, but we haveentative estimate of tbe costs of three eicmerts of the program full-time civil defense personnel, operation of military civil deferur units, and blast shelter construction. These three elementsiutoo rubleshis ruble figure, which 'ndicates the burden of these three elements on the Soviet economy, represents lessercent ot oar estimate of Soviet defensef Incurred in the United Statu tbe costs of these three elements would have been aboutillion6 While this dollar figure conveys the magnitude of the program in familiar lermt. It does not reflect the economic burden to the Soviets. The higher dollar estimate mulls primarily from tbe greater costs of manpower in the United States than In tbe USSR. Manpower represents aboutercent of the local dollaris.4 billion ofnly aboutescent of the ruble costs.stimates ahould be considered rough approximations Thev are affected by uncertainties both hi the quantitative data cn civil defense programs and in rstimates of prices}
Overall Effectiveness
We have analyzed iheeffecttof civil defense on the leveb of damage and casualties the Soviets might sustainuclear exchange. We have deliberately chosen to anal vie important and sensitiveeconomic damage andcan bequantitatively, and have made arbitraryto deal wllh the inevitable uncertaintiespreparatk.ru for and conduct of an actual nuclear exchange. This type cf analysts Involved trading on the realism of the war scenario adopted to gain detail in calculating themorer analysU for purposes of calculations, the lest likely the calculations would apply to another scenario.
For purpose of these calculations we have assumed for example, ihtl vi-ious times rangingew hourseek or more would be available to the Soviets to make civil defense preparations, while in each case opposition forces were assumed ta be on no more than day-to-day aiert In reality, Soviet efforts to
matimtrr civil defense preparations couldotential opponentlace its lores al Increased levers of readiness We have also assumedetaliatory strike would aot delsbmtelv lanet the Soviet population bat would attack high-value mdrtary and economic targets This apprraacb lends toower limit (or the level of casualties such anould inflict on the Soviet Union In effect, il tends Inworst case- for retaliation. especially if Soviet population casualtiesajor cn tenon
of People. The eslent of losses to
tbe leadership would be bat lenutive to final preparation time than would be the level of casualties anvwj essential personnel and the remaieingCasualties among the Ultet would depend primarily on ihe lime the Soviets had to prepare for an attacke!her or not they chore lo evacuate their urban population The findings ol our analysis, based on the results of ihe hypothetical retaliatory attack under the assumptions oven above, were as follow*
Wilh leveral hours lo make finalarge pen enrage of leaden and ceeomuMcalions facilities would probably auivive
A large percenlage of the essennal work force inuld survive an attack designed lo maumlre damage lo economic facilities.
inimal period to make finalla few hours orovwt caiualtiei from prompt nuclear effects and fallout would be wellMore than half the casualties would be fatslit.es
oderate period ol preparation (two to tiuee dayi) during which the Soviet civil defense authorities implemented plans for evacuation of urban areas, (he level of caiualtiei and fatalities could be reduced by moreercent Most of this reduction wtuld be due to evacuation, the remainder to startlers
Eslended preparationeekore) could further reduce ibe level of Soviet casualties and fatalities. With lime to complete urbanand to protect the evacuated population, casual lies from prompt nuclear effects and fallout could be reduced to the low tens of mdlXns. about half of which would be fatalities
he findings of oar analyso serve to point out the Important fact lhat, in ihe preparations for an attack, ti- critical dcciston to be made by the Soviet leaden in lentil of sparing the population would be whether or nol to evacuate cities The cost of not evacuating could be in the neighborhoodillion casuallm There are. of count, many corobr-nalioas of preparation times and assumptions about hypothetical retaliatory attacks which would increase the calculated levels of casualties over thosearger attack directed at more targets (oerbapaoasequence of Use opposing forces' having beenn unnautd levels of- attack directed against ihe popubtion. ones earned out over an eitended period, or an alack which came while tbe Sennets were in the process of evacuaUtg (bear caries.
3A. fVolecraon o/ ihe Econorntr. Those measures we have described for protection ol ihe economy could not prevent massive darnage. Eveneek or so ofhere would be belle reduction in the amount of prompt damage to facilities indicted by blast The Soviet measures for protecting ihe work force critical equipment, and Tippntt and for limiting damage from seeondary effects could contribute to maintaining and restoring production after an attack. As noted above, however, we have not anal vied the Soviets' long-term potential for economic recovery.
iIn oreiv. We air unable toonfident assessment of how effective Soviet civil defense would be in rescue and recovery operations following an attack. Our leotatise estiovate it lhat.eek or more to make preparation, the Soviets could accumulate slocks of essential supplies adequate to sustain the surviving population in the period tmmedutctvuclear attack, but ihe distributionew supplies wouldritical problem. Under worst conditioni wilhew hours to prepare, the chances would be poor that ihe Soviets could effectively support the survivingwilh lupplies and services
tO The Soviets almost certainly brheve their present cinl defenses willeir ability lo conduct military operations and will enhance the USSR's chances for survivaluclearhey cannot have confidence, however, in the degree ol protection their civil defense would afford ihem. given the many uncertainties attendantuclear exchange. We do nol believe lhat the Soviets' present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately lo eipose ihe USSRigher rai of nuclear attack.
Future Trends
'lngramt for protection of ihe leadership are solidly etlabllihed and well advanced. We are confident thai this aspect of the program will continue Io receive attention, with better protection lor leaders
at all levels. The continued growth in the numbers of leadership facilities will increase the prospects of survivalarge number of Soviet leaders.
The Soviets will probably continue thru em-pi asis on construction of blast shelters in urban areas. If this resultsace of construction matching lhathey would,ncrease ihe minimum percentage of population sheltered in urban areas to an estimated IS toercent This increase takes into account the protected growth in uiban population.
Over the neatean, the percentage of population which can be shehered will increase, but the absolute number of people that would have to be evacuated will also increase because of growth in the urban population. To avoid an increase ln tbe number of people to be evacuated the nte of shelter construction would have lo be higher than ihe rate currently indicated. Thus, the Soviet leaden' critical problem of deciding whether to evacuate, and when lo do so. will not change substantially over this period They may. however, be able to achieve some reduction In ihe time required Io evacuate by increasing the available transportation.
l/rospecb for improvement in measures to protect ;he economy against attack are rniicd The increase in the number of blast <helten at economic facilities will probably enable the Soviets loamer rro portion of the work force. Bui ihe continuing concentration of economic insestmeni in previously eusting plan! sites, together wilh an absence of construe lion-hardening techniques, suggestsuture retaliatory attack would be about us destructise as at present The protective measures the Soviets are likely to undertake during the neatean would probably not significantly reduce damagearge-scale attack desuosed to maximize destruction of economic targets.
Present evidence does not suggest that in the foreseeable future there will be any suouficant change in the Soviet leaders' judgment that civil defense contributes to war-fighting and war-survivalSet thai their uncertainties about its actual effectiveness would be lessened Thus, we have no reason io believe that the Soviet leaden' perception of the contribution of civil defense Io their capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict will change Manificanlly.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
paper basedore lengthy and detailed memorandum on the same subject, ihe product of several thousand hours of research and analysts. The longer document contairs citctuive documentation involving sensitive sources and methods, and therefore cannot be released for reasons of national security There Is.ubstantial body of open-source literature on Soviet civil defense and related war-survival subjects. The lollowint, bibliographyelection from open sources based on the following criteria:
In the USSR during the
77.
Intrinsic value of eachontents
Coverage of representative subiects within the broaj field of dvil defense.
Not all of Ihe tlocuments Included In this bibliography have been translated into English. Sitmi/icani vources in the Russian language are included so that those readers interested In conducting In-depth research on Soviet disaster preparedness have an appropriate, initial, open source of data. Tbe books are arranged by dale of publicalion. beginning with ibe oldest:
. Civil Defense Is Everyone's foboscow:
. Civil Defense in Nuclear-Missile Warfare (Grazhdanskavaakctno-yader-noyoscow:
Tsivilev, M. What One Must Know About Carrying Out Rescue and Emergency Repair Work In Area of Nuclear Destruction (Chtt nadoedeniieotlozhnykh avaiiyno-vosstanovt-ld*nykhcbage yadernogooscow:
. From MPVO to Civil Defense (Olrazhdamkoy
. Protection of the Popublion from Radioactive Fallout (Zashchita nasdenlva ot ra-dloaktJvnykhoscow:
. Protection of the Population Is tbe Principal Task of Civil Defense {Zashchitaladacha graihdanskoy oboroovX Moscow: Press
. Civil Defense (Crazhdanskayaoscow: Vyssbaya Shkob,
. Protection Against Weapons of Massihchrta ot oruzhiya massovogoMoscow:
. Civil Defense Ezerctse* for the Fifth Grade (ZanvaHva po grazhdanskoyyaiomoscow:
Kammerer, Yu.Yu Emergency Work on Public Service Networks In Area of Nuclear Destruction (Avgrfvnyye raboty na knuununal nykhcbage vadernogooscow. Stroyiz-dat.
Krecbetnikov. NP. Civil Defense at Machine-Tool Plants (Craihdamkaya oborona na mashinottroitel'-nykhoscow:
Molodyka. VI. Radiadoo Shelters in Rural Areas (ProtlvDiadiatsionnyyed'skoyloscow:
. Civil Defense at Agricultural Facilities (Grazhdanskava oborona na ob'vektakh sel'skokho-zyaystvenoogoloscow:3
Bala ye. Fired ighting at National Economic Installationsuclear Erwuronrnentozharami na ob'vektakh iwodnogosloviyakb yadernogooscow:
. Tbe Use of National Economic Equipment for Decontaminiiiori Pus-poses (IspoTzo-vaniye tekhniki narodnogo khozyaystva dlya tseleyoscow:
Dorofeyev. Yu.P. Engineering Approaches toAgainst Modem Means of Destruction (liuhc-nemyye meropriyatiya zashchita ot sovremyennyfch sreditvoscow Vovcoirdat.
. Medical Assistance and Protection of the Population in Areas of Massive Destruction
iMrditsimkavashchita ntatVotya vmaarovogo*
eople and Attain ofra grazndanskov nboruny,.
Kit mm. ND Protecuon of the PopuiitKici From Wenporo ol Mas Destruction (ZashrbiU neaelenna ot oruihaya manovogoashkent4
Mtkltno, Ye.in.r. of Destroyedinitinovleruyp ranuihennylh
ooperation ol DOSAAF Committers With Civil Defense Staffs (Sodeystviye komitetov DOSAAF shtabam pazhuaiakoyoscow
vd Defease at an Indostnal IrotauY Hon tCraihdaeakaya oborona promyshleivoogooscow 3
KoaaeJtek, TATA Civil Defease Yesterday and Today (Crarhdanskava oborona1oacow
Krotkov, FC The Medical Service of Civil Defense (Medltsimkiya sluzhha graindanstovoacow:
Unknown Author. What Everyone Should Know and Be Able Toio dolihenmefoscow
nstruction to the Rural Populace on Protecting Animals From Weapons of Mam De-Uructinn IPamyatka sel'skomu aasetyrniyu po ia-shchite rhivotnykh et oruihiva massovogo pora-theniva) Moacow Voyenudat3
Altunin, AT. GvU Defease Formations ta Action inairoi Nabonal Disasters (FormirrnaiUya granV danakoyorbe so BaUuynyrni brdst-
iranul. Vtoacow: Srrny-.nial. S
KofJukov. EC Cm!ihdanskayaMoacow:8
Yegorov. PT Gvil Detune (CcarbdansaayaMoacow: Vysshaya7
Newspapers In Russian: Irvestiya Uterarv Camie Pravda Red Star Socialist Industry Soviet Patriot Triad
Communist of the .Armed Forres
Military Historical journal
Military Krsowledge
New Times
Soviet Military Review
Soviet encyclopedias:
Soviet Military Encyclopedia.nd6 The Great Soviet Encyclopedia. Annual6
Other reports covenng Soviet news media.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service translation! Joint Publications Research Service translations Radio Liberty reports
It.
END OF FICHE DATE FILMED
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: