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The Foreign Policy Views of Mikhail Suslov
Central tnUUlgenc* Armey NaHonal Foreign Autument Center
- ; Mr im
Keu Judzments
(he chief guardian of; ideology in ihe Soviet leadership and t'uv overseer of relations with the foreign,Communist world, Mikhail Suslov haspecial role in the formulation of Soviet foreign ipolicy. His doctrinaireur-tured by early trainingheoretician, by experiencehief executor of the party cultural line under Stalin, and by narrow job responsibilitiesarty career spanning almost half ainclined him to place ideological principle; before expediency in the formulation of foreign policy strategy.
Suslov's fundamentaloward and distrust of the West impels him to ;define the limits of detente more narrowly than most other Soviet leaders. Ho sees competition andas the dominant elements in relations with the Unherl States. His extraordinary concern foraintenance of internal control and the limitation of flow of Western ideas and Infl'i-encea into the Soviet Union have probably also led him to be less Inclined than other Soviet leaders to make concessions to the West
In relations with the Communist world, Suslov has'regarded any devolution of power fromwith consternation. His' hostility toward polycentrist tendencies In Eastern; Europe,Eurocommunist Ideas in Western Europe, and toward all forms of nationalism within the
Soviet Union itself are part of an ideologically inspired adherence to the concept of an ever-expending centralized socialist state.
Suslov's voice in the leadership today is one that:
Urges caution against pushing detente too far.
Refuses except in extreme circumstances to loosen controls over Eastern Europe or the international Communist movement
igh premium on support tomovements" in the Third World.
Criticizes China for its "left deviation ism."
Suslov inspires awe in many of the party rank and Hie and commands considerable respect even from his peers. He is the senior member of the Politburo and the Secretariat in terms ofeteran whose service to the Party goes back so far that It Includes workoor Peasants' Committee during the Soviet Civil War, an internationalist who supervised the Baltic purges after World War II and who led the crusades againt Tito and Mao, an ideologue whoseis tempered with intellectual sophistication,olitician more interested in the substance than the trappings of power.
Suslov's departure from tho Soviet leadership, when it comes, willacancy not easily filled. Other Politburo members whokeptical vicw:of"including Kirilenko, Mazurov, andwill be deprived of one of their most powerful and articulate champions.
Several among the younger Politburomembers andand Zimyanin amongto share much of Suslov's basic outlook on the world, but they lack his prestige and authority. Ponomarev, who has worked under Suslov's supervision for many years and has the requisite background for the job, is the most visible candidate to replace Suslov as senior ideology secretary. PonomarevV, age, however, may necessitate his own reti.emcnt in the not too distant future.
If Suslov departs while Brezhnev remains in power, the result coulderceptible tilt toward the more flexible foreign policieshas pursued.
The Foreign Policy ^
i Introduction
Mikhail Suslov is the chief guardian ofideology in the Soviet leadershipapproaches foreign policy from anurtured by his early training'asby his experienceshiefof the party cultural line under Stalin, andjob responsibilitiesartyalmostentury. !
Unlike most of the current lot of top Soviet
leaders, Suslov was not trained as an engineer or manager. Instead, he steeped himself in Marxist-Leninist theory, studying inseading economics institute and later at the Institute of Red Professors. His early career was spent not in workractical or administrative character, but largely in pedagogical andwork. During thend again briefly after World War II,'heeacher, first at Moscow State University and then at the Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences. In thee. worked in the lorganization that preceded theiSovictCommission, which servedatchdog over the governmentn thee servedecretary of Rostov obkom (oblast party committee) and subsequently as first' secretary of Stavropol kraykom. During World War II he was in charge of partisan forces in the Stavropolj9 he headed what was then the Central Committee's Administration for Propagandaafter which he served for two years as jchief editor of Pravda. I ; ji|I |
While most Soviet leaders at one time or another have held positions in the' government bureaucracy, Suslov's entire careereen within the party apparatus'. Moreover] his role In foreign affairs has been confined largelyMikhail Suslov
ings with foreign Communist parties. In spite of his key involvement in the formulation of foreign policy in some areas, as party secretary in charge of relations with the foreign Communist worla he has had little personal experience in dealing with "bourgeois" governments and minimal contact with non-Communists of any sort. This lack of broad exposure has doubtless contributed to Suslov's dogmatism.
Suslov's outlook may also have beenby his personal participation in policy execution during the Stalin years. He was more
heavily involved than any other currentin the purges of; as well asearly postwar cultural crackdown andof party officials during thein the. In addition,an important role in tbe suppressionin border areas annexed byUnion after the war. As chairman ofCentral Committee's Bureau for thoRepublic, Suslov supervised the exileof thousands of Lithuanianswas suspect in the.
Against this background, Suslov emerged in
s somethinghigh priest" of Soviet Communism. As the leading Soviettheoreticiann foreign and domestic policy, he has remained aloof from political factions based on personal loyalties rather than policy views. He has apparently used hisauthority and influence to preventcollectivity from being undermined bydictatorship, whether by Khrushchev or Brezhnev. Suslov is not uninterested in power, but is more inclined than most Soviet leaders to seek power as an instrument for the attainment of ideological ends rather than forersonal political
Suslov's commitment to traditional Marxist-Leninist objectives and his predilection for speaking end writing in theoretical terms do not preclude tactical flexiblity on his part. They do generally incline him to subordinate expediency to 'ideological principle In tho formulation of Soviet foreign policy strategy. ,
Relation! withUntiedurope
It would be oversimplifying to las SusloV as an "enemy ofuslov has expressed no objection in principle to limited cooperation with the West, evidently viewing cooperationactic serving the larger objective of creating opportunities for tho Soviet Union to Improve its strategic position and extend its influence in the world. Sus'nv's speeches sufgest that he believes detente has on occasion benefited the Soviet
Union by lulling the West into passivity,the vigor of the Western responseinvolvement in Angola and otherareas. Additionally*'although it isthe idea of the Soviet Union's becomingtrading partner with the "bourgeois"distasteful lo him, on balance he evidentlythe commercial benefits thai mightimproved relations with the West. In 3discussion
iv/i, he noted that the development ol economic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union was indispensable for improving bilateral relations. Finally, Suslov probably shares the general desire of the Soviet leadership lo avoid direct involvement in waruclear age. At least since thee has publicly cited the threat of atomic waractor making relaxation of tensions with the West desirable. However fervent histo the expansion of Soviet power, hewishes to create safeguardsuclear holocaust.
For Suslov, however, no amount of window dressing can make detenlc moreact with the devil. He continues to see competition and confrontation as the most important elements in relations with the United Slates. Suslov'sin touting detcnto implies that he believes Brezhnev and others have at times bordered on euphoria in assessing its benefits. Presumably, he fears that having embraced detenteeans of expanding Soviet influence, Soviet leaders will allow the means willy-nilly to prejudice the end by creating sotake in the status quo thai their force and will in the struggle againstin the Third Wor'd will be weakened.
Moreover, Suslov continues lo di>'rust the motives of Western statesmen. This distrust is reflected in public references to the strength of "rcvonchtst" or reactionary forces in the West, and in his tendency to recall past hostile actions of Western stales against the Soviet Union. He has devoted considerably more words to the "crisis of capitalism" than has any other Sov.ci leader and appears to believe that presentmoderation loward ihc Soviet regime reflects
(he West's weakness rather than anychange in the nature ofome leaders, especially Brezhnev and Kosygin, have noted on occasion that the forces of "realism" and reason arc increasingly gainingpper hand in Western governments. Suslov hasifferent tack. Inor example,laimingchanged correlation of forces"rowth of Communist strength in the world had forced the West to the negotiating table, Suslov added:
Of course, the metier also dependsertain extent on the realism of thoseormulate the policy of the leading impcil* alist states. However, one cannot but see that this very realism results from the necessity to adapt oneself to the newion and by no means bean witnesshange in the nature of imperialism. Unlike Brezhnev and Kosygin, Suslov has never made favorable personal references toof such Western leaders as Brandt,De Gaulle, Schmidt, and Giscard.
In playing down the mutual interests served by improved relations, Suslov probably believes that thetroubled and debilitated by the "crisis ofin the poorerposition and could be pressed harder for concessions by the Soviet Union, in whose vigor and economic vitality he probably has greater faith than most of his colleagues. |
Suslov's fundamental antipathy; for andof the West also impels him to define tbe limits of detente more narrowly than most other Soviet leaders. Some of these leaders have gone so far as to suggest the permanence of detente. Brezhnev at one point declared that detente had already becomend PartyAndrey Kirilenko has stated that summit meetings areregular nature" and :that the "system" of treaties and agreements between the Soviet Union and Western [states constitutes "something close to 'internationalimilarly, former President NEkolay Pod-gorny stated5 thatonstantlymechanism has been set up for political contacts at the sumn.ituslov has never implied an acceptance of the institutionalization of detente.
There have also been indications that Suslov is more reluctant than most leaders to downgrade Soviet military power. He is rumored to have sided with military generals in successfullyBrezhnev's effort toivilian minister of defensee is not among those Politburo members who on occasion have called for "supplementing political detente with militaryuring theuslov, along with Politburo members Aleksandr Shele-pin and Kirill Mazurov, publicly attempted to justify sacrifices by the Soviet consumer, citing continued uncertainty in the international arenaonsequent needtrong SovietHe has not repeated this argument in, but neither has he turned the logichasimply that aof international tension will free more resources for the consumer sector of theJust as idealistic Russian socialists of an earlier prerevolutionary day condemned mesh-chantsvo (crasso Suslov sees "consumerism"bourgeois" interloperommunist society, which should properly be motivated by loftier spiritual and Spartanlearly, Suslov subordinates "butter" to "guns."
A major consideration tempering Suslov'sto negotiate meaningfully with Western states has been his extraordinary concern for the maintenance of internal control and hisdesire to limit the flow of Western ideas Into the Soviet Union. The extent of Suslov's anxiety about foreign influence can be seen in his opposition over the last several years to Politburo decisions to issue passports to Soviet cultural figuresecord of dissident involvement. He is said to have opposed giving sculptor Ernstassportrguing that Neizvestnyy should instead be made to leave the countryommon emigrant in order to impart the correct Ideological message to the West.6 he argued against extending the passport that permitted cellist Mstislav Roslropovich to live abroad.
Il is not merely intellectual dissent thatSuslov. He apparently fears that lhcj"frccr movement of people and Ideas" will open Soviet societyhole host of ideas and influences from the West that are, from his point of view, not only politically subversive but sociallyand morally unhealthy. Identifying Western concepts of liberty with license, ho seemsthat extensive contact with theWest will expose the Soviet people not only to;alicn political ideas of civil liberty, political democracy, and national self-determination, but also to crime, terrorism, pornography, and drugs, and generallyreakdown of order and discipline.
Because of the depth of these concerns Suslov is probably less inclined than any other isenior Soviet leader to make concessions to the West in the area of foreign contacts. Suslov's expressed desire for cooperation with the West has been particularly weak at times when Westernwith the Soviet Union have raised the issues of freer movement of people and ideas and human rights rather than focusing on armsand economic ties.
Despite his consistent adherence to this world outlook, Suslov has over time adjusted his;policy viows in accordance with his appraisal of the relative "correlation of worlduslov was not inclined toward cooperation with "bourgeois" states, wiih "progressive" non-Communistin the West, or wiihlements in East and West European Communist parties until the. At that time, Suslov gave sign, of having decidedrcaler threat to the Soviet Union lay in the "left devialionism" of the Chinese Commun'sls than In. the "right opportunism" ot some European CommunistThis evaluation of Suslov's position is forli-ficd by his treulmcni of the question of cdopera-lionunited front" between Communists and social democrats. The question of how far in tho Interest of political expediencyprinciples can be compromised withoutCommunism itselfajor point at issue between both Moscow and European Communis* parties and Moscow and the Chinese.
Suslov's orthodox position with regtrd io "united front" tactics had been expressed inhen he asserted publicly that. Stalin's refusal to join forces wiih socialin the Wcsl duringad been the correct policy end thai the social democrats had been solely responsible for the split in themovement thel had facilitated the rise of fascism.owcver,r
i ^usiov'had
been persuaded to accep; the position of tht "liberal" wing of the Finnish Communist Parly, which advocated precisely this sort ofwith social democracy.
lso, Suslov had urged theof the left and right wings of the Indian Communist Party and callednited front with other leftisl parties in India. Ai about the same time, he began to acknowledgeprogressive" although "nonsocialist"movement existed in Western Europe.
It was not untilowever, that Suslov made public remarks directly refuting his previous opposition to "unitedpeech on the Comintern anniversary, hecriticized Stalin's opposition lo political cooperation with Social Democrats. According lo Suclov, Stalin had been wrong in ihinking that social democracy represented ihc "mainand his mistake must not be repeated. Thai Suslov was "out front" on this issue wasby the fac! that East German party chief Ulbricht, speaking from the same podium,to oppose cooperation with ilic Social Democrats.
Suslov reaffirmed his position latern an article which noted that Lenin had not been hostile to all non-Communist groups but had struggled to unite "ilic most diverse contingents of the working class, including thosen9 Suslov noted with approval tho growing participation of non-proletarian elements in the struggle for social progress in the Wcsl.
By seeming in this way to approve alliances between Communists and social democrats,provided an ideological justification for an opening to West Germany, where Socialled by Willy Brandt were making efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Suslov publicly endorsed the improvement [in relations with West Germany andear earlier than did his Politburokrainian Party leader Petr Shelest, the strongest critic of Brezhnev's detente policies at that i
In the, however, there werethat Suslov was not enthusiastic about the direction detente was taking..Thepeech he delivered in!1 contained virtually no comments on;foreignbut did call for increased Soviet military might. He stated: j ' j
j If imperialism has not unleashed aworld war and is unable to foist its wiltbrute force on recently liberatedwe are primarily obliged for this toSoviet Union and the powerfulsystem and its armed forces, whichnecessary to repulse theany enemy and torushingany aggressor. i
a : I
By contrast, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and Kirilenko, in speeches given at this time, all made moderately positive references to thoarms limitation talks then in progress. Byuslov, along with Shelest, isj to have opposed the decision to go ahead with the scheduled US-Soviet summit in Moscow and the consummation ofespite the US decision to minearborpeech three'months later Suslov' gave the regime's most explicit public warning of alleged efforts by "certain forces" In the United States to distort the spirit and the letter of SALT agreements, j
Suslov's doubts about the wisdom of pursuing detente with the United States evidently reached an apexuslov's basic distrust |of the Wost may havo been aggravatederception that the United States was! up to imlschlef in conducting "shuttle diplomacy" in the wake of the3 Middle East war, and also by US insistence that Jewish emigration from the Soviet Unionegitimate issue in bilateral US-Soviet relations.
that Sus-
lov uj'pme itM euviet-US tradeHe was said to have been instrumental in putting pressure on Brezhnev to reject USoffered by Secretary Kissinger inn important Suslov speechoscow audience on the eveummit meeting that summer was unusually tough on the West. In contrast to similar speeches by other top leaders (including Brezhnev, Kosygin, Kirilenko, anduslov's talk made no reference to President Nixon's forthcoming visit. Warning that new offensive weapons were beingdeveloped in several "capitalist" countries, he maintained that unceasing confrontationto characterize US-Soviet bilateralHe went on to contend thatan restraining Soviet activities in the Third World, detente serves to "open up more favorablefor the further advance of revolutionarytatements to the effect that detente does not attenuate the struggle for "national liberation" are common, but Suslov's swaggering contention regarding new "prospects" (on the eve of major Soviet intervention in Angola) was not standard.
During the summit, which followed shortly, it is said that Suslov was noticeably aloof at the Kremlin dinner, as well as at the final reception for the US party. Laterhen the issue of Jewish emigration arose as an obstacle lo passage of Congressional legislation ontrade, Suslov reportedly disagreed withand Kosygin about the wisdom ofonciliatory gesture of some sort toegree of Soviet flexibility on the issue.to one plausible rumor,entral Committee plenum inuslov and Shelepin sharply criticized Brezhnev's handling of Soviet-USand the trade-emigration controversy.also is said to hove charged Brezhnev during
6-J
(second from right) alongo Moscow airport fo this period with having exceeded Politburo instructions for negotiating on' SALT atin j
As the overall Soviet appraisal of Vladivostok gradually became more positive and the Soviets began to use some of the wording of theas an argument against the deployment of US cruise missiles, Suslov also came to register publicly his acceptance of thepeech In5 he referred favorably to the interim SALT agreements, and in remarksisiting delegation of USin5 hetrong brief for them. At Brezhnev's birthday celebratione subscribed to Brezhnev's pro-SALT formula that the danger of thermonuclear war had lessened.
orleaden accompanies Brezhnev recent trip to Prague
Suslov retreated, however, in the early monthshen the US Administration wasdown heavily on the human rights theme and SALT negotiations seemed stalled. Althoughcriticism of the US human rights offensive has been so uniformly shrill as to makebetween the views of different Soviciextremely difficult to discern, it can be said that no Soviet leader has outdone Suslov in vituperation. Suslov has not made asonnection between US "interference" in Soviet domestic affairs and the overall development of bilaterals has Brezhnev, but he has strongly denounced as hypocritical the "entire shrillrr-wipn"human rights.'"
was
the only Volitburo'member who strongly opposed
Brezhnev's trip to West Germany.in earlyS. Shortly after Brezhnev's return, Suslovpeech in Stavropol in which he made no reference to Brezhnev's trip. Instead rousingmemories of World War II by recalling the activities of the Hitleriteoul ropisti, andn Stavropol. By contrast, Kirilenko, Shcherbitskiy. andwho also gave speeches about this' time, praised the results of Brezhnev's trip lo Bonn.
China
Until theuslovajor advocate ofonciliatory policy in the Eastard line toward the West. Heavily involved in the formulation;and execution of policy toward China since, Suslov clearly had considered the threat from Weslern "imperialism" the mtin danger to ihe Soviet Union. He evidently had greater sympathy from an ideological standpoint for Chinese Communist policies than did many of his colleague; +
There were indications as earlyiffered with Khrushchev over thebe used in dealing with the Chinese.to the Chinese press, for example,led by Suslov made importantto the Chinese on the wording ofdocuments eventually adopted by themeetings7was unwilling to ratify theseIt seems likely that in the earlywas also less Inclined than KhrushchevEastern Communist partiesthe Chineseourse of compromise designed toback to tho! 1
It is against this background of relativeon the Chinese issue that Suslov's4 report on relations with thedeliveredPSU Central Committee plenum, must be read. According to subsequent reporting, Suslov'sattacked the
"nationalist arrogance" of the Chinese leaders (whom he labeled the "main danger" to the world Communistondemned Mao's "personalityndorldconference to deal with theproblem ofnot accurately reflect Suslov's own views. It appears that Khrushchev drastically toughened up Suslov's draft report and that Suslov himself attempted to blockof the report in its final version.
Ironically, in spite of his reaping the hatred of the Chlrese Communistsesult of the report, Suslov in theeportedly continued to be optimistic about the possibility of an accommodation with the Chinese once Mao departed the scene. At the time of Khrushchev's removal, Suslov was said to have denounced the Soviet leader for widening the Sino-Soviet split and for ostracizing Albania and alienatingin the process. Suslov's speeches, like those of Shelepin, in the period afterouster were marked by an absence of provocative criticism of the Chinese.
With the onset of the Chinese Culturalin the,ew scraps of evidence suggest that Suslov was moving closer to the strong anti-Chinese position that thehad been attributing to himpeech inas far as is known had not publicly attacked Chinese leaders by name sincethe "Mao Tse-tung group" for its "completeto the "language ofccordingoviet intellecf tutl, guslov's support forStalinist" novel was won on the grounds that the Chinese had praised the book.
That Suslov's attitude toward the Chinese had stiffened at the time of the Cultural Revolution was also suggested, indirectly, by indicationselaxation in his position with regard to "liberal" elements within both East and West European Communist parlies. Suslov now began lo show greater toleration of diversity among European Communist parties and of political cooperation with Western social democratic parties.
It may be that Suslov considered China lost to the Communist movement for all practicaland (hat the potential breakup of the unity of Communist parties in Eastern and Western Europe appeared toreater threat than the loss of China.
Suslov has made public statements since thehich suggest, in fact, that hea harder line toward China than some other Soviet leaden. He has, for example, not gone beyond tbe standard formulaesire for the normalization of state relations between the Soviet Union and China, whereas Brezhnev and Kosygin have seemed to hold out hopeore comprehensive reconciliation. Thushas advocated normalization "on thepossiblehile Kosygin has called for
normalization "at least" on the state level;
I
In like manner, Suslov has stated that "an even sharper opposition to detente" than is found in the West comes from Chins, while Brezhnev has implied that (he Soviet Union and China are engagedommon struggle againstIn general, Suslov has hit harder than most Soviet leaders the theme of Chinese anti-Soviet collusion withlements in the West. Suslov has also engaged in personalof Chinese leaders. !:
: j a. j?
In spite of his increasingly hostile ideological stance toward China In recent years, Suslov has not matched the rhetoric of some Soviet leaders in denouncing China; Also, he has not referred publicly, as have others, to'China's nuclearpotential, or calledefensive military buildup against tho East as well as the West, or explicitly used the Chinese! threatustifies-Uonjfor,Increased military|expenditures.
East end West European Communist Parties
I ' r I
Suslov's conception of the proper relationship between the CPSU and European Communist parties derivesorld view that impels him to regard any devolution of power from Moscow with consternation. His hostility toward polycen-
tristn in the Communist world and toward na-
i
tional "deviations" from the Soviet modelhis opposition to all forms of nationalism within the Soviet Union itself, whether espoused -by the dominant Russian majority or byethnic minorities. Amone Soviet leaders, Suslov is an outspoken adherententralized state, but for him the impulse towardnitary state (and, by extension,nified international Communist movementon Moscow) is dictated by Marxistrather than Russian chauvinism.
The main thrust of Sovic! Marxist ideology since Lenin's time has been toward centralized political and economic decisionmaking, uniform cultural forms, and obliteration of nationalThis is why Suslov, although doubtless sharing the usual prejudicesominant ethnic group, has not condoned neo-Slavophilc ideas or attempted to utilize traditional Russianas an integrative political force for the Soviet regime, as have some otheras former Politburo member Dmitri Polyanskiy and even Brezhnev. Suslov is oneandful of Soviet leaders who have continued ino condemn "great power chauvinism" (afor Great Russian nationalism) as well as "bourgeois nationalism"odewordhile reference to the latter was and Is de rlgueur, reference to the former has become generally passe. Seen in this light, there is no contradiction between Suslov's postwar role in crushing national opposition to Soviet rule in the Baltics, his reported opposition in theo the "nationalist" tendencies of former Ukrainian party chief Shelest, and his simultaneous support of several attacks onnationalist novelists. Althoughof RcalpoliUkesire for greater political control are presumably not unimportant In his thinking, his commitment to ideological purity appears to be the motive force in his rejection of national forms of Communism. Il is not therefore surprising that Innduslov gained the reputation of being the foremost Soviot exponent of doctrinaland of rigid Soviet control of Communist parties both in Eastern and Western Europe.
While Suslov at that time undoubtedlythat armed uprising was not ain Europe, he evidently was notcomfortable with the emphasison the theme of the "peaceful" path-advent of Communists to power, or withof the Stalinist doctrine thatof Communist powerharpening of class struggle. In aSuslov accused "revisionists" ofthe teaching of the uriavoidability of astruggle during the period of transition"victory.1 speech,that only through the use of force orthe threat of force could the workingpower, once having achievedithering1 away of state"disarm the proletariat in the face ofand external enemies and woulditshe state, he added, "mustsword without hesitation againstThus, although in Suslov's viewmight be able toestthrough "parliamentary"then must not hesitate tosunderwith "bourgeois" elements andmeans in order to consolidate theirthe government.uslovI i
! ! 1
'. The Marxist principle that the bourgeoisie will never voluntarily yield Its power holds true even today. But the experience of the workers movement demonstrates that the forms of revolutionary coercion can vary".
Suslov particularly deplored the difficulties that the "soft" attitude of European revisioniststhe United States and armed struggle created for Soviet relations with the Chinese and other militant and anti-American parties (such as those in Cuba, North Korea, and 'North Vietnam).
I
The Italian Communist Party, In particular, found Suslov intransigent on the subject of the "parliamentary" approach to political power. The Italians inere also convinced that Suslov was less willing than Brezhnev io tolerate independence from Moscow.or example, Suslov was reported to have opposed bilateral relations between the Italian and other nonruling Communist parties, preferring instead thai Moscow serve as the coordinating center of the movement.
Suslov's overriding concern for orthodoxy and control during this period was also manifest in his dealings with East European Communist parties. Suslov's functional responsibility as the party secretary overseeing relations with both ruling and nonruling Communist partiesincreased his interest in preventingdivisions within the movement, if necessary by compromise but preferably by maintaining strict discipline. Suslov reportedly had beenin Ihe Soviet decision to abandon the Hungarian Stalinist, Rakosi, evidently because he reached the conclusion lhat Rakosi did not command enough popular support to make his regime viable. Suslov, however,eading role in crushing6 Hungarian revolt, and he also earned the lasting antipathy of the Yugoslavs by his early identification with Co-minformist sentiment.
It was Suslov who had presided over8 Cominform Conference that brought into the open the conflict between Tito and the Soviet Union byetailed condemnation of the Yugoslav party. Suslov, whom Tito had publicly named as the representative of the "Stalinist" trend in Soviet policy, also delivered the report condemning revisionism at7 worldconference. During the, when the expulsion of the Yugoslavs from the world Communist movemententralfor Chinese cooperation with the Soviets, there was evidence of sparring between Suslov and Khrushchev on the Yugoslav issue.to Khrushchev's memoirs, Suslov insisted thit Yugoslavia was noommunist country.
The special enmity with which theKnclov has evidently persisted. In
As lar as is known, Yugoslavia remains theEuiopcan country which Suslov has .
Although Suslov earned the undyingthe Yugoslavs by his actionsnd, his viewsof the tactical issues separatingthe Soviet Union apparently. The shift in Suslov'sthis period demonstrated that heof considerably more sophisticationthan had previously beencounterpart to his movement toward ahard line toward China was histhe opposite direction with regard toEuropean Communisi parlies.or example,onferencein Budapcsl preparatory to the conveninginternational Communisi conferencefor later lhat year, Suslovpeechhe attempted to allay the suspicionsEuropean Communists tbattep toward thea ;ncw Comintern. Thus, hehe setting up of some guidingtional center of the Communist movement isthe question" since "there is absolutelyfort the same time,registered support for unity* of action withwing socialists and socialt wasthis speech also that he renewed his attack onleadership, denouncing it interms than he had used since ;. |
The besl evidence of Suslov's moveore flexible approach in dealing with East European Communist parties came out of8 crisis presented by the Czechoslovakin "socialismumanuslov was not as visibly involved in trying toeturn to orthodoxy with theduring the spring and summer8 as were several other Soviet Politburo members. But he clearlyajor voice in deliberations outside the publicnd he is reliably reported to have used his voice to urgeon his Politburo colleagues.
There is some question as to when Suslov began to speak in favor ofonciliatory course on the Czechoslovak
3 Suslov had reservations in8 about the Soviet decision to go to Cicrna and meet with the Czechoslovaks on Czechoslovak soil. Evidently Suslov wastooviet moveould be viewedoncession to the Czechoslovaks.
At other times during the crisis, however, Suslov is reliably reported to havesoft" approach toward dealing with theWe have the testimony of the Czechoslovak leaders themselves, as well as other sources; that Suslov was "conciliatory and humane" at the meeting in Cicrna. His behavior is said to have contrasted sharply with that ofeading advocateHungarian" solution (quickintervention) ratherPolish" solution (gradual political pressure).
After the invasion Suslov appears to have continued tooderate and gradualist course in reestablishing controls. He reportedly was severely critical of the hard-line stance adopted by Chcrvonenko, the Soviet Ambassador in Prague. Suslov is also said to have opposed the imposition of extremely stringent censorship on Czechoslovak newspapers. Further, he instructed Soviet journalists in the fall8 to cease direct attacks on Czechoslovak leaders by name. And Suslov. C
^rged
full support for the current Prague leadership. Brezhnev, who spoke on the same occasion, was less supportive.
Suslov's concern about the disruptive effect tbat military action in reimposing orlnodoxy in Czechoslovakia might have or, Soviet relations
i
European Communist; parties was probably tho'decisive factor in .causing him lo favor greater efforts toolitical solution to the crisis. Hearticular reason at this time for not offending the European Communists^Thc Soviets hadorld8 to demonstrate solidarity against the Chinese. In the event, the disarray created in Communist ranks by the Soviet-led interventionostponement of the conferenceuslov was personally very involved in the campaign to woo fence-sittins Communistand to ensure that the conference run as smoothly as possible.
Further evidence of Suslov's willingnessa relatively greater degree offrom Moscow during this period was seenspeech Inuslov reiteratedtheme ofoting"organizational form according toof the entire movement wasone center" hadnd was not appropriate forThis appears to have been aon the eve of the internationalconference, for in, Suslovhis earlier hard-tine position concerning;
uslov's position seems, in fact,become increasingly intransigent. Inwas criticizing "revisionist flunkeys ofwho try "to remove from theevolutionaryt the same time he issuedfor Communists to expel'from theirwho direct their whole activity notclass enemy, but againste Hated that the "task ofdeviutiorts was acquiring greatfor Communists.3 he rejectedthesis that the, role of thein the struggle against capitalism wasand declared that, on the contrary, it j;
uslov has seemed particularly alarmed about tho phenomenon ofHe has apparently ncrcd the end ofwith the French, Spanish, andas they became increasingly outspokencriticism of Soviet internal policies afterAccords were signed in Augustreporting about tbe attitudes of SuslovSecretary Ponomarev in dealing withsuggests that they may havethat it is more desirable to haveparties in Western Europe thanones. In his speech on theine voicedto "any and all attempts to introduceand nationalistic ideas intoof the international6 speech to theSciences, Suslov barely stopped short ofthe Eurocommunists out of the worldhas been inconceivableand apart frominternationalism is not justthe elements or aspects ofIt permeates tbe entirethe theory and practicebe entire historyistory of the rise andproletarianhoof Marxism have- begun moreoften to don Marxisto substitute bourgeoisforiking* thepresent as some "regional"version of Marxism havein common with revolutionarydo harm to the cause of theWe Soviet Communistsdefense of proletariansacred duty of every Marxist-Leninist,1
According to several reports, during the last several years Suslov has clashed with Brezhnev over policy toward Eurocommunism, charging
' Tlx luUctied Matenoseceaond Ml of Prxrda. gommu*-Ui. and nort oealnl ncwiotncn. pouibij bcaue tome la ihe So-iet leaderthlp coufdered tbe UnfuceInlUmnM-wry.
Urezhncv withuicidal ^course vhat was allowing Eurocommunist trends'to escalate Italian Communist leaders have commented that they have been relatively well received and treated by Brezhnev, in contrast to Suslov.Suslov appears to hold very strong views on this issue. Ineeting of pro-Soviet West European Communist'parties; he harshly criticized the Italian, French, andCommunist Parties, which he referred to as the "axis" of Eurocommunism. C
3 denounced Spanish Communist Party head Canillo for working to undermine the teachings of Marxism-Leninism itself.the differences between the Spanish party and the Italian and French parties, he claimed that the Italians and French did not lag far behind the Spaniards in taking up anti-Soviet positions.
In, view of the tenor of his recent remarks about Eurocommunism, iti is very likely that Suslov initiated or approved the7 New Times attack on Carillo. That this articlea controversial position in the Soviet spectrum of views on Eurocommunism became e'ear when subsequent articles in Sovietfailed to reiterate the New Times ad ho-minem attack on Carillo. Suslov does nol appear to have retreated. He took another swipe at the Eurocommunistspeech during theof the October Revolution anniversary last year. Although he reiterated the now pro forma assurance that there is nosinglecenter" of Communism, he. went on to stress that the CPSU's role was increasing, since it possessed "the most advancedn contrast to those who could "only build socialism on paper."
Suslov has also participated in the delate over ihe "lessons" of Chile, which hasouchstone for views on the role of force in the Communist drive to political power. This debate has become more pronounced since the removal of the Communists from Ihe junta in Portugal in the fallhe general line of those associated with Suslov, such as Ponomarev. has been that Communism failed in Chile becauseeluctance to use force against "bourgeois" enemies and that the Chilean experience thus tends to invalidate gradualist, reformist, and parliamentary meansiable approach to socialism. The opposing, "liberal" argument, as presented in some Soviet journals, has been that Allcnde failed because he did not controlleftist elements or attract moderates toroader base of support.
Suslov addressed this issue in an7 Kommunlst article, in which he contended that the use of force by Communist parties was indispensable and that he opposed theof any Communist parlyoalition which it did not control:
ll is not enough for Ihe working class to seize stale power; it must also be able lo
retainrevolution isonly
when it can not only win but also defend its gains and oppose the forces of reaction and
ts (the
working class's) participation in thebut also its seizure of political
power (ishistorically
substantiated policy of broad socialand of unification of all leftist and democraticoes not eliminate this losk but makes it even more urgent and important.
Indirect evidence that Suslov's doctrinaire views apply to Eastern as well as Westernwas provided on ihe occasion ofh birthday inhe reaction of East European leaders to this event varied from one country to another, according to the orthodoxy of the individual regimes. The heads of the conservative regimes of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria praised Suslovheoretician and honored him with high state awards. The media of the country with the most conservative regime. Bait Germany, gave the event the most publicity. But Hungary's more liberal and independent Kadar simplyessage of congratulations, the text of which was not published in the Soviet press, andGierek sent no message at all.
Tho Third World
Suslov's altitude toward "nationalappears toix of twostronger in him than in most leaders:onereater ideologicala greater willingness to confrontin the Third World; on:thea greater concern over the .tendencynational liberation movements toimpure and independent fromcontrol. Suslov's ambivalence towardWorld was exemplified by histhe Algerian-French conflict Of theseems to have approved Communistin and Soviet support of theOnce Algerian independence'however, he appeared less inclinedto recognize Algeria as a
! jj" i
Cuba and
Like other Soviet leaders, Suslov rarely makes more than passing references to Latin America in his speeches. He may be more enthusiastic about Castro's revolutionary militancy than some Soviet leaders, but he probably is somewhat wary of Castro's maverick tendencies.
As Castro has moved ino bring Cuban institutions and policies in line with the Soviet model and demonstrated his willingness for Cuba toroxy role in Africa, Suslov's enthusiasm for the Cuban variety ofhas probably increased. It was Suslov'who headed the Soviet delegation to the first Cuban Party Congress inand it was Suslov who greeted Castro at the airport when he arrived in Moscow two months later, at the time ofh CPSU Congress. In his speech at the Cuban Party Congress, Suslov was much more positive about Cuba's achievements lhan! was Brezhnev during4 visit lo Havana,in the main Suslov's appraisal probably reflected the evolution of Soviet policy more .than any divergence between him and Brezhnev. ;Sus-lov's speech employed formulations which had by that lime become standard. He included the pre-
Castro periodegitimate part of themovement in Cuba; paid polite tribute to the progressive role of Jose Marti, an earlier Cuban non-Marxist revolutionary; emphasized thesolidarity of the Communist movement; praised the documents that came out of the congressrend toward reduction of personal and arbitrary elements in the economy and government; and acknowledged Cuba'sin the national liberation movement, though without mentioning Angola specifically. In passing, Suslov acknowledged Cuba'son the revolutionary movement in Latin America, something the Soviet leadership was unprepared to do before Castro made his peace with other, more bureaucratic and conservative, but Moscow-backed Communist parties in the hemisphere. Finally, Suslov warmly flattered Castro personally as "that ardent revolutionary and splendidan enjoyingauthority throughout the world."
f.
mare'v, whose views on international affairscorrespond closely to those of Suslov,ajor advocate of the joint Soviet-Cuban involvement in the Angolan Civil War, inlo Foreign Minister Gromyko.C
3 int the height of the war, Suslov approved forin Pravda an article that stronglySoviet support for the MPLA and made !hc firs! authoritative admission that the Soviet Union was supplying it with military aid. It was on Suslov's suggestion that the article was signedresumably to lend greater weight to its message. Ath CPSU Congress, Suslov rose to his feet before other Soviet leaders to lead applause for the Angola speaker's call for "down with imperialism."
Tho
When Suslov has addressed the subject of policy toward the Middle East, he has generally employed the standard Sovietall for PLO representation at Geneva. He has not, however, been in the forefront on this issue. He has never traveled to the Middle East,
aim in bis speeches he has devoted scantto the area, in contrast to his lengthy treatment of relations with China, Europe, andnited States.
Suslov's reticence suggests that he may have been less enthusiastic than some leaders inof the Palestinians, possibly becauseideological laxity offends him. Suslov did notirefer to the Palestinians' right to create their own state untileveral months'after Podgorny had become the first Soviet leader publicly to take this stand. Earlier!e reportedlyeading role inritique of the Syrian Communist PartyAccording to the. critique, the Syrian Communists paid too much attention to the Palestinian issue and not enough to the need to strengthen the "progressive" SyrianIt would seem that,inimum, Suslov supported the dominant Soviet policy of steering clear of identification with particular extremist factions, white preaching the doctrine of unity of all "democratic" forces.
Conclusion*
'
However subtle Suslov's mind and histo foreign policy, his voice in thetoday is clearly one that urges caution against pushing detente too far, refuses except in extreme circumstances to loosen controls over Eastern Europe or the international Communist movement, andigh premium onto "liberationhe Third World. For all his tactical flexibility; the strength of his basic ideological commitment to the expansion of Soviet power necessarily leads him to be more reluctant than most of his colleagues to make foreign policy concessions anywhere in the world, whether to the West or to China.
Suslov's departure from the Soviet leadership, when it comes, willacancy not easily filled. As the upholder of Ideological purity, Suslov haspecial place in the leadership.ime when the Politburo is made up largely of administrators and technicians,ho would not understond much of Marx's Kaplial
r i
ad they read it, Suslov is one of the few who claims to take pleasure in philosophical
One must, nevertheless, resist the temptation to portray Suslov as the lastreed. There are several other Politburo leaders who appear to share, at least in part, his basic outlook on the world. Tbe ideological orientation of Belorussian Party head and candidate Politburo member Petr Mosherov may be the closest to Suslov's. Like Suslov, Mosherov is suspicious of the West and more openly critical of the Chinese Communists and the Eurocommunists than most leaders.
Probably nearer to Suslov personally iscandidate member of the Politburo, Party Secretary Boris Ponomarcv. Ponomarev's entire career, much of it under Suslov's guidance, has been spent in directing the internationalmovement. Particularly in recent years, he appears to have worked in complete harmony with Suslov, sharing his views on the West, Eurocommunism, and Eastern Europe.
Party Secretary Mikhail Zimyanin alsotoultural hard-linerossible Suslov protege.peech on Lenin's birthdayimyanin expressed views.on detente, China, and the international Communistthat were entirely consistent with Suslov's foreign policy views.
Several reports have suggested that an alliance exists between Suslov and Grigoriyolitburo member who appears to aspire toBrezhnev. Suslov presided over Romanov's installation as head of the Leningrad partyut other evidence indicates that Romanov has more often looked to Kirilenko for support. Whether or not Romanov is personally close to Suslov, he does seem to share Suslov'son cultural policy and perhaps on some foreign policy matters as well.
What none of these men possesses and what Suslov cannot pass on to them is his authority. The senior member of the Politburo and the Secretariat in terms ofeteran whose service to the party stretches back to work on a
Poor Peasants' Committee during the"internationalist" who supervised theafter World War II and who ledagainst Tito and Mao. anorthodoxy is tempered witha politician more interested inthan the trappings of power,awe in many party rank and fileconsiderable respect even from
With Suslov's" passing, theref course continue toenior party secretary watching over Soviet ideology. The most visible candidate to replace Suslov is Ponomarev, who has worked under Suslov's supervision for many years. With almostears of experience in directingwith nonruling .Communist parties,could perhaps fill Suslov's shoes but for the fact that at agee, also, will presumably retire in the not too distant future. Noyounger man with the requisitefor the job is available. It is possible that Suslov's departure may thus enable Brezhnev and men personally closer to the Generalas Leonid Zamyatin, newlyhead of the revived Central Committee Information Department, or Konslontin Rusa-kov, head of the Blocincrease their authority within the CPSU propaganda apparatus that Suslov was largely responsible for creating.
More important, when Suslov is gone from the political scene, other Politburo members who have occasionallykeptical view ofKirilenko, Mazurov, andbe deprived of one of their most powerful and articulate champions. If Suslov departs while Brezhnev remains in power, the result coulderceptible tilt toward the more flexible foreign policies Brezhnev has pursued,
The author of this paper;
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