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Civil Defense
HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
IN FULL
Soviet Civil Defense
Director o/ Central Intetlttence8
Keu Findings
Civil defense in tbe Soviet Union is an ongoing nationwide program under military control. The Soviets' strategic writings integrate civil defenseinto their military strategy. It is parteneral scheme of the likely origins, course, and consequences of nuclear war. The Soviets* experience in World War II and their traditional emphasis on homeland defense reinforce their interest in civil defense. By developing an active and extensive civil defense, in conjunction with their other defensive and offensive strategic programs, they hope to convince potential enemies that they cannotar with the USSR. If war should occur, the Soviets seek through civil defense along with other means to assure survival of the homeland and to leave the USSRtronger postwar position than its adversaries. Civil defense Is meant to contribute to the "Tnaintenanceunctioning logistic base for continuing military operations, to help limit luiman and material losses, and to help enable the Soviets to speed recovery from the effects of nuclear war.
The Soviet civil defense program isrash effort, but its pace increased beginning in the. Civil defense activities are directedationwide civil defense organization consisting ofull-time personnel located at all levels of the Soviet government and economic structure. While improvements have been made in virtually all facets of the program, it has been marked by wide variations in implementation from area to area and year to year. Bureaucratic difficulties and apathy on the partarge segment of the population have retarded implementation in tbe pest, though in wartime such problems would probablyustained effort has been made to provide blast shelters for the leadership and essential personnel. Programs to protect industry by geographic dispersal have not been implementedignificant extent, however, and there is little evidence of hardening of economic installations.
The Soviets regard the specific objectives of their civil defense program to be:
An ability to protectleadership first, the essential work force second, and the remainder of the population third.
An abilityrotect the sources of economic productivity, to assure the continuity of economic activity In wartime, and to permit Ihe restoration of productionuclear attack.
An ability to sustain the surviving population in the period immediatelyuclear attack, and lo prepare for longer term postattack recovery.
We have assessed the stale of Soviet civil defense preparations with respect lo these objectives
Protection of People;
Leadership: The Soviets probably have sufficient blast-shelter space in hardened command posts for virtually all the leadership elements at all levelsome of these sliclters are harder than those available lo the general ixipulation. All fixed leadership shelters which have been identified are vulnerable lo direct attack, but we assume lhat alternative arrangements are available to protect at least the top leadership.
Essential Work Force: Shelters at key economic installations could accommodate aboutoercent of Ihe total work force. However, Soviet plans do not call for sheltering the entire work force.risis, nonessential and off-duty workers would be evacuated. Only those required to maintain essential production would remain behind to be sheltered If one-half tbe total work force is dispersed, fromoercent of the remainder could be sheltered.
inimum ofoercent of the total population in urban areas (including essential workers) could be accommodated at present in blast-resistant shelters.he percentage of tbe urban population that could be sheltered would rise tooercent, assuming no change in the present rate of shelter construction. Despite the scope and pace of shelter construction, the absolute number of city dwellers not afforded such protection5 will increase because of the expected population growth in urban ureas.
The critical decision to be made by the Soviet leaders in terms of sparing the population would be whither or not to evacuate cities. Only by evacuating the bulk of the urban population could they hope toarked reduction in the number of urban casualties An evacuation of urban areas could probably be accomplished in two or three days, with as mucheek required for full evacuation of ihe largest cities. These times could be extended by shortages in transportation, Oliver bottlenecks, or adverse weather conditions
Protection of the Economy: Soviet measures to protect the economy could not prevent massive industrial damage. The Soviet program (or dispersal of industry appears to be offsetontrary tendency for investments in new facilities lo be inside or near previously existing installations The Soviet measures for protecting the work force, critical equipment, and supplies and for limiting damage from secondary effects could contribute to maintaining and restoring production after an attack. We expect some improvements in the level of protection for the economy, but any radical change in its vulnerability to nuclear attack is unlikely.
Poitattack Recovery: The operating elements of ihe civil defense program as wellubstantial number of the civilian populationumber we cannot estimate with confidence) have received training in rescue and recovery operations such as administering first aid, clearing rubble, decontaminating, and providing emergency repair andof power. With at least several weeks to build up reserves and distribute supplies of food and fuel, the Soviets could probably provide adequate supplies to sustain the relocated and surviving urban population in the period immediatelyuclear attack. Nevertheless, the coordination of requirements with available supplies and transportationomplex problem for Soviet planners even In peacetime, let alonearge-scale nuclear attack Wc have not evaluated the potential for continuity of the Soviet government or the USSR's long-term ability to recover from the effectsuclear attack.
Cotta: While total civil defenso costs are unknown, cost estimates have been made of three major elements of the Soviet program: pay for full-Ume civil defense personnel, operation of specialized ci%-il defense military units, and shelter construction. The cost of these elements6 amounted toillion rubles. Uzsercent of the estimated Soviet defense budget. If these three elements of the Soviet program were to be duplicated in the United States, they would have cost aboutillionith about three-fourths of this representing manpower costs. (These estimates should be considered rough approximations They are affected by uncertainties both In the quantitative data on civil defense programs and in estimates of prices.)
Effect* of Civil Defense: In analyzing the effects of civil defense on levels of damage and casualties the Soviets might sustain weypothetical attack against high-value military' and economic targets. The Soviet population as such was not deliberately targeted. For the purposes of this simulation weingle retaliatory attack immediatelyoviet first strike. Our analysis in effect tends toworst case" for retaliation For sample, various times were assumed to be available to the Soviets to make civil defense preparations, rangingew hourseek or more, while in each case opposing forces were assumed not to have
progressed beyond day-to-day alert, in reality, Soviet efforts to maximize civil defense preparations couldotential opponent to place its forces at increased levels of readiness.
The effectiveness of civil defense in reducing casualties in the USSR and in coping with the postattack period would depend primarily on the time available to make final preparations before an attack. (The analysis considered only those casualties that occurred during the first month following an attack and resulted from prompt nuclear effects and earlysing the results of the hypothetical attack under the assumptions referred to above, we estimate that:
worst conditions for the USSR, withew hours or less to make final preparations, Soviet casualties would be wellillionarge percentage of the leadership elements would probably survive.
The critical time for preparation appears to be about two or three days, because only by evacuating could tbe Soviets hope to avert massive losses.ew days for final preparations, casualties could be reduced by more titanrceiit; most of this reduction would be due to evacuation, the remainder to shelters.
Under the most favorable conditions for the USSR,eek or more to complete urban evacuation and then to protect the evacuated population, Soviet civil defenses could reduce casualties to the low tens of millions.
While many of the essential personnel sheltered at economic facilities would probably survive an attack, the Soviets could not prevent massive damage to their economy and the destruction of many of their most valued material accomplishments.
The casualty levels noted above could be increased if. for example, the attack came while an evacuation was In progress, if the size of the attack were larger, if the attack were stretched outonger period, if il were directed against the population as such, or if the evacuation were less expeditious than planned or impeded by adverse wrather or transportation deficiencies. In assessing the protection afforded by their civil defenses the Soviets would take account of these uncertamtins.
The Soviets almost certainly believe their present civil defenses would improve their ability to conduct military operations and would enhance the USSR's chances for survivaluclear exchange They cannot have confidence, however, in the degree of protection their civil defenses would afford them, given the many uncertainties attendantuclear exchange. We do not believe that the Soviets' present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately to expose thr USSRigher risk of nuclear attack.
Present evidence does not suggest that in the foreseeable future there will be any significant change in the Soviet leaders' judgment that civil defense contributes to war-fighting and war-survival capabilities, nor that their uncertainties about its actual effectiveness would be lessened. Thus, we have no reason to believe that the Soviet leaders' perception of the contribution of civil defense to their capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict will change significantly.
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DISCUSSION
Civil defense hi ihc Soviet Union ij an ongoing nationwide program under military control. The Swlrtt' strategic writing* Integrate civil defense' into their military strategy. It Is parteneral scheme of the likely origins, course, and cwuequences of nuclear war The Soviets" experiences in World War II and their traditional emnliaiis on homeland defense reinforce their interest in civil defense By developing an active and eitemtve civil defense program, in conjunetion with their other defensive and offensive strategic programs, they hope to convince any potential enemy that it cannot winwar with the USSR. The Soviet, .eel, through civil defense along with other means, to assure Ihe survival of the USSRar does occur and to come out of ittronger postwar position than their adversaria Civil defense is meant to contribute to the maintenanceunctioning logistic base of operations by regular armed forces lo win tbe war. to help limit human and material losses,p enable the USSR lorecovery from the conseqisences of war.
Tills study focuses on the USSR's civil defense cfctcrtives and the progress the Soviets are making toward achieving them it assesses some of the effects of Soviet civil defense preparations lo reducing casualties and damagearge-scale nuclear attack. Because we do not know much about the consequencesarge-scale attack on the functioningodern. Industrialized socioty, ihc study deals with that reUlively brief periodtrike during which the most obvious effectsuclear exchange would be apparent. It does. the
Soviets' post-nuclcar-attack capabilities to conduct military operations or their longer term prospeeti for polttioal cohesion and recortstilution of the economy.
o have attempted to describe the Soviet programay that would allowan assessment of the eonfioVnce that the Soviet leaden place in thedegree to which their civil defense make* them fool more able to withstandtrategic nuclear exchange.principal effort has been to analyse what the effect of an attack on ihe Soviet Union wouldassnss the degree of protection provided for Ihe leadership, for the economy, and (or the population
Objectives, Priorities, and Pace
he Soviets regard the specific obiectlves of (heir civil defense program to be
An ability to protecte leaoVrsrup first, the cuenrial work force second, and theof Ihe potxihition third.
An ability to protect the sources of economic productivity, to assure Ihe continuity ofactivity in wartime, and to permit live restoration of productionuclear attack.
ability to sustain the surviving population in the period immediatelyuclear attack and to prepare for longer term postattack recovery. (See the tabulation below.)
S. In tenm of actual priorities, the Soviet program appears to hew closely to what its organizers declared their .Mentions to be. The first priority is to protect people. In support of llil* part of ihe program, Ihe Soviets have built blast inciters, established relocationnd developed evacuation plans. The
rrstrty Tm*.
Objectivei ondl Soviet Civil Defense
riuajeai
Sbrhmng and dUprnal <tf eeawul
and mmiUoibe u.
baa population MocapOinc hod and nvadlcal eapplim
o( Eccrauc l cm! drfeaae aadaronsa aaanslc mraJxfriatlc* plana
Rapid ihvtfoWn of Usduatnalftnnanenl and baaty kudentng of
iajjiaii Cttas rataoatton of economic vntt* prvoi
sWlpllUil icsmyh ol nwteriah Olographic dlaproal ol ladustry
anoibury and Ovii da-
fraw lonnaliaas Intlnjng in frrparaUonadaenbutionload
secondo maintain the continuity ol* economic activity in wartime. Much of the action on thb patt of the program appear, to have been directed toward providing protection for the force The third priority, "liquidation of the consequences of an enemynvolves the trainingubstantial number of the civilian population in postatlack operationsas admin interim lint aid. clearing rubble, decontaminating, and providing enjcrgniicy repair and restoration of power.
& The pace of the Soviet civil defenseffected on the one hand by commitments ol the leadership to realize progress in peacetimeand on (he other by the reluctance of some ministries. Industrial managers, and local offlclab lo dedicate scarce rnourcc* to what they regardecondary requirement and by apathy toward civil defensearge segment of the public While It iirash effort, the pace el the program increased in theivil defense prrparationt are continuing, but the extent of implementation of civil defense measures varies from area to area.
ent In this large organization But the fact that the organization exists, despite lis problems, and the fact that progress is being made toward fulfillment of the objectives of the civil defense program give Soviet civil defense loaders some confidence in Ihctr ability to function as requlied. On the whole, the Soviets' view of their civil defense organizational structure probablyavorablebetter than it was before the military assumed control of il in the
he Soviet leaders' emphasis on civil defense also offers the potential to (eater favorable popular attiludea toward the Soviet system, to demonstrate leadership concern for the people, and to lend credibility to calb lor vigilance against potential enemiesever* Soviet citizen recritn civil defense instruction either in school or through training courses, lectures, and exercises at places of work Public attitudes aboutuclear war remain skeptical, however, andvidence that many people do not take the program jertooaly.the Soviet people would respond to directions from civil defense authorities
ublicly recoomrcd. highly structured, milt-Ury-cootrolled civil defense organization exult at ail leveh of ihe Soviet government and economy, with the head of every organization designated "chief of civilhe nationaled by General of the Array A. T.eputy Minister, of Defense- Full-time civil defense staffs exist at each echelon of the Soviet administrative structurerepublic, oblast. city, and rayon, as well as at all significant economic institutions and enterprises.
he operating elements of the Soviet civil defensethat would carry outarge number of military civil defense units, communications elements, and civilian civil defense formations. We estimate the number of full-time civil defense penonnet to be more than Hxj.OOO. Counting all civilian units andactor ding to guideline! issued by General Altuninhe total number of people In the program would be upwardsumber that includes many perfunctory participants.
9 The peacetime effectivenesi of the civil defense organization suffers at Umes from the reluctance of Industrial official* to spare labor and other resources for civil defense and from misunderstandings between civil defense officers and Soviet civilians. In wartime, increased cent rail ration of authority would probably reduce many of (he bureaucratic Inefficiencies inlier-
Proloction of Poople
eadenhip. When we speak of measures for the protection of the leadership, we refer not only lo the top national leadership but also toarty and government official* at ihe national and republic0 party and government leaders at kray. oblast. dty. and urban rayonanagers of key installations, and0 members of civil defenseeople in all.
hroughout the Soviet Unionattern of inciter construction for thb leadership. It consuls of hardened underground shelters near places of work and relocation sites outside the cities. Hardened command posts have been constructed near Moscow and at other sites. Some of these shelters are harder than those available to the general peculation The pattern of local shelter and relocation sites extends from government ministries to party headquarter* and oblast and dry governments and Includes sites for major industrial enterprises as well While we do not know much about eaact amounts. It is probable that tbese shelters generally have some stockpiles of food, medldnc. protective equipment, communications, and other supplies for their prospective occupants
he Soviets probably have ndficscnt command post shelter space for virtually all the leadership elements as defined in this paper (thai is,hb estimate lakes into account
space requited for supplies, communications, and work area. All filed leadership Snellen which have been identified would be vulnerable Io direct attack, but we assume that alternative arrangements are available to protect at least the top leadership.
aaeniief Person net Soviet plans forof essential personnel include sheltering at their places of work and rotation of off shift personnel outside of likely target area* The Soviets could probably shelter aboutoercent ol the total work force at key industrial installations. This assumes shelter occupancy (actonquare meter orquare meter perthat are mentioned in Soviet civil defense manuak The actual percentage of on-duty workers that could be shelteredrisis would be considerably higher. Only those required to maintain essential ptoductson wouldIIt.il work force is dispersed, (romoercent ol tbe remainder could be sheltered
Population. Soviet plans call lor moving people to mplace blast shelters as well as for the evacuation oi population from urban target areas Assessments of the effectiveness of this part of the Soviet program are highly dependent on Ihe scenario chosen, but lentative evaluations are possible. Nationwide the Soviets have proUbly constructed more0 blast-resistant shehen (including those at ecor-srnsc facilities) that can protectillion toillion people, depending on whether tbe shelter occupancy (actorquare meter per person This is roughlyoercent of the total population in cities of moreeople. We are confident that mote extensive analysis would result in an upward, not downward. ao*justmonl of this fbruro. but we are unable to say by bow much
Some additional protection would be available lo the Soviet porwUtion In the form o( subway tunnels and stations. The Moscow subway, for example, hasnderground stations and moreilometers of tunnels. We estimate thatrrsons could be sheltered in the station areas and four limes that number in the track tunnels,otal ofoercent of the population of the city. This total Is in addition to the number that could be sheltered in the previously discussed shelters The live other operating subway system. In ihe USSR could provide an additional increase In the total sheltered population. However, we have not included subways in our estimate of loud inciter capacity because tbe subways could bo intended for eviicualton and because of our uncertainty about the existence of ufe-support systems in the subways.
e estimate thatoercent cf the people in urban shelters would he adequately protected from the blast and other prompt eflectsuclear attack that was intended lo uuiirnize damage to industrial and military targets On the other hand, evacuation of the bulk of the urban population would lie necessary in order toarked reduction in the total number of* urban casualties
oviet writings state that the order lo evacuate cities would be given during the "specialperiod of high tension and Increased risk of war. This order would be disseminated to tbe public via the mass media. Individual installations would use available means lo notify personnel of the time and place for staging their evacuation Factories, offices, schools, or bus and tram stations would serve as embarkation points. According to Soviet plonners. the population would haveew boms to prepare for an evacuation following the order to do so. On their arrival at assembly points, people would board buses or trains, or would begin walking toward their previously assigned relocation areas Those persons destined for remote areas would be evacuated first to intermediate points, where they would rest and be fed by local autlsorilies There is no evidence that evacuation escrcises In large cities involving the actual movement oi people have been practiced. There Is evidence of small-scale evacuations and numerous esetcrves primarily involving civil defense staffs.
Theoretical studiesange of tiroes necessary to accomplish evacuation, dependingcan the availability of traraspcrUtion For evacuation employing motoriredtrucks, trains, andto four days would be required lor the last group of evacuees to reach theii relocation area- If the evacuation were carried out oneek or more would be required to evacuate the larger cities. Using some cotnbiiution of motorized and foot transport would reduce the required time lo lesseek. Umisually severe weather could stow the pace of evacuation andocal decision to evacuate. On an average, two or three days would probably be required to evacuate the major portion ol the Soviet urban population
Soviet planning recognizes that the evacuated portion of the population roust befallout protection. Plans and some materials exist forexisting structures and constructing hasty shelters In rural and exurban areas. However,ractical matter, the bulk of the evacuated population would initially have about ihe level of protection afforded by upgraded basements and interior rooms of standard Soviet rural structures Under ideal circumsUiK-es.
eek or so to evacuate urban IMH and to modify existing Utucturct and construct hasty shelters, the evacuated population could be afforded high level* of prot eel ion.
Protection of the Economy
'lans for protecting the Soviet economyumber of complementary measures, not all of which are to be taken at any individual site but which could apply selectively dependingartime economy These measure* include
Sheltering personnel at installations in the event ol attack.
Dispersalortion of the work forceeriod of crisis,
Emergency relocation of certain imtallations
Geographic dispersal of new installations.
Hardening of physical structures
Ilasly hardening measures when an attack is imminent, such as sandbagging of equipment and mounding of earth around structures.
Rapid shutdown of equipment.
n their programs to protect the economy, the Soviets have given first priority to protection of personnel at economic facilities Tbeir plans for protecting the work force are related directly to the importarice of the place of work both in terms of Its output and its contribution to postaltaek recovery. Some industries and other enterprises wiD continue to functionwo-shift basts, with one shift dispersed outside of urban arras and the other protected in blast shelters at or near Its installation. Some enterprises are considered nonestentiat and will stop operations, and others will be relocated in time of crisis
ho Soviet program for geographic dispersal ol industry Is. as far as we can teQ, not being Implementedignificant extent
New plants have often been built adjacent to major existing plants.
Existlns plants and complexes have beenin place.
No effort hasmade to expand lite distance between buildings or to locate additions inay as to minimize fire and other hazards in the eventuclear attack.
Previously open space* at fuel storage site* have been filled In with new storage tanks and processing units
consumption levels Reduction of these supplies by nuclear attack: and the disruption of local distribution could be offset by energy conservation measures, alternate fuel sources,ecrease in industrial demand. Sufficieiil stocks of fuel would therefore pmluihly bo available in tho near-term postattack period to sustain the needs of the surviving population
n (he immediate postattack period, treatment of trauma (wounds and broken bones) and burns would create the greatest burden on those who pomeiv specluliied medical skills Treatment for radiation sickness and relatively mint* injuries could be provided by those who have received civil defense first-aid training Nevertheless. Soviet civil defense medical prenaratioiu would be unable towith the levels of casualties which lame-scale nuclear attack would inilact on the civilian population
lic Soviets' capacity to continue production in the postattack period depends not only on hnw much of Ihe critical production equipment and essential work force survive, but also on the on-hand inventories of raw and processed materials. Attacks industry in general would reduce the overall level of supplies on hand, but It is likely that supplies would be available at undamaged industrial facilitiesallow production to continue lor several weeks foUo*>lng an attack. The adequacy of strategic reserves for coutinu-ing productiononger period, however, would depend on the survivability and restoration of transportation and electric power systems
The distribution of essential suppliesostattack period wouldifficult problem for the Soviets. They have made some effort to ensure survival of the transportation system through such measures as preparations to disperse equipment and lo establish stockpiles of rolling stork They have abo organired civil defense services and formations In transportation enterprises and have constructed blast shelters al critical points in the road and rail transportation systems Scvcrtheleu ihe coorditiation of requirements with available suppliesornroblem for Soviet planners even in pcaeelime, let alonearge-scale nuclear attack on the USSR
The operating elements of the civil defense program as wellubstantial number of the civilian populationumber we cannot estimate with confidence) have received training in rescue and recovery operations such as administering first aid. clearing rubble, decontaminating, and providing emergency repair and restoration of power. With at least several weeks lo build up reserves and distribute food and fuel, the Soviets could probably provide adequate supplies lo sustain the relocated and surviving urban population id ihe period inirncdlitelyuclear attack. We have not evaluated the potential (or continuity of the Soviet government or the Soviets' long-term ability tn recover from ihc effectsuclear attack
Costs
e are unable to estimate the total annual costs of Soviet civil defense, but we haveentative estimate of the costs of three elements of the program full-time civil defrnse personnel, operation of military civil defense units, and blast shelter construction These three elementslIIInn rubleshis ruble figure, which indicates the burden of lliese throe elements on the Soviet economy, represents lessercent of our estimate of Soviet defense spending. If incurred in tbe United States, the costs of these three elements would have beam aboutillion6 While this dollar figure convcyi tbe magnitude of the program in familiar terms, ll docs not reflect the economic burden to the Soviets The higher dollar estimate results primarily from the greater costs of manpower in the Uniied Stales than In the USSR. Manpower represents aboutercenl of the total dollaris, about JL4 billion ofnly aboutercent of the ruble coats (These estimates should be coauadered rough aprwouoialioos They are affected by uncertainties both in Ihc quantitative data on civil defense programs and in estimates of prices.)
Overall Effectiveness
We have analyzed tbe effects of civil defense on the levels of damage and casualties the Soviets might sustainuclear exchange. Wc have deliberately chosen to analyze Important and sensitive variables -economic damage and casualties liut can bequantitatively, end have made arbitraryto deal with the inevitable unorrtamlics regard ing preparations for and conduct of an actual nuclear exchange. This type of analysis involved trading on the realism of the war soenario adopted to gain detail in calculating themore detailed our analysis for purposes of calculations, the less likely the calculations would apply to another scenario
For purposo of these calculations we have assumed, for example, thai various times rangingew hourseek or more would be available to the Soviets to make civil defensehile in each case opposition forces were assumed to be on no more than day-to-day alert In reality, Soviet efforts lo
mail mitt* civil defense preparation* couldotential opponent to place its forces at increased levels of readiness We Have also assumedetaliatory strike would not deliberately target the Soviet population but would attack high-value military and economic targets. This approach tends toower limit for the level of casualties such an attack would inflict on the Soviet Union. In effect, it tends toworst case" for retalution. especially if Soviet population casualtiesajor criterion.
rotection of People. The eaten! of losses to the leadership wouldless sensitive to final preparation time than would be the level of casualties among essential personnel and the remaining popuU-lion. Casualties among the latter would depend prunarily on the time the Soviets had to prepare lor an attack and whether or not they chose to evacuate their urban population. The findings of our analysis, based on the results of the hypothetical retaliatory attack under tbe assumptions given above, were as follows
With several hours to make finalarge ni-rccntage of leaders and communications facilities would probably survive
A large percentage of the essential work force in shelters would survive an attack designed to maximize damage to economic facilities
inimal period to makeew hours oroviet casualties from prompt nuclear effects and fallout would be wellillion More than half the casualties would be fatalities.
oderate period of preparation (two to three days) during which the Soviet civil defense authorities implemented plans for evacuation of urban areas, the lovol of casualties and fatalities could be reduced by more thanercent. Most of this reduction would be due to evacuation, the remainder to shelters
Extended preparationeek or more) could further reduce tho level of Soviet casualties and fatalities With time lo complete urbanand lo protect the evacuated population, casualties from prompt nuclear effects and fallout could be reduced lo the low tons of millions, about half of which would be fatalities.
he findings of our analysis serve lo point out the important fact that. In the preparations for an attack, tho critical decision to be made by the Soviet leaders lo terms of sparing the population would be whether or not to evacuate cities. The cost of not evacuating could be in the neighborhood ol illion casualties. There are. of course, manyof preparation times and assumptions about hypothetical ictalialnry attacks which would increase the calculated leveb of casualties over thosearger attack directed at more targets (perhapsonsequence of the opposing forces' having been placed on increased levels ofn altack directed against the population, one which was carried out over an extended period, or an attack which rame while tbe Soviets were In the process of evacuating their cities.
Protection of Ihe Economy. Those measures we have described for protection of the economy could not prevent massive damage. Eveneek or so of preparations, there would be little reduction In the amount of prompt damage to facilities inflicted by blast The Soviet measures for protecting the work force, critical equipment, and supplies and for limiting damage from secondary effects could contribute to maintaining and restoring production after an attack. As noted above, however, we have not analyzed the Soviets' long-icrm potential for economic recovery.
Poila Hack Recovery. We are unable toonfident assessment of how effective Soviet civil defense would be in rescue and recovery operations following an attack Our tentative estimate is that,eek or more to make preparations, the Soviets could accumulate stocks of essential supplies adequate to sustain the surviving population in the period immediatelyuclear attack, but the distribution of these supplies wouldritical problem Under worst conditions withew hours to prepare, the chances would be poor that the Soviets could effectively support the survivingwith supplies and services.
he Soviets almost certainly believe their present civil defenses will improve their ability to conduct military operations and will enhance the USSR's chances for survivaluclear exchange They cannot have confidence, however, in the degree of protection their civil defense would afford them, given the many uncertainties attendantuclear exchange. We do not believe that the Soviets' present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately lo expose the USSRigher risk of nuclear attack.
Future Trends
rograms lor protection of the leadership arc solidly established and well advanced. We are confident that this aspect of the program will continue lo receive attention, with better protection for leaders
all levels. The continued growth in the number*acilities will increase the prospects of survivalaiae number of Soviet leaden.
he Soviets will probably continue their em phasrs on construction of blast shelters in urban areas If this rmultsace of construction matching thathey would,ncroase the minimum percentage of population sheltered in urban areas lo an estimatedoerceni. This Increase takes into account the projected growth in urban population
ver tbe neatears, the percentage of population which can be sheltered will increase, but the absolute number of people that would have to be evacuated will also increase because of growth In the urban population. To avoid an increase In ihe number of people to be evacuated. Ihe rate of shelter construction would have to be higher than the rate currently indicated Thus, the Soviet leaders' critical problem of deciding whether to evacuate, and when to do so. will not change substantially oser this period They may, however, be able to achieve some reduction in the lime required to evacuate by increasing the available transportation
rospects for improvement in measures to protect tho economy against attack are mliod. The increase In Ihe number of blast shelters at economic facilities will probably enable the Soviets loarger proportion of the work force. But the continuing concentration of economic investment in previously enisling plant sites, together with an absence of construction-hardening techniques, suggestsuture retaliatory attack would be about as dentiucttve as atThe protective measures the Soviets are likely to undertake during the neatears would probably not stgnificantly reduce damagearge-scale attack designed to maximize destruction of economic targets
'itiscnt evidence does not suggest that in the foreseeable future there will be any significant change in the Soviet leaders' judgment that civil defense contributes to war-fighting and war-survival capabili lies, nor tbat their uncertainties about its actual effectiveness would be lessened "Thus, we have no reason to lielieve tltat the Soviet leaders' perception of thei tuition of civil defense lo their capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict will change significantly.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
paperasedore lengthy and detailed memorandum on the same subject, the product of several thousand hours of research and analysis The longer document contains extensive documentation involving sensitive sources and methods, and therefore cannot be released for reasons of national security. There is,ubstantial body of open-source literature on Soviet civil defense and related war-survival subjects. The following bibliographyelection from open sources based on the following criteria;
Published in the USSR during the.
Intrinsic value of each document's contents.
Coverage of representative subjects within the broad field of civil defense.
Not all of the documents included in thb bibliography have been translated Into English. Significant sources in the Russian language arc included so that those readers Interested in conducting In-depth research on Soviet disaster preparedness have an appropriate, initial, open source of data. The books arc arranged by date of publication, beginning with the oldest:
. Civil Defense Is Everyone's Joboscow:
. Civil Defense In Nuclear-Missile Warfare (Grazhdanskayaakctno-yader-noyoscow:
Tiivilcv. M. What One Must Know About Carrying Out Rescue and Emergency Repair Work in Area of Nuclear Destruction (Cbto nadoedoniieotlozhnykh avariyrto-vosstanovl-tel'nykhchage yadenTogooscow:
. From MPVO to Civil Defense (Otrazhdanskov
. Protection of the Population from Radioactive Fallout (Zashchita naseleniya ot ra-dioaktivnykh
. Protection of the Population Is tlie Principal Task of Civil Defense (Zashchitazadacha grazhdanskoyoscow: Press
. Civil Defenseysshaya
. Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (Zashchita ot oruzhlya massovogooscow:
. Civil Defense Exercises lor the Fifth Grade (Zanyatiya po grazhdanskoyyatomoscow:
Kammerer, Yu.Yu. Emergency Work on Public Service Networks In Area of Nuclear Destructioo (Avariynyye raboty na kommunarnykhchage yademogooscow:2
. Civil Defense at Machine-Tool Plants (Grazhdanskaya oborona na inashinostroitet-nykhoscow:
. Radiation Shelters in Rural Areas (Protivorsdiatsioanyyeel'skoyoscow:
. Civil Defense at Agricultural Facilities (Grazhdanskaya oborona na ob'ycktakh sel'skokho-zyaystvennogooscow:
. Fircfightiog at National Economic Installationsuclear Environmentozbaiami na ob'ycktakh rsarodnogoslo viodernogooscow:
. The Use of National Economic Equipment for Decontamination Purposes (Ispol'xo-voniye tekhniki narodnogo kbozyaystva dlya tsclcvoscow:
Dotofeyev. Yu.P. Engineering Approaches toAgainst Modern Means of Destruction (Inzhe-nernyye meropriyatiya zashchita ot sovremyenoykh sredstvMoscow:
. Medical Assistance and Protection of the Population in Areas of Massive Destruction
(Mrditsimkayaashchitachagafch massovugooscow4
roplr and Affairs of Civil Dr-fenvceli grazhdanskov
Koz'n.in. NJDl ProtnctKin of (he Population From Weapons of Mass Destiitction (Zashchita nasclenlya ot oruzhiya massovogoashkent:
Mikhno,estoratioii of Destroyed Facilities (Vosstanovtcniye
Caranov, V. Cooperation of DOSAAF Committees With Civil Defense Staffs (Sodeystvlye komitetov DOSAAF shtabam ttrazhdanskoyoscow
. Civil Defense at an Industrial(Crazhdanskaya oborona prom yshlen nounoscowozachok. YA.YA. Civil Defense Yesterday and Today (Crazhdanskaya oboronaoscow:
Krotkov, FC. The Medical Service of Civil Defense (Meditsinskaya shi/hba gra rhdamkoyoscow: Meditsin.ii
Unknown Author What Everyone Should know and He Able To Do (Eto dolzhenmet"oscow:. Instruction to the Rural Populace on Protecting Animals From Weapons of Mass(Pamyatka sel'skomu naselyeniyu po za-shchite zhlvotnvkh ol oruzhiya massovogoMoscow:
Ahunin. AT. Ovil Defense Formations in Action Against National Disasters (Forralrovamya graih-danskoyorbe so itikhiynymloscow: Civil Defense (Crazhdanskaya obo
oscow:il il Defense (GruhdanskayaMoscow Vysshaya
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