Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications For NATO Warning of War
National ulctugcocc btiotalc.
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGS* RELEASE AS SANITIZED
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WARSAW PACT CONCEPTS AND CAPABILITIES FOR GOING TO WAR IN EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO WARNING OF WAR
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
ing intethgeeKe organizations participated in the preparation ot the Estimate:
ThenleKoence Agency ond IMctgariiofrOM of it* DafartMM of Slate ondhe Nolionol Security Agency.
Abstaining:
The Specie! Altaian! lo the Secretory for Notioool Security. Deportrnent of the Treoiory
Aho Participating:
The Aiiitloncef Stoff for Inl.lligerKe, Department of the Army
The Director of Novo! Inlelligeivce, Department of me Navy
The Ais.ttonce Chief of Staff. Inieffigence, Deportment of Ihe Air Fore.
CONTENTS
SUMMARY AND KEY JUDCMENTS ,
DISCUSSION
L LIKELIHOODATO-WARSAW PACT WAR
View* of Risks in War Wiih NATO _
of War in Present Clrcumslances
SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVESAR WITH NATO
OperaUons for Limited Objectives
Basic Soviet Objective. Possible Pad Theaters of Military Operations inActivities in Other Areas _
HI. WARSAW PACT DOCTRINE AND READINESS
A. Doctrine
U. Warsaw Pact Readiness
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u u
THE PACT WOULD CO TO WAR
to Crisis
Process of Preparing for War
Deciding To Co to War
Poliiical Preparation
Preparation of NaUonal Economies
Military Procedures
c. Attack options
OptionStanding-Start
Option II-Attack Wiih Two
Option Ill-Attack Wiih Three %
Option IV-Attack Wiih Five
Summary Judgments and Relative
D. Gradual Buildup
OF WAR
of Warning
Indicators of the
Indicators of Political" Indicaiors of Civil and Economic Preparalions.
Indicators of Military
Security. Concealment, and Deception
Slilngcnl Security
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85
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Concealment and Deception
D. Detection
_
SUMMARY ANO KEY JUDGMENTS
ATO-Wofiaw Pott Wor
nder present circumstances, it is highly unlikely that the Warsaw Fact nations, or the Soviets alone, would deliberately decide to attack member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the Soviet view, the risks involvedar with NATO would be extremely high. Thc Soviets regard (he possibility thatar could go nuclear with unpredictable consequences, perhaps includingto massive nuclear strikes against thc Soviet Union,ajor threat to llie existence of the USSR. Thc Sovietsonservative view of NATO capabilities and understandtiff NATO defense* mightuick Pact victory, allowing time to bring into play (he greater manpower and industrial reserves of the West. Concern that Its East European allies might not fight loyally and effectively further constrains Moscow's planning for aggressive war. Moreover, the Soviets appear lo rate more highly than we do the danger of China's taking advantageonflict in Europe to strike the USSR.
env
For these reasons, we believe that war in Europe would become likely onlyesultrofound change in the present political, military, or economic situation and would be precedederiod of extreme tensionrisis of unprecedented severity.
If,eriod of many months or several yean, relations between the Western and Warsaw Pact nations deteriorated badly, the political, economic, and military posture of both alliances could bo expected to change.his were to occur, the judgments in ihisagainst the preseni political, economic, and militaryno longer bc valid.
Military Objectivesor With NATO
f thc Soviets decided to go to war with NATO, for whatever reason, il Is highly likely that their principal military objective would bc theefeat of all NATO forces in Centra! Europe. Whether France became an objective would depend on thc course ot the
campaign and ihc part the French played in it. In the Soviet view, onlyroad, rapid offensive campaign could lhe USSR hope to interrupt or prevent NATO from developing equal or. possibly in the longer run. greater combat polential in Europe. Soviet military writings
C
rapid, lotal victory over
Judge it to bc extremely unlikely thai the Sovietsattack with limited force to achieveirst step in going lo war with NATO or to obtainrisis while attempting to avoid war.irst step in athe limited-objective attack would have liltle or noin destroying or interrupting NATO force development. Ilfact, completely sacrifice slrategic surprise and ensure thatwould not far lag that of the Fact.
a device to secure an important political objectivecontrol of West Berlin orimited-objectivehave serious flaws in the Soviet view. First. Soviet leadersbc confidentlmlted-objcclivc aliack could succeedto avoid an undesired broadening of the conflict. Secondly,consequences of NATO response with nuclear weapons,the chances, would seem to outweigh by far any potentialin the absence of war, such an action would signal the end ofof "peaceful coexistence" and would inevitably throw NATOpreparations for war in Europe. Given their ownof NATO's rapid mobilization capabilities in the short run, nndof activating NA: O's much greater industrial, manpower,potential in the longer run, the Soviets could perceiveadverse balance of forces in Europe as NATO rose loof confronting what would be considered an extremelythreat. Accordingly, we judge there is virtually no chanceSoviets would initiate an altack to obtain limited objectives inmilitary, political, and economic silualion.
Soviets evidently plan for military operationsin three separate theaters: in the northwestern USSRin central and western Europe, and in southerna crisis leading to war could develop as easily on oneflanks as in the center, the Soviets would expect centralbe thc decisive theaterarge-scale NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.
Doctrine ond Readiness
doctrineeed for heavy superiority inbattle areas, with strong reserves to ensure thc momentum ofDoctrine also stresses achieving surprise and. in general,will strive to achieve both surprise and superiority. If forced to
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choose between them, lhc Soviets are likely to opt for force superiority: superiority in forces is real and affords advantages that arc certain; surpriseess tangible advantage and always runs some risk of compromise. In any event, Soviet strategy for war in Europe centers on seizing and holding the stralegic initiative through prompt offensive action by all forces.
tenel of Soviet doctrine is joint action by allof the military forces, each of which is considered toontingentany major operation. Related tothe longstanding Sovici insistence on the importance of theand poliiical stability of the nalion in lime of war. Becausein view of the risk of nuclearthroughoul Ihe Pact countries and armed forces can be expectedprelude to any military venture.
Soviets apparently believeeriod ofcalled the Period of Threat in Soviet usage, will precedeuse of miliiary forces. The Soviets' heavy reliance on thethey believeeriod would provide is reflected inreadiness status of Pad forces, many of whichthrough mobilization before commitment toalso recognize the chance that an enemy might drasticallyperiod of tension. Each Pact nationual alert andwhich provides both for the mobilization readiness ofadministration and economy and for the readiness,mobilization of the armed forces. Thc key alert phasesthis dual system are: Increased National Defense ReadinessNational Defense Readiness for ihe national economiesCombat Readiness and Full Combat Readiness for
How Ihe Pocl Would Go to War
Our judgments concerning our ability to sense lhat the Warsaw Pact is taking steps to enable it to go to war in the near future derive from our ability to monitor,ear-real-time basis, lhe normal pattern of Soviet and East European civilian and military activity in peacetime. Our confidence in sensing Pact preparation for war is based on our judgment that significant early changes would almost certainly be initiatedide range of civilian and military activities as the Pactosture which would enable it toar.
The earliest indicators that the Soviet Union was taking steps which would enable it to initiate war in Europe would be potentially available as the Soviets and their Pact allies were making the decision to undertake them. Given the ptesent structure of Soviet poliiical and military leadership, the decision to prepare for or initiate war with
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NATO would necessarily be made by lbc full Politburo and almost certainly with the recommendation of the Defense Council. Wc cannot judge lo what extent the counsel of Fast European leaders would be sought in thc initial decisionmaking process, but sooner or later the commitment of principal East European political and miliiary leaders would almost certainly be required because iheir support would be critical in the executionar with NATO.
nusual activities on thc part of the Pact leadership would raise US and NATO awareness of possible imminent Pact activity of some kind, and increase thc likelihood that indications of actual preparations would be interpreted quickly. Strong signals could be reported Io one of the NATO intelligence services directly from one of the Pact principals or staff members involved in the decision process.
major concern of the Soviet leadership would be tothe support and stability of the population and public institutions in both thc Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Representations to the regional leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would probably be made,arge-scale propaganda program to motivate the Soviet populace to support the decision to go to war would be planned or initiated. The more critical problem, in the Soviet view, would be the elicitation of support and maintenance of firm political control of the populace and public institutions of lhe principal East European allies. Eliciting and enforcing thc support of the Soviet and East European populationajor atiack on NATO could not be accomplishedow-key manner. There would likely be clear indications of steps by the Pact leadership to ensure the political stability of the Warsaw Pact nations.
In preparing lo Initiate hostilities with NATO, the Soviets could noi be certain whether lhe prospective war would be short or long, nuclear or nonnuclear, andatter of prudence would have to consider full civil and economic preparations from the start. The process of putting Industrial, agricultural, and civil defense systemsull war footing, whether begun before orar started, would be both disruptive and visible and would take weeks or months to work out, even with wholly adequate planning.
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oviet doctrine anticipatesritical step in preparing the populace and national economy for war is the declarationtate of Increased National Defense Readiness. The declaration, even if not published, would be widely communicated throughout lhc Soviet Union
and would, in itself,irm indication that thc Soviets were preparing for Ihc contingency. Similarly, declarationtate of Full National Defense Readiness, even if not published, would be widely communicated and would, in itself, clearly signal tlie serious Soviet (or Pact) intent to prepare for war. The declaration and associated measures would be impossible lo mask.
he Pad nations consider the normal peacetime poslure of their forces totale of Constant Combat Rcadtness. Tlie way in which the Pad would modify its military poslurerisis would depend largely on the speed, urgency, and intensity with which the crisis developed:
a slowly developing crisis the Pact countries might move to institute Increased Combat Readiness (as defined in the table appended to chapternide variety of measures might be undertaken, but these would fall far short of placing the Padull war footing. The process need not be continuous; rather there probably would be rx-riods of holding at interim levels.
the Soviets had determined lhat the likelihood of war was high, the Pad's final preparations would be initiatedecision to go to Full Combat Readiness (as defined in the above-cited table).
ey step in beginning the process of preparing military forces for the contingency of war is declarationtate of Increased Combat Readiness. Indicators of preparatory measures necessary to achieve this level of readiness include:
K thc Warsaw Pact is taking slept to enable it to go to war in the near future and tluit the course of events has increased the likelihood of war in Europe. This degree of warning, although it does not incorporate all of lhc elements of ideal warning, could be provided to national decisionmakrrs relatively rapidly and would provide anbasis for decisions concerning appropriate counlerpreparations and other courses of action. We are unlikely to be able lo be more definitive than this in our initial warning and foretell when the enemy will attack, where he will attack, or whether he will attack al all. The' perceived pattern ol activity on which the initial warning would be bnsccl is likely lo be consistent with Soviel intentions otherlanned aitack on NATO, such as: preparations to defend,liffer stand, orelter bargaining position in'the crisis; or to take actionifferent theater.
he Warsaw Pact nations, and particularly thc Soviets, have the capability and thc experience to employ many techniques of security, concealment, and deception that could affect our ability lo detect or correctly interpret some indicators of their preparations for war. We would expect the Pact to employ such measures, but wc judgo that Pact security, concealment, and deception would not significantly degrade our ability to interpret quickly the sum of identified activities as preparations for war.
the Pact hadecision that war is Inevilahlesanction at least selective interference with ourThis could include space-based sysiems. While suchwould degrade Western intelligence, it would, in itself, constitutewarning Indicator.
are. In any case, confident of the ability of US andto detect and interpretteat numberwhich would be given were the Pact to prepare for awar with NATO. We are confident that we couldthat the Sovietor without its Pacttaking steps which would enable it to go to war in the nearone day of the beginning of activity associated with thc moveNational Defense Readiness or Full Combat Readiness.
Pact Options for Initialing War inImpactions
s Soviet leaders were considering thc preparation of Warsaw Pact forces for war with NATO, they would be faced with deciding the Jocallon. timing, and size of thc initialajor dilemma facing the Soviet leaders would be the degree to which they would care to trade off Pact preparedness and full combat potcnllal called for in their doctrinereater degree of strategic surprise which might be grantedmaller, but more quickly generated aitack designed to
Top taaoH
picempt lhc establishment of an organized defense by NATO. In the evaluation of the riiks, benefits, and warning implications of alternative Soviet and Warsaw Pact options for the initial altack. we have defined four Warsaw Pact options. Tho first, the stantllng-slart attack^
s included toore complete range of Pact capabilities. The other three of these options are selected on the basil of inielligence evidence^
n describing certain of the options, we refer to Warsaworganizations called fronts. (See the fnscif chaptern discussing thc number of fronts forEurope, we refer only to those lhat would bc in Central Europefor commitment in the initial attack. Warsaw Pactplans fot war in Europe envision the establishment of aof three fronts in the Central Region, with additionalforward from the western USSR toecondhc foldoul map appended to chapterhb conceptclearly in
doctrinal literature, and olher documentary evidence. If (he USSR should decide on war in Europe, it probably also would begin to activate the wartime structure of fronts throughout the USSR.
OptionStanding-Stort Attock
is no evidence *,
"^whicn feature an unprepared, standing-start attack on NATOeacetime force posture. The Soviets, however, do have the capability to attack NATO units using ground and air combat forces garrisoned near thc inter-Cerman border. As many aso IS Soviet divisions and perhaps several East Cerman divisions could reach initial combat points and lead or support such an attack in the Central Region in somewhat less ihanours. By dint of surprise and local force superiority. Soviet planners wouldmightearly ground and air victories.
initial successes would likely be the onlywould accrue to such an attack, however. Theweigh againstartanding startand we judge that there is virtually no chance thaiwouldar against NATO with an atlack fromstart. The Soviets would have to expect that thewould cause NATO to initiate massive and rapidsimultaneously with the Pact, and lhe local forcewould accrue in such an attack probably could not beNATO forces reacted effectively. The Soviets, consideringview of NATO rapid mobilization capabilities (discussed in
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fight well conclude thai the attacking force could face an advene situation before reinforcements could beThe attack would initially have to rely on incomplete lines of communications. The Soviets would not have time toront-level command, control, and communications structure or lo prepare thc Soviet or East European populace or national economics forbasic requirements posed in Soviet military literature. Finally, lhc standing-start attack would leave other Pact strategic and general purposewell as the nationalfor expanded hostilities. In particular, the Soviets would be concerned nbonl the threat of NATO escalation to nuclear war.
iThe forward movement of an attack force ofoivisions would provide many additional indicators to NATO intelligence, which routinely monitors military activity in East Germany.
ccordingly, in the extremely unlikely case of an unprovoked atiack on NATOeacetime posture, we judge that US and Allied intelligence could sense and would report the massive movementQ
J within hours of the beginning of preparation. Such activity would provide sufficient intelligence for Allied commanders and decisionmakers to take precautionary steps. Given the extremely unlikely nature of such an event, however, interpretation of this activity would be ambiguous,inalthat an attack was imminent might not be reached before hostilities occurred.
OptionWith Two Proofs
xtensive analysisus to
conclude that the smallest force the Pact would use to start theater offensive operations would consist of two fronts. This force would be composed essentially of all Soviet ground and tactical air force units in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia together with most of the East German and Czechoslovak units which are active intotal of someround divisions, plus support and tactical airxtensive study of Pact contingency plans
^he Pact's theoretical capability to organize, deploy, and prepare forccTTor war in Europe, Indicates that, fa lhc most urgent circurnsUnces. the Pact would need about four days towo-front force. While initiation of an aitack with slightly less than four full days of preparation is possible, thc complexity and magnitude of tlse operation and the risks attending insufficient preparation would be
likely to cause lhc Soviels lo lake more than four days lo prepare this two-front force, These preparations would bc madeompressed buildup procedure which would exacerbate the confusion andinherentransitionar footing and, at least initially, would yield combatespecially combat supportless ihan full capabilities to undertake or sustain combat operations. Preparations which,ess demanding operation, wouldhased or sequential pattern would have lo occur simultaneously.
By waiting towo-front attacking force. Ihe Pact would diminish many of the critical deficiencies of the standing-start attack. Naval capabilities would be substantially improved, and the minimal essentials of thc command and control system could be functioning.
Still, initiating hostilities after only these minimumwere made would entail serious risks for the Pact and would be extremely unlikely except in thc most urgent circumstances. The attacking force itself would lack some /ronl-level elements and would have to cover the broad sector from the Baltic to Austria. Command and control capabilities, particularly at the theater level, would remain incomplete. Pact mobilization would not have proceeded far enough to ensure immediate followup forces and supplies for the altack in Central Europe and effective participation in the war by major forces in other areas.
We are agreed that it is extremely unlikely that the Pact would initiate war from this two-front posture in other than an extraordinarily time-urgent circumstance On this point there arc two views. One holds that the only circumstance which would cause the Pact to Initiate theaterwidc offensive operaUons against NATO from this posture with only four days of preparation would be the Soviet perception of the threat of imminent NATO attack. Although NATO mobilization would be viewederious threat and would almost certainly cause the Pact to make counter preparations, the Soviets would be particularly averse to initiating an attackorce not fully prepared against NATO forces which emoyod some advantages of prior preparation orunless threat of imminent NATO altack was clear.1
The other view holds (hat the Soviets might choose Io atlack with the two-front forceariety of urgent contingencies. For example,erious East-West political dispute, the NATO countries (particularly tho United States and West Cermany) mightegree of mobilization and other military preparations to improve their defensive postures and to demonstrate will in support of
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the diplomatic bargaining. The Soviets, of course, might see this as weakening their own bargaining position, in particular by threatening to upset the political advantage afforded them by superiority in forces-in-being in Central Europe. Inontingency, and if they perceived truly vital interests at risk, thc Soviets might set in motion the rapid buildup and early attack option. Their efforts would be intended to preempt NATO defensive and diplomatic preparations, not an immediate threat of NATO attack.1
reparationwo-front attack from the norma! Pact peacetime posture would almost certainly require declaration of Full Combat Readiness and Full National Defense Readiness. Even if the alert were accomplishedost of indicatorsull readiness posture was being taken would be available and would almost certainly be interpreted and conveyed to decisionmakers within one day. Accordingly, US and NATO decisionmakers would almosthave three days or more of warning In the caseapid Pact attack with two fronts.
OptionWith Three fronts
third and fourth options are ones in which Sovieta less urgent need to defend or attack, would elect to bringto full readinessore efficient, phased buildupto aitack when the force available for initial operationsfronts {Option III) or five fronts (Optionhe sameearlier on Pact buildup planning and procedures indicates that,circumstances, the Pact would require,inimum, abouttohrec-/ronl force.
Pact preferencearger than two-front attack jsin Sovietbuildup to threeotal of someoivisionsand tacticaleasonable expectationorderly and efficient transition to an attack posture affordingsustainability, and precautions against thc risks of aIn addition, this option would provide opportunity fornaval forces to deploy. Accordingly, we judge that, excepturgent circumstances (as described above. the Pact would prefer to prepare athree-/ronfinitiating hostilities. Although these preparations coulda phased, organized manner, they would be massive andceruinly be initiated by an alert to Full Combat ReadinessNational Defense Readiness. US and NATO decisionmakers
* Thefrftni4 Mfd&fffMir Afrmiy. ihtSrcsrll, Aftmey; At AMWIiat Oul of Sufir-ulNcmo. Oeponmetdr. (A* OUoesm tf
(VjitXrvnllhe Nen. ond ihrf Stiff,n>tf mrnl of iht A* Fcxl
would almost certainly have seven days or more of warning in thc eventact altack with three fronts.
OptionWitt. Five Fronts
he Pact might elect to build up even greater forces in Eastern Europe prior lo initiating hostilities against NATO, depending on its assessment of the political and miliiary situation at theround divisions plus support and tactical air units and with additional naval units atfulfill Soviet conservative doctrinal preferences to the extent possible in practical terms and would take about two weeks lo achieve
he pattern of activity involved inull five-front attack force in Europe would be similar to that of lhe lhrce-/ront force, although the pace might bc reduced somewhat. We judge that aboul two weeks would be required to prepare for combat and move from the USSR the two additional fronts. Western intelligence would almost certainly be able lo sense thc change in overall posture even if the first alert to increased readiness were not directly and immediately detected. Therefore, we judge that in the caseive-front attack option, intelligence could provide warning that the Pact was taking steps which would.enable it to go to war in the near future, possibly within hours, but certainlyay or Iwo of the initial order to go to irKreased readiness. Accordingly, in the caseull five-frontS and NATO decisionmakers would haveays or so of warning time.
Summary Judgmenti ond Relative likelihood
n summary, the following judgmenti are unanimous within the Intelligence Community and are based on extensive analysis of all-source dataj"
Ion Pact planning, and information related to the generation of military forces in the Central Region.
The' Pact would begin to organize at least five fronts fot use in Central Europe from the time of the decision to go to full readiness.
There is virtually no dunce that the Soviets would attacktanding start.
The smallest force the Pact would use toheater offensive would consist of two fronts, requiring about four days of preparation; except in an extraordinarily Hme-urgentit is extremely unlikely the Pad would initiate-war from this posture
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-lop Soc^-flUff
The Pact would prefer, before attacking, to prepare athree-/ron' force, which would require,inimum, about eight days of preparation.
Circumstances permitting, lhe Pact would build up even greater forces in Eastern Europe before initiating hostilities against NATO.
paragraphshroughe have discussed theof thc strengths and weaknesses of each of the fourwe have estimated approximate minimum preparation limesbe required before the Pact couldoherent attackforceiven size. Of course, any Soviel decision on when tobe influencedet of sometimes contradictoryincluding thc USSR's own level of preparations and itsof the slatus of NATO preparations and deployments, the desiresurprise, and the urge to develop fully, in advance, as largeas possible. We are agreed thai lhe ultimate decision tocertainly would not rest on purely militaty factors, but rathercombination of those and political imperatives, the state ofor other consideralions.
though the various analysts within lhe Communitythe same basic data, different conclusions have beenthe most likely timingact attack. This is dueinterpretations of data and judgments about the weightingvarious military and polilical factors and considerations. One viewthe data and draws conclusions as follows:
two to three
are the forces thai the Pact would have available in the forward area in the four-to-eight-day period.
The Pact has the most favorable force ratio in this same period after beginning preparations for war.
These factors in the context of Soviet military writings and other sensitive materials, emphasize the importance of surprise.
Therefore, the four-to-eight-day period is the most likely time for the Pact to attack.
others believe that it is more likely the Pact would takeeight days of preparation (assembling three to five fronts)hostilities. In their view:
Pact preference for an attack involving more than two fronts is well supported in Soviet writings^
' Tht holder et thlthe Ahummf Stsf/ for Inietllgrxtit. Dtpaitmenl of iht Army. 13
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"There ii no agreed system of calculating force ratios, and several methods other than that used to form the preceding view show that greater force ratios occur after eight days of preparation. In any case, force ratios would be only one of the considerations in timing the atlack.
Soviet doctrine calls for force superiority, availability of icsup-ply and reinforcements, full preparation for joint action by all components of the miliiary forces, stability of thc rear, and fully effective command and control, and each of these is enhanced with eight days or more of preparation.
Although the Pact would attempt to achieve both surprise and force superiority, if forced to-choose between them the Pact would likely opt for force superiority.
Soviet military planning is conservative, and the risks the Soviets would associate with potentially inadequate preparation would be high.
G'aduaJ Buildup
odification to any of the options previously discussed, the Soviets, and possibly their Pact allies, could make gradualfor waronger period. Steps which increase the combat readiness of any elements of their military forces could be taken selectively over an interval of weeks or months. For example, such steps the mobilization of rear service support elements in the forward area^
which would normally be accomplishederiod of Full CombaT Readiness, could be accomplished incrementallyeriod of no alert. Such steps, however, would probably be noted by Western intelligence within days after their implementation and would bc interpreted as modifying the Pact peacetime military posture Such actions might result tn reactionsimilar nature by NATO members and would certainly increase Western intelligence efforts. Though these Pact steps might somewhat reduce the lime necessary to achieve the full combat readiness of thc forces discussed in Options II. HI, and IV, they would be taken at the expense of likely greater NATO preparedness and vigilance.
ther measures which the USSR alone or in concert with Its Pact allies might undertake to carry out gradually could Include more time-consuming, bul relatively unprovocative, civil and military preparedness steps. These measures would not Involve any steps normally associated with the alert to Full Combat Readiness and could improve the efficiency of the nation toar and thq sustalnability of the forces but not necessarily the initial combat
Tap Cwtf BUf-f-
capability of (lie engaging forces. They would noi grcally improve lhe Soviel and Pact capability to move quicklyosture of Full Combat Readiness because the large-scale and most time-consuming actions that
are required in each of thc previous options, and which would still be
very visible, would remain to be done.
radual Pact preparations for hostilities, eithereliberate policy in preparation for some "surprise" action including attack oreriod of political crisis, would present more analytic problems for US inlelligence than would thc sudden and widespread implementation of war preparations.radual Implementation would provide us more opportunities to delect some of tlie preparations and more lime Io validate our information, the early preparations would probably be ambiguous and might be difficult to distinguish from "routine" force improvements or exercises.
ecause of the high risks and costs involved, the Pact would defer general mobilization, major deployments of combat forces, and other highly visible and provocative measures until the final move to full readiness. We therefore believe that even after some montlis of preparation,inal or contingent decision to attack was made, there would stilliscernible difference in the nature, scope, and pace of preparedness measures. Thb would alert us and enable us to provide warning that the Pact was initiating the final steps that would ennble it to go to war in the near future. Accordingly, evenradual buildup, wc believe we would detectay the final moves to full readiness to attack.
eriod of gradual preparations would improve Pact combat effectiveness and civil preparedness under any of thc postulated buildup options. Depending on the number and nature of the measures already taken and the political circumstances, the time required to prepare tbe attack could also be reduced, perhaps by as muchay or more. We would, however, already have issued warnings, probably repeatedly,rowing danger of hostilities.
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DISCUSSION
LIKELIHOODATO-WARSAW PACT WAR
The Soviets keep strong miliury forces ol theii own in East Cermany. Poland. Chechoslovakia, and Hungary in order to maintain thetr dominant position In that region, to deter Western mihtary action or to fight elfectlvely if deterrence fails, and to maiimire (heir Influence upon West European affairs.
The danger of war in Europe has longajor preoccupation of Soviet security policy. Soviet leaders would regard another Europeanlhe prospects of nudeara major threat to the USSR's existence.
A. Soviet Views of Risks tn War With NATO
arsaw Pact' Initiation ofNATO in Europe, the Soviets see two
NATO could puttiff defense which mighluick Pact victory and thus gain the time to bring into pby the greater manpower and industrial reserves of the West.
The war could go nuclear with unpredictable consequences; the end result mightassive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.
In addition. Moscow might wellisk In depending on its Pact allies to fight loyally and effectively.
planners woulduick,reaction to any atuck. Soviet reportingmilitary capabilities indicates clearly thathave good daU on NATO's order ofprocedures, readiness categories, andlimes and lhal they interpret this information Inconservative manner. Foe4
Ta*acl bet iht
oland. Eu Cernunr. Cttha&mUK.
Romania, and Bulgaria.
classified Soviet assessment ascribed to NATO the capability to:
Deploy covering ground unils to forward areas, within six hours.
Deploy first-echelon ground units for combat within onealf to two day*.
Launchercent of tactical aircraft within three to threealf hours.
Deploy naval combat units to sea within four hours.
Launch almostercent of tactical nuclear missiles within five minutes,
Emplace some nuclear mine barriei within Iwoalf hours and tho remainder withinours.
Complete lhe air deployment lo Europe from the United States of two divisions In three diys.
These Soviet estimates assumed no prior NATO alert. The Soviets assumed shorter times If NATO wereosture of increased readiness. Another assessment indicated Soviet belief thatFrtnch participation, which the Pact cannot prudentlyfield in Central Europe more thanivision equivalents In five days and someivisions Inavs. Other Soviet assessments^
J confirm thb picturerudent, sometimes exaggerated, appreciation of NATO capacities.
hc Soviets would also be inHiiervecd by their perception of NATO's long-term potential and of Its good prospects for external help. The Soviets are awaro that Sweden wouldarsaw Pact victory and could complicate Pact problems on the northern flank and lhat Spain too has potential for fupportlng NATO operations. The Soviets probably see most non-European nations as favoring the Western cause and believe lhal some of them would likely Join NATOrotracted war. Moscow must abo reeognlae. moreover, thai most of those few states that might
-fiUff-
el coact victory would bo constrained by' NATO's control of thc seas and of trade.
oscow fears thai if II were engagedrotracted conflict tn thc west. Peking might lake the opportunity to strike in thc easi. We'lhink there is litlle dangerhinese aitack on lhe USSR, but the Soviets, perhaps againatter, of prudence, rale lhe danger higher lhan do we. [
he second great deterrent for llie Soviets Is ihcir realization lhat nuclear operations could start at any lime alter hostilities began and could quickly spread without limitfj^
^Moscow i
that NATO
would use nuclear weapons to avoid defeat and ihat escalation may not be controlled shortuD'Scale exchange of strategic weapons. The mere existence of the separately controlled British and French strategic nuclear systems compound) lhe Soviets' uncertainty about their ability to control nuclear escalation. Publicity about US consideration of limited nudear options, the West's continued refusal to accept Soviet no-first-usc proposals, and the Soviets" expressed concern with what they perceive as Western,US, unpredictability convince us that the Soviets would be most unwilling toonflict with NATO unless they had accepted the risks of both iheatcr and strategic nuclear war.
& Doubts that its allies would fight loyally and effectively would further constrain Moscow's planning for aggressive war. The Soviets know lhat. Ifree choice, few East Europeans would support them inar. Moscow would rely on political and military controls and onanti-Ccrmanwe cannot say how effective Moscow believes these measures might be
he SovieU would icoognlze great risk In, initiating a' war alone in the expectation of dragging the East Europeans In after them. They must depend on their alliesATO-Pact war because of Central European geography and tho Interdependent Pact force structure. The Soviets would have to mount the attack from East European territory, and they probably could not depend upon unwarned and unprepared allies to commence and carry outand effectively lhe tasks necessary to augment and sustain the offensive. More than half the Pact divisions and aircraft now In Central Europe are East European, and they have been assigned combat roles in the initial stages of conflict Furthermore, the lines
of communication from the USSR all run through East European countries, and these countries are largely responsible for operating and servicing the land ttaniport systems and for provision of critical air and rear area defenses.
honces ol War in Present Circumstances
In light of Soviel views of the rbksATO-Pact war. we believe il highly unlikely thai the SovieU would decide deliberately lo attack NATO In the present circumstances. It Is abo unlikely lhat Ihc Soviel leaders believe that NATO wants war or would seek IIeliberate policy. War In Europe would become likely onlyesultrofound change In the political, miliiary, or economic situation. Changes in thc military balance and alterations In each side's perceptions of the other's strengths and weaknesses could, of course, affect the way the SovieU would calculate the potential gains and risksignificant weakening of NATO's nuliUry potential would encourage lhe Soviets to think they could eaerdse more influence in Western Europe and might tempt Moscow Into using pressure tactics. But changes in the miliiary balance would not likely lead lo war so long as tlve SovieU perceived.that their losses would be heavy and that the risk to the Soviet homeland would be high.
We believear in Europe would be precedederiod of eitrerne tensionrisis of unprecedented severity. Tbe Soviets showy
"jlhal they too anticipateeriod of tensioalo view of the above-cited dangersar with NATO, the SovieU wouldrotracted search for an alternative solution. Onlyrisisoinl where they saw tlieir viul interests directly threatened would the SovieU entertain the possibility otar with NATO.
a period of extreme tension wherewantt war, there are likely to be movesIn which cause and effectwith each side believing that time andof evenu are working against IL There bdeal of uncertainty in predictingituation. We think it Is highly unlikelySovieU would allow minor Isostile Incidentsinto open hostilities in the absence ofdecision to go to war. We believe,any Sovlol decision to go to war it likely toby some sequence of evenU Involving
escalations on both side* and miscalculation! in est sis management.
IJ Wc do nothat changes in the Soviet leadership in the foreseeable future willny marled effect on the probabilityATO-Pael war. Differences of view, pctsonally or institutionally motivated, exist in the Politburo and. no doubt, will continue to exist, but these differences aie not lively to upset the stability of the system.
II. SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVESAR WITH NATO
clearthe principal objective of PacTiniliUry operations against NATO wouldapid and total victory in Central Europe. We consider II extremely unlikely lhat lhe SovieU would deliberately attack with limited1 force to achieve limited objectives, eitherr si step in going lo war with NATO or lo obtain thc upper handrisis while attempting to avoid war.
A. limited Operotions for limited Objectives
It he Sovieu
could,risis, undertake military operalions in Europeimited scale to seitetrategically important territory or city. Theobjectives of such an operation could be cither to serve as an initial step in going to war or to settle lhe crisis on Soviet terms while avoiding large-scale war with NATO
We see no advantage to Ihe Soviet! inarge-scale warimitedaitack. By delinlllon, lhe limited-objective attack would have little or no military value In destroying or interrupting development of NATO's combatl would, in fact, completely sacrifice stralegic surprise and ensure that NATO mob Ji ration would noi (ar lag lhat of the Pact
evice lo secure an important jviktieal objective (for ei ample, control ol West Berlin or Hamburg) while attempting to avoid war withimited-objcclive attack would hive serious flaws In lhc Soviet view. The SovieU would attempt lo present the United States, West Germany, or NATOiliiary fall accompli by selling lhc objective quickly,inimum of resistance, while mobilis-
ing Pact forces. They then wouldegotiated settlement while deterring further military action through the threat ol theater warully prepared Pact force.
he Soviets' perceptions ol NATO forces and doctrine and their concept of Ihe overall "correlation of forces" show that iheysee lhe risksimited-objective attack as far outweighing ihe short-range gains Accordingly, we judge there is virtually no chance that they would Initiate an atiack lo obtain limited obsCctlvcs in the present military, poliiical. and economic situation The mosi serious risk would be the expansion ol armed resistance and in escalation to general war. The Sovleti could noi be confident that tactical nuclear weapons would not be used In responseudden limited -objective aitack. The grave consequences ol miscalculation and first use of nuclear weapons In response lo such an attack, however slight the chances, would seem lo far outweigh thc potential gains.
Even In the absence of war, such an action would signal thc end of lhe era of "peaceful coexistence" and would Inevitably throw NATO into serious preparations for war in Europe. Civen their own conservative view of NATO's great mobilization eapabililies in the short run. and the prospect of activating NATO's much greater industrial,and economic potential ia lhe longer run, the SovieU could perceive an Increasingly adverse balance of forces in Europe si NATO rose to tlse lask of confronting what would be considered an extremely serious Soviet ihreal.
Soviel leaders could noi be confidentimited-objective aitack could succeed quickly. They are aware that an attack to scire control of West Berlin, for example, would be complicated, bitterly opposed by Western foices In lhe city, and likely lo escalateroader war. Likewise, lhe occupation of major urban centers near the iMer-Cerman border, such as Hamburg, would require major deployment of Soviet forces to lhc area to overcome lhe NATO forces garrisoned there. In either ease, protracted resistance would inevitably cause the Soviets to increase the weight of iheir attack and (he attendant destruction of their objective, thus Increasing Ihe chances lhat the war would spread The risks perceived by the SovieU ofar with NATO without the force-wide miliiary preparations they deem necessary lo sustain the atiack and lo guard against escalation are discussed in chapter IV. on "How (lie Pact Would Co toeginning at
B. TotolBasic Soviet Objecli've
f the SovieU decided to go to war with NATO, fot whatever ruion, it it highly likely that their principal military objective would be the rapid defeat of all NATO forces in Central Europe. Whether France became an objective would depend on the course of the campaign and the part the French played in il. The requirement lo rapidly engage and destroy all NATO combat formations In Central Europe and lo occupy NATO territory Is driven by the Soviels' high regard for NATO's greater war potential. In the Soviet view, onlyroad, rapid offensive campaign could the USSR hope lo interrupt or prevent NATO from developing equal or. possibly in (he longer run. greater_eombat potential in Europe.
5
iet military
operations designed to achieveapid, total victory over NATO forces.
C. Possible Pad Theaters of MilitoryIn Europe
strategists have identified al leastofperatlona (TVDs) In whichpotential land conflicts withhese theaters are described below,brief characterizations of the types of military
operations that the Soviets appear to envisage for each.
Pact planning is sufficiently flexible to allow for
variations In any of these elements, and exercises
frequently rehearse such variations.
TVD. Information^
"^indicates that (he Sovietsorthwestern TVD (hat would be based on (he Leningrad Military District and(he Scandinavian Peninsula. This Information implies the eslstence of contingency plans for (he defense of the Murmansk and White Sea areas, including Northern Fleet instillations, for neutralising or selling the lightly defended NATO facilities in northern Norway, and for deploying fordefense in depth of the Norwegian Sea. The Soviets" Urge Northern Fleet would also be used lo restrict NATO movements north of the Creenland. Iceland. United Kingdom gap and against NATO naval forces and merchant shipping in the North Atlantic where possible.
estern TVD. The Western TVD would include East Cermany, Poland, and Cxeehoslovakla on the Pact side and West Cermany. the Benelux nations, Denmark, and France on the NATO side. The bulk of
both NATO and Pact (heater forces are eitherEurope or earmarked for use there. The SovietFleet and the Polish and East Cerman Navieslikely be used in attempts to gain conirol of (heSea, to support amphibious operations InTVD, and lo secure passage to tlvc open*
oulhweslera TVD. Soviet planners envision military opermlions against Oreece and Turkey, and probably northern Italy and Austria,""
^operations against Crecceurkey would bc launched from Bulgaria and Ihe Odessa region of (he USSR to secure (he Turkish Straits and support naval operations In the eastern Mediterranean. Operations against northern Italy intended to secure the southern flank of the Western TVD might be launched flora Hungary through Yugoslavia or Austria. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet (including lhe air component) and the much smaller Bulgarian and Romanian Navies could supportaimed at securing the straits and neutrillrlng NATO naval forces In the Mediterranean and Black Seaa
against eastern Turkey; oo thewould be far from certs inL
^Moscow mighl wdl prefer mcrdy toresence there suffldent to tie down Turkish fences without weakening the principal efforts elsewhere
Soviet Navy's EiWrala lhewould be employed primarily against theand ballistic missile submarines therethe threat they riosc, Soviet land-basedwould be similarly employed. Thewould attempt to destroy these carrierswith conventlonaj weapons al thc outsetand would use nudear weapons foronce nuclear warfare begin. Anyextensive naval campaign would be beyondhowever, because of inadequatepoor local air support NATO land-basedthat could be brought lo bear over the sea,ai NATO navies, wouldignificantto the Eitadrc and to IU essential linesthrough the Turkish Strolls, evenwere under Soviet oiflilaiy cexarpaboo.
1 This Ruoua word woulde trudiud uThe So-Het ninl force le theuja theaUS to.ii.droe, however, 1Bd more nodr ojuilanumbered US fleer In die ind tnof tHrm.
Althoughcrisis leading lo war could develop at easily on one of NATO's flanks as in ibe center (pcrhapi even more easily on llw southernhe Soviets would expect Central Europe io be the decisive areaarge-scale conflict, ll Is the European locus of jx>wor for boih alliances and encompasses military, poliiical, and economic entities thai the Soviets would have lo dominate or destroy to achieve victory. We believe lhal ihc Warsaw Pad hat Ihe means to conduct limited offensive operations in tlieand Southwestern TVDs while simuhaneoudyull-scale olfenslve against llie NATO conler, arid it might do so in hope of both helping Soviet naval operations and diverting NATO ground and air forces from the decisive theater. In any case, however, lhc Soviets would not launch flank offensives before having made full preparations for hostilities in Central Europe.
ctivities in Other Areas
f the Pad were preparing for war with NATO, thc Soviets would also prepare for conflict In the Far East with Chinese, US. ot Japanese forces. On lhe mainland. Soviet iheater forces would be prepared for the possibility ihit China might take advantagear in Europe and attack Sovietn lhe Pacific, the Soviets would prepare for action against US naval and air forces.eriod of tension or crisis we would eipect intensified lutveiilance and the initiation of certain preparatory measures by ground, sea. and air forces, such as the movemeni of ships to sea lo enhance their survivability as well as lo position them for possible war,
he small number of Soviet naval units deployed in distant areas, such as Ihe Caribbean Sea or the Indian Ocean, piobably have contingency missions in the eventATO-Pact war. These units probably would be prepared to engage Western naval forces wiih conventional or nuclear weapons. Because of the limited size and eapabililies of the Soviet naval forces, they would be extremely vulnerable to counterattack. If they were able to carry oul iheir tasks and survive, they probably would try to Join other Soviet naval forcesthey could bedisrupt Weslern shipping.
III. WARSAW PACT DOCTRINE AND READINESS
A. Doclrino
he key elements of Soviet doctrine which attect how Ihe USSR might initiate war in Europe
Include (he principles of force superiority, combined arms, surprise lhe stability of lhe rear, and offensive
initiative.
oviet doctrine emphasizes lhc need for heavy superiority in the main battle areas, with strong .supplies as well asensure the momentum of the attack. Concentration of force is. ofundamental principle for all armies, but the concept has exceptional impact in Russian militaiy thinking and practice. lU continuing importance to Soviel planning is demonstrated not only by doctrinal slalctnents, but also by Pact peacetime dispositions, by exercises, and by lhe size of the foices fielded for Ihc intervention In Czechoslovakia.
nother tend of Soviet doctrine, closely associ-Bted wiih lhat of force superiority, is joint action by all components of thc miliiary forces. Each component of the military establishment is considered lo haveontingentany majorPreparations by the ground and tactical air elements, for example, would be paralleled by readiness preparations in naval and strategic atiack and defense forces even If these forces were not required to participate directly in the contemplated action. Such preparations would be extremelyin the Soviet view since there would always be thc risk of nuclear war in any large-scale hostilities.
wcre no lime, ot if surprise were considered intlM. such measures would be taken concurrently with the opening of hostilities. The Soviets view morale--not only of the lioops but also of the generalhighly important, if not essential, lo armed struggle. They put almost equal stress on Ihc effective functioning of the political and economic Institutions. Tho il.-ilii, of Ihe rear" was given first place inpermanently operating factors ofnd. though his words are no longer used, modem Soviet military theorists emphasize lhc same thought.
oviet strategy for war in Europe centers on the doctrine of selling and holding lhe strategic initiative through prompt offensive action by all forces: Pact
emphasis
on early launcharge-scale "offensive to destroy thc main NATO forces and to sets* at lhc leasl West Cermany. the Benelux nations, and Denmarkampaign tasting less,onth. Although these Vddress the contingencies of an actual or threatened NATO attack, lhc concept would apply equally well to an unprovoked Soviet altack. In this case, the shock and suddenness of the Pact
offensive would be Intended to prevent NATO fotces fiom preparingounteroftensive or establishing a
fined dcfcmlve line which might force the Pact into
prolonged positional warfare and provide NATO time
to develop its full wartime potential.
B. War sow Poet Readiness
he principle of the strategic initiative is also consistent with Pact efforts to maintain capabilities for rapid mobilization and emergency deploymenl.peacetime the Pad countries maintain large theater and strategic forces at varying levels of readiness. Details on tlte readiness ol selected elements of the Warsaw Pact armed forcei are contained in the annex The basic structure and most elements of the entire theater force intended for early wartime use are in being, although usually not al full strength. Most Soviet strategic offensive forces are maintained at lower levels of readiness than their US counterparts. The Soviets apparently believeeriod of increased tension, called thc Period of Threat In Soviet mago, will precede any major use of military forces. Tho peacetime readiness status of Pod forces reflects the Soviets' heavy reliance on the warning that they believeeriod would provide, and their rcoognition of the political and economic cost of maintainingigh readiness posture. It is clear from force organisation, deploymenl. aod teadiness thai Moscow does expect lo have some time
for preparations before hostilities begin. Tlte Soviets also tecognlae, however, that an enemy might be capable of drastically reducing the duration of ihis period of tension.
ach Pact nationual slcrl and callup
3
One part of the system, called the tedinea Plan (oreals with thc mobilization readiness of lhe national admlnlslrallon and economy. Including theof reserve manpower and civilian equipment for miliiary duty. The other part Is lhe Pacl-wlde System of Combat Readiness, which seU forth readiness, alert, and mobilization requiremenU and procedures for lhe active armed forcei In combination, theseprovide the control and coordination necessary toountry and its armed forceseacetime statusar footing. The table appended lo ihis chapter outlines the various alert and teadiness levels and the Interrelationship between the two parts of the system.
IV. HOW THE PACT WOULD OO TO WAR A. Response to Crisis
ecause of lhe deterrents to war described inhroughf chapter I, we Judge that, from the beginning of any crisis, lhe SovieU wouldajor and protracted effort to resolve thc outstanding issue peacefully. They would attempt diplomatic inilUtives, both public and private, might use pressure ladies or thread, and would prefer any means other than war whichhance for an acceptable solution.
ndeed, we believe lhat hostilitiei would more likely follow from an escalating political crisis than from an unprovoked decision lo resort to war. Diplomatic effortserious crisis would be hampered by mutual distrust of and possibly by misreading of motives, leading to demonstrative or precautionary military preparations and therebyIhc chances of further miscalculation and escalation.
his ond the following sections in this Estimate discuss Tad options lot initiating war with NATO from its present political economic, and military posture. If,eriod of many montlu or several years, relations between" (lie Western and Warsaw Pad nations deteriorated badly, tlie political, eco-
Situation ami Method of Implementation
TV nationhole ami ihe naml forcea
niinliM CarallanlWM aaad Cone'eal Cqulal ruWtarai re-
* (Thee* ate nan-laid Waiaa- "act
lfimi dcaignating the peacetimeelected r'"iie->ti canordered io htgiKr
rcadiri^ii Ic-veli lo eientw1 (ha iraaan oteal -Mii (xobkmi not aitoeUird with (de iiiionaixinal
In Conifdnf national Dt/nut PteJlnai Ike n> (tonalitration and the economy iiiitly routine aimed forces requlremenU
and Create iKe neceuary COndillool. lueh al
llci of equipment,apid mobili-ration.
In CiMjianf Coml-if Rtedlntu lhe armod Force aie not oo itcrl and ate conducting normal peeoct'nf training
a/ Ihtimt
I nc lea led International tendon wouldan evaluation ofn-llon by the
nationalefoia the nl' iiailon had mulled let * decJJon. a lew
niiiiinal and armedr. intelligence and reeenna
could be oid'ted litcrvewdelective barta Whena^anhar. decer-rruncthreat eaiata, pra-
,
wiel.li, lha nation having moeiuUatJoe ear wartime aralgearvnitj to Increase natlocnl
'.oflMVIl fadrif,
ln the our of an immediate and obvtsuaVthreal lo lha nation, preparation,nuy br directed Irtl mad lately toward fuUy root* tiling tlie emnomy. ihu armednd Ihe tn mortal border, and etvd drfriueeriod ofIn-rat ingluctuating temloo. preparatlom may beonumber of ptiaaealo enntie lha availability of force) appropriate for dealing wllh each ilage ofdcvtfcifitrir. situation, while al thc lame nine avoiding unneceaaary dUruptlon of Ihe nation. Although Ih* actual numbert uard would prolrably vaiy wiih lhe
particular cililt. lheorn generally fall Into two lubdi'ltloni of lhe overall Peilod a/ Ik-tet
lira? MbdJvtaian. celled IrwraerW Pri Ji-'n. li character! led by various nwaiurn Intended la) aon-re lha abif.ty af nr total component! to mee-Iiie rapidly 0*
required and to IraCasaae lhe Ulelyof lhe cwmpuneMtmeeultwd /acreaaW NaUlonaaf De/nur fUe-tWa
for ibe rattan aod fnavaawed Co-afcer fteWineu foe (he armed loraea are or-dered either Immediately foe all comp> neetti orore aelev'ive and gradual bait* Preparation* may be co.nl and may Include eaJlaTag taleeeed eleanenU lo FiiH Rradtiuu The duratloa of Ihe paludi' FraJirwi It determined more by the nature of lhe crlKs than by lhcy lo oampleir trie preparatory mramria
Footnotei al end of la We
Oe/enM fjodtfmi
the nalurt (ullilla Uila lhat ara primarily of an Mganlultotul naluie and lhal preduol al little durn ['Ion at pottlM* In the national
economy. Limited orgmlialimit ihanjei In
the. govetnmenl and civilianioiij:tiiFiit and aupptte* held Is national leasrveo, togethn with limited nuroben of loervuu. ve hie lea, andmay be called ap from the national ocotomy. Moveanent of all transportilliatlortotrlcted.
At UtuiuJ Combar flrWinau, unlti ire on alert and tela prrraratiwyn anlktpattea af the deoLratlon of FuU
Convbat Readlnaai Deprndi-ig on lheand miliiary tiiaanen, all mlUary feroea
a mueilry, ar una branch eat ariMrax eat Dll.Uiy doUttt. Or twaa aaaai ta^tiaeJ
formutloa. may he pkoad an frvrrtaW CeWal Hiatflaeai. Aaf the meaawaa are
ma ad Hal ft and ftBiOout group! k
aatiaicaoona/eoiaaaaaad poali naafaalptaae ra^trwed/aaaoddled.
eoaooia Inrmaod.
arraeai and prepared
paepaiod lo reoelvo leaeotalt
-SetecCed eafluiia brgiia.unit deoloymrnt may be made.
Sllirahon andd,.
ti
Wivii-
li chaiailertied by mruurei which pin-
efinite liaiuillon lowar lootirf. FofftftiHt >Wiw la thr
ami Fvtf Combat fteariracuIhr
armed forces would be ordered unmcd., l(
thecal ol allack. Deoauie ol ihr liWh;
ounluitait indela iwyiledTact (nwrto -UU petei. il lime -o* avlrlable. lo moblliie inmiwedVily iraaaaaM Abe the
jpl-T.1 a>
niobilliallon.
Warsaw Paci Alert and Callup System (Continued)
olfcuiaf Otfctut Rredlnetimialxrlcs and cue admlnulrairve or-garo uunit ihtli (u" wartime orginlulloru aod provide wv.t, and (Uppon la (he armed force* Ileaerviili and equipment fiom ihe national economy have motillucd Into the limed loim. andoo. verted to tin production cf war rnilciiik
Amin! I'okoi
( Aeorfrntii lii at mid
iradivu level. Full inoblllulUan li cadeird aad ikeM
natal - .
undo comhil *Vd rondllioiu Allti ne intended to achioa Fuff CamUil
beforei.nf. although. Iniveteeiara* Immediate
aliisa, ihiie* of (he
ateaMirel lalin aie
rvwad alrtartoie aciraated
liKcdeaemtii.etrpluyrd, read/ lo eiceulc war plan*
xiuud daaalo
uier 'i
' Trveie are only thee* teadirua* lev*ti lor lite armed (orce* There are. however, varvln* rumSeri ol read'-en ccndifioni loe weapon
" InScMrl lermlr-Jtfr. an os**attain fn>f> haflloHl MM by Ihe Halliy* licjj(folenter* lo
nornic, and military posture ot* both alliance* could be expected lo change. If thb were to occur, the |iidgmenti In thisagainst the present political, economic, and militaryno longer be valid.
the contingencies we discuss incould possibly derivehort,developing from an ealraordinary event, suchconfronlalion ovei Berlin. Yugoslavia, lheorstrategic nuclear accident.
B. Tho Process of Preporing for War
purposes ol discussing how the Pactto war. we have categorised expected activitiesprocesses: deciding logo lo war; internalcivil and economic preparation;preparation.
Deciding To Oo lo
iven the present structure of Soviel political and military leadership, the decision lo prepare for ot Initiate war with NATO would necessarily be made by the full Politburo and almost certainly with the recommendation of lhe Defense Council (Seenless lhe reason for going lo war were obvious to lhe principal Politburo members, the decision wouldontentious and probably protracted process. We judge il unlikely thai |he Soviets couldlear cause or provocation llnl would not be obvious to the
West aslL Security ior rounding such grave deliberations would be ealraordinary, but lhe decision process would almost certainly involve scores of high-level political and military officers. The initial decision probably would establish the intent lo prepare for or initiate an attack on NATO and the degree of iiigeney tequircd. Il almost certainly would not establish the date and lime of aitack or irrevocably commit the Soviets to attack. The final decision lo attack might not be madeew hours before ils ei (Cut ion.
4S. We cannot judge lo wkal extent lhe counsel of Kast European leaden would be sought in lhe initial decisionmaking process, but the anticipated reactions of the principal Warsaw Pact allies would almost certainly weigh heavily in the decision Sooner or later, the eommilment of principal East European political and military leaders would almost certainly be required because their support would be critical In (he executionar wiih NATO.
Poli tic ol Prtporotlon
ajor concern of the Soviet leadershipo guarantee lhe support and stability of the population and public institutions In both the Soviet Union and Eastern Furope Rcpreaentataotu to the regional leadership of lhe Communist Party of llie Soviet Union would piobably be made,aige-scale propaganda program to motivate lhe Soviet populace lo support ihe decision to go to wai would be
24
articular grouping of lion (or Iciml TW* puup hu rhe menuommand, control andind ti inpoealble lor maintaining close coordination wiih ihoe nrtoui aMt ol anay* lleU loreea
JV-Sewef-ftWf-
National Political Authority
National Military Authority
Command Authorities Peacetime
Politburoember*
Defense Council 8'e fine* IChavmin) Kosvgift
Collegium
Ustinov iM<mj!t. ol Dclenselew oik sis
Minister
of Defense
Armed
rnit rtovf* Oapkiaaimoii carufa'v would
io praoara to* war. Jucn oC'DWallom would alio Hilly liwolva aeoin ol emx hl^ j. Otricci *vtiovlo. mil aupperl lor lha pHnclpali.
Ittaal and t
or initiated. The more critical problem, in the Soviet view, would be the ellcitation of support and maintenance of firm political control of lhe populace and public institutions of the principal Easi European allies.
irm represcnlations would almost certainly be made to the principal political and military leaders of the East European allies, and massive propaganda campaigns would likely be orchestrated. Steps to suppress and conirol potential dissident movemenU would almost certainly be takea Circurnstances permitting, the Soviets might undertake weeks or months of such activity tooherent response from the East European populace. In the caseudden altackeacetime posture, the Soviets would have to accept the risks cf uncertain East European .political backing for their action, although they might hope to enforce cooperation from the outset If necessary and establish firm political support during the Initial stage of Itostllltles through control of Informationclear" call to war.
Preporotlon of Notional Economies
n preparing to initiate hostilities with NATO, the Soviets could not be certain whether thewar would be short or long, nuclear or nonnuclear, andatter of prudence would have to consider full civil and economic preparations from the start.risis deepened and the chances of war increased, the Soviets almost certainly would take some steps to prepare lhc nation for warr Such preparations would continue at an accelerated pacetate of Increased National Defense Readiness was declared. (This stale is described in thc table appended to chapter III)
he process of putting industrial and agricul. rural systemsull war footing, whether begun before orar started, would be both disruptive and visible and would.lake weeks or months to work out. even with wholly adequate planning. Many of the measures would have to be implemented promptly. For example, miliiary control over the transportation
res fitroaott-
fncililtcs would have lo be established early. Conuder-ablebo required lo rcroule and organize tolling slock lo support Ihc rnovemenl and logistics support for lhc forcea in lhc field and lhe changed economic priorities. Likewise, cilabliihmcnl of military control of criticalcould not be delayed.
defense preparations would certainlybc integrated with lhe political and economicwould be considered In the early stages of apreliminary steps might abo be taken, suehlo relocate leaders and lo maleOther more drastic steps, such aiof cities, would begin, if al all, only Inof full preparation (ot war.
Miliiary Procedures
way in which the Pact modifiedrisis would depend largely onurgency, and intensity with which the
a slowly developing crisis thc Pact counlries might move lo Institute Increased CorruSii Readiness (as defined In the above-citednide variety of measures mighl be undertaken, but these would fall far
short of placing Ihe Pactull war footing.
The process need not bo continuous; ralher ihere
piobably would be periods of holding al Interim
levels.
lhe Soviets had determined that the likelihood of war was high, the Pact's final preparations would be initiatedecision to go lo Full Combat Readiness (as defined In lliehis decision could occur with or without the pieeiistencetale of Increased readiness. After that decision, preparations for war would move rapidly and continuously.
arsaw Pact contingency planning identifies two basic approaches to achieving Full Combat Readiness:
Tho phased approach, to bc undertaken while the Pact stillhance of avoiding hostilities; would be lo movear footingeliberate and orderly manner, bringing various force elements to full readiness sequentially.
Tho compressed approach, which would he undertaken either after the unanticipated out-
break of hostilities or when the SovieU deemed war both unavoidable and Imminent, would entail readying all forcea simultaneously and as rapidly as possible. The compressed approach would create fotces for com mil ment to combat more quickly, but would eucerbale'theand disruptions Inherent intransitionvar fooling and would yield combatespecially combat supportless than full capabilities, al leas) initially, to undertake or suslain combat operations. In lhe compressed approach, unlike Ihe phased approach. Ihere would bc no cipcclnllon and little possibility of modulating the transition process.
C Atlack Options
s Soviet leaders were considering theef Warsaw Pact forces fot war with NATO, they would be faced with deciding the location, timing, and size of the initial altack on NATO. This decision would be made againsi the background of those factors discussed In the preceding sections of the Estimate: Soviel planned militaryoctrine and plans fot readying the military forces, populations, and economies of lhe Warsaw Pact for war; and Soviet perceptions of NATO capabllilies. The major dilemma facing the Soviet leaden would bc lhe degree to which they would care to trade off Pact preparedness and full combat potential called for in their doctrine,reater degree of strategic surprise which might be grantedmaller, but quicker attack designed to preempt the establishment of an organized defense by NATO.
n the following evaluation of lhe risks and benefiu of alternative Soviet and Warsaw Pact options for the initial attack, wo have defined four Warsaw Pact options. The first, the stand ine-start atUck,r
aed
toore complete range of Pactother three oLlliesc options are selected onof evidence^
n describing certain of the options, we refer to Warsaw Pact wartime organizations called /ronra. (See the accompanying insetn discussing the number of fronts for war In Europe, we refer only to those that would be In Central Europe and available for corrunitiDent in tbe Initial attack. Warsaw Pact contingency plans for war In Europe envision the establishmentirst echelon of three /rents in the Central Region with additional fronts moved forward
from lhc waitern USSR toecond echelon. (See figurehe foldoul map appended lo chapterhis concept Is reflected yjcarly
1 doctrinal literature, and other documentary evidence. If lhe USSR should decide on war In Europe, it probably also would begin In activate the wartime structure of /ronlr throughoutlie USSR. This couldronl in each peripheral military district of lhe USSR from the Norwegian border to the Soviet Far East
A Front in lhe Warsaw Pact
In the Pactront wouldombined-arms force usually cornicing of three to five fieldnumbering three to five tank or motorired rifle divisions; an air army ofactical aircraft; and those naval elements necessary to accomplish the mission of the front. The ground forces of Ihe front also include numerous separate combat and combat-support elements such as tank, artillery, missile, and air defenserge service-support clement numberingen would provide the front with transport, maintenance, engineering, supply, and medical support, as well as resupply of items ranging from ammunition to rue) and missiles. The front itself would totalen after full mobllitatioru Although not diieclly comparable to any Weslern organisation, the front would be similar to the NATO army group In sire, level of command, and function
we believe lhal, In all of lhebelow, the Soviets would envisage the usefrom the western USSR asthe NATO center and would begin tuleast five fronts tor use in Central Europe fromof the decision to go to full readiness.would be formed from Soviet andforces already in Central Europe and twowould be formed from forces based InBelorussian, and Baltic Miliiary Districts.
Option Slopingttack
is no evidence
an unprepared, standing-start atiack on NATO from peacetime force pollute. Tho Soviets, however, do have thc capability lo attack NATO units using ground and air combat forces garrisoned near the inter-German border.
As thc means ofarge-scale war with NATO, the standing start would, by definition, grant the advantages of tactical surprise. As many asooviet divisions and perhaps severs! East German divisions could reach initial combat points and lead or support such an atiack in lhe Central Region in' somewhat less thanours fly dint of surprise and local force superiority. Soviet planners wouldand mightearly ground and air victories.
These initial successes would likely be the only advantage which would accrue to such an aitack. however. The consideration! which weigh againstar from a standing start Include:
I.oss of Mobilization Advantage. Tho Soviets would have lo expect that the standing-start allack would cause NATO lo initiate massive and rapid mobilization, almost simultaneously with lhe Pad The local force superiority created by such an allack probably could not be maintained if NATO foices responded effectively. The Soviets, considering their conservative view of NATO rapid mobilization capabilities (discussed Inl chapter IX might well conclude that tlie attacking forces could face an adverse situation before reinforcements could ba com mi lied.
Hear Service Support. Because Soviet and East European nondivisional rear service units are normally manned at far below planned wartime slrenglh (see the section of the annex beginning with. (he standing-start attack would initially have to lely on incomplete lines of communication If Pact mobilization of rear service support were inefficient, interdicted, or otherwise delayed, the operation wouldigh risk of failure. At the outset, lhe movement of reinforcement unit* would be competing directly with resupply requirements for lhe capacity of an unprepared national transport syslem.
Command, Control, and Communications. The Soviets would noi have lime loront-level command, control, and communications structure until al least several days after the aitack was launched.
Poliiical and Economic Preparation. Theattack would not allow for preparation of the Soviet or East European populace or national economics forbasic requirement posed in Soviet military literature.
-Top-Secret-BUPP'
and Rack of Escalation.attack would leave otherand general purposewellnationalforhostilities. In particular, thebc concerned about the threat oflo nuclear
hese arguments lead usonclude that (here is virtually no chance lhat lhe Soviets wouldar againsi NATO with an attacktanding start.
OptionWiih Iwo ftonrj
CI. Extensive
leads us to conclude thatthc smallest force lhe Mr would use to start theater offensive operations would consist of two fronts. Thb force would bc ceenposed essentially of all Soviet ground and tactical air force until In East Cermany, Poland, and Csxchoslovakii together with most of the East German and Cxechoslo-vak units which are active intotal of someround divisions, plus support and tactical air units. (See figurehe foldout' map) While organizing the initial two/ront force, the Soviets and their allies could begin preparations of other general purpose and stralegic forces and their national economies for general war and for the risks of nuclear escalation
xtensive study of Pact contingency plans and
capability lo organize, deploy, and prepare forces for war In Europe, indicates that, in the meal urgent circumstance, lhe Pact would need about four days towo-/ronl force. White initiation of an attack with slightly less ihan four full days of prepatation is possible, the complexity and magnitude of the operation and Ihe risks attending Insufficient preparation would bc likely lo cause the Soviets to lake more than four days to prepare this two/roni force. These preparations would be madeompressed buildup procedure whichcerbate the confusion and disruptions Inherentransitionar footing and would, at least Initially, yield combatespecially combat supportless (han full capabilities to undertake or sustain combat operations. Preparations which,ess demanding operation, would bc undertakenhased or sequential pattern would have to occurBefore attacking, the Pact would probably:
Call for a state of Full National Defense Readiness for all Pact nations.
tate of Full Combat Readiness for all Pact forces.
assemble, move, and prepare for combat lhe attackingmultinational force of moreen andajor ilemi of equipment, some of which would moveilomclcis lo their Initial combat positions.
Dring most of the Pad's tactical aviationeadiness poslure that would enable it to sustain large-scale offensive operations in Centralfrom lire outbreak of war.
Set up al least minimal national syslems of logistics, particularly supply lines, thai could provide some reinforcement and resupply to Ihe attacking forces.
Deploy and setommand and conirol system that would enable Moscow io controlwo-/ron( offensive in Central Europe- The system would Include al least some links to supporting strategic commands and to forces in other areas.
Bring land-based strategic offensive andforces to lull readiness and deploy them as necessaryupport the initial offensive, to defend Pad homeland) against air attack, and to hedge against lhe possibility of rapid escalationassive strategic nuclear exchange,
Ready and send to sea as many warship* as possible (about half of the Soviet major surface combatants and aboutercent of their attack submarines) to prevent (heir being attacked in home ports and to eruble ihem to perform their assigned roles on Ihe flanks and In direct support of the Central European offensive (as described In paragraphshroughf chapter II).
Begin civil defense preparations,
y waiting towo-/ro-ii attacking force, the Pad would diminish many of the critical deficiencies of Ihe standing-start attack. Navalwould be substantially improved and the minimal essentials of the command and control system could be functioning. This altack option would give NATOew days lo organize. Although wo estimate that Pad war planners would expect lo achieve higher force ratio* by delaying hostilities further, the suddenness of the onset could be expected to provide major sdvantaga by Inducing disorder and reducing NATO time to prepare. The rudiments of (he supply system could support at least early fUOOaH.
e are agreed lhat It is eilremely unlikely that thc Pad would initiate war from this two-front posture in other lhan an extraordinarily time^uigent circumstance. On this point there are Iwo views. One holds that the only circumstance which would cause the Pact to initiate iheaterwide offensive operations against NATO from this posture with only (our days of preparation would be thc Soviet perception of the threat of imminent NATO atiack AHhough NATO mobilization would be viewederious ihreal and would almost certainly cause the Pad to make coun-Icrprepaiallons, the Soviets would be particularly averse to initiating anorce not fully prepared against NATO forces which enjoyed some advantages of prior preparation orihreal of imminent NATO attack was clear.'
he other view holds thai the SovieU might choose lo attack with lhe two-front forceariety of urgent contingencies. For cample,erious East-West poliiical dispute, lhe NATO countries (particulaily tbc United Slates and West Germany) mightegree of mobilization and other military preparations to Improve their defensive postv)res and to demonstrate will in support of the diplomalk bargaining. The Soviets, of course, might sec Ihis as weakening their own bargaining posilion. In particular by threatening to upset the political advantage afforded them by superiority In forces-in-being in Central Europe. In suchconlmgency, and If
and flkf Bureau o/ lmtlllg<^e* and ReuareKf Slot*
they perceivedital inleresls al risk, thc SovieU miglit sel in motion the rapid buildup and early attack option. Their efforts would be intended to preempt NATO defensive and diplomatic preparations and not an Immediate threat of NATO attack.*
Option HI- AttackThree 'roo'i
he third and fourth options are ones in which Soviet planners, underless urgent need lo defend or attack, would eled lo bring lhe Pact lo full readinessore ellicient. phased buildup procedure and io attack only when the force available for initial Operalions totaled three fronts (Option III) or five fronts (Optionhe same evidence cited eattiet on Pad buildup planning anil procedures indicates that, in tliesehe Pact would require,inimum, about eight dayschieve the three front force.
he more complete national and military preparations permitted under Option III would aim atarger and better prepared force for the attack on NATO, more efficient Joint action by all forces, more effective maintenance of thc attack, and added preparation for contingencies of possible nuclear war. In this option;
ground forces readied for offensive operations would consul of most of the Pad uniu garrisoned in peacetime In East Cermany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, Including all forces in the two/rent grouping described above with the addition of Polish forces and some additional
Czechoslovakotal of tomeo 60
giound foice divisions.
tadical aviation could deploy forward and adequately prepare additions! aircrafl, perhaps including some from lite western USSR, and would improve iU overall eapabililies lo mount and sustain large-scale iiffrr.sve air operations ia Central Europe.
A more extensive Pact command and control system would be eslibluhed at ihe front, theater, and national levels. Communications capacity would be Increased, and redundant channels would be developed to guard against disruption.
The readiness of Pad civil and military defenses lo withstand NATO counterattacks would be
' The hMen if inear* rh<efterno. Armey; tht National Securityhf AsAltnl Chief of Staff for InleSlgenee, Departnwnl of Ihfhe Director of fatal Inletl'l-eace, Department of lhe h'aoy; and lhe Artisan! Chiefof Staff, Inlttkeena, Oewnmenr of the Air Forte.
Imprnved. as would Ihe transition ofar footing.
Additional Soviet balliilic missile submarine* could be readied and deployed, thu* furthering the preparationi for nuclear war.
Naval forcei could reach wartime operating areas in much greater numbers for operation! on the Hanks, In support of tho Genital European offensive, and In more diilnnt areas.
Preparation of ground forces would continue thiinojlui'it lhc Warsaw Pact, and they wouldapability to undertake early offensive operations on the flanks, while Pact Uclical air capabilities for supporting flank operations would substantially Increase.
he Pact preference for an attackthan two /ronli is well suppmtcdlnii
evidenceThat Pact planners would want arieast three Jronlt available for initial operaUonsCentral Euiope, with assurance of al least.one additional front for reinforcementeek of the initiation of hostilities. This option also fits better than do the early-attack scenarios with Soviet doctrinalfor force superiority, national preparation, joint-forces operations, and conservative threatThe phased buildup used wouldeasonable expectation of an orderly and efficient tiansilion lo an attack posture affording force superiority, luilalnabilily. arid precaution! against the risksider war. This attack opliort would provide time for an additionaloercent cf tlse Soviet Navy to deploy. Ineek lhe Soviets could probably put about Iwo-lhirds of their major naval combatants and attack submarines to sea in order lo eiecute the plans indicated in paragraphshroughf chapter IL Acrasrdingly. we judre that except In extraordinarily urgent drcurnsttnccJ (as described In paragraphsbove) thc Pact would prefer to prepare athree-/rOnI force prior lo initiating hostilities.
OptionWith five ftontt
ircutiistances permitting, thc Pact would build up even greater forces in Eailern Europe before Initiating hostilities against NATO. Aposture would fulfill Soviet conservative doctrinal preferences lo the extent possible In practical terms and would take about Iwo weeks to achieve. In this option:
The array of Soviet ground and tactical air forces In Ihc three western military districts of Ihe
USSR corulilules the principal grouping ol lorces apparently intended for early rein foi cement of Pact forcei in Central Europe. Such additional forcesrganized into at least two additional fronts) would undoubtedly add lo the momentum and sustaina-bilityad attack. The ground forces available in thc European Theater could tolal someround divisions. (See figurehe foldout map)
Even further general put pose naval, strategic, and national defense preparations could be undertaken prior lo Pad attack.et ease in Part strength could be continuous, and thc Pad would maintain its capability to attack at any lime.
altack option would, of course,opportunity for surprise, whileweight of lhe atlack. This option wouldtho ratio of Soviet lo non-Soviet WarsawIn the theater of operations. In tbis option,and phased buildup would offer theof an orderly and efficient transition toposture, the greatest sustains bility. andcommand, control, andand it would allow lhe nationalsystems to concentrate on resupply withalready In place
Summory .lodgment! and Rotalire likelihood
summary, the following judgmentswithin lhe Intelligence Communitybased on extensive arulyiii ol all-source data,
on Pact
planning, and information related Io thc generation of military forces In the Central Region.
The Pad would begin to organize at least five fronts for use In Central Europe from the time of Ihe decision to go to full readiness.
There is virtually no chance that the Soviets would attacktanding start.
The smallest force lhe Pad would use loheater offensive would consist of two fronts, requiring about four days of preparationi except-in an extraordinarily time urgent circumstance, il is extremely unlikely the Pact would Initiate war from this posture.
The Pad would -prefer to prepare athree-/ronr force before attacking, and the
-Top -Swet-fiUFf-
would require,inimum, about eight dayi.
("ircur'iitances permitting, iht Pad would build
up even greater (orcci in Eastern Europe before Initialing hostilities agalns! NATO.
n paragraphshroughe have discussedhe Soviet perceptions of the strengthsalncsses of each of lhc four oplloni and we have ealimalod approximate minimum preparation lime* which would be required before the Pael couldoherent attackorceiven aiie Of cootie. any Soviet decision on when to allacli would be lullueiiccd et of sometime! contradictory military factors, including the USSH* own level of preparations and its perception of Ihe status of NATO preparationi andhe desire lo achieve surprise, and llie urge to develop fully, in advance, asorce as possible. We ore agreed lhat lhe ultimate decision to attack almosi cenainly would noton purely military factors, but ratherombination of those and political imperatives, the stale of diplomatic negotiations, or other considerations.
ven though the various analysts within tho Community have used the same basic data, different conclusions have been reachedthe most likely limingact attack. This is due to differing interpretations of data and judgments about the weighting of lhemilitary and political factors andOne view* Interprets the data and draws conclusions as follows:
|o
"ire* frontt, which are the forces thatThe Pact would have available in the forward area In lhe four-to-eight-day period.
The Fact has tbe most favorable force ratio fn this same period after beginning preparations for war.
These factors, in the context of Soviet miliiary writings and other sensitive materials, emphasizeimportance of surprise.
Therefore, lhe four-to-eight-day period is the most likely time for ths Pad to attack.
ll others believe (hat it is more likely lhe Pad vould take al least eight days ef preparation
Tht holier ef thuht Auuiant Chief ef Sloff fot
eperinent of llie Airly.
31
S.
(assembling ihreeive /ronti) before Initialing hoslililies. In their view:
The Pad preference for aa atlack involving more than two/ronii is well supported in Soviel writings
There is no agreed system of calculating force ratios, and several methods other than lhat used to form the preceding view show that greater force ratios occur after eight days of preparation. In any ease, force ratios would be only one of the consider al ions in timing lhe atlack.
doctrine calls for force superiority,of icaupply and reinforcements, full preparation for joint action by all components of (he miliiary fotces, liability of the rear, and fully elfeclive command and control, and each ofnhanced with eight days or more of preparation.
Although the Pad would attempt to achieve both surprise and force superiority, if forced to choose between (hem the Pact would likely opt for force superiority.
Soviel military planning it conservative, and lhe risks Ibe SovieU would xisodite wiih potentially inadequate preparation would be high.
roduol Buildup
odification lo any of Ibe options previously discussed, the SovieU, and possibly lhe Pad allies, could make gradual preparallons for war over an eatended period There are many changes In their economic, political, and military posture lhal Ihe Soviets can make gradually or piecemeal In responserisis. Steps which Increase the combat readiness of any clemenU of their military forcei could be taken selectively over an interval of weeks or months. For eaample, such steps as lhe mobilization of rear service support elements in the forward areaLT
hich would normally he accomplishederiod of Full Combat Readiness, could bc accomplished Incrementallyeriod of no alert. Such steps, however, would probably be noted by Western Intelligence within days alter thcir implemenlation and would be Interpreted atng the Pad peacetime military posture. Such actions might result In reactionsimilar nature byemben and would certainly Increase NATOefforts. Though these Pad steps might sornc-
what reduce the time necessary tothc full combat readiness of (lie foices discussed in Options II, III. and IV. they would be taken al Ihc expense of likely greater NATO preparedness and vigilance
lher measures which the USSH alone orwith it* Paci allies might undertake togradually could include more lime-consumingunpiovocaiive civil and miliiarysteps. These measures would not involve anyassociated wllh lhe alert lo FullThey could entail selectederiod of increased readinessarc illustrative ol such measures:
Fist Europeans would not easily be persuaded lo cooperate unless they understood and accepted the reasons (or the Soviet tidection to initiate war. In any multinational dialogue on soailer. leaks of information would be hkeJy. And, if lhe Soviets did noi bring the other Pact nations in on their plans, lhe buildup would not improve the greater part of the Pact miliiary force which is lhc least combat ready In thii ease, lhe USSH would incur lhe same risks of attacking without pieparing the PactIt would in lheattack.
V. WARNING OF WAR
J
hese kind* of steps can Improve the efficiency of lhe nation toar and the sustains biliiy of lhe forces bul not necessarily lhe Initial combat capability of the engaging forces. They would not greatly Improve the' Soviet and Pact capabilily lo move quicklyosture of Full Combat Readiness because the large-scale and most time-consuming actions thai arc required in each of the previous Options, and which would Stilt be very visible, would remain lo be carried out.
here Is an added danger for (he USSH Inovert buildup for altackeriod of calm. At some point ia thc preparations il would be necessary to include the other Pact countries, and this would greatly Increase the risks of compromise. The
33
A. Definition of Worning
deally, intelligence warning of imminentilltles would have all of the following characteristics:
Describe preparalion*otential enemy was taking and stale that these steps. If continued, would enable it lo go to warpecif le time in the near future (hours, days, weeks, months).
Isolate these preparations to the course of crisis-related events and conclude thai iho likelihood of war in the near future had increased.
Give specific details concerning the potential enemy's plan for (he lime, place, manner, and strength of thc Initial attack.
Convey the fnformallon convincingly to national decisionmakerslear, timely, and well-documented form.
or the purposes of this Estimate, we define warning as on inielligence Judgment clearlyto naUonal decisionmakersr Warsaw Fact is taking steps lo enable tl to go to war tn the near fuiure and that the course of events has Increased the likelihood of soar Inhis degree of warning, although il does not Irvcorporate all of thc elements of ideal warning, could bc provided lo national decisionmakers relaUvely rapidly and would provide an adequate basis for decisions concerning appropriate counlerpreparations and other courses of action. We are unlikely lo be able to be more definitive than this In our initial warning and foretell when the enemy will atlack, where be will attack, or
* Thii dellnllloa ofnsllar to uradefuiUloiioI imUtrtc
iteming provUrd In JCSf Mi/llary
AuoesaMdepreabcr lit "I. vbka ledui
aataaf liaMalad Seatslaia HfwaJni Iromto Wen. to aVaa, or kmcer prior to
InAUtfen of kxillil-*-
act
likely to bc consistent with Soviet intentions otherlanned attack on NATO, such as preparation! to defend,tlffcr stand,elter bargain-ing position in the crisis, or Uke actioniffctent theater. Certain key military activities, sueh as: the pattern of movement of ground force units to initial combat positions, may allow us to picdicl the likely scope, location, and timing of the attack. This type ol continuing attack assessment would be lhe major conccrn of intelligence following the Initial warning that the Pact was taking steps which would enable il lo go to war In the near future, but is not considered in this Estimate'
arning Indicators'
he following judgments on our ability to sense that the Warsaw Tact is taking steps to enable it logo to war tn the near future derive from our ability to monitor,ear-real-time basis, the normal pattern of Soviet and East European civilian and miliiary activity In peacetime. Our confidence In sensing Pact preparation for war is based on our judgment lhal significant early changes would almost certainly bc initiatedide range of civilian and military activities ai (ho Pactosture which would enable it toar.
Indicalori of tha Decision
he earliest Indicators that the Soviet Union was taking steps which would enable it to initiate war In Europo would be potentially available as the Soviets were making the decision to undertake them. Because of the extraordinary security which would surround such discussions, however, there ts little likelihood that direct evidenceoviet decision to prepare for war would be available before dear evidence ofn-is lion. Indications that an Important decision was being considered could* be apparent at thc time, however.
Boca use we judge It extremely unlikely lhal the Soviet Union would Initiate an attack on NATO without the volunteered, elicited, or enforced coopera-
'The Dictionary of UillUiyAnotitltddefine* atUola fouowr 'Am enrwtaori of WwmHoo la CeremOne the prtcnUal cruro and eejeeer-r. ol "UcV. lor the f providingIton for tieody oVeuloni."
*etailed UsTing of warning India Ion et* war pnpar.rloniEurope, teeSIB CrwrrWi for "SSt/Waraaw reef Cbonrrtaa,Top Secret Umbra/KofornK and Ciad.V
Indicators ol Politkol Preparations
lldrmgandcnfortdngthesupportoftheSoviet and East European populationajor attack on NATO could not be accomplishedow-keylear statement of the grave threat lo the Pad nations and lightened Internal political security controls are likely to precede or accompany large-scale war preparations. Clear indications" thai the Pad leadership was taking steps to ensure the polilical
Ihe
Increased National Defense Readiness wouldinclude:
1-
liability ol lhc Warsaw Pact nations, includin Soviet Union, would likely include-.
ir
L
"sT Similarly, declarationtate of Full National Defense Readiness, even if no! published, would be widely communicated and would. In itself, clearly signal the serious Sovid (or Pact) intent to prepare for war. The declaration and associated measures would be impossible to mask. Indicalors associatedlate of Full Nalional Defense rWfnes* probably would Include such activities ok
risis deepened, or if the SovieU and their Pact allies decided io initiate war soon, the stridency of their official statements andwould likely increase markedly and they would begin widespread arrests of potential dissldenU in the USSRstern Euiope.
fndtcoiors of Civil and EcooonvV. Preparation*
r
The transition of the national economics of lhe Pactartime pasture would, in general, involve: (I) civilncreasing production of warontrolling critical commodities,rganizing transportation systems to support military activity. There Ls little question that such activities would occur as the Pad countries prepared for war, allhough iheir liming in relationship lo military preparations is difficult lo predict.
If Pact preparations for war were protracted, civil and economic activities could provide early indicators of Pact Intent. These could include:
r
oviet doctrine anticipate*ritical step Id preparing the populace and national economy for war is Ihe declarationtale of Increased National Defense Readiness. The declaration, even if not published, would be widely communicatedthe Soviet Union and would. In.itself,irm indication thai the Soviets were preparing for the contingency of war. Adlons associatedtate of
J
Indicalors of rVUBlary Prepororlons
s discussed In chapter III of this Estimate, the military forces of the Soviet Union and IU Pad allies are mainUinedeacetime posture which keeps only selected forceselatively high stale ol readiness,arge miliiary unil structure which can be rapidly mobilized to generate large forces to
RUFf-
ndertake major offensive Opera I
he Pact nation! consider this posture tolate ol Comiflnl Com'wfey step in beginning the process ol preparing military (oiees for the conllngency of war Is declarationate of tncrfcicd Combat /tea dine is. Indicators ofmeasures necessary to achieve ihis level of readiness include.
As the Pact movedosture of increased readiness to one of fulluch more visible series of activities would occur, including:
1
nce lhe Pact hadecision thai warV^
. i. ii';
incvi cnce
lable, it would sanction al least selectiveith our Inlelligence collection. This could include ipace-based systems. The USSRariety ol capabilities, ranging from selective jamming of miliiary communications links to outright destruction of intelligence satellites. While such Interference would degrade Weslern intelligence, it would, in Itself,trong warning indicator.*
e tec lion Time
c are, in any case, confident of the ability of US and Allied Intelligence to detect and correctlyreat number of indicators which would be given if the Pact were lo preparearge-scale war with NATO. In general this confidence is based on:
r i
c are confident that we could Inform decisionmakers that the Soviet Union-with orits Padtaking steps which would enable it to go lo war in the near future within one. day of the rseglruiing of activity associated with the move to Full National Defense Readiness and Full Combat Readiness.
See Nlor Soviet Interference. With US Sp.ce SyrWou During Crisis or
Tup SniTt- ftUFf-
II
reparationwo-front attack from thc normal Pad peacetime posture would almost certainty require declaration of Full Combat Readiness and Full National Defense neadVneij.Q
oreover, the
Soviet Union and III Pad allies wMldlikely lale steps lo ensure political stability at least in ihc East European Pact countries. Even if the alert were accomplishedost of Indicatorsull leadiness posture was being liken would be available and would almost certainly be inlerprded and warning conveyed to decisionmiken within one diy. We have concluded (chapter IV,hat lhe Pad would require about four days to prepare for the two-front atiack; thus US and NATOwould almost certainly hive three dayi or more of warning.
Option III
vailable evidence on Pad plans to preparehtce-ftonl offensive againsi NATO indicates lhat lhe Pad would plan on about eight days of preparalloninimum before initialing lhe atiack. Although these preparations could proceedhased, organized manner, ihey would be massive and would almost certainly be Initiated by an alert to Full Combat Readiness and Futf Noitonaf DefensePropaganda broadcasts would probably be an orchestrated part of lhe preparation process.
ven though these preparations would be undertakenhased-buildup approach, ihey would. If accomplished in eight days, constituteprodigious logistics effort.eacetime posture of0 adlve ground force troops in lhe Central Region, the Pad would have mobilizeden, brought somendentrength or cadre divisions to full sUength. moved the someivisions to Inlllal combat positions, prepared them for combat, set up wartime command and control networks, and rati Wished logistia lines of commutations.
activities which
iilC
the simultaneous,he Tad military would necessarily be
IllIWlT
would raise many alarm. En (he US ond Allied Intelligence network* thai the Part wai vigorously taking steps lo prepare forudgment thai (hit wat Ihe cate could be provided national decisionmakersay of the Part alert to full leadinesaccordingly. US and Alliedwould almost certainly have at least seven days of decision and preparation limeull Pact altack with three /rents.
Option IV
he pallern of activity Involved inull flve-/ront attack force in Europe would bc similar to lhat of Ihe lhree-/ronl force, although the pace might be reduced somewhat We judge that aboul Iwo weeks would be required lo alert, fill out by mobilization. Iramrxut to the East European theater, and prepare for combat thc combat and support dementi that would make up thc two additional fronts.
oull five-front posture In the minimum time, lhe Pact would have to Initiate thc preparation process by declaring Full NotionalReadiness and Full Combat
wo weeks to prepare, however, the Part wou^ have greater opportunities to mask its intentions in the earliest stages of preparation. Nonetheless. Western intelligence would almosi certainly be able to sense the change in overall
Therefore, wc judge lhat in thc caseive-fronT^ attack option, intelligence could provide warning that the Pact was taking steps which would enable It to go to war in the near future, possibly within hours, but certainlyay or iwo of the initial order to go to increased readiness. Accordingly, US and NATO decisionmakers would haveays or so of warning time.
F. Effects on Warningradual Buildup
radual Pact preparations for hostilities, eithereliberale policy In preparation for someaction including atlack, oreriod of political crisis, would present more analytic problems for US intelligence than would the sudden and widespread implcmeniation of war preparations,radual implementation wouldprovide us more opportunities to detect some of the preparations and
more lime lo validate our information, the early preparations would probably be ambiguous and mi7ht bc difficult to distinguish from routine forceor exercises. Such incremental preparations would provide thc SovieU opportunities forand deception, bul the effectivenesj of such measures would decrease in proportion lo' their scale.
eriod of political crisis we would be expecting the USSR and iU Part allies to undertake some readiness measures, and bolh tho eolleclion and analytic elements of lhe Western community would be alerted lo recognize and report promptly any unusual activity. In these circumstances the Pact might refrain from hiding some preparations in order to signal Iu resolve and determlnaiion. It might, in fact, undertake some fairly overt alerting and mobiliiatlon of units, as well at civil defense and other civilian preparations. In this case, which mightrisis of some weeks or months, we would almost certainlyeries of preliminary warnings that the Pact wat taking steps to improve Iu readiness for hostilities, but wc would also be able to judge that final preparations (thateneral imposition of Full Combat Readiness and the deployment of large combat forces) had not yet been undertaken
f lhe crisis continued and bolh sidesumber of preparedness measures in an action-reaction situation, ihe dangers of waresult of escalation or miscalculation would clearly beIt would be particularly difficult in these circumstances for intelligence to judge whether Pact preparations were essentially defensiveear -of NATO atlack or were being made for possible offensive orations. We would, however, be able to judge that live Pact was improving iU capability to initiate hostilities on short notice
J
ecause of lhe high risks and costs involved, the Paci would defer general mobilization, major deployments of combat forces, and other highly visible and provocative measures until the final move lo full readiness. We therefore believe lhat even after some months of preparation,inal or contingent decision to attack was made, there would stilliscernible difference in the nature, scope, and pace of preparedness measures which would alert us and enable usrovide warning lhat the Part was initiating tho final steps which would enable it lo go to war in the near future. Accordingly, evenradual buildup, wc believe wc would detectay lhe final move to full readiness lo attack.
Tap Secret -
ANNEX
MILITARY READINESS
i
he intent of thii annex is la provide additional background information on the readiness of various components of Pad forces, ll begins by briefly discussing thc strategic forces, both offensive and defensive, ll then discusses, in more detail, the thealexair. and naval. It docs not make an overall estimate of how long the Pad forces would lake to prepare wartime operalions.
Slroleglc Forces
espite the emphasis thc Soviets give in their miliiary writings to tlie requirement for high combat readiness, iheir stralegic forces are not normally maintained Bt high levels of readiness. This posture probably is the result of policy decisions basedumber of considerations. Chief among theseelieferiod of increased tension svill precede conflict. Other factors probably include confidence on Ihe part of the Soviets in their early warning capabilities, thc survivability of some of their offensive systems, tlse rapidity with which some stralegic forces can achieve full readiness, and an appreciation of the costs thai high combat readiness entails.
Iniercontinentol Holtistic Missile Force
c believe that in peacetime thc Soviet ICBM force is not maintained at the highest readiness.ignificant portion of the force Is capable ofew minutes after receiptaunch order even if not at Full Combal Readiness. There docs not appear to be any technical reasonignificant portion of the entire sllo-based force cannot be held at Full Combal Readiness levels for longis. months.
0-oVislic Missile Subrnorinot
"llT*lass SSBNs could launch their missiles Trom their home ports, o: very close to them. Units of other classes, however, would require, even with high-speed transits, about sw days to reach suitable launch areas for US targets.
omb**!
The Soviets do not normally maintain any strategic bombers at high readiness. Tlie long-range bombers and tankers In Long Range Aviation (LRA) are concentratedelatively small number ofpractice whichegree, of vulnerability. Also we believe that tbey axe not maintainedondition appropriate for Immediate Lunch. Thus, the launch of the Soviet strategic bomber force from its peacetime posture would require at least several hoon.j
Even without Uunching aircraft. It would require several hours to bring LRA forces to Full Combal RtaAlnts, at their home bases.[_
If sufficient time were
-'op-occrel RUFf-
A regiments probably would diipcrse In oidereduce vulnerability. Tlie entile, process probably would require many hours ll not daya.
Siiolegic Defensive. n
oviet ilrateglc defensive forces arc normally maintainedlale of Constant Combat fltoMneu, but there are various readiness conditions lor weapon systems.mall portion of defensive forces are ever at the higher readiness conditions. There seems totandard procedure of rotating unils between thc various readiness conditions so that, at any one lime, at lenit some componentsafor unit aieavailable for combat.
Defense Avialion. The Warsaw Pacta small portion of its air defense aircraft in aof readiness for air defense emergenciestwo to four aircraft from each of theEast European air defense regiments are keptand ready to take off within minules. Itabout four hours for most of the otherto reach full readiness. If redeploymentairfields were required, the time forforce to reach full readiness would increaseeight andours.
Defense SAMs and Radars.regiments and brigades arc not normallythe highest readiness stage. Instead, ais used toquickUnder Ihis system, one or two battalionsregiment or brigade are heldonditionthem lo be ready to fire In lessould take as long as Iwo hours, however, forregiment or brigade to reach FullUnits engaging In maintenance wouldadditional hours to reach full readiness.elements of these SAM units have
Anliballistic Missiles. Aboutercent of the launchers in the Moscow anllballistic missile system are normally equipped with missiles, and much of lhe system would bc capable of operation within the lime available from tactical warning. The radars require up to five minutes to reach operational status, after which the missiles on launchen could be fired immediately.
Antisatellite System. The Soviet orbllalhas been operationalecision to prepare lhe system for launch has been made, wc estimate that it would take about one day lo
assemble and clteck out two interceptors io tlie launch area support facility. When these preparations^ axe finished, lhe two Interceptors could be moved lo lhe' launch pads, fueled, and launched In aboul one hour.
D. Theater Forces
Soviet theaterair, and navalnormally maintained al various peacetime preparedness conditions. Soviet forces In Eastern Europe are maintained al the highest levels of. preparedness. Soviet forces in the border military districts, bolh in (he western USSR and along (he Chinese border, are test prepared. Those forces in the Interior of the USSR are mainlaincd at even lower levels of readiness.
The following discussion addresses both Soviet and East European forces since all of them In Central Europe are arrayed against NATO. Indeed, the Soviets have placed increased reliance on the East Europeansecent years. East European forces also reflect Soviet readiness practices But East European forces, for the most part, are less ready than their Soviet counterparts In Eastern Europe.
Ooood Forces
peacetime Warsaw Pad ground forcewith their support and command andare maintained at widely varyingpreparedness levels. As these unitsthe transitionar footing, theyFull Combat Readtnest over varying periodsMost divisions which are active Inbc filled outew days. Bulcalls for the use of such divisions as partsand front' organizations and many army-elements particularly rear servicelonger to mobilize than the combatthey support Additional units, with hide orstrudure inould coniinuethroughout the coursear. Inthe time at which various portions of thb forceapplied against potential Pad opponents,as the time necessary to set upand conirol, logistics, andmovement time, and time necessaryfor combat also must bo considered.
he combat elements of Soviet ground forces in Central Europe would require some preparation fo
Vu<prionart front, see the liaeriai referenced lachapter IV.
achieve lull combat effectiveness But. ll required to act Immediately. Soviet divisions can vacate their garrisons within about Iwo hours and could conduct combat operations soon thereafter. Although most of the East European fotces are manned al lower levels, some of (heir divisions could conduct limited combat operations on short notice. These Soviet and East European divisions maintain detailed alertingand rcheaise them frequently.
he Soviets maintain seven airborne divisionsigh stale of readiness, all Inside lhe USSR. Uilng all of Iheedium and heavy aiicraft lhal belong to the USSR's military air transport fleet, lhe Soviets could move the assault elements of. two divisions Thb would be unlikely, however, because many of lhe aircraft would be needed to fulfill olher high-priority requirements that would arise at lhe outsetar.ore likely case, the Soviets could deliver the assault elements of one airborne division, with ihree days' supplies,istance0 nautical miles) using as fewedium transports. These elements would have limited ground mobility, however. There Is also one Polish airborne division, but It would depend mainly on Soviet aircraft fo* mass airborne operations. (See also paragraphf this annex.)
ignificant portions of lhe Soviet and other Warsaw Pact rear services required for wartime operations do not exist during peacetime- Tho Warsaw Pact has developed plans for rapid mobilization of major elements, such as medical and transport units, from the civdian economy to support Pact opera lionsar with NATO. The following items areew of those required forhift (the lime required lo mobilize and deploy ihese elements would vary):
and deploy large rear service units (medical, maintenance, POL, transports lion, adm Inbt rati ve. etc) forward lo the battlo area. Each /toil could haveersonnel0 vehicles In its rear service organization.
Provide theater, /rent, and army units with enough depot supplies (flied and mobile) lo meet establuhed norms; those norms are designed to assure adequate supplies throughout an offensive despite some disruption of Ihe resupply effort.
Reorganize lhe trarstcorUtion system (Including the lines of co mm unkal ion) between the USSR and lhe forward area loATO-Pact
war. This Includes, among other things,large rail and highway transportation units from the civilian sector. '
hc Soviets and their Pact allies do not maintain wartime command, control, andnetworks In peacetime. The establishment of the wartime structure for command and conirol would be complca and lime consumimg. The Soviets' concern for tight, centralized control over military operations makes ft very unlikely lhat they would elect to begin combat opcrallotu without adequateand control.inimum, Moscow authorities would need multiple means of direct communications with /ton! and army commanders. In addition, within thehe estent of oominunica lions links necessary for battleritical. Without such links, commanders could not control theirew measures that would have to be accomplished include:
Establiihmcnt of extensive communications and data transmission networks.
Activation of command posts, includingof commanders and staffs.
Dispatch of operations groups and liaison personnel
Review and adjustment of battle plans and issuance of combat orders.
SO The actual time It would take the Pact to converteacetimewartime command and controlot known}
risis In which the Pact had some control over tlte timing of events, Ihe Pact would plan to prepare the ground forces for warhased, deliberate manner. Initial prcoarstioru would be aimed al Improving combat efficiency, and at enhancing readiness to nvobilire and would bring selected force elements to FiaO Combat Feadtntss. The phased Implementation toward full readiness it designed to assure the availability of foroesto different stages of an International crisis and to
increase th* chances of an orderly and efficient transitionar looting white al the same time avoiding premature or unnecessary disruption ol* lhe economy.lowly developing crisis the Pad, because of tho phased nature of the progression toward readiness, would be able to hold most ground forces a| preparedness plateaus short of Full Combat Readinat. If the Pacthased mobilization plan, our best evidence Indicales lhal it would tale si* days to bring its ground foices as wellarge portion of Its logistics snd command and control structures to Full Combat Rtadtnttt. Thb assumes that there were no delays or plateaus in lhe im pie menial ion of full readiness. .This does nm consider deployment snd final preparation time for particular postures which the Pact might desire to attain prior to Initiating hostilities. Depending on the posture desired, either the same or mote time would be required.
n eitrcmely urgentPact ground forces could move directly and simultaneously frompeacetime posture to full readiness. This procedure would masimlzespeed bui would result in greater confusion and lower Initial combat efficiency. Using ihis procedure, our best evidence indicates thai lhe Pad would plan lo cul in half the time required for its giound forcesarge portion of its loglsllcs and command and control structures to reach Full Combat Rradtneu. Once again, this does not consider total time needed toarticular desired Pad operational posture.
Toelkol Air Forces
ome Tadical Aviation regiments are prepared to conduct limited combat operalions within three hours, and most withinours, utilizing (listing peacetime strengths, locations, and command and conlrol means The principal problem areas appear to involve the peacetime manning practices of Pad air forces and the need to set up eitensivc command and conlrol facilities prior to major offensive operations.
ad air forces in Central Europe havebeen Judged to be manned al or near iheir intended wartime operating strengths. Recentindicates thai there is some underminnlng. particularly in support units.
nother factor which appears lo be adversely affecting the current readiness of specific Soviet and possibly non-Soviet Pact air force units is maintenance. Defectors have Indicated that Soviet units which arc receiving new aircraft have experienced difficulties in
meeting the concomitant requirements for additional trained malnlenance personnel In some casesof such personnel have persisted for moreear following delivery of new aircraft.
c estimate that II wouldinimum of 4fj hours fur lhe Pad air armies In Central Europe to deploy their wartime command post structure and establish the command and control required to engage In offensive air combat operations in supporiront commander. We believe, however, that it wouldotal of aboutoura to make the command and conlrol preparations (including lhe updating of billle plans) needed looordinated theater-wide air offensive, including LRA, against NATO airfields, nuclear weapon sites, aod other priority targets as envisaged in Pact plans,
hc other requisite preparationsajor oftensive action could probably be accomplished wilhin the time specified above. These would include any final maintenance and lhe arming and fueling of aircrafl, and ibe activaUon of additional airfields for dispersal or recovery purposes.
Mr:,,
rie Introduction of ndditior.il aircraft from the western USSR Into Central Europe would not be required prior to thc iniaition of combat Should ihey decide lo deploy these aircraft from the western USSR into the forward area, however, the Soviets could complete this deployment withinours of the decision to do so.
ry Ironiport Aviation
e estimate that about SO percent of the Soviet Military Transport Aviation (VTA) aircraft arereadyay-to-day basis and, like Tadical Aviation units, would require little preparation to reach full combat readiness We estimate that aboul sis to eight hours would be required to recover tlvose aircraft which are flying routine training missions, service Ihem, change crews as required, brief the new missions, and rccoiiFigure the aircraft for theirmissions. During the transitionar footing, civil aircraft (for rumple, those of Aeroflot) would be placed under military control This might take several days or more.
Nudtor For cm
n addition lo the tadical nuclear systems, such as army lurface-to-surface rockets and missiles and tadtcal nuclear aircraft which are Integra! ports of the theater air and gioundortion of the longer
range missile, bomber, and ballistic missile submarines iust discussed also provide theater support. These include medium-range and Intermediate rangemissiles, intermediate range bombers, and some support by naval delivery systems such as older dass ballistic missile submarines. Most of the strategic and peripheral strike system* usedheater support role could bc brought lo Full Combat ReadMeu within hours as could theater-based tactical nudear aircraft Readying ground forces lurface-to-surface rocket, and missiles is complicated by lhe requirement to process and distribute warhead* from central storage areas. More than one day would likely elapseajor portlon of this force could be ready lo conduct nudear operations.
acceptable level of combat readinesseek: or two and most could be made combat ready within two months. The rest of thclong-term overhaul orbe unavailable for combat operations even with severalreparation.
operationally available ships inprovide the Soviet Navyapabilitydeploy ine rata In crisis situations,limes to operating areas areto weeks Ships of the Northern Fleetabout three days to reach Ihe criticalin lhe vicinity of Iceland.
Submarines.^
Force*
rincipal Surface Combatants. The normal peacetime status of Soviel major surface units is as follows:
of Force
SSM
Major OverhaulRepair or
S
Under normal peacetime conditions aboul half the Soviet major surface combatarit force is readvfor combat or could bc readyay or iwo.]
lS an
the readiness of naval forces were Increased durlngan extended period of tension, the number of ships able lo putea on short notice would bc increased, while training and maintenance probably would beto improve combat dfcctlveness. Many of lhe combatants undergoing minor repair or in refresher training following repairs probably could regain an
3
The SovieU' practice ofost of their submarlnes In port and ready for deploymentarge number of submarines rapidly available for action In areas close to lhe USSR. But unless there were Ume for transit to Atlanticautical milesbest the SovieU would haveew submarines on station in those waters.
Naval Aviation. Naval aircraft normallya low level of peacetime activity. Most naval aircraft could reach full combat teadiness inseverallime to operating areas In Europe could take several hours, while deploymenlverseas airfields, such ai (hose in Cuba or Guinea, would take longer.
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