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Soviot Policies on Restraint of a*ales to the Third World
is an updated version of the background paper on Soviet-LDC arms ealeo policies which we prepared originally for the Secretary of St.*to in7 for his talks with the Russians. an be,of further assistance please feel free to call on me.
Office of Economic Research
tater'
2
Sovtot-LDC Arms Transfer
We are not aware of fonual overall Soviet restriction* on anno sales to the Third World. Indeed, Moscow has been extremely receptive to Third World requests for military aid and has used arms as its most direct and fastest means ofresence in the LDCs. With military supplies, Moscow has fueled LDC ambitions for power, while entangling themob of Soviet accomodation that often deepened and prolonged their dependence on the USSR. In the guise of supporting LDC national aspirations, the USSR has seized opportunities to fill the vacuum left by 'che withdrawal of colonial powers. It has capitalized on regional and local conflicts by infusing military personnel and advanced weaponry into states ripe for conflict. The Russians exploited Arab-Israeli tensions, Yemen's conflict with the United Kingdom over Aden, Afghanistan's border dispute with Pakistan, the Indian-Pakistani crisis, and Indonesia's territorial conflict with tho Nothorlands and Malaysia, and more recently, nationalist movements in Angola.
In the 23 years since Moscow'sonsignment of military goods to Egypt5 (throughhe USSR has responded to aid opportunities in target areas throughout tho world,illion of military pledgos toountries. (Graphict has trained0 LDC personnel in military skills and has sent as many0 Soviet technical personnel to LDCs as military advisorsingle year. Last year0
Soviet military technicians were in Third World countriesDC personnel were still in training in the USSR. Aircraft and ground armaments have accounted for the largest share of equipment provided. The bulk of Moscow's military aid has gonearrow band of nations extending from the Mediterranean to China's southwestern borders. Four of Moscow's presently preferred clients in this area Iraq, Syria, India, ana Libyahave accounted for aboutercent of the total.
The Soviet offensive has scored significant successes over the yearsumber of Middle Eastern countries, and recently in Ethiopia And Angola; it has suffered setbacks in Indonesia, Egypt, and Somalia. LDCs were lured by (aj offers of modern equipment not usually available from other suppliers, (b) prices which were generally cheaper, often with discounts, (c) long term credits at low rates of interest, and (dj payment in local currency rathor than hard currency. Store recently Moscow has expandod its prog, "awulti-billion dollar annual sales effort which has carried withindfall of cash payments, now totallingillionear. Moscow has shown no sign of reducing the scale or breadth of its program} in fact the program is oxpanding rapidly.
Our estimates of Communist arras sales to LDCs include military hardware (aircraft, ships, tanks, and missiles) which has accounted for about ercent of the total the remainingercont is made up of major support equipment ouch as radar and smaller types of equipment, ammunition, spare parts, and quartermaster goods. EsH-^tes do not include the technical
services, training, or military construction for which wc have only fragmentary information. Estimates currently being prepared suggest that the inclusion of these items would add no more than
tenear to our figures.
Soviet sales and deliveries cittid in this paper are derived
LDCs. These values arc appropriate for comparing Soviet military sales to LDCs from year to year, for looking at arms exportsercent of total Soviet exports, for computing LDC and Soviet balance of payments, and for computing LDC debt servicing. Howevor, Soviet sales values derived from trade prices areood measure of Soviet military sales for comparison with US sales because Soviet trade prices bear no relationship to US prices for similar equipment. Soviet sales pricen are influenced greatly by political motivation and are not closely related to actual costs of production. For purposes of comparison with US arms exports to LDCs, we have calculated the cost of purchasing the Sov*iet equipment in tho United States at about one-third higher than -In the USSR. Sales7
Sales to ollents and massive support to Ethiopia pushed Soviet arms sales7 toear record) deliverios soared3 billion. ) Onlyhen Moscow was restocking Middle East Inventories, were ordors higher. Fivo Soviet clientsAlgeria, Ethiopia, India, Libya, and Syriaaccounted for almostercent of salesarge share of which was taald in hard currency or cil. (Graphic 2) In a
major broakthrougn, cncold p
Kuwait, ending the Western arms supply monopoly in conservative Gulf States.
As before, Soviet support to major Middle East clients was largely motivated by political considerations, although important commercial dividends sweetened many of the deals. We know of few concessions given these states either in pricing arrangements or repayment terms..
If commercial considerations weighed heavily in Sovietin tho Middle East, political considerationsdecisions in other areas. Ethiopia was the primeMoscow used military aid toresenceand Tanzania, military hardware and personnel supportmovements in southern Africa reinforced thein that area. to Ethiopia
moved Addis Ababa into the big league as the third largestrecipient in
In South Asia, India continued its long dependence on thewith 'its largest military
supply accord with the USSR. India's total military purchases from the Soviets now stand at S3 billion.
Aboutercent of tho3 billionmilitary equipment delivered to LDCs7 wentIraq, Libya, Peru, and Syria. (Table 3) Shipmentscountries ranged betweenSyria to C* J
Iraq. They were followed by
of receipts and Algeria's First time Soviet-LDC
equipment deliveries included! (Table 4)
Initiatives8
The momentum of the past aoveral years did not carry through
Into first8 Soviet arras salos. (Table 5) Although
negotiations with several? large traditional clients wore
i
underway, actual agreements are know to have been signed withew African governmentsi
all major Soviet arms clients receiveddeliveries in the first quarter.ho list-
C
Syrian and Iraqi acquisitions highlight Soviet arms supplies to the Middle East. Both countries received
Restraints on Sales to LDCs
Despiti the Soviets apparent eagerness to expand sales in general, there have been certain implicit restraints on the extent and character of the Soviet sales effort in the Third World.
(1) Most Important are political considerations which are appliedase by case basis and override all other They were responsible for the recent play off between Ethiopia and Somalia, the cut-off in arms to Egyptj and Soviet support to the Angolan insurgency. The character of the decision making process itself reveals the extent to which political factors Influence sales.
All agreements with new clients and major changes in the kind or amount of military supplies for established LDC clients require approval at the highest level? of the Bureaucracy. The Politburo signs off even on routine supplementary contracts, and the political price, if any, is set at this level. These decisions; usually are based on recommendations of the Central Committee Staff, the Ministry of Defense, and the military-industrial planning organs. The military section of the State Committee on
Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) is the implementing body for military supply decisions, ; Security/technologleal considerations .
may, in some cases, actestraining
influence on the kind of Soviet equipment supplied, Moscow holds back advanced hardware that might be susceptible to compromise by Western intelligence. For example, no iRBMs,;
ICBMs or SLflMs have been exported to LDCs. Nor has Moscow ever supplied nuclear weapons.
Priority for Soviet defense requirements
and those of its East European allies
nay in some cases limit Moscow's
ability or willingness to sell certain
items of equipment. Even though the
Russians sometimes draw from their
own stockpiles to satisfy LDC demands,
where Soviet production schedules lag
their own needs, LDC deliveries are sometimes delayed. On the other hand,
Moscow also has supplied modern weapons
to itswhile they are still being
introduced into their own forces. In
.,. 73 Arab-Iaraali vara the
USSR had problem in meeting
demands and had to draw on Soviet inventories
to expedite tho flow of 'arras. In general,
the USSR can respond rapidly to LDC demands
for tt.isr produced items, such as tanks,
but is less able to io so for some types
of advanced aircraft and naval vessels.
(4) In some cases the lack of LDC absorptive
capacity has inhibited Soviet sales,
thoughesser degree than for
Western sales. Mosctw has shown some
reluctance to provide equipmentlients that have not been able to
integrate military hardware effectively
Production for Export
The USSR does notpecial line of military equipment for export, although certain plants may concentrate on arms for export. In some cases, export versions of Soviet equipment are manufactured which do not include all the packages provided on weapons for Soviet use. For example, aircraft My not be equipped with advanced avionics or bomb-delivery packages.
Equipment for export normally comes off the sa:oe production line as for Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. In the case of thoowever, (and possibly others) Moscow has continued to produce equipment for export after it has discontinued stocking the equipment in its own inventories. Also some weapons systems retired from Soviet inventories (such as4 tanks) are reconditioned for export. Nonetheless, more thanerctint of Soviet equipment exported to the Third World5 is still in Soviet forces inventories and more than one-half probably is still in current production.
Moscow usually requires arms clients to present their requirements for equipment and sparesear in advance so that thev can be incorporated into Soviet production schedules. Some of those orders will be met from large Soviet stocks. Where the orders impinge on already taut production schedules, the Russians would probably have to draw out delivery schedules, possibly by ononths.
-to-
Readiness to Exportardware
17 Over the years the Soviets haveillingness to provide sophisticated hardware on very attractive terms to LDCs, The USSR was the first'to introduce jetupersonic jeturface-to-airuided missile patrolnd surface-to-surface) into Third World arms inventories. (See Table)
0 the USSfc began toew generation of weapons to the Third World, with Middle Eastern countries the first to receive the advanced equipment. Included in these exportsurface-to-air missile systems, self-propelled radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns, jet fighters and bombers, medium tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and siirface-to-surface missile systems. Most of this equipment had first entered production in the USSR in, some had not yet been provided Warsaw Pact countries, and otherssuch aset fighters andighter bombers.were still being introduced into Soviet force inventories.
In general, however, the onset of exports to LDCs is conditioned largely by the timing or* introduction of successor systems into the soviet armed roroes. ajor exception was the mass-produced, multi-modelor which exports began long before successor system production was started. In the pastears, Soviet tanks and medium bomber aircraft have; been exported to the Third World about throe years after successor system production was started. Recent model interceptor and ground attack aircraft were withheld .from export for considerably longer periods, presumably because of high performance and cost, as well as limited output of these
CM il I
aircraft. In general the Soviets have withheld medium bombers, tactical surface-to-surface missiles, and tanks from export to the Third World for considerably longer periods than interceptor and ground attack aircraft and anti-aircraft equipment. Licensing and Co-Production Agreements with LDCs
Moscow has extensive agreements for licensed military production ir. East European countries^including Yugoslavia, but has signed such agreements only with one LDCIndia. It has not concluded any agreements with LDCs for co-producing 'military equipment or sharing the development of production technology with them. The licensing agreements signed with India do not provide for full manufacture of the equipment in India. Certain components are supplied by the USSR. The agreementd provide: (a) initially, for assembly operation, (b) later, for the manufacture of Gome components in Indiai and (c) finally, for assembly of components proceed domestically with parts imported from the USSR.
Policy Toward Third Percy Araifi Transfers
Like the United States, LDC transfers of Soviet arms to third parties require Moscow's approval. Transfer restrictions generally are incorporated into the terms of the arms agreements. C* Jl
We also have evidence that Moscow vetoes arms sales by its licensed manufacturers of arras (Eastern Europe and India) to clients it is boycotting.
ilitary Agreements with LDCs,
Africa
North Africa
: Algeria Libya
Sub-Snhoran Africa
Angola
Benin
Congo
Equatorial Guinea. Guinea
Madagascar
,
Nigeria
Tanzania
Zambia
Latin America
Colombia Peru
Middlo Eaot
840
no
Kuwait
Syria
South Asia
Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
1 B
onoo ; thiopia
uinea Madagascar
Mali ., i
Mozambique
Nigeria
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Latin America
ColombiaPeru :
I Egypt Iran raqorth Yemen South Yemen Syria
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
India
Hiddln East
383
L-
mix
ill1 w
1
'
i 1
I
1
n
mm-
' Table 4
' First Soviet Hardware Exports to Less Developed Countries
First Delivered
Exports2 fighter/bombers
, '
",
SW
guided missile patrol boat
m self-propelled guns
helicopters
elicopters
2pril 19
Table 4
Pirat Soviet Hardware Exports to Less Developed Countrie:
(Cont.)
...
Other First Exports of Selected Equipment Aircraft
i 11
r -i
Fighters7
Ground Attack SU-7
SU-17
SU-20
Bombers
J
L-28
Date First Delivered
4
2
5
_
Table 4
First Soviet Hardware Exports to Lean Developed Countries
(Cont.J
Country
Hissiles' '-
Frog SSM
Scud SSM
BtVa SAM
. mm
- - mwM
First Delivered
2
ank
ank
ank
Delivered to LDCs it all regions of the world. i: . elivered toegions of the world.
Exported only to Middle East and
missile boat
26
r
Military DaUve
Graphic 2
_ Soviet Military Agreements with Less Developed Countries
illion US $)
Five clients accounted for almostercent of agreements concluded
r
J3.
lrt Anril 8
Original document.
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