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CASE'hLC DOCUMENT *-
IfiTELl.ICE.NCE AGENCY. National Foreign Assessment Center Karch6
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POSSIBLE SEPEKCUSSIOKSOVIET WIS IN ETHIOPIA/SOMALIA
In response to the request of the NSC, the following assessment of the possible impact in the near term on the attitudes and actions of the principal countries or regional groupings of countries concerned with the Ethiopia/Somalia situation is submitted:
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:9
l.Sldlt6MI<Wri ISI
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around co support Ethiopia. The reinforcementthe Soviet position in the Horn ts unlikely to alter thc positions of any of these States any tine soon.
III. Iran: The Shah's public warning that Iron supported the territorial integrity of Somalia has been eroded in recent weeks by the lack of US coeval teent. Iran probably feels too exposed in its contiguous location to challenge the Soviets without firm US backing. At the sase tine. It is clear that the Shah has never intended to be dependent on US support in the long run and hence it is unlikely that the US position in this Horn of Africa issue will alter hii policies.
IV. Soviet Union: In embarking late last year on greatly expanded
support for Ethiopia, tho Soviets probnbly estimated the military risks as negligible and the political costs as modest and manageable. They have probably not substantially reviaed this estimate. Thoy have seen aigns of US concern mount in recent weeks, but probably
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perceive it aa lacking focua,ustrat-ioreetermination to act- They aees divided on the extent to which pressure* should be brought to bear on lha USSR outside chc Horn. They probably believe the b'S has for several weeksoviet/Cuban backed Ethiopian victoryait accoaoli and chat Washington nowossible invasion of Somaliaatershed event. They are almost certainly persuaded che US will not take action itself or mobilice others to act locally if there is no invasion of Somalia, and even if there is an invasion, they probably doubt that the US could putountervailing effort in cinely fashion.
The Soviets probably prefer an oucceae which does not include such an invasion, believing chat without accepting any additional risks thoy wiil have already succeeded ia achieving their local objectives and in reviving the credibility of their capacity co netlobal power in distanc areas. Should large-scale fighting be ended ln the next few weeks without an Invasion of Somalia, the Soviet leaders probably think it most likely that there will be no serious further consccueaces for SALT or other major aspects of che bilateral They will continue, however, Co watch carefully the Impact of their Horn behavior on the public ond Congress nnd on the correlation of forces inside the US government, which they see as now engaged ln internal debate about US-Soviet relations. Meanwhile, tbey will look upon their Ethiopian achievement aa advertising to revolutionary forces in southern Africa their readiness and capability to act, and aspringboard from which to seise other opportunities to expand their role in armed struggles should they appear.
Ethiopia's Neighbors: Kenya is driven by its concernocall invasion, though there Is clearly an underlying concern at aSoviet presence next door.
Sudan's opposition to Mengistu, expressed in material Bupporc for the Erltrean rebels and expressions of Intent to support Somalia, ha* cooled in recent weeks; Nimeiry has reestablished contact with Mengistu. Having found it necessary in5 to reduce the Soviot presence in Khartoum, Sudan clearly must be apprehensive ac the sizeable Soviet presence next door, but iso Che power realities.
Southern African Scaces: Very little ia heard from these states that vould indlcaee that events in the Horn will influence their
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