NATIOSAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
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MCICRAKD'JM
SUBJECT: Somalia: Implications for President Siadomali Withdraw*!
President Siad probably believes his political survival would be Jeopardized if he withdrew Somali forces from the Ogaden without gaining either concessions from the other side or promises ofsupport for Somalia. In the absonce of offsetting gains, Siad probably calculates that his political position would be better served by having his army pull back only under heavy military pressure.
Siad realizes that Somalia has almost no chance of halting the Ethiopian offensive. In his view, however, he oust be seen to yield only in the face of an overwhelming force of Ethiopians, Cubans, and Soviets. Siad's strategy has thus been to stand and fight. This does not mean that he would allow tho Somali army to be destroyed in the Ogaden. He might at some pointithdrawal, but only when he can justify it as necessary on ailitary grounds.
The serious Somali reverses at Jljlga over the weekend may make moot any optionoluntary Somali withdrawal from the northern Ogaden and force Siad soon to decide what to do with his farces ln thc south. He is unlikely to unilaterally withdraw hi6 forces in order to improve Somalia's legalolitical position beforeopinion. For Siad to pull his forces out ol thc Ogaden simply to remove the stigma of aggression from Somalia would be viewed by his governing colleagues and his countrymenetrayal of the Ogadenl Soaalls and would give Siad's potential domestictrong weapon to use against him.
If Siadnilateral withdrawal, he would also be vulnerable to charges of tacitly admitting that Somalia had no right to pursue its irredentist claimsun admission no Somali leader can afford to make. The Somalis will be unwilling to renounce permanently the "Greater Somalia" concept or toormal commitment not to sponsor future military operations in thc Ogaden.
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Pearosestic political, repercussions is therefore likely prevent Siad froaoluntary: Sorali Fortes from the Ogaden. To overcome these fears even partially, and thu*oluntary pull back possiblebut still not certainSiad would have to calve assurances on some najor points. At ahe would demand guarantees, supported by international agroeaents, of no reprisals against the Ogadeni Somalia. He would alao demandin return for Somali withdrawalthe withdrawal of Ethiopian. Cuban, and Soviet forces frost the Ogaden, although he might bewithltimate withdrawal rather than an immediate one.
Although hc would not fraand assurances of substantial foreign military support to resupply the Somali army, an offer to do this would be an indiiceawnt. since Siad could then present it to his domestic audience as evidence that Somaliable to fight another day. lie would probably make this argument, at least privately even if potential foreign donors stipulated that their assistance could be used for defensive purposes only.
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