Soviet Military Theory: Structure and Significance
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Soviet Military Theory: Structure and Significance
a Research Paper
In/or mauon amiable ai of9
hat been used in the preparation at this report.
This paper has been coordinated with the Office of Political Analysis and the Nationut Intelligence Officer for Ihc USSR) I
paper describes how members of the Soviet party and mililary
establishments formulate what the Soviets consider the two components of militarydoctrine and military science. It includes an eta ruination of the political context in which militaryormulated and ibe conceptual structure (he Soviets have developedlassify il. It also highlights the import.me the Soviets assign to lesiing the resulting theoretical propositions and how this testing is accomplished
Military theory is discussed in publications written by Soviet military officers. These writings discuss tactical and operational questions and provide guidance to the armed forces. The Soviet political leaders,apparently have the final word on militaryavoided public identification with any of these discussions at thelevel. This leaves open the question of how these guidelines would be implemented in the eventrisis,
On the other hand, recent evidence clearly indicates that Soviet military doctrine is reviewed periodically and updated as necessary to provide the justification for mililary policies and programs It is important, therefore, that doctrine be viewed with an understanding of the political and military context in which it was formulated.q
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Soviclceory: ,
Slmcturc and
writings on militarythose on military doc-
trine serve three principal purposes:
They provide Ihc moral and political justification forarge, well-equipped com bat-ready defense establishment.
They provide operational guidance lo the armed forces.
They serve as an officially approved talionale for Soviet mililary policies and programs, including the defense portion of the Five-Year Kconomic Plan.Q
In addition, unclassified military publications are probably designed to influence foreign audiences, particularly those assessing Soviet defense posture. Q
The political leadership appearsave the final word on military doctrine and the capability to cicrt political control over the entire process The current leadership, nevertheless, has avoided publicly identifying itself with any bul the most commonplace doctrinal propositions. ^
The role of Communist Party bodies such as congresses in ihc creation of mililary doctrine appears lo be highly exaggerated in the Soviet press Although military issues may be discussed in party sessions, it appears ihcy are held mainly to ratify and disseminate decisions previously made by Sovicl leaders. The Defense Council probably is the forum in whichoctrinal issue* arc decided, subject to ratification by the Politburo. I
The professional mililary, directed by the General Staff, develops the purely military aspects of Soviet doctrine and evaluates theories through centrally controlled exercises. Research results are broadly distributed before conclusions arc adopted for general use in the armed forces. Q
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Con ten is
Soviets define military doctrine as "the Marxist* Leninist-based vie* accepted by the government on the nature of war. the use of armed forces in conflict, and the preparationsountry and its armed forces forhus, Soviet military doctrine contains both political and military-technological aspects, withconsiderations paramount. The Sovietslassical expression of the relationship between these two aspects of doctrine in the Clauscwitzian dictum that war is the continuation of politics. Accordms to Lenin, the "Marxists have always considered this axiom as the theoretical foundation for the meaning of every
Recent evidence strongly suggests that militaryserves to rationalize the defense effort in terms of Ihe threat, (be probable natureuture war. tbe role of the armed forces, and the preparation of the country for war. This evidence has strengthened ourlhat what appears publicly as "military doctrine" is based on sensitive documents which arc periodically revised.
Selected portions of doctrine appear in Soviet military and political literature. These writings arc nolto provide information on subjects such as defense appropriations, the rationale for certain weapon systems, or the deployment of mililary forces. Rather, the party intends to demonstrate to the armed forces and citizenry the legitimacy ofarge, well-equipped defense establishment. Theselling in which the doctrine is expected to be operative is defined in terms of Marxist-Leninist principles, with the ultimate objective the triumph of the socialist over the capitalist system, tj
The Soviel political leaders also recognize thatcan be innucaced by publications onfor exam-
pie. were recently informed by Soviet senior political-military analystsew and authoritative book on Soviet military strategy, which included Soviet views on military superiority and nuclear first-strike capability, would appear soon and contributerational discussion of SALT II in the Unitedhrough (his and similar literature the Soviets have tried to convince foreign audiences, particularly (hose concerned with defense analyses, of the political support behind and the intellectual soundness or Soviet defense policies.
Military-Technological Basis of Doctrine Structure.
Military science is defined by the Sovietsystematic study of the laws and nature ofarmed struggle, as well as the military preparations by the country and the armed forces for war. The Soviets divide military science into different categories. The most important is military art. which is concerned withar is fought
Military art is divided into:
Strategy, which entails planning the conduct of war, training ihe armed forces, and providing support for combai operations.
Operational art, which is concerned with the conduci of operations by large groups of forces.
Tactics, which involves the preparation for and conduciattle.
I"hc Soviets rank components of military art in terms or their importance to dociiine- Strategy is considered most significant, and operational art ranks above tactics.
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Secret
art. which isconnecting link between strategy and tactics, became an accepted part of Soviet military thought in thefter experience during Worldemonstrated that dividing military art into strategy and tactics alone was inadequate. Soviet theoristsewbecause they anticipated thatuture war involving the USSR, the geographic length of the front would be longer and the number of Soviet troops engaged would be larger lhan for any other country. Tactics could be applied to the battlefield activities of corps-size and smaller units. The term "operational an" was chosen for ihe army and front echelons even though il was recognized thai the term would be confusing because of ihe frequent use of the word "operational" in ihe military lexicon. |
Debate Oier Contenl of Mililary Science
Although all Soviet theorists agree that military art ismost important component of military science, they often disagree over whether such categories as history, geography, administration, and technology should be included in mililary art. This dialogue is evident in recent editions of Mililaryor example, in an6 article, Lt. Gen. M. A. Garcycv, chief of the Military Science Directorate of the General Staff, divided military science into genera) theory, mililary art. organizational development, training and indoctrination, and military economics. Garcyev's classification system was discussed inarticles which appeared in the7 edition of the same publication. Some authors disagreed with his categorization as well as his decision to exclude mililary historyategory. One writer argued lhat the history of military art provided ihe nucleus of military science. |
The significance of these discussions is that they may indicate deeper bureaucratic disputes within llic Soviet defense establishment. In his decision not to include military historyeparate component of military science, Gateyev may have been warning the military that they were giving too much attention to pail experiences specifically World Wartheof doctrine, f" "f> |
'miliarynemirrcipal ifccurclical publication of ibeinistryo' Defease lit dissemination iionet military olTiccis.| j
Garcyev's inclusion of mililary economics as aappeared to be more controversial lhan his exclusion of military history. He included it because of the "increased significance of military economics in the area of support of armede wrote thai military economics is the study of demands made on the economy for preparing and conducting war as well as Ibe effective allocation of resources among the armed forces.
The theory of military economics and how it relates to military science has been discussed in several Military Thought articles. One writer argued that since civilian specialists "do not consider it their duty to investigate general military-economiche training of military economists should be improved and their numbers at military academies increased. Others wrote, however, thai military economics should not be directly related to military science. The debate may indicate thai: (I) there is discussion within ihe bureaucracy concerning the allocation of resources toertain officers may be hopingxpand the mililary rote in the economic planning process;here are probably some who have attempted to defend or upgrade the status of professional economists in the military. Since we have nolefinitive articleilitary journal on the status of military economicsomponent of military science, we assume ihc debate has not been closed j j
Formulation of Military Theory
Political-Military Relations The Soviets claim lhai the levelation develops military theoryajor factor inits combat effectiveness. They have devoted considerable resources and attention toighly structured classification of militaryan effort (hat differs from the more ad hoc UShis elaborate structure offers insights into the process that is used to develop Soviet military doctrine and science. | j
'Soeh terms as national security, military doctrine, andpeeuitc. official definitions in the United Slates and are often used interchangeably Moreover, ihe dri^iion of strategic issues is nol dominated by the military. Other US eovernmental agencies. Ihc academic community, research institutes, and domestic pecsaurcfriwptarc actively involved in tbe debate of deft tee
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Thcic appears lo be an understanding between the political leaders and ihe military aboul how these Iwo groups should interact when shaping the content of military theory. The party leaders have the final word on doctrine and can exert political control over ihe entire process. Although the military claims primacy in ibe formulation of military scier.ee. militaryis conducted under the watchful eyes of officers of the Main Political Directorate (MPD) of the Soviet Army andhus, accordingecent Soviel publication, "military doctrine is developed by the political leadership of the country wilh theof the highest military organs."
Mililary Docirine
Party Authority: Myth and Reality. Soviet military writers invariably indicate (hat military doctrine is formulated on ihe basis of Communal Party directives For example. iheScwict Offict'i Handbook slates that:
All questions of the defense of the socialist fatherland, of military development, of military theory and practice, today as in the past, arc decided in precise conformity with the ideology and policy of the party, on tbe basis of the directives and instructions formulated in the resolutions of congresses, of plenums of the Central Corrunittec. and of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Q
Although Soviet writers repeat the official claim that the Central Committee and the party congressesajor responsibility in the policymaking process, this exaggerates the role of the political parly forums. Party congresses arc too large and unmanageable lo effectively debate and decide defense mailers. Whereas military issues may be discussed al these sessions, it appears that they arc held primarily to ratify and disseminate decisions previously made by the Soviet leaders.
' Tbe MFD nfor ihe ioeotofKzlf ibe mitre Soviel milit(f) eiliMnhmcnl. In aOcrtian iootmoii*niien nuterul lor mini) noiationi. every major militaryolitical-mililaryo control idcuMtnal eonienl railiei lhan lochallenccters un lrchnK.il ifroundt
As the ultimate decisionmaking body in ihe Soviet Union, the Politburo makes tbe final decisions on Soviet military doctrine. Centralization and control are key characteristics of the Soviet decisionmaking process, and the formulation of doctrine is no exception.
The Defense Council appears to be the single most important body in ihe USSR dealing exclusively with militaryhaired by ihe General Secretary, it is composed of top mililary and political leaders. Major decisions concerning the formulation of Soviet military doctrine probably are discussed and approved in ihe Defense Council, with the Politburo usually accepting proposals made by the Council. Among its most important functions are presumed io be theapproval, and supervision of five-year defense plans. |
Role of Political leaders. We do not know how
extensively Soviet political leaders become involved in the actual formation of mililary doctrine. Although the party leaders provide guidelines through decrees and instructions issued in the name of Ihe Centralthe directives cited in Soviet mililary literature available to us seem vague. Tor example, mililary officers arc told lo In ff till (he combat readiness" of ihe armed forces and "lo raise the level of military scienceor certain military projects itimportant, however, the Politburo is likely to give specific, classified directives In any case, the current leaders, principally General Secretaryhave avoided being publicly identified with the details of military doctrine
In (he past, party leaders were more openly associated with particular developments in Soviet militaryWhen Stalin was alive, Soviet doctrine was based on his "permanently operatingof theorale or tlie army, quantity and quality or divisions, army weaponry, and organisational and leadership qualities of the command. Soviet military writers were restricted in their consideration of such
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key doctrinal issues as the impact of nuclear weapons in war. In every article they were compelled to frame the discussion in Stalinist terms. This tight grip over the process of formulating doctrine was criticized by the military after Stalin's death and was described asegative impact on militaiy thinking.^
When Khrushchev was First Secretary, be apparently attempted to identify himself with the planning of Soviet military strategyand force structure. During his famous speech to tbe Supreme Soviet ine declared that nuclear weapons would be decisiveuture war and lhat conventional forces were becoming obsolete. Khrushchev claimed he discussed his proposal with ihc General Staff, but his decision to downgrade the role of conventional forces met with direct resistance from conservative elements of the Soviet military establishment. Although the military deferred to Khrushchev's authority as party leader, after his departure4 it was openly critical of bis involvement in the formulation of doctrine and strategy. Q
Tlie Soviet political leadership has changed its style under Brezhnev. Although Brezhnev has commented on defense-relatedSovicl support for arms conlrol and detente, warning anyof the consequencesuclear attack, and questioning the political utility of nuclearand oiher lop political leaders have stopped short of direct comment on Soviet mililary doctrine,
crning !
The decision by Brezhnev and other political leaders not to be publicly identified with substantive military issues has advantages for the Soviets. Their refusal to be openly committed to any one particular course of action allows them greater flexibility duringcrises and increases the uncertainty in ihe West concerning how ihe Soviet leaders would respondrisis.
The Soviet political leaders also may have determined lhat warlike statements have an undesirable impact on the West. They know that Khrushchev's "missile-rattling" created apprehension among the NATO allies and helped to stimulate US missile production in the. The lop leaders may have decided Western analysts arc less alarmed by doctrinalmade by the military, since the analysts
would assume that Soviet military leaders would be more bellicose in their statements lhan civilian rulers.
Military Science
Key Institutions. Although we know that mililary science provides the basis of Soviet doctrine and is the responsibility of the military, it is not clear how, and by whom, the military findings become accepted as inputs lo Soviet doctrine. The Soviet military literature notes only lhat the core of doctrine is derived from mililary science judgments concerning Ihe probable nature and conduct of armed conflict.'1
The key organizations engaged in formulating military science are the General Staff, the military academies, and ihc editorial staffs of the military journals. These organizations work directly with field commands (military districts, groups of forces, andhey are responsible for analysis of military scienceas well as for publishing their findings. ^
The General Staff apparently orchestrates the process, wilh ils Mililary Science Directorate playing live key role in coordinating the inputs of the variousThe Directorate performs the managerialof developing and assigning military science research topics, defining the research and analysis performed by subordinate organizations, andthe dissemination of ihe final product.
The Main Operations Directorate of ihe General Staff, the main staffs of the services, and the mililary academics propose research topics selected frommonographs, and dissertations to the Military Science Directorate. The officers of the Military Science Directorate also study and react to topics imposed by the Minister of Defense and, possibly, the Defense Council. The directorate then assigns research topicshe appropriate military districts, fleets, academies, and|
* Article* and book* on Soviet military science are attributed primarily to militaryumber ot whom have earned tbe Soviet equivalenth.D. Tbe find nits of Sonet military science arc peobabty formalated by these full urne ipeoalisu. althoafit bon la live articles un military science are often signed by senior military officials, rj |
'Seerief discussion about the Institute or the USA and Canada and Ihe Institute of the World Economy amiR tin tarns t
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Moil frequently mentioned in miliiaty literature as being involved in these Uudies are Ihe Academy of the General Staff and ihe Frunze Academy. The faculties of these schools ate expected to study the assigned theoretical problems and to coordinate their efforts with ibe tuffs of military districts and fkcts. Soviet authors indicate that proportions are Tint tested with tbe use of computers, utilizing mathematical models and other techniques. Exercises arc then designed to evaluate proposals in the field.
Value of Exercises. According to one mililary author, "to enrich theory with the accomplishments ofs Ihe paramount methodological problem of Soviet militaryhe Soviets stress thailies on integrating theory with practice, rather than "speculative cliscussions" of mililaryThis emphasis dates back to Marx, who strongly believed lhat an idea must move from the realm of pure thought into practice. | [
The Soviel effort to combine theory with practice appears to focus on militaryhese are designed to evaluate the theoretical Findings of person-ncl in military academies and major staffs, verify existing operational plans, and lest Ihe latest military equipment and weapons. As expressed by one officer, "Exercises serve as the major criterion fordecisions pertaining to troop organizationaland new problems of military art "
Fjerases are Med to solve problems such as planning and implementing from offensive operations War games conducted at one major military academy helped the officers to explore problems nvsociHtedront offensiveuclear war and the degree of enemy destruction in particular operations
Besides testing new theories, exercises are used to check principles in field manuals and other instruction; to ensure thai operational plans are not based on obsolete techniques Forrofessor at one military academy wrote that major precepts found in manuals concerning protection of troops from nuclear attack are frequently verified by research conductedhe school in exercises.I
'So-iel mililary eicKoa mn iwo haile lainiiona: unit training and iminc mililary science principle* The exerci ihb paper arc UMsc designed to teal ihcoicUcal findings.
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Exercises also contribute to development ofsystems. Soviel writings indicate thatresearch is always coordinated wilh theof new combat equipment and weapons.Tic example was the use of exercises atlo improve the survivability of tanks
Special Research Teams. Soviet military literature emphasizes the importance of good organization in preparing, conducting, and synthesizing ihe results of exercises In preparing the exercise, tbe planners drawchedule, indicate their goals, and project Ihe results and possible areas of their application. While tbe exercise is being conducted, the officers are directed lo collect data on iheir activities. The final stage entails analysis of major findings, j |
To fulfill these requirements, ipccial research teams are formed to serve throughout the exercise. These teams are selected fiom personnel of militaryparticularly the General Staff Academy and the Frunze Academy. They probably are responsible for evaluating the specific problems and fur synthesizing the results. Apparently the accumulated data from many exercises over several years are carefullyand analyzed in reports.
Scientific Conferences. Reports on exercises areat military science conferences. Mililarysponsor these conferences in coordinationheadquarters of various military echelons fromlevel up to the ministry level. Theirtogether key personnel from the operationalsides of the defenseappear structured along the theme of anormally deliveredigh-rankingsuch as the Chief of the General Staff.may be the primary means for reviewingrecent exercises
Accoiding to one author, "This keynote address or report should be based on the results of the latest research on theories and practical operational combai training It should not be weighed down wilh well-known statements from guideline documents, works on military theory, and materials from the military periodical |
Militaiii -injic impOlr.irr: vehiclesihc results of the militarythe armed forces. The presentationsnot only for the benefit of the representativesconference but are also published as article*by military newspapers, journals, andfor arcuLalioti throughout ihc armedproceedings of the conferences arc then used asfor field manuals, military regulations,and other official documents.
Once the results of theoretical research, exercises, and scientific conferences have been disseminated, they are to be adopted for use by the armed forces. In the words of one mililary officer, "Without the promptof scientific research results to thend without iheir practical adoption, no investigation, howerer high ns theoretical level, can be considered complete, il loses its practical value and risks being an addition lo that fund of literature in the archives which is in no demandmplementing Ihc findings of research projects becomes the final stage in integrating theory and practice in the formulation of Soviet mililary doc trine and science.
Military science, Ihe technological basis of doctrine, is developedystematic and controlled manner by full-time mililary specialists, schooled in theoffering advanced degrees in mililary science. They are required lo master and contribute to the discussion of the importance of mililary art, history, economics, and other categories of militaryimited amount of debate over Ihe significance of ibesellowed, indicating occasional tension within ibe defense bureaucracy."^
Tbe ma/or goal of this systematic approach is to provide Ihe armed forcesound guide to action in the event of war. The guiding Marxist-Leninist principle is the integration of theory and practice. This is accomplished through the use of exercises which test hypothesis, operational plans, and mililary equipment and weaponsi""!
Conclusions
Many questions remain aboul Ihc development of Soviet military doctrine and science We haveeneral idea of the specific functions of Ihe key institutions involved in the process, especially the interaction between ihe Politburo, Defense Council, and General Staff. We know that there arc disputes in the USSR over doctrinal issues, but we lack dear evidence as lo how ihey are resolved
We believe thai Ihc party leaders, who consider themselves the guardians of the ideological purity of the socialist movement, define military doctrine in terms of theninisl class struggle and that they have the final word on ihc development of Sovicl mililary doctrine. (
Marx ism-Leninism und Soviel Mililary Theory
Inflmemee
The Soviets at tribute iheir superpower tlatui not only to the quantity and quality of their weapons but alsouperior mililary doctrine based on the principles of Marxism-leninism, (he foundation of Communist ideology. As defined by Lenin, the principal objective of Marxist theory was to instill belief in the eventual victory of socialism over capitalism. This goal would be rcali/cd only through the constant review andof hypotheses in light of practical experience.
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The influence of Marxism-Leninism is pervasive throughout Soviet military writings. All authors must pay their respects to the works of Lenin and the dictims of Ihe party Adherence lo the established ideological goal of Ihe triumph of socialismonstant theme in Soviet military literature. At ihe same lime, military research is conducted pragmatically, inicgraling theory and practice.^
Dialectical andaterialism
Marxistideology, which shapes the world outlook of Soviet military and political leaders, is based on dialectical and historical materialism. Dialectical materialism holds thai nature istale ofmovement and change. Lenin believed lhat Ihe core of tbe dialectic was the "unily ofeaning that tbe basis of all development is the divisionnit into opposing elements and the clash between them. Historicalhe dialectic applied lo social conditions, describing the conflict between capitalism and sociatism.istorical materialism presumesviolence, and the inevitable destruction of capitalism. Although accommodation withstales" could be justifiedemporary basis, Lenin argued that ultimately the capitalist system could be overthrown only by violent meanij-
The nuclear age, however, has made ihe use of force as advocated by lenin less attractiveolicy option: controversy in ihe USSR regarding ihe dangers of nuclear war was especially evident during the
Khrushchev regime. Ath Party Congresshrushchev announced lhat war was no longer "fatalistically inevitable" and that "peacefulwould prevail as Soviet policy. Thisayor revision of the traditional Communist dogmaar lo the finish between Use socialist and capitalist systems would eventually take place. Khrushchev aho implied that ihe tenet of inevitable Communist victory was no longer relevant in an age when war might mean mutual
Khrushchev's successors continue lo claim lhat the Soviet Union promotes peaceful coexistence andwith the West. They no longer argue, however, that all wars, including wars of national liberation, could lead to the destruction of civilization. In fad. Soviet leaders and writers have openly stated that the USSR has an obligation to support wan of naiiooal liberation."
in Ihe view of Soviet political and mililary writers, capitalist countries may be temporarily constrained by internal problems, but (he nature or Westernhas not changed Soviet leaders, including Defense Minuter Ustinov, have warned that there arecircles" in (he United States who hope to obtain military superiority over the USSR. As stated2 in Ibe Soviet book. Military force and Inter national Relations. "During the postwar period tbe United States constantly pursued the goal ofilitary superiority over the Soviet Union thai would enable il to achieve success in opposing it and in restraining the international revolutionary ondliberationhis world view has caused the Soviet Union lo engageteady buildup of
" these lemiumnt-Leninist theory cei war were bitter It attacked by Ibe Chinosc Commusuisai Ihe early IfftOv The Chinese reveled lha thesis ihii ibe powbilMy of catalauon uinuclearnade liwuiofi wir kx>dutercmHkag much or Tbe borers of Mclea:ixl nrtlec taag to lappon lane aBie* of uuail labcranoa Ihe
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war. the socialist niirs would nmmohSoma aortitis* in Africa show thai the car reni regimetoruovcquKhly locipioillocal (onfUclibtneic.to attack ihe Soviet! for refusing lOMpport limited wars.ibeen for duiag ioj
conventional and strategicrowth guided by the continued development of Soviet doctrinej
Mttkodoifj
In Soviet ideology, dialectical materialismethodology for observing and explaining natural and social processes. It cancientific effort to use existing knowledge in understanding processes and in predicting events" Lenin viewed Ibis approach as applicable to every field. Its importance lo military science was discussed recently in an article attributed to Marshal N. Ogarkov. chief of the Soviet General Staff. Accordinghe article, the diatcetical method
isreliable compass in the study of Ihe many
phenomena associated with the perfecooo of the defense of the stale "uo
Adherence of ihe Soviets to dialectical materialism is relevant to our understanding of how they formulaic military doctrine. The dialectical method holds thai no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself Thus, each war must be considered in light of ihc political and economic conditions surrounding it as well as the military
Dialectical materialism callsontinuous review of militarym'i "unity of opposites" theory presumes that change in weapons technology will lead to major changes in doctrine. The most prominent example of an important change in doctrine after an intensive debate was acceptance by Soviet political and military leaders of thr revolutionaryl ROCanU weapons.
anc Sovxlhaiill
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la tb* WcariW uactsof Harvst taMcacpt) aa* UM aouaa tkai tiea itaSwpeanabtc eaiJe tosocialhave been ctRidnt. It hat been argued (hat ihe lanof the dialecticich that -haiewi the actual MM rfcaUOtXUavt possible to cite Ihc mulls at ttluMraliwialecinal change
The dialectical method presumes there will be clashes between writers advocating different positions and strategics. This concept is discussed by Marshal Ogarkov:
The law of conflict and unity of oppositesbask idea of the dialectical under standidevelopment of mililary affair* and.military science. The conflict ofis the source, ibe motive force ofof all the diverse phenomenaconflict and warhole
Armed conflict is by its essencecontradictions of armed conflict are firstthe contradictions between oppositesgoals, offense and defense, theof forces and means in limited space*,of superiority on ihe axes ofthe nossibility of their defeat by fire,of the armed forces forand ihe economic capabilities of
Institute of the USA and Canada (IUSAC) and the Institute of ihe World Economy and International Relationsoth under the direction of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, arc responsible for analyzing American domestic and foreign policies. One of their functions appears to be inierprclint mililary developments in the United States and other Western countries for Soviet political leaders[
Within the IUSAC. thereepartment which studies the military dimension of American loie.gr. policy This unit, staffed by retired General Staff officers, evaluates the political significance ofweapons and strategic policy. Their publications, which primarily depend on information from the Western press, reflect few details of Soviet defense issues, indicating that the institutes do not have access to classified information or are enioined from using il."
There is no evidence to suggest thai agencies such as IUSAC or IMEMO compete with militaryin tbe formulation of Soviet military science Moreover, the functions of these institutes are shared with other institutions, such as ihe Mam Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) and the American Department of the Committee for Suie Securityhich probably have more influence with Politburo members. 4|
G. A. Arbatov, director of the IUSAC, is an adviser to Brezhnev. His responsibilities probably includeon the political climate within the United Slates concerning arms control and delenlc. Another likely responsibility is lo proscci the response of US policymakers to Soviet mililary activilies|
Arbalov's role is valuable lo the catcnt he is able lo keep Politburo members informed on political-military events in the United Stales Many Westerners believe that Arbatov and others in the Academy's research institutes have offered ihc Soviet politicalore .sophisticated world outlook. Arbalov's view of detente may also influence the outlook of Brezhnev and other important officials, and this could impacton the political content of Sovicl doctrine.
informal
analyst* still did nut have access lo lion j
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