Soviet Military Capabilities To Project Power and Influence in Distant Areas
National IMrllicence Estimate
CIA HISTORICAL REViEW FR08RAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
278
9
SOVIET MILITARY' CAPABILITIES TO PROJECT POWER AND INFLUENCE IN DISTANT AREAS
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Aoency, the lot exigence orgoniialioni ot the Deporlmenii of Stole and Oefenie, ond the National Security Aoency.
Also Participating:
The Aiiiitont Chief of Sloff tor Intelligence. Deportment of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Deportment of the Navy
Ihe Aiiiitont Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Deporiment of lhe Air Force
PREFACE
Since lhchc Sovieis have strengthened and expanded (heir influence in the Thirdurine lhe past three years the USSlVs arms sales and miliiary assistance have been poitrayed as havingew stage with the introduction of Cuban combat forces in Angola and Ethiopia. The magnitude of these interventions and their success in furthering Soviet objectives have caused growingin the West, in China, and among some Third World leaders thai Moscow has embarked in Africaew, more assertive expansionist policy with worrisome implications for other areas of the Third World. The overriding concern is that the leading Western nations, wrestling with the intricate and politically volatile issues of counteracting these initiatives, will fail to meet this latest Soviet challenge and thereby encourage Moscow to intensify and broaden its efforts.
This Estimate examines the substance and objectives of this Soviet policy, reviews Soviet gains and losses to date, and analyzes overall Soviet capabilities for distant operations across the full range of militarymilitary aid, arms sales, and support of insurgent movements to the use of friendly forces and the intervention of Soviet combat units. The Estimate does not address Soviet options or capabilities for military operations against specific countries except in analysis at annex concerning hypothetical deployments to illustrate Soviet airlift capabilities. The final chapter projects likely military initiatives to extend Soviet influence in the Third World, future development of Soviet forces for distant operations, and trends in Soviet arms sales during thc next five toears.
At annexhronology of notable Soviet military actions in the Third Worldupplemental information on Soviet aid to insurgent movements,rief discussion of Third World perceptions of Soviet military power and the effect that Soviet military assistance has on regional balances of forces.
Appended at the end of this Estimateoldout mapiving locations of places mentioned in the text.
Some figures in this Secret version of9 have been updated to account for information that became available after the original Top Secret edition was issued in
contents
pr
executive
discussion
i. objectives and policies
A. Thr ProjectionPower and Inlluence
K The Primacy nl Military Force
C Poster Aporataal
11.
A. Military Sales loThird15
B Military Training of Third World Personnel
C Other Advisory
Delivery. Assembly, xnd Maintenance of Miliiary Equipment
Construction of Military
Military Intelligence
D Combat Support ol* Third World
Renpplv
Advisers and
E Aid lo
F. Use of Cuban and Other Friendly
KaHcin Europe
North Korea
Angola and
III. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND CAPABILITIES FOR DISTANT
OPERATIONS
Forces Deployed in Diitont Areas
Indian
South
Caribbean
Pacific Ocean
Forces Available for Deployment to Dulanl Area*
Naval Forces
orest
Naval Avialion
Frontal
Airborne Forces .
C- Other Soviet Resource* for Distant Operation*
Overseas Facilities
Meichonl
Piihini:
0i fm Distant
Military Airlifts
Intervention of Combat Forceiocal
Airborne Assault
Amphibious Auault .
Interdiction ol Sea Lines of
Thc Monetary Cost oi Distant Operations
IV. OUTLOOK
A. Likelihood and Nature of Future Soviet Distant
Areas ol Operation
Weaknesses and
Reaction to Economic Problems
U. Options for the Developmenl and Deployment of Forces for
Distant
Navy
Air
C Future Military Sales and Assistance
ANNEX A: Selective Chronology of Events Related to Soviet Military
Activities in the Third World.
ANNEX B: Soviet Aid to Insurgent Movemenis in the Third World
he Movement of Large Soviet Forces by Military Transport
ANNEX D: Third World Regional Perceptions of Soviet Military Power
V,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Objective]
I. Soviet leaders continue lo view tlie Third World as fertile ground for the expansion of Soviel political, military, and economic inlluence through an assertive and opportunistic policy. They see iiotitical conflict involving the use of military force or conducted In its shadow as the main propellanl of fundamental changes in lhc Third World. They believe lhat military power will remain the cornerstone of Soviet policy. Their primary objectives in aligning themselves selectively with slates and insurgent movements in Third World conflicts arc to assert the USSR's legitimacy as ideological vanguard of world "national liberation" movements, toajor role in Third World affairs, to affect the outcome of regional conflicts in favor of Soviet interests, and to neutralize Western and Chinese political and military influence. The Soviet leadership has no illusions, however, about thc difficulties of attaining these objectives.
hile broad political objectives are paramount, thepursue specific military objectives as well. These include acquisition of overflight clearances and access to facilities abroad for supporting military operations of Soviet as well as friendly forces, especially emergency air and sea lifts of military equipment and supplies to Third World states and insurgent forces. Overseas facilities also can ease thc logistic problems of operating naval forces at great distances from Soviet waters. The Soviets deploy military forces in distant areas to show the flag, toilitary presence lhat can be augmented relatively quickly in time of crisis, and to monitor and, if necessary, counter thc operations of Western naval forces.
ower order in Soviet policy in the Thirdto promote trade, to secure access to certain raw materialsand to be capable of restricting Western access to theseefforts to foster both military and economic dependenceThird World countries go hand in hand, as theof Soviet arms8 also account for almost half ofnonmilitary trade with the Third World. Soviet economicnot always resultedommensurate level of influence, nor doexpect economic interests alone to buy much Influence.
Policy Appraisal
Soviets have undoubtedly (tained from the expansionmilitary activity in the Third World. Soviet policymakers are
probably persuaded lhat they have generally been on lhe right track, and theit most recent ventures in Angola and Ethiopia have surely reinforced lhat conviction. Soviet polilical influence has grown in some countries at the expense of the West and China. Events in Angola and Ethiopia have enhanced thc USSR's imagereat power capable of projecting miliiary force far from its shores. Miliiary nssislance to Africa and lhe Middle East has demonstrated the value of Soviet support, especially under emergency conditions. Moscow also has benefited from the international perception lhat the military balance has changed, lo the detriment of the West, and from the seeming US reluctance to use military lorce lo counter the expansion of Soviet and Cuban presence in the Third World.
oviet military involvement in Third World conflicts has evolved from military assistance programs, lo occasional use of Soviet forces in defensive roles, to thc extensive use of Cuban combat forces. The Cuban intervention in Angola and especially Ethiopia has probably strengthened Soviet confidence In the feasibility and effectiveness of this strategy, enhanced its appeal among political and military leaders in both Moscow and Havana, and encouraged them to press this slratcgy. Soviet and Cuban leaden probably will believe that, as long as such actions do not portray them as invaders and do not threaten the West's allies or Us sources of vital raw materials, the risk of Western military involvement and escalationider conflict will be slight.
The interdependent relationship between the USSR and Cuba is complex, and both sides would probably find it difficult to determine at this stage who has gained more from their joint military ventures. The Cubans have worked closely wiih the Soviets, and Cuban involvement in lhe Third World has served Sovicl policy. The foremost advantage in using Cubans or olher friendly forces is the reducllon in visibility of Soviet involvement in Third World conflicts. It also allows Moscow to exert influence in circumstances where Soviet forces would be unwelcome.
Calculation of the risks in applying miliiary forceentral feature of Soviet policy. Thc Angolan and Ethiopian ventures, though dramatic In scale and noteworthy in their use of Cuban forces, did not entail major risks for the Kremlin, but reflected Moscow's assessment of African reactions, of political restrainls on the United States, and the availability of Cuban forces. Though thc Initial role of the Soviets in Cuban military operations in Angola is not known, we assume that the strategy and tactics employed were coordinated with them. In Ethiopia. Moscow's role was clearly more dominant from the outset.
2
n the few instances where the Soviets have introduced their own military forces into conflicts In the Third World, Ihey did so to assist friendly countries and to inhibit possible Western military initiatives. In these cases, however, they haveolicy which strictly limits the role ol Soviet forces while at the same time accepting measured risks of escalation.
Their pilots and air defense units have engaged in combat, but to date have not operated outside friendly territory.
Soviet naval forces have established orresence in (he regions of conflict but have noi enRagcd in combat.
Airborne units have been placed on alertanner possibly designed lo bring pressure on the belligerents as well as thc United States.
These activities illustrate Soviet appreciation for the utilityhow of force and of implicit and explicit threatseans of achieving policy goals.
Instrumentalities
Arms transfers are by far the most widely employed of the military means available to thc Soviets for projecting influence in the Third World. The SovieU have more than tripled the current dollar amount of agreements and deliveries of military assistance to Third World countries over the last five years. Where the bulkecipient's military forces become equipped with Soviet weapons, dependence on the USSR for advisers, spare parts, and newer equipment grows and in timeotential means of influencing the recipient's policies. In practice. Moscow's efforts to exploit such dependence for this purpose have had both successes and failures.
Third World nations continue to be lured by Soviet offers of modern military equipment not usually available from other suppliers, by long-term credits at low interest rates, often by lower prices, by payment (until recently) in local rather than hard currency, and by quick delivery. Moscow is laying greater stress on the commercial considerations of its arms sales to earn hard currency. Civen these factors, the market for Soviet arms remains fertile, and the trend in sales is upward.
Through military training, advisory, and assistance programs tlte Soviets attempt toase of enduring influence by fostering extensive tics with Third World miliiary personnel.0 have been trained in the USSR.0 Soviet military advisers and technicians arc currently stationed in Third World
counlries. In recent years, suspicions of some Third World leaders about tbe motives behind Soviet military assistance programs have grown and led to increasing reluctance by some to allow large numbers of Soviets into their countries. Nevertheless, the number of Soviet military advisers abroad has steadily increased.
mergency resupply of high-priority miliiary items by air and sea is the most widely publicised form of Soviet combat support to Third World states, ln this regard, the USSR's ability to provide large quantities of armselatively short timeajor advantage. This service carries little risk for the USSR because few Soviet personnel are involved, they are not combatants, tbe deliveries arc generally made to areas remote from the fighting, and other countries are reluctant to oppose such operations militarily. In addition, such resupply operations do not necessarily commit the Soviets to deeper involvement.
A step higher on the Udder of involvement and risk is the assignment of Soviet advisory personnel to Third World combat units.hen Soviet pilots flew combat missions against rebels in North Yemen. Soviet personnel have seen actual combat in at least three Third WorldSyria, andhaveirect combat advisory role In twoand Ethiopia.
The USSRumber of insurgent movements in the Third World, but the type and extent of this assistance vary. Il Is usually channeled through third parties because insurgents normally do not operate where Moscow can provide direct aid and because the Soviets may want to play down or conceal their role. By leaving tbc degree of lhcir support ambiguous, the Soviets gain freedom for political maneuvering.
ast European states haveide variety of military equipment and experts to Third World nations and Insurgent movements, often in close cooperation with the USSR. While in most cases this support has furthered Soviet objectives, the East Europeans have had their own political and economic motives. The East European governments have not committed combat troops in the Third World and would bc reluctant to do so.
aval surface ships and submarines are the principal Soviet military forces deployed in distance areas and are supplemented by periodic deployments of naval aircraft. Although Soviet concerns over potential strategic threats from Western carrier*launched airstrikes and submarine-launched ballistic missiles remain prominent In Soviet distant operations, the Navy continues to perform important missions related to the projection of power and influence in thc Third World, primarily by maintaining forces in regions of Soviet interest which can bc auginonted relatively Quickly in times of crisis,
We have no evidence of Soviet contingency plans to exert political or economic pressure on the United States or its allies through interdiction of sea lines of communication in the absenceATO-Warsaw Pact war. The Soviets probably believe that such an operation would lead lo war with NATO.
In lhe principal areas of ihe.ir normal deployment in distant areas. Soviel diesel submarines and naval ships have accessumber of ports for crew rest, replenishment, maintenance, and fn some cases major overhaul. Moscow is seeking additional access, but the only goodin lhe near term arc in Angola. Ethiopia. South Yemen, and Vietnam Staging facilities for Soviet naval reconnjisr,mci- aircraft are currently limited to Cuba. Angola, and South Yemen. Ethiopia also probably will giant access for this purpose
Intervention Capabilities
he Soviets have significant forces capable of intervention In distant areas and have introduced forces into combat situations in distant areas in the past. We believe that Soviet leaders in the future would be willing under certain circumstances to use forces for this purpose. Elements of all Soviet cor.ventionalair, andpotential resources for use in situations that call for intervention. The deploymentarge segment of Soviet forces in distant areas is constrained not only by thc practical difficulties of moving large forces over long distances but by the requirement, as Moscow sees It, to retain thc bulk of these forces in the USSR and Eastern Europe in readiness for their primary mission of waging war wiih NATO or China. On the other hand, these (actors would not restrict the deployment of smaller units.
here Cuban or other friendly forces are not available for use in the Third World or are deemed unsuitable, Moscow would have the option ol using its own ground forces. Although Soviet air. naval, and air defense forces have been involved in conflicts in lhe Middle East, Angola, and Ethiopia, Soviet ground combat forces have not. Crowing Soviet self-confidence in projecting power and in the USSR's rolelobal power will diminish whatever Soviet reluctance may have existed in the past to employ ground forces outside the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, there are limited situations in which allied forces would not be preferableoviet point of view; Afglianistan is one where the provision of limited Soviet ground forcesurry might well be undertaken. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership would probably view the use of ground combal units, even in modest numbers,ignificant escalation of Soviet involvement. Thc major constraints would be concern over the likelihood of Western or regional
5
counteraction and the impact on Third World perceptions of Soviet policy. We believe, therefore, that Moscow would employ cround combat units only where, and to the degree, it considered such action essentia) to preserve vital Soviet interests in thc region.
ver the nextears the Soviets will continue to make modest improvements in amphibious lift, logistic support ships, naval tactical air support, gunfire support, and airlift Such improvements, when added to current naval, airborne, naval infantry, and command and control resources, will result in an increased ability to deploy lorces in distant areas and to come to thc assistance of any ally. For example, the Soviets might introduce an airborne or naval infantry unit at the invitationovernment, particularly if Moscow believed there was little danger of Western reaction and thai the intensity of combat would be low or the presence of an armed Soviet contingent would be sufficient to accomplish Moscow's objectives.ingle Soviet airborne division is larger than the armies of many Third World states.
e believe, however, that thc Soviets are unlikely tohird World country. They have never mounted an airborne assault or amphibious assault operationistant area. Nevertheless, Soviet forces have long been capable of undertaking such an operation against the light opposition which could be expected in most areas, and tbe above-projected improvements will expand this capability. But, over the next decade the Soviets will still not have built tbe forces capable of transporting, landing, andarge joint assault operation against substantial opposition in thc Third World,
Outlook
olicy-hange in thc makeup of the top Soviet leadership is highly probable in the next five years and virtually certain in thcc do not believe that Soviet policies or long-term objectives toward the Third World will change substantially for this reason alone We do not foresee the present or any likely future Soviet leadership altering these objectives to secure short-term economic or political benefits from the West. Although future Soviet leaders will attach varying degrees of importance to detente relations with tlie United States and other Western powers, we believe it unlikely that
Soviet leaders will be any more dissuaded from pursuing opportunities in thc Third World in the future than in tho recent past by concern over adverse effects on detente. Indeed. Soviet leaders will probably
continue to calculate that major issues like the strategic arms limitation
talks will be largely unaffected and tbat costs in less critical areas of
US-Soviet relations will be bearable.
6
IU:lional Prospects. We believe lhe Soviets will persistteady course of creating and exploiting opportunities in distant areas, utilizing wherever possible their comparative advantages In military instruments of influence. They will continue to regard militaryarms sales, military assistance, and support of insurgentthe most feasible way of bringing about the changes they seek in the political structure of thc Third World.
In Latin America, opportunities for expanding Soviet influence through military means arc less favorable than in other regions of the Third World, with the exception of the continuing Soviet role in Cuba. Although Moscow has designated Latin America as an arena for Soviet-US competition and has made some economic and diplomatic inroads, prospects arc still limited. There will undoubtedly be incidents of unrest and turmoil that should lend themselves to exploitation, but Soviet efforts will be hampered by prevalent anti-Communist sentiments in Latin America and by the USSR's inability to provide the kinds of nonmilitary assistance Latin Americans need. Most Latin American governments are wary of Soviet overtures and concerned as much about Soviet expansionism as about US regional influence.
his paragraph of (he earlier oerston of9 addressed Sooiei military presence in Cuba. In view of events related to this matter since issuance of the Estimate, the paragraph has been deleted. The reader is directed to more recent intelligence publications for information andon this subject.}
In South Asia, the Soviet outlook is somewhat brighter than in Latin America. The Soviets arc expanding tlieir ioie in Afghanistan and are maintaining close relations with India. India's current government, however, is not as well disposed toward the Soviets as its predecessor and has begun seeking to make Indian foreign policy more genuinely nonaligned by improving relations with both China and thc West and by reducing its dependence on the USSR for arms aid.
In Southeast Asia, Soviet support tothe Friendship Treaty of NovemberHanoi significant external. hacking for its invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) inonetheless, Hanoi remains fiercely independent, and Soviet Influence in the region will remain largely dependent on Hanoi's sufferance.
In the Middle East, opportunities to expand Soviet influence will depend, at least in thc near term, mainly on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the course of events Jn Iran. Over the long term, underlying antagonisms toward, and deepening suspicions of, Moscow's motives will qualify Soviet prospects. Sovici opportunities
7
could greatly improve, however, if peace negolialions in the Middle East fail, raising the likelihood of renewed hostilities.esult of thc instability in Iran, the Soviets undoubtedly anticipate significant changes there and in the conservative regimes of thc Persian Gulf area that will lead to opportunities for new Soviet ties with tbe oil-producing Mates and to further reduction of Western influence.
best opportunities for the USSR will lie in Africa,instability is commonplace and where conditions thatand insurgencies will remain rife.
of Influence. This will remain thein Soviet efforts to project power and influence in thethrough military means. Even where Soviet influenceit is vulnerable lo unpredictable changes in the localor in its attitudes. Nationalist-minded states will continuethc arrogant behavior and thinly veiled prejudice oftenSoviet representatives. Many Third World leaders willof Soviet motives and probably would be reluctant clientsUSSR. Those who do accept Soviet assistance can be expectedagainst instances of exploitative military agreements,and training, and interference in internal affairs.
preserve Soviet influenceountry where, foron Soviet military support has diminished or expulsionpersonnel is threatened. Moscow has essentially threethe continuation of present policies:
Use friendly outside forces more extensively to carry out Moscow's policies.
Seek to acquire through Soviet advisers sufficient control of the military and internal security forces to prevent the leaders of the client state from taking actions inimical to Soviet interests.
Garrison Soviet troops in thc client stale, at its invitation, ostensibly to protect the slale against some external threat but in reality to preserve inovernment that is friendly and beholden to Moscow and that will enforce policies in line with Soviet interests.
last alternative would have unforeseeableSoviet foreign relations, but it is nonetheless an optioncould attract serious consideration by SovietThe deployment of Soviet forces for thisrastic departure from the policy Moscow has followedThird World.
-UCIUA
espite Soviet difficulties in preserving political influence in most Third World countries. Moscow will have ample opportunities toajor role. Soviet policy in the Third World feeds on political turbulence, military conflict, and civil strife. During thc nextears these disruptions are likely to recur, especially in Africa and the Middle East, and the major role the Soviets have effectivelysource of arms and military assistancerotector oftemain relevant to the needs of many countries.
DISCUSSION
I. OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES
Tho Projection of Power aod Influence
I. Soviet leaflets continue in view lhe Third WorldIt Mil, ground (im 'I--of Snvieti'. military, and economic Influence. Thc United Stales and China arc seen as Ihe main opponents of- (his expansion. Thebjectives in aligning 'he Soviel Union with stales and insurgent movements in Third World conflicts are to assert thc USSR's legili-macy as ideological vanguard of world 'national liberation" movements, loajor role In Third World affairs, lo affect (he outcome of regionalin favor of Soviet Interests, and lo neulraliw Western and Chinese poliiical and miliiary Influence.
2 Soviet leaden have no illusions aboul (hedifficulties of attaining Ihese objectives, but neither are Ihey in any particular hurry, for Ihey remainat least conditioned by Soviet Ideology tolime and history are on Iheir side. Although (hey see their struggle wiih (hes as rooted in ideology, they view lis practical manifestations in terms ofhich the lid* of baltle is measured in poliiical control and Influence. Their struggle, moreover. Is relentless, pursuedwhere conditions permit, but pallcnlly when (distance stiffens. Setbacks, which ihey view as the inevitable accompanimentorward policy, do not deter (hem from pursuing long-term objectives.
Soviet policy constantly seeks throughcovert action, and the coordinated application of diverse means to exploit opportunities for expanding Soviet power in (he Third World, securing nowof influence and continuing to press (he limits of Soviet power projection. Soviet policy therefore is both assertive and opportunistic, exploiting andevents and situations over which Moscow has little or no control and vigorously pursuing competitive advantages where circumstances permit
While broad political objectives are paramount, the Soviets pursue specific militarydL These include acquisition of overflight clearances and access to facilities abroad Irom which they can support
military operations of Soviet as well as friendlyemergency air and sea liftsin Third World stale* and
insurgenl forces The Soviet Navy wants overseas facilities thai can ease (he logistic problems ofnaval forces at great distances from Soviet waters Tlie Soviets deploy miliiaryand navaldistant aieas Io promote and defend (he USSR's Inleresls abroad: protecting (he maritime and fishing fleets, asserting Soviet rights on the high seas, demonstrating Soviel military might through port visits, affirming Moscow's support of Third World governments, and even in some cases assisting (he combal operations of friendly forces. They also collect inteUigence and aUernpt to monitor and. If necessary, counter (he operations of Western naval forces,aircrafl carriers and ballistic missile submarines capable of conducting nuclear strikes on the Soviet homeland. Soviet leaders believe lhal Ihe presence of their naval forces, by servingisible symbol of Soviel concern and military capability, also inhibits Weslern military initiatives in areas of live Third World during periods of (ension.
ower order In Soviet policy inWortd arc lo rxornote trade and to secure access
certain raw ma let lab and foods in short supply io the USSR. Al present the USSR's needs for meat Third World mineral resources ate limitedew critical items such as lhe bauxite it imports in large Quantities from Cuinea and phosphates it will Import from Morocco over the nextean. The Soviets already have tried lo ensure now, though limited, sources of oil through development assistance to Iraq's and Syria's
Industries and arc expected lo view access to foreign petroleum sources in (ho future as an ever more crucial strategic factor. (See (he discussion in chapter IV. beginningn the possible impact of future Soviet oil requirements on the course of Moscow's policy toward the Third World)
addition, just as Moscow throughseeks to male nations dependent on Uie
USSR lor lhcir militaryttemptsariety of meant to foster economic dependence. These Iwo efforts ro hand in hand, as Ihe major recipients of Soviet arms8 also accounted for nearly half of Soviet nonmilitary trade with the Third World. Moscow also seeks to create the capability to control, disrupt, or deny Western access to rawin Ihe Third World. This capability could be exercised, primarily during periods of international tension, to disrupt Western economies or lo pressure Western governments lo grant political concession: All of these efforts serve the same ultimateinfluence political actions, making them responsive to Moscow's direction.
S. The Primacy of Militory Force
Soviet leaders see military force, augmented by persistent diplomatic and political efforts, as Ihe main propellant of fundamental changes in Ihe Third World. Miliiary strength is crucial not only infuture opportunities to extend Soviet influence, but abo in preserving past gains. It is lhe foundation of lhe USSR's statuslobal superpower and wilJ remain through the coming decade the bey to Soviet behavior in the world arena. Indeed, In the past few years, military assistance and support to friendly forces have become demonstrably effective forms of projecting Soviet influence abroad. Moreover, the Soviets believe that lhe growth of their military power has permitted them toore assertive policy in Ihe Third World.
Soviet military involvement in Third Worldhas evolved gradually from dependence on military assistance programs in, to occasional use of Soviet forces in strictly defensive roles In, and more recently to extensive use of Cuban combat forces for intervention. Calculation of the rbfcs. liowever. in applying military force in the Third Worldentral feature of Soviet policy and was not vitiated by the actions In Angola and Ethiopia. Those two ventures, though dramatic In scale and noteworthy in their use of Cuban forces, did not entail major risks for the USSR but instead reflected the Soviet assessment of African reactions, politicalon US involvement in foreign conflicts, and the availability of Cuban forces.
Moscowew occasions has Introduced Soviel military forces Into conflicts in tlie Third World to assist friendly countries and lo inhibit possiblemilitary initiatives. In doing so. however, it hasolicy which strictly limits the role of
Soviet forces while at Ihe same time acceptingrisks ol escalation.
Soviet pilots and air defense unils have engaged in combat, but to date have not operated outside friendly territory.
Soviet naval forces have established orresence in the regions of conflict but have not encaged In combat
Airborne units have been placed on alertanner possibly designed to bring pressure on Ihe belligerents as well as the United States.
These activities Illustrate Soviet appreciation for the utility of show of force and implicit and explicit' threats as means toward the realisation of policy goals.
C. Policy Approisal
Frequent Soviet appraisals of the Interactional balance of political power contend thai theof forces'"5 has shifted steadily In favor of the USSR. They note lhat Ibe decline and demise of the colonial system gave rise to large numbers of independent nonaligned states in Ihe Third World.Furthermore, many former Western colonies have chosen noncapitalist forms of development and aligned themselves with the "socialisthich now comprises greater human and material resources than ever before. Soviet policymakers are probably persuaded by thb appraisal that they have generally been on lhe tight track, and their most recent ventures in Angola and Ethiopia have surely reiriforced that conviction.
Although the USSR hasumber of reversals, such as expulsion from Egypt and Somalia and the consequent loss of access to valuable military facilities, Soviel leaden, as for as we know, have not viewed these setbacks as groundsundamental reappraisal of their policy toward the Third World. In general, ihey probably would attribute these reversab not to the policy but to events beyond their control or to unfortunate miscalculations such as their apparent belief thai Sadal could be bullied1 IntoEgyptian programs along lines dictated by Moscow.
Soviel economic efforts in tlie Third World have been modest and selective bul have achieved Important returns due largely to military sale*.
Soviet Irade with the Third World grew8 billion94 billion6 and
gMiig<ii
illionOnlyercent of the growth reflect! expansion in realilitaryaccounted lortrrcent of Soviet exports7 and lor moil of lhe sizable earning* in hard currency, which totaled ISO0 million6 and an2 billion
The number of Tkiid World countries irad me with the USSR hai alto risen, from5 io nearlyt the present time.
he USSH. hrrwewi. cuiiiHit seriously cballencc Western economic pi edo mi nance in the Third World and iii tlte nonmilitary sector Is losins cound. al-though it has gained access to new fishing waters and certain raw materials and food Although nonmilitary Iradc rose steadily (in current year prices) fromillion17 billionl has dipped somewhat since ihen1 billion6 andillionore important, the Soviet share of lotal Third World trade (excluding armsas not only beenless than 2fell sharply6nd Soviel nonmilitary Irade with Third World countries has declinedhare of total Soviet Irade with non-Communist countries. (See
n contrast, Soviet pledges of economic aid lo Third World counhies over tlvc past five years have totaled more thanillion, as compared5 billion in lhe preceding live yean Soviet economic aid deliveries over these si* years have averaged0 million annually. Also, thereharp increase in economic aid relative to miliiary aid8 (see figureowever. Soviel economic aid has no* always resultedommensurate level of influence, no* do the Soviets expect economic interests alone to buy much influence.
he Soviets have undoubtedly gained from the expansion of their military activity in the Third World. Indeed, thc policy hasoviet
8 tixd* MMil.Ur lor tnduslM i> ihb
Eat anile.
miliiary and economic presence In some Third World countries and has enabled the SovieU to exercise some Influence over the course of events there. Moscow has expanded ils political influence in some countries at the expense of thc West and.esser extent, the 1'cople's Republic ol China. The Interventions in Angola and Ethiopia have enhanced tlie USSR's imagereal power capable ol projecting military force far from its shores and demonstrated the feasibility of using Cuban forces. The military assistance to Africa and the Middle East has demonstrated the valueupport, especially under emergency conditions. The faclSoviet involvement in Ethiopia was limited to countering the Somali invasion has probably allayed some African fears of Soviet intentions.has also benefited from lhe internationalthat the miliiary lab nee has changed, to the detriment of thc West, and from Ihe seeming US reluctance to use military forceounter lheof Soviet and Cuban presence in theThlrd World.
espite ils successes, Soviet policy suffersumber of vulnerabilities which have contributed to lhe setbacks in the USSR's relations with the Third World. The policy has persistently underestimated the power of nalionalismounter to the expansion of Soviet influence. Third World slates deeply resent lite arrogant, secretive, heavyhanded behavior of Soviet representatives and advisers, whose thinly veiledagainsi, and contempt of. Third World peoples and cultures, especially black African, is sharply felt. The policy also has misjudged Ihe resentment and suspicion lhat are mounting among Third World leaders against Soviet motives and has overestimated the potential of military assistanceechanism of control over Third World political leaders. Moreover, the policy falters where economic considerationsthe priority interest of Third -World nations. These factors often combine to undermine thc achievement of Soviet policy goab and make the preservation of Sovicl influence once achieved the molt pressing problem facing the Soviet leadership in its efforts to project power and influence fn the Third World through military means.
13
Trade Between the USSR and the Third
Soviet SKate ot ThMd Wotld Tiade*
Worldol Soviel Iradr*
V. /
, 1 , 1
1 1
77 7* 74 75 76 77
10
Unt Unified
2 73 74 75 71 77
*
ot Soviet Military and Economic Aid lo Less Developed
SOannual ivsiib*!
g
14
II. INSTRUMENTAlllrCS
MiUlory Soles lo lhe Third World
rms train!en tie bv lar lhe moa widely employed of (he military mean* for projecting Soviet influence in the Third World. What beganow-key miliiary aid effortoverned largely by political consideration* and snfl financial terms, lias mushroomedassive aid and sales program (seendaying Moscow important poliiical and commercial dividends Salespanned0
ear in lhe initial period of Ihe programo more lhan SI billionverillionnd over S5 billion7 (these dollar values are not adjusted foroscow's abilily to move quickly in erploitlng newhas given6 percent slice of the Third World arms maiket in the nasi four years Only (he United Stales has sold more miliiary goods to Third World buyersniversal staple in the world marketplace, arms have opened the door to wider Soviet relations
I
Soviet Miliiary Assistance to Third World
Alani*
UUr.
Mwocra
IMl IS06
74
SI
w
u
123
:i
100
III
S
a
B
AliKa
Cor
3
African
7
Culnea
Cimbla
Ghana
,
* as
<-.
Leon.
Mass
-:iat end at lablr.
15
Table I
Soviet Military Assistance lo Third World
(Continued)
7
HlVTflH Mil
A titer ii*
410
7tM
Yemen
Ycn*en
South Ali*
m
IJT7
TO
941
641
3
.
-
4S
21
i 1 . .
Ltnlu .. , .. .
Table 2
Soviet Military Assistance lo Selected Com muni it Countries,
Million LS Ooflm
a DeJivcrio
Delicto
If
57
Kcm
- -
Total
220
1TS6
0
%
Wilt, AuJ.liiKc to
World Cowrtfrie*
1
6
tdiutted for inflilJon
eiC%*
villi countries like Peru that have few political affln-tries with the USSR andhich (lie USSR haa lew il any other entrees, and they provide direct access to the recipient's military establishment- -the fulcrum of power In moil Third World counlries.
here the bulkilitary forces are ecjuipped with Soviet weaponry, dependence on the USSR for advisers, spare parts, and newergrows and in limeotential meant of influencing the recipient's policies by threatening to curtail or even cut oil lhe supply. Leaden of many countries hang ibeir political survival ind iheir Inter nalional image on assured weapon flows In practice. Moscow's efforts lo exploit such dependence have had both successes and failures.
hird World nations continue to be lured bv Sovicl offeri of modem military equipment not usually available from other suppliers, by long-term credits at low inleresl rates, often by lower prices, by payment (until recently) In local rather than hard currency, and by quick delivery. Given these factors, Ihc market for
Soviel arms remains fertile, and the trend in sales is
upward.
oscow is laying greater sticss than before on thc commercial considerations of Its arms sales. We know of few concessions given lo Important customers in the past year or so either in pricing arrangements or repayment terms. Libya paid cash. Even Syria no longer receives discounts and Is believed to be paying for most ol lis arms purchases in hard currency provided by Arab oil producers. Iraqpaying in crude oiL natural gas. and hard currency for deliveries under its order6 for more thanillion worth of equipment II should be noted, however, that Moscow will make significant concessions on payment terms when refusal to do so might Jeopardize Soviet interests- In Ethiopia's case, for example. Moscow has discounted the price of the arms delivered
In general. Soviet exports ol more advanced weapon systems to Third World nations have not begun until Soviet forces have been equipped with the successor syslems The Sovietsatter of policy have been reluctant to export their most advanced, high-performance military aircraft because of (he difficulties In training Third World pilots lo fly them and lhe danger of compromising the capabilities of the aircraft and thef their technology.
The USSR does notholly separate line ol miliiary equipment for eiport. In some cases,
however, the Soviets manufacture export versionshardware that do not include all of (heor ancillary equipment {such as bombdevices) provided on weapon systems forIn other cases, moreover, production offoi eiport has continued even (houghno longer procure ibis equipment. Also,interns like4 tank that havefrom active Soviel Inventories have beenfor
oscow usually insists thai arms buyers submit iheir requirements for equipment andear in advance so that production schedules can be adjusted. Some of ihese orders aie met from large Soviet stocks. Where thc orders impinge on already taut production schedules, tlse Soviels sometimes draw out deliveries beyond Ihe usualoonths. But ihey retain (he capability to deliver Urge quint Hies of militaryrapidly by dipping Into tbe eOTipment reserves of Soviet2 tanb In storageank division in the Kiev Military District reportedly were shipped lo Ihe Middle East In the fallnd that division's reserve stocks were later refilledUs.
B. Miliiary Training of Third World Personnel
otal of0 military personnel Irom Third World countries have received training in the Sovicl Union (seeraining is also conducted in Thiid World nates, therebyfor the Soviels Ihe administrative, logistical, and security problems lhat attend the entry of largeof foreigners into the Soviet Union. Both the In-country and the USSR-based programs. In addition to providing military (raining, are intended lo extend Soviet Influence In Third World countries, lo cultivate pro-Soviet sentiments among client military personnel, and to identify controllable Individuals and factions that can be eiploltcd to serve Soviet interests,
he ever-growing compleiity of modernhas enabled (he SovieU over lhe years lo send Urge numbers of advisers to diem countries in the Third World, where0 Soviet advisers andnow provide instruction on the full range of Soviet equipment, serve as Instructors In clientInstitutions, and supervise military exercises (seeoviet military advisers are often Ingood positions to Influence political alUtudes because of the teacher-student situations in which they generally work and the broad access they frequently have to influential client officials. Some Soviet advisers
l! 'l' li in - i'l
J* r* p*
ie SISs _i_ pii
i i
i I
feii ossiiSsi s
l ill l . 8
|
.-
5
8 $
I
Is
3 "
..ill
S
3 III
i
In
Table 4
Sovici and Cast European Military Adviser* and Technicians in lhe Third
F.^.
Africa .
trail
_
Africa
.
until
Verdi
African
*.
Cuinea -
Zambia
10
SO
America
Middle Eail
Yemen
Yemen
Ada
Afthinfttan
7W
number toi" (or co*ore
are active at tlie highest levels ofthe host military establish men U. Moreover, thoy can spot talented and politicallv impressionable individuals and single them out for special Instruction and politicalin the USSR, where training of foreigners stresses Marxist-Leninist ideology.
n recent years, suspicions of some Third World leaders about the motives behind Soviet military assist-
ance programs have grown and led lo increasing reluctance by some lo permit large numbers of Soviets into their countries, and in some cases both iheir access lo facilities and their contacts with Indigenoushave been restricted. Some major aid recipients have contended that thc Sovieis intentionally slow down Ihcir training and purposely introduce' more sophisticated equipment from lime lo limeeans ofontinued Urge Soviet presence. The Soviets. In fact,umber of schemes to perpetuate and enlarge their presence. For cample, ihey some-limes refuse lo provide leelinical manuals for equip-mcnl. thereby making thc hosl dependent on Sovici technicians. Despite the suspicions and resistance of Third World leaders, however, there hasteady increase In rcccni years in the number of Soviel advisers abroad.
C. Other Advisory Functions
from iheir combat support roleilitary advisers and techniciansother functions that contribute to thcof Soviet object Ives. These functionsthree general categories.
Oelivery. Assembly, ond Moinlenonce of Mffitory Equipment
most Soviet eauipmenl guaranteesvalid unless the equipment Ls maintained byduring thc one- or two-yeara substantial number of Soviet militaryabroad are involved In this activity.
Construction of MKtory FociGfiet
large number of Soviet specialists areunder miliury aid agreements in theand construction of miliiaryinstallations, and military training centers.
Miliary Intdipence Operation!
full extent of Soviet support ofIntelligence activities Is not known, nor Iswhether such assistance Is performedaid agreements or through separate contracts.
prnonnel am eaJkd "purarxort.-lam lhal In Soviet Internal admlalitnlivehai cook Ioll Soviet aatliiaiy penonnel abroad actlnr. to an adriiorr ramctlv norpt thaw dirrclr enraend In combat or those who could be by virtu* of (heir duilo. The latter are called "combatuoaoed In
Sovicl investment In thi* area ol loreign military assistance is small lit comparison with the otherdiscussed* above and probably earns small returns in increased influence, though It may provide access to client intelligence services The USSR certainly has benefited from the activities of East Cerman and Czechoslovak intelligence advisers in such count tics as Somalia. Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique.
ombat Support of Third World Clients
USSR has provided ft*angeand com bal support that havethe level of Soviet involvement inconflicts short of engaging Soviet personnelthat would risk entanglement withpower.
Resupply
most widely publicised form ofsupport to Third Worldberesupply of high-priority items ofby air and sea lift This servicelittle iiiks for the Soviet Union asof Soviet personnel involved isthey are not combatants, the deliveriesin thc rear areas remote from the fighting,countries have been reluctant to opposemilitarily. In addition, such resupplydo not necessarily commit the SovieU (oThc Soviets are capable ofoperations on slmrl notice and can beto do so again
Combat Advrjefi ond lo. ci
step higher on the ladder of involvementis the assignment of Soviet advisory personnelWorld combat units, principally to assistand control functions but also logisticssupport activities, Soviet leaders recognizeand limitations Involved in using combathave acted with restraint Yetpilots Hew combat missions against rebelsYemen. Soviet personnel have seen actualin at least three Third Worldandhaveirectrole In twoand Ethiopia.1
'aiehavnoliirv ol So>tet InvotveoVcM Sn and tuppori ot eomlxt oornlloni In ihe lliiid WoaU amifears.
20
E, Aid la Insurgencies,
3i. The Soviet Unionumber ofmovements in the Third World, but the type and extent of this assistance vary, as do the mcthodi of providing iL Thil aid ranges Irom propaganda support to arms and other material assistance. The USSR-seldom supplies financial backing, preferring to send material which is often paid for with money donated by Other sources. While the Soviets maintain direct contact with some insurgent groups, ihey usually channel their maierisl support through third parlies, chiefly for two reasons
most insurgent groups operate In remote areas far from main ports aod air terminals. Supplies must therefore be trucked overland, sometimes through rugged terrain, in countries where the Soviets do not control tlie resources necessary for such transport. Reliance on tliirdcooperative governments oelghbortng the countries where the Insurgent movemenU aretherefore essential
Moscow may wfah to conceal or at least play down IU support of an Insurgent movement. The extent to which the Soviets want to be identified with an insurgent group depends on the political context in which it operates, the chances of iU success, the risks involved for the Soviets, and the legitimacy of the cause, both from the Soviet perspective and as moreperceived. Moscow's assessment of these variables determines the nature and degree of its support. Uy leaving the degree of their support amblguoua, the Soviets gain freedom for political maneuvering'
F. Use of Cuban and Other friendly Forces
he foremost advantage In using Cuban or other friendly forces to further Soviet objectives In Third Worldhat they reduce the visibility of Soviet interest and involvement They allow Moscow to extend in influence Into areas where Soviet military presence on the scale needed to achieve desired results would either bc unwelcome lo friendly forces In the areas of the conflict and generate hostility andor be denounced by Thud World governments and even opposed with outside military forces. Where large contingenU of Soviel forces might cause alarm In
fl (or bactfrnind on li* aatuni and *Uno ot
lo liuurirorsa In tl* Mlddta.
Alia, and lttm Amrika
llw Wesl and ihc Third World, allied forces such ai lhc Cubans appear much less menacing: Friendly forces alsoseful propaganda function In support of Soviel policy in lhe Iniemaiional forum.
Cuba
he Cubans have worked closely wiih lhe Sovieis. Iheir relationship has in most casesatter of Moscowartner already willing to help but not fully able lo do so for financial orThe Interdependent relationship between the two governments' policies is complci. and boih sides would probably find illo determine at this stage who has gained more from their joint military ventures In ihis regard Cuba is by no means an entirely independent actor, given its economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union, but Castro, if he chose, could refuse toMoscow's need of allied military forces to pursue its policies In lhe Third World.
uba has benefited greally from its closewith the Soviets in their overseas actions. While Castro has longtaunch advocate of aggressive action againsi the "reactionary forces" of imperialism, his impact as lhe representativemall country would be negligible without Soviet support That backing has increased hb prestige and influence inhird World. Moreover. Castro clearly believes that Cuba's actions are of value to lhe USSfl and liave provided Cuba with greater Influence In dealing wiih Moscow Ho probably views the increased Soviet military and economic assistanceuba5 in this light In addition to the recent delivery of Cuba's firstF-class diesel-powered aitackhas presided some flntllnc weapons, including MI ftombat assault helicopters and recently MIC-23 Flogger fighter-bomben. These weapons will improve Cuban combal capabilities and most could be employed in distant areas.
00 Cuban military personnel are currently stationed In Third Worldost of these personnel serve la combat units in Angola. Ethiopia, and to some eitent(seehe rest perform mainly military advisory and training functions.
FEurope
ast European stales have abo provided suppori to Third World nations and insurgent movements, often in close cooperation with thc USSH. While in
Table 5
Cuban Nondiplomatic Personnel In
Third World 6
GvilUa
Technician! ' Fein-net
S-bSihlran
.
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau ,
Tome and rMneipe .
.
Earl/North Alrtea _
Yemen
Latin America
73c,
10
Table 6
Easi European Military Assistance to Third WorldS-77
ArnuUS OcB-t
C_eifto.Uiv.Vla
E_a
Mean.IT
tdmmd ,
Y-tmlavU
most cases this support has furthered Soviet policy objectives, the East Europeans have had their own political and economic motives. These countries have provided military assistance (see tables well as military esperts (see tableo maintain theand train lhe recipients In its use.
ast Cermany hai been especially active in furnishing: advisers to strengthen local secunt, services and lo establish Soviet-type political institui iom East Cermany sees Its involvement in Ihe Third World as alio serving ils own interests, such as affirming its legitimacy as an important actor on the international scene among both ils own people and other govcrn-ments, and establishing productive economic relations with Third World slates and movements Indeed, fostcilng profitable trading aiiangemeotstrong motive for the Involvement of many East European Stales, all of which are preoecupxd with Iheir own domestic problems, lhc meal serious ol which are economic
omania and Yugoslavia have objectivesIhe Third World that differ radically from those of the USSR and that do not purposely serve Soviet interests. The Romanians sec conflicts in the Third World primarily as stages upon which thev can play lhe larger international role ofopposed to partisan. Doing so, ihey believe, buttresses tneir independence from the USSR. Yugoslavia tries to win the states and movements of the Third World lo the nonaligned movement, of which iteader, rather than to an international Communist movement led by Ibe USSR
East European governments have notted combat troopi In support of nationaland progressive regimes in lhcAlthough they generally share thecommitments. Moscow's Warsawin Eastern Europe would be reluctant lo
nlcih Korea
North Koreans do not wish lo beSoviel surrogates- North Koreanhas become increasingly circumscribedKim ll-song has tried to avoidcounlries or insurgent groups aligned onof lhe Sino-Soviet rivalry. More recently,North Korea's sympathy for Kampucheahas clearlyilt loward ChinaKorean policy. The Soviets probably dolo encourage North Korean military
nd
he Angolan and Ethiopian cases provide some useful insights regarding lhe role ol friendly forces in
olicy and underline the political and military advantages ol* their use. In particular, the deployment of Cuban forces to Angola to support lhe Popular Movement for the liberation of Angola (MPLA) dimmed much of the critical foreign reaction against, Soviet Involvement. Cuban support for lhe MPIA dales from the.owever, Ihe number of Cubans working with theeverew hundred and for the moat part averagedonetheless, Cuban support for MPLA leader Neto remained constant, even when the Soviets backed one ol his rivals2
4S. Thc ultimate requirement fot sending more0 Cuban Iroops to Angolaas probably unforeseen by Havana inhen It apparently decidedurther increase in ils aid lo Ihe MPLA. We do not know whether Moscow pressured the Cubans, but il is dear lhat the USSR and Cuba consulted closely before Ihe decision wasinal decision to supply large numbers of Cuban troops was probably not made untilhen Ihe MPLA had run into great difficsdbes onattlefield.
lie Cuban forces bote the brunt of tlse fighting and weie indispensable in establishing the MPLA's control ol the central government. They continue loey role in countering the guerrilla threat lo lhe Angolan regime, which Is totally dependent on Cuban miliiary assistance to remain In power. Although some Soviet military advisers saw action with MPLA units during tlie civil war. Soviet participation In Ihewas limited mainly to logistic support. Thc role of the Sovseti in thc Cuban military operations In Angola is not known, ihough wc assume that the strategy and tactics Ihe Cubans employed were ceordinated with the Soviet i.
n any case, Soviet military advisers appear torowing responsibility lor military operations io Angola Thev reportedly operate lhe naval base In Luanda, andoviet generals arrived In August lo advise the Angolan armed forces. One of these officers has been assigned to each of the country's miliiary districts. In addition, Soviet and East Europeanpersonnel have moved Into Important llnaneia] and commercial positions In the Ministries ofFisheries, and Trade. These Ministries had been virtually run by Cubans, who filled much of lhe vacuum created by the departure of the managerial and technical personnel of llie colonial era.
In Ethiopia.ole in Cuban military operations was clearly more dominant from tlse outset. The Soviets would certainly have preferred to play both sides of Ihe Ethiopiaa-Somali conflict anda settlement that would have assured Sovietin both counlries as well as access to facilities there. Top Somali concern over Moscow'isupport of Ethiopia. Soviel leaders may have hoped at least initially lo channel then militarylargely through Cuban military personnel
n7 Ceneral V. I. Pelrov. First Deputy Commander of Soviet Cround Forces, arrived in Ethiopiaetinue of high-rankIng Soviel officers to study Ethiopian military needs. Hy lhat timeoviet military personnel were in Ethiopia.f whom were assigned lo advisory positions with the Ethiopian high command
he airlift of Cuban forces and Soviet miliury equipment and supplies went into high gearnd by8uban Iroops had been transported to Ethiopia. The turning poinl in the conflict occurred In late January when Cuban units joined In lhe defense of lhe city of Harar and Cuban-piloted aircraft began bombing Somali nosilions Somali forces were driven bock, and
the Ethiopian counteioffensive got under wmv.in the withdrawal of Somali forces from the Ogaden in early March When the airlift of Cuban troops ended in early April, there were as many0 Cuban andoviel military person-nel in Ihe country, as wellumber of Soulh Yemeni lorces.
s the Ogaden fighting drewlose, the Mengislu regime turned its full attention tothe Eritrean secessionists in the north. Soviet personnel hive provided logistic, advisory, andsupport to ihu effort, while Cuban combat advisers have assisted Ethiopian unils down tolevel No Cuban units have beeno Eritrea. The reinforcement and resupply of the beleaguered Ethiopian forces at Massawa by Soviet ships, protected by Soviet naval eombalants offshore, prevented lhe loss of thb vital port to the Eritrean insurgents. The Urge Cuban and Soviet combat presence remaining in tbe Ogaden. however, allows the Ethiopians to pursue the campaign In Eritrea without fearesurgence of major hostilities wiih the Somalis. Consequently. Ihese foreign combat Iroops areignificant indirect role, even though not fighting In Eritrea.
hronology of Soviet and Cuban involvement In Angola and Ethiopia.
7
Chronology of Soviet and Cuban Involvemenl in thc Anpolan Civil War
establishes linti (fclllc nvwr thin proMfindl support) to lha
l$*r
Populii Movement lor ihr Liberationead (MPM) tKimrh (He Porttnixw Communlit Pint-
A nlj-Portuguese Insumency ftrtslu oui in Aneol*.
irbuffod by char Asotin insurgent groupa. tuinl ciehaivcty
ta Ihr imitler. weaker MPLA. providing limUnJmoney, and training.
-Cuban support for MPLA begins, "ith milllxy Iruimcton totoc Congt ind training of MPU luwerten in Cubs. .
nd oilyPriherM ihovundi of MPLA tuomneis are mined In gastrin Europe.
Cuba, and mtical African ilais.
Willi ihlll (half Mpnurt prnda.l one
of Ihe mln*MPLA, Cuba mnU wl'h Nno
fadiaav
nalef amall vimf
MetouuoUdun itul brooch)a reni|<wwh( wtaWh cab
ngola. MPLAnmmi
rxaaUoil MpowtUaW. aad nit la LnWlaaib. raliUa-l
hrx.n, im Kant la MPLA'ir.
Onnortuiedf So-net am Ira* alaUpBaa In
Cone*
4 deeSdra lo Incieaw support of MPLA huilwr
IBJt to USSR for mllil.rv Iraining.
23
-Mew-
Table 7
Chronology- of Soviel and Cuban Involvemenl in lhe Angolan Civil War
(Continued)
Ml.
niet .mat I- MPI.A. .iLli-Jinc ihr
(Unilire iMHl-inl. tir ilrli'i'riil lit air. oiiWlr ">
Conco ud WUMore .ndItirim on oltVniive.
5 Fmni lor llieof Ancola (FNLAl britm drivr
loward Luanda
lulmililiri .nli-iwr- jr-in MPI.A.
iljntl-lrt tii.Ho. limitingulLiu-Ja. Ilr
MI'LA'. ina.il MnuadinU.
Uieulxio arrive i. Cnnao coSo-Jet mllllsrv
eavipaneni.
NLA out ef Luanda
Mid-Auilinat decoion lo tend Cubanncola; miinKy ol
toreicn ralkit)h MPLA al frot-linei teinledlyCuban! bt ihU lime
27Affkan and MPLAU.h: (im South Afiican offensive
adba.
ateopAip tl loaded (or Ai-ola.
6 Seprelalet CaiHo,
euiea CaaiK.
U5 Fine ol live Cuban irooraihlrai that navel to Coneo In SeMentber and
October itri-e> ai Point* Noire
lifl oland men to Ancola befiiu, il lea" live IranapotU
2d
Hourlive rtriHol (liilaianiu ind al least one., IL-JSi) (ly Kraa Aitintic ia Srptembet and October; oo uraency is appat-enl.lhe CuUiri troop movement depends on icalill.
Table 7
Chronology of Sovici and Cuban Involvcmcnl in llie Angolan Civil Wat
(Continued)
r-
_r>. . KM.* PW IU-
l .iLMHI1 i
il OnS.OUDima roan>
PLA
MAIihj-iUiboi atir.ni* -into
il Snalhilmnv
lit Ui-'ic-li iti-luwb
ct
y>-* MPLA. Iknr
fn rt-iiSa-wa wi
avUiionmjUi. Ccnea. lo aw tnIiiubhu
Carl- Mo* CoiAfl ahrilirillawarfare.
5 Alrican- realHanee. Hi*
Cuban ail Ml aeeeterated.
iitonvnouiio-mtiom heWn. Al thu point aome IJOO
ino-nelreit* awtaary. HowMet pan laot Inu-n. but -al IcaM
oo*u-rtat oHkm eoannundrd mnttipla nr4ctaMarlUN IT ANo-loan aaarar balllc ani Luanda ano iMirtU U
3 FNlArrtieet)
ti No-Urro Mao Soulh Af-Mn-UMTAand .afUl key
ca-aabNa.
tl. Deeot baillr hai thifud anol MPLA
Lateearlr Ian IB70. Soldi up.ride thrir Wen Afrtr-an navil-uh a
eruivniie-mioilelutuniiliie.l-limitihip.
andral amil>at>** Sovietleaill naval (lr>"a In"" Conalrr and Havana umkitaVeal lherfna-ranf- et-il MM l-
lerryaacen aaaatajreola
CxbirMlInn Cwbaa irooc* from
Cvb. lo Ant-U
Bv laleooth Alneaowonei faaaaN La ai
defeated ia north. UNITA foiro In - aad itmiI Anaola
return to currrilla -arlare. endmi lhe period of onvrnlional -ir.
Febmllitaiv mvwl la Anaola
Novr-ilnair pcoonnel la.
Table 8
Chronology of Soviet and Cuban Involvement in the Ethiopian-Somali Conflict
ovietUh Elhlopla.
ormenti broaden lubM-auent to teriea ol military Ulhi
- none KlkkuHin. Cuban, and SovielMay.iuU MMeow, liera afieei-enl lor nllMary aa-tance
h.lt> dettvenlo Bdioc-u; In-lat eonllBrienl of CMtan
mlHlary advberi anivea, aome probably from SouthomaliarnnoriaM ElhMoUa nroxrlxtdi in Ocaoen
75
7
Uie7
7 .,
7
Chronology of Soviet and Cuban Involvement in the Hlhiopian-Somali Conflict (Continued)
.Seventy Soviet military idviien arc in KthWpla:alb, Ethiopia
rJaced oe, lull -ar footlnc
BhlOOiWo aWloootpCiddlv-
eries of MIC-2II
Cube* artttWrrmen provide combat wpporl lo Dhaopiin vnM> In
Somalia ibrocato Soviet friend ihip treaty:l-ir* personnelrllrd Some ISO Soviet military personnel *re In Eihlopia: II are aliened le id.iiear potrlions -lib the ttluopi.nolheri arc lo be atiiined lo division level son.
he dccOioa to eomm* Cuban combat uniti to battle In lite
7
a made. Soviet VTA airlift of military luppliei and Soviet and Cuban miliiary petwnnel betiniuban inapt ite flown from Cuba to Meaeenr. aod then ^imported bv Soviel ainrndl te AneoU.
Someabinnd MIC-II pdcO arrive In Ethiopia.
Soviet iblpi arrive
Since the0 more Cubaiaore
Soviet military ndvbori irrtve on alrtii. Tfvcre arc no- mereubansovieti In BUoota.
-Flnt Cuban eombat unils arrive In Ihe li.rar am of lhe Oraden.
S0 Cuban, am la.
A tOOO-man Cuban ovMhaiabed brlfadeuban artillery Unil.
ion ire lo be deployed la lhe '
The maior airlift of Cubanm Ancob boftuoot* are
flown oo Cuban md Soviet trimpotti from Cuba lo Ancola. where ther Hay overnight before continulnt on to Qbooia oa ZtmovU* and Ancolan Imnqoru WHS (hit airlift from Aiarola. lhal el Cuban iroops vt, Moaenw ihii becan In November come, to in end.
Table 8
ChronoloRy o( Sovicl and Cuban Involvement in lhe Ethiopian-Som.ili Conllict {Continued)
8 W- luio Uke Hint-briefly pennr.te citythey
ei an.
i; Cubatvpflotid airenfi bcj.il bombln* SontilifinSown send Ura* number of naval thiol lo ihe Red See prejumiblr to
leep con otopenorces are driven baeb from Hirar, Som.lidat.ovcd
y. moreri-H'Cmnp..
Elbiooniu bnpn covintreoffen&veortheast ot. (ell bad unde. Ethiopian
eetarei "sUle of en^niencr'1 md Ml mobiVmion Som.l.
fotcosreetoup north of lUnr. Etl.iopUftJ continue to id.incebe railroid lo Djibouti.
nd Cuban troop, movlm (Mo portion /or three-pronaed
UUd lo rapture jUbw Arab* end Ctrl Kochc. captured, ihui Min.nUnad. Fan.
orcei idvanclna nerlb of fEnt* are reinforced -ilk ISO lo ISO
lanlu.
8 fihlopUni complete pfaaa for final alUck on Jtttti dortoa -eekend of *
Mini; poor wenthee lumpen air opei.tkmi
eeec*ath tbrourb 'be mountains
northeuti
ean four Cuban aeoenh ire no- tn Ethiopia. Cubin/Elblcolin
forcei bteal out ofthwesiher nsovement.
A Mardm find intuit on JIMaopporied by heiv,
Siken; CuUu/Etbbpum posh ihnxiili town lo toutheait.
orce, coniinuetuh Kxrfte Somite, wtlhdr.w
undei pressure.
nnounce wlibdr.wil of iH forcei from Ociden
II8 withdrawal from Oaaden la fn pcotrru
uban tree* to Bh^
iUm. Indudlnf aledial penonnel ind mdltiryre In EtKiopU- The ildlfl from CubaArieoti btoufht .Uul MAO Cuban milit.ry peneoneL
ooUn millurrlie In OhSopu. of
which .boutare eeenUl Itoopi deployodind loulhera Oatden
27
in niiianl
ireai and are supplemented by periodic deployments of naval aircraft, lite ovr-rall level nl Snviel naval opctalions in distant ureas hai remained relatively liableollowing the steady eipanuon inl Soviet naval presence abroad (seehat expansion paralleled Ihen si on of Soviet miliiary assistance into ihe Third World but was motivated initially by Soviel concerns over polcnlial strategic threats from carrier-launched airstrikes and submarine-launched ballistic missiles Although these concerns remain prominent In Soviel distant oper-
Oporations of Soviet General Purpose Naval Forces Outside Home*
1
n il* Gvtl ol Suoiangfaeeah
i.iu aubooi-H
28
andW apeea
alums, lhe Navy continues to perform important misaiora related lo lhe profaclion of power andin lhe Third World, primarily by maintaining force* In region* of Sovici inter est (sec figure A) which can be augmentedn limes nf crisis,
n aridon to routine and sbow-lbe-flagSoviet naval forces have demonstrated support for friendly nations and possibly inhiblled Use of hostile naval forces against Soviet allies During Third World crises the Soviets have augmented their naval presence in the are-ai of conflict; the Arab-Israeli warhe Jordanian crisishewarhe Arab-Israeli warhe Angolan civil warnd lhe Klhiopi an -Somali conflict inSecor*rr MM
SS. The Med iter tanean Squadron, the largest of the permanently deployed Soviet naval forces, made its appearance. Before lhe loo ot access lo Egyptian port facilitieshe number of ships in the squadron avetagednits. Since ihcn lhehu declined2 surface combatants (eight major combalanls, twoand two amphibiousine submarines, anduailiaiies. Thc squadron reliei mainly on the Black Sea Fleet for surface ships and Ihe Northern Fleet for submarines
basing of Soviel naval aircraft2 ligniflcanlly increased Sovietcapabilities In the area to performantisubmarine warfare (ASW) minions Inlactical strike aircraft probably were toowever, when lhe Sovietsuse of Egyptian military airfields, theSquadron has bad no land-based air support.
Sovicls have not been able lo gain (nMediterranean nation lhe degree of freedomrange of support for their Mediterraneanthai ihey enjoyed In Egypt The loss offacilities has probably contributed toof surface combatants. Also, thelength o! diesel submarine deployments from Fleet have been reduced. Units of the
fiCCBCT
Kjuadron coniinue Iu make eiteasivc use olin Internationalaien. bul most surface unlU return lo their home ports (or major repairs Facilities in Algeria, Syria, and Yugoslaviaused (orrepairs and maintenance
lbania. Sire* Ihc. when lhe Sovielsubmarine base al Saseno, they have not had access to naval or air facilities in Albania, nor have Soviet ships made port rafts. The currentleadership would almost certainly not allow tbc Soviets access to Albanian facilities, bul ihis leadership Is without allies since its brcaV with the Chinese earlier tl>is year.ew leadership lhal would look upon an alliance wiih lhe USSR with some favor mighl come to power In Albania during lhe period of this Estimate.
Indian Ocean
hc Soviet Navy hasau>contlnu-ous presence in tbe Indian Oceanhis lorce normally coniisli of seven'surface combatants (lour maior combatants, two mines wee pets,ne submarine, anduxiliaries drawn mainly from tbe Pacific Ocean FloeL Soviet naval ships continue to make extensive use ofIn international waters and to obtain logistic support from Iraq, South Yemen, and Ethiopia.
he ouster of Soviet military personnel from Somalia7 deprived the Indian Ocean Souadron of Ils support facilitiesport and airfield at Berbera developed by the Somalis wtth extensive Soviet help These facilities included POLaval communications relayarracksa floating drydock.aval cruise missile handling and storage facility. By the time the Soviets were cipelled, ihey had used only some of these facilities, but all of them were Important for their poteniial to sustain higher levels of naval and air activity of tbe squadron. Soviet naval rexonnaissaivce and ASW aircraftear Di andays) had used other Somali airfields periodically to patrol the Arabian Sea and on several occasions to rcoonnoi-ler US ships (seehe Soviets will remainpportunities to restore Iheir position inbut they clearly arc proceeding on the assumption lhat Ihey will not regain use ol tlie Somali facilities in the near future.
veotlaoia. Tlic SovieU routinelyiesel submarine, accompaniedender, in overhaul In Tivat. the only Yugoslav shipyard officially designated for the repair of foreign naval ships. In violation ofugoslav maritime law. but with YogotlavSoviet naval auxiliaries, posing as civilian ships, also have beer, repaired al Iwo or three similar yards not officially assigned (or this purpose.
espite the arrivalarge floating drydockhe facilities at Tivat are more limited ihan those which had been available at Alexandria In Egypt, and the Soviets have been attempting loYugoslavia to grant them increased
unisia. Sincehen Soviet ships began using the Memel Bourguiba (Mamil flu Raqay-bah) shipyard al Btrcrte.umber of surface combatants, diesel submarines, and auxiliaries have undergone repairs there. Although there was an unci-plained hiatus In repair activities between7 andegular Soviet usage hasSeveral Soviet surface ihips have been repaired at Bixerte sinceul rao submarines appear lo have used the yard ilncct present this shipyard provides lhe only drydock available on short notice IO the Soviets in lhe Mediterranean
lgeria. Since6 diesel submarines have been anchoring regularly in the harbor of An-naba, Algeria, for minor maintenance and repairubmarine tender that usually accompanies them. The Soviets will continue iheir efforts lo obtain tlie use of the port of Mers el Kebfr. which has excellent berthing and storage facilities but no major repair capability.
31
ailed no time in acquiring acceu lo facilities In olher countries, including Fihlopia. Among the Ethiopian porti of potential use is Massawa. whichall naval bate with Limited repair facilities lhal will require rehabilitation The port of Auab is tmallet lhan Massawa and more crowded, hutuel storage facility. Tho lloalins drydork formerly al Beibera and then temporarily al Aden is now localed oft Ethiopia. Despite lhepioblemt and the potential for disruption ofoperalions from lhe continued fighting Inlhe Soviets seem determined lo make lhe best of lite situation.
agreement also grants thc SovieU -acccufacilities al Dahlak Island, which theywith lhc Ethiopian Navy pending lhefacilities at Massawa. andeparate Utility.constructed and conlrolled by the Soviets, ooSea coast north ol Assab opposite Sanahborfloating dry-dock formerly alalnow located at Dahlak.
The Soviets have long supported South Yemen's Manist regime but, despiie diplomatic pressuring and increased arms deliveries, have been unable lo obtain complete freedom of use of South Yemeni facilities. Nevertheless,oviet naval ships havecalled al Aden for replenishment, crew rest, water, and minor maintenance. Soviel transportregularly use the airport al Aden in support of Soviet military missions in lhe area.
Creatcr Soviel access to, and control of. naval support facilities may result from events ihere in8 thaiom pro-Soviet leadershipower. Thc former British naval base at Aden and nearby Khoemaksar airfieldore attractive location and support capability lhan the facilities in Ethiopia. The Soviets recently increased their use of Aden andoirununtc* Irons station nearby,eplacement (or lhe one ihey gave up in Oerbcra
he Soviets also have given extensive technical assistance lo Soulh Yemen Inew airfield lhal is nearing completion al Al Anad This Held, begun in lhe springong before lhe eiplusion from Somalia, will be able lo handlemilitary aircrafl. The Sovieis probably will make use of this airfield for boih civilian and military aircralt. Including naval reconnaissance.
8 lhe Sov.et Indian Ocean Squadtoo has used the Iraqi ports ol Al Basrah and Umm Qasr
37
for logistic support.imeaoviet repair ship was stationed at Al Hair ah, primarily lo aid in repairing Iraqi naval units. Soviet naval ships abo made occasional use of the ship's repair facilities, but no formal agreemenl providing Soviet access to Iraqinown to eiUi The frequency of Soviet calls ihere has recently declined (torn an annual average of IS36 lo only four8 This reduction may be due to lhe recent cooling of Soviet-Iraqi relations, stepped-up Soviet naval activity in lhe Red Sea area, atul thc uupeminn nf (he Soviet patrolie Strait nf Mormiit
Tl Soviet approaches lo other Indian Ocean nations for access to port facilities have been reported, but nationalism and sentimentrone ofn the Indian Ocean will likely frustrate suchherc aware of lhe desiie of some littoral states lo curtail great-power presence In the Indian Ocean. Although Breihnev has given sympathetic public treatment io ibe ideatone ofhere Is no indication ihat ihe Soviets will unilaterally reduce their naval presence in the Indian Ocean or yield on the principle of freedom of navigation there
on tk
incehe Soviets havemall naval presence off West Africa. The Initial purpose was io support the government of Guineahreatened coup from Portuguesenowin5 this presence was expanded somewhat to support the CubanIn Angola. Since ihcn thc force has normally comprised one or Iwo major surface combatants, one submarine, one amphibious ship, and severalOver the past year al least one combatant has been stationed near Luanda,epair ship haa been thereerving Soviet units as well as Angolan patrol craft- Inumber of Soviet naval auxiliaries regularly deploy into lhe Atlantic for intelligence collection and research operalions.
Soviet surface combalanls on palrol off Guinea and occasionally some units en route lo thc Indian Ocean re provision at Conakry- Soviet use of naval support facilities ashore there remains limited.
Deployments ofaval reconnaissance aircraft liaveajor part of Soviet activity in West Africahen President Toure wlth-deew permission for the Bears to useirf ields. ihese deployments have shifteduanda, Because Angola ilile* southeast ot Culnea.
Luanda ii much less satisfactoryase (or air reconnaissance of thc North Atlantic, particularly the approaches to the Mediterranean (seeore-over, tbc distance to Luanda from thetaging bases in llie Kola Peninsula is nexily the maximum range of the aircrall. Therefore, apparently in Ihe interest of safety, alllights to and from Luanda7 have been staged through Cuba, doubling transit distances. The transpoit aircraft that
support these flights continue, however, to stage
through Conakry.
In Angola the Soviets have access In ilmr.-installations, but facilities lor major work are lacking.
lie Soviets are probably seeking access to additional facilities in West Africa to improve their basing and reconnaissance flexibility. Since February Soviet naval units have paid visits to Benin and Soviet military assistance to that country has sharplybut the USSR Is not known to have access to any facilities ashore.
Coribbeon
paragraph of the earlier version ofaddressed Soviet militaru acliottiesIn viem of evenlt related to thuIssuance of the Estimate, thebeen deleted. The reader ti directedrecent intelligence publications forand Judgments on this subject.}
Pacific Oceon
for Indian Ocean deploymentsASW activities in the Philippine Sea.combatants do not normally operate inocean areas of the Pacific. The Pacificconducts thc great majority of its trainingoperations in the Sea of Japan, along theand off the Kamchatka Peninsula.patrols are periodically conducted inTsugaru. and La Perouse Straits tofleet command with surveillance of Ihese
B. Soviet Forces Available for Deployment
he Soviet Union has vast ground, airjand naval forces oo which it can draw for deployment to distant areas. Tlie deploymentarge segment of these forces to distant areas, however. Is constrained not only
by (he practical difficulties of moving brge forces over long distances but also by the requirement, as Moscow sees il. lo retain the bulk of Ihese (orces in Ihe USSR and Eastern Europe in readiness for tbcii primarywar with NATO or China. On lhc niher hand, these factors would not restrict iheof smaller unils.
Novol Forces
number of ships and submarinesoutside home waters Ismallif Ibe Snvict inventory. Additional naval fnrcesto dislanl areas can be drawnrincipil surface combatanls (in-
" eluding two aiicrafleneral purpose submarines,mphibious warfare ships of the four major Soviel (feels (Northern. Bailie. Black Sea. andboutercent of the surfaceand amphibious shipsomewhat lower percentage of the submarines could probably be ready lor combat operations in four days.
following tabulation shows thc numberIt would lake Soviel naval units, as applicable,various distant areaspeed ofnotsdifferent fleets and from lhc Mediterranean:
Medlie.- IVI.cl Ihstlc North. _ Sea em Oeein
Euteintefl Coaff of Afririorthwe*ea B' IS
The Black Sea Fleet is conslrained in Itsby thc Montreux Convention, which requires prior notification to Turkey of planned transits and limits Ihe numbers and types of ships lhat may pass through the Turkish Straits. To alleviate the problems (hese limitations create for lhe Black Sea Fleet, the Sovietsontingency declaration system lhatimited number of ships lo deploy out of area to meet an emergency without violating lheThis system has enabled ihem to send up to IS surface combatants lo lhc Mediterranean within nine days.
The Montreux Convention prohibits the passage of submarines through the Turkish Straits unless they are to be repairedhipyard outside lhe Black Sea. Probably for Ihis reason lhe Black Sea Fleet has onlyperations)small percentage of the total Soviet submarine order of battle. Although the Convention is ambiguous on restricting aircraft carri-
* Through llie Suet Canil villi nrrlcrcnilil ousaie.
-SCCMi
am potential challenge lo (he tight of passage ol lhe Moskva- and Kiev-das ship) would be weaVentd bv llie precedent of passage these ships have I
AmpMMowi Fortes
anpower 'n ibe Soviel Naval Infantry is eilimoted0he basic unit is lhe naval rifle regiment, totalingen in ihree Infantryank battalion, and supporting units Si* regiments have been identified: one in each Of lhe three western fleet areas ond three in the Pacific Only one of lhe Pacific Kleci res-imcnlt it believed to be fully manned. Constituted for mobility ralher than firepower, naval infantry is primarily intended lo serve as the inilial assault element in amphibious landings
ost of the Soviet Navy* amphibious shipsrc capable of deployment lo distant areas, although onlyhips of (he Rogov. Alligator, and Ropucha classes arc well suited for carrying combat troops on eatended deployments Forward deploy menls of these ships haveoutine practice since (hendegular (ealure of Soviet naval deployments in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean and off West Africa. There are rarely more than one or two amphibious ships in each area. It li not
known .helhcr throe ships routinelyetach ment of naval infantry;ale no moreroops ate believed lo have ever been etnbarked on any lor ward deployed amphibious ship.
Novo!
ny ol llie long-range aircralt at llie disposal of Naval Avialion (seeould be used In distant areai if Ihey could stage through forward haics In practice only Dear D's. Badgers. Mays, and Mails hive been employed in (his way for distantnd only In limited numbers No Soviel naval aircrafl al ihe nr.-scnl time are based in lhe Third World2 Ihe Sovieu have period-cally deployed TU-OS reconnaissance aircraft lo Cuba, Cuinea; Angola.and Vietnam. Currently, thev have access only lo Cuba. Angola, and Vietnam. When combined with flighu from bases in the USSR. Soviet naval air reconnaissance can palrol Ihe western Pacific and Urge portions of lhe North and South Atlsntic.
d Aviation
elatively few of (he several thousand combat aircrafl In Frontal Aviation could be brought lo bear directly in distant areas. None are currentlyfor aerial refueling, and most are deployed opposite NATO in Europe or along (he Sino-Sovivt border. Frontal Aviationompatible.
9
Soviet Amphibious Assaultof Baltle by Fleet
Tonnage
Sea
Rnaoa
Naval Aircrafl
II CO Dear O
I'lMB Rear FMay
lUet fire
TUIO fladiei
hnder
HE.II Marl .
HMM inarm
ASW
ASW Strike
ini-
(trrtronV warfare
ASW
a
47
-srcpci-
var, with equipment already sold to Third World counlries, and Frontal Aviation could be drawn on, as it has been in the past, for selected tactical air re-sources.
Aii borne Forcas
lthough there are limtlalinns on Soviel capa-liiiiiies lo use airborne forces in distant areas (see discussion of airborne assault operations,hcte are many types of distant operations lor wl itch these units are well sulled. Because of iheir
bigh level of readiness, small0iclil equipment, and highly mobile ami well-developed and conirol, airborne division* can bemore rapidly Ihan eilher lank or motorited fifle divisions, and they can be more easily supported loaastleally; but they have less firesjower
he seven tegular airborne divinum (see figurere believed lo have most ol their autltorircd men and equipment and to be capable ol deploying On short notice Although ihese unils. lite their Western counterparts, are necessarily lighter In both firepower
.1/
andprotection lhan other types of divisions, improvements have been made in iheir firepower, Cround mobility, and air defense capability:
mphibious asuuh vehiclei ate brine addedach airborne division. These can be parachuted from Cock. Candid, and Cub transports.
The number of fully armored, air transportablem assault sunsivision reportedly has been increased from IS
Them howitiet may be replacing lowed howitzers in each division.
A new. highlymmtocket launcherrucfc chassiseplacing lhe towed version lhal has been standard equiprncnL
bach division has been equippedhoulder* firedli missiles.
C. Other Soviet Resources for Distant
Overseas foci.'ti?-.
lear from llw Soviets' efforts lo acquire access lo naval and air facilities abroad and from (heir use of (hose facilities (hat accessrized objective of Moscow's policy in the Third World. Il hasey role in the projection of Soviet power andin (hc Third World, and is important for Its potential lo sustain higher levels of naval and air activity.
Access; however, is not Io be confused with formal base rights, which the Soviets have never held in any Third World nation. Perhaps the closest they have comexercising formal base rights was (heir near-sovereign conlrol o( naval facilities In (he port of Alexandria before iheir ouster from Egypt
The Soviets have lieen reluctant to become overly dependent in distant areas on shore support which might suddenly be denied (hern in time of crisis or major war. Por Ihb reason, naval auxiliaries for fuel, walcr, supplies, and repairs usually are deployed with Soviet combatants even in areas where shore support tl availablehows llie foreign naval and air facilities to which Soviel military forces have access.
n support of current operations. Soviet reliance on overseas facilities it heaviest in (he case of air
38
operaliont. enabling long-range aircraft to conduct military aitlilli and reconnaissance over laige parts of the world which could not otherwise be reached from Soviel territory. Access lo foreign ports greatlydiesel submarine operations In Ihebut these operalions are not absolutelyon ihat access The same level of deployment could probably be maintained through (he use of international anchorages and more frequent.of ihorler duration Surface combatants are least reliant on overseas facilities.
Merchonl At or me
s the principal means for transporting Soviet arms and military equipment destined for friendly forces and insurgent moveroenU. (he merchanl marine is vita]oscow's efforts to influence developments In Ihe Third World. As (ablehows, more than SS percent of the ships in Ihe USSR's oceangoing cargo Heel (vesseU designed for (he movement of nonbulk cargo) fall into categories of general purpose freighters and roll-on/roll-off (ro/ro) ships.
Most of tlie USSR's general purpose fleet consists of ships with al least two decks lhal carry (heir own cargo-handling gear (cranes or booms j. Moref these ships have booms with capacities ofons or more, capable of handling heavy vehicles such as ranks. In addition, atesselshe fleet have large hatches with lengths ofeel or more,Ihe transport and concealment of bulkyobjects such as aircraft and missiles.
The Sovieu have been able lo use their general cargo and ro/ro vesselsount crash miliiary sealifu in (be past At such times, merchant ships may cease or limit commercial service and act as naval auxiliaries. Many Soviet merchant ships would require little or no modification to serveaval rote and provide direct logistic support to military forces.
otalndividualships delivered arms0 Third World
Tableoviel Oceangoing Cargo Fleet
Ships
cargo
contiinei
led
countries. Sixty of these deliveries were made by ro/ro ships. Thene ships, which the USSR is currently stiess-inc In modcr Piling its cargo fleet, woe inl reduced4 and reflect the latest tochnolocv for fast loading and offloading of wheeled and tracked vehicles. II can be expected that in areas where pent connectionroblem and the need (or military equipment is immediate, lhe Soviets will make greater use of ro/ro ships For example, in Flhk>pia. general cargo ships waited as long asayserth, and some Soviet arms earners wailedays. Ro/ro shipsurnaround time of two to seven days, demonstrating iheir utilityrisis situation, especiallyecure beachhead is available.
FnJsing Head
he USSlt's worldwide fishing fleets play no direct role In Soviet distant military operations. Yet, by theirodernhave poteniial for supporting certain types of military activities. Thev already provideand occaoographic data used by the Sennet Navy and could serve as transports lor small lightly armed .Iroop units. Properly equipped, these ships could be odapted for mine and electromagneticand for use as communications stations. Soviet fishing ship* routinely report on contacts with foreign naval units and would perform such reeonnaiiursce functionsrisis to assist Soviet naval intelligence Soviet fishing support vessels have on occasionSovicl intelligence ships operating off of Ihe US roasts.
D. Capabilities for Distant Operations Military AMI (It
smaller Thin! World ports and have rmuppliedfriendly forces. In addition, iheseto bolh Ihe recipients and (he test ofs dramatic demonstration of SovietWhile il is Impossible lo measure lheimpact of such missions on the client, (beof aitcrall oflloading urgently neededboosi morale and possiblyote inol a
hese operations, wllh the caceptlon of the Iwo to Peru and Pakistan, demonstrate lhal VTA canaior. unopposedhort lime and sustain it llul ihey abo have revealed limitations. Tbe prcJiciency displayed has been uneven, and in some cases even relatively low levefa of effort have taxed VTA's capabilities.
Obtaining clearance for overflight, landing, and refueling from various counlries en route has been and will continue to be crucial to the success of VTA airlifts to the Third World. In the past. V1 Ai operations have been compli-cated by the denial of these clearances In airlifts to the Middle East and Africa. As the distancee covered by an airlift increases, clearances become even mote important. To facilitate the acquisition of overflight clearances. VTainvolved In overseas airlifts routinely carry Ihe markings of Aeroflot, the USSR's civil airline.
Aho. as the distance between refueling points exceedsautical miles, (lie payload capabilily of the VTA transportof which is made up of, whichairly shortrapidly, because of the technical characteristic* of this aircraft.
Tbe USSR's Military Transport Aviationfactors could pose serious problems for the VTA
has undertaken seven maior airlifts lo Thirdintensivef long duration requiring heavy
hey clearly have ctemonslratedover distances greaterm The
ruination to assist (he friends of the Soviet Unioninventoryransport aircraft consists
al great distances. Although the tonnage deliveredCubs.ocks, andandtds.
air is dwarfed by what tbe Soviets have (ransported _ _, _
__. i _ ii Aeroflot. The Acrollol civil lloet constitutes a
sea. atrlllls have provided critically nr-cded ,
ment. ammunition, and medical supplies much
rapidly than Is possible by sealift. They
helped overcome logistic bottlenecks In somew,flo1 eu"en,ly h"
medium, and long-rangencluding about
ladnde Hburyibt huddlea total lift capabUtty
orth TenaenfsVTl the Midd> Rut
ncoli (Oetobe. IfTSJ. indxeteats nat irPCWueJ dnnlwuwn nf So-vrt
IW ilrt.fu lor dliaiter rrhef IO Peruirthoailelpwiww lorra llThin! World thaiVTA iirlifl
3?
KI
-GCCftfi-
Many of Awollolrewsmuch of IU equipment are available lo support VTA and In facl are used whenever neededcapability it dernon-il rated each spring and fad when Aeroflot malmlights transporting moreoomnd Irom bases in East Cermany. Poland. Hungary, and Caeehoslovalia.
Ihe preseni time, most VTA airlifts oututilizemall percentage of theNonetheless. Aeroflotaiorbolh the Angolan and Ethiopian airlifts.
fllixloda
blockade is generally considered acarried out by miliiary forces and aimedthe flow of marilime commercearticular area. Blockading can beby ships, submarines, or aircraft and canuse of naval mines and other means ofibe Soviet Navy has neveristant area, there are potential,conflicts in lhe Thirdasand South Yemen or Ethiopia andthe risk of Western Involvement is minimalSoviet leaders mightlockadeNavy to prevent the seaborne resupply ofa government or faction favored byA blockade might appear toiable option
Table 12
Estimated Inventory of High-Performance Aircraft in
let
)
111
j
A) U1
inJWan
Ihe hMih-Deelo'rnuce
In Airoflot'l
ri. litero
- , praen
Te. lhe
omoeZtx-diin
i eed In
iO
mmd for peak traffic i'
Soviet assistance had been requestedegitimate government in lhe region and where local reaction could be ei peered to be favorable or at least
ueuirai.
the Soviets had announced their inlet*the mere presence cf their combatantswaters might be sufficient lo enforceStill, because the threat of lorce is atin the declarationlockade, (liehave to be prepared lo deal wllh any attempttheir cordon. The units which lhemaintain in areas sueh as the Indianoff West Africa probably would be adequateresojvelockade situation againstarmed Third World nation. But lo bclhe face of significant opposilion. Sovietrequire augmentation- So long asnot opposedrujoe power, lhewould be able to provide suff seven ttheir home fleets to maintain the blockadethe feasibilityiot one athey would need to calculate tbeof their forces lo local ait andIn addition to weighing lhe risk ofinvolvement of other major powers.
Intervention of Combat Forresceol Conflict
The Soviets have significant forces capable of intervention in distant areas nnd have Introduced forces Into combat situations In distant areas In tbe -post, and we believe lhat Soviet leaders In the future would be willing under certain circumslances lo use lorces for ibis purpose. Elements cf all Sovietair. sndpotential resources for use in situations thai call for intervention Although Sennet airborne and amrAibioua forces have generally been touted by Western tsbservers as Ihe most likely components of any Soviet intervention in tbe Third World, in practice these forces have notole, though Soviet airborne divisions have been placed on alert during several periods oftension. In thc few cases where Soviet forces have Intervened, they have beenofcombat and support units taken from regular formations.
The effectiveness of any intervention of Soviel combat unilsocal conflict would depend on scenario-rcUied factors, of which Iwo are probably the mostlevel of opposilion and theNaturally, the kind of cwostt-sn the Soviets would espeet to encounter would determine the feaai-
-
bttilytne opcraiion and the composition of lhc Intervention force. Airborne troops or naval Infantry would probably make up most of the force against light opposition. As both of these service components aie Inherently mobile and lightly equipped, their transporthe area of conflict could be accomplished fairly quickly by air or sea.
Interventions against mote substantialhowever, would probably require conventional ground forces. If they could not be moved overland into areas contiguous to (he USSR, they would have to depend in large part nn mnvi-mrnt by sea. Thc sealift in thc Middle Eastubstantial interventiona combat-ready motorized rifle division from the Odessa Military District, fortake around (wo weeks. This includes assembly, movement lo Ulacsi Sea ports, loading, transiting across theand offloadingiddle East port. Deployment of largerinstance, theof two combined-arms armies totaling atrequire two to three months.
A consideration Inwvement would likely be lhe use of naval forces to protect the troop ships against air and naval attack both In (hearea and en route from the Soviel Union. Naval forces mlghl also be needed to provide direct support to (hc forces ashore, particularly naval gunfire, alr-slrikes. and air reconnaissance.
Air and naval support of any military Operation at great distance from (he USSR would be vulnerable lo interdiction. The operation of transport aircrafl would be open to atiack by air defense forces,near their destination. Moreover, many Third World countries possess navalasaircraft, and foil palrolcould pose an appreciable threat lo seaborne inlervention.
Airborne Assauli Operations
In many areas of thc Thirdoviel airborne division would be moreatch for any indigenous miliiary forces. Indeed, there are more men with better cquipmenlingle Soviet airborne division than in Ihe armies of most African nations. Thus, there are potentially numerous situations in which on aliboine division,ilitarycould be highly effective, although Its use might not be politically feasible.
The situations In which airborne forces might he used range from antigucrriila operalions like those conducted bv thc French and Belgians in Zaire last
vcar tu more convenlionalhe suitability of an airborne force in each instance would vary. The Soviets might be tempted lo deploy an airborne unit if Ihey believed lhc likelihood of combal were low and that llie mcie presence of an armed Soviet contingent wouldufficient signal lo compel thc opponent toolicy moie favorable lo Moscow. Even in ihese nrruinstances, laowrvcr, Soviel leaders would have to consider Ihe military viability of lhe operation Soviet prestige wouldajor blowoviet combat unit were defeated while interveningistant stair Again, however, political, not military, considerations would dctcrmini- wliether such combal operation* were undertaken.
IIS. An important factor affecting lhe feasibility of airborne operations is the Clienthich Ihe transport aircraft ate thicalened by opposing air defense forces Soviet fighter aircraft could escort lhe transports upistance ofautical miles from (heir bases, including (hose in countries where Soviet aitcraft might be deployed In (he absence of fighter support, the slow-moving transports would be eilremelyto attack from both interceptors and surface-to-air missiles. Unless Ihe Soviets believed (hey couH land and resupply an airborne force without serious Interference to Iheir tramporls. llie option lo deploy the unili would be
ny plan lo employ airborne uniis would also have to address (lie capabilities of (he units themselves. Airborne units gain (heir greal advantage of airat lhe expense of leas firepower andprotection. While So-iet airborne units today are much more mobile lhan their predecessors, they generally remainisadvantage against modern motorized foices.
The speed with which the SovieU could deploy an airborne force would dependumber of factors; the distance lo be flown, lhe level and type of opposition expected al (hcit ion, lhe granting of overflight clearances, tlie logistic support available, and the degree lo which preparation had already been accomplished before the decision lo deploy. (Seeiscussion of planning factorsTA airlift.)
If ihe Sovieis had no time to make advance preparations, ihey would be haid put loivision-life force to. say. Syria in lesseek. If, however. Ihey chose lo mike preparations inor during the developmentrisis, thev theoretically couldlightly reduced airborne
here in onn lo Ivro days. Thii would require around GOO flights, lull acquiscence oj Turkey or Iran for overflight clearances, and full use ol three Syrianapid deployment would probably be coot em plated bynlyernonstralion ot support for Syriaeriod of tension Mote(hen. It would piobably tale lhe Soviets thtne lo lour days loorce equivalentedticed airborne division to Syria.
he time needed lo prepare airborne lorces themselves would notignificant eonttraintong-distance operation. Other (actors thai would have more impact on the time needed to prepare for an airborne operalion are acquisition of overflightobtaining necessary intelligence, preparation and coordination o( plans, and laying on ol logistical support en route.
there should be numerous indicationspreparations for deploymentargeas requests for overflightncebeen accomplished, deployment could beginshort notice.
Aiiovfl Operotiont
amphibious forces weie developedassault landing* on the maritime llanVs ofin support of ground theater operationsaugmentation by other naval combatantsthese forces could undertake assaultagainst light opposition In many areas ofWorld. Limited seaborne tactical airbe made available from tlie Forgertakeoff and landing)with Kiev-class aircraft carriers. Antask force might also receive tactical airneighboring countries, possibly by Sovietaircraft deployed there Even withhowever. It Is doubtful that atask force could carryorcedagainst heavy opposition, because of the lacksea-based tactical air support, the absencenaval gunfire support, and theair and sea lines of communication Motcover,lack eaperience In integratinc all of thefacets of an assaull landing beyond the
induce! luborne division include, eli ol Hie unil'. hoivy
ercent of lit men. TO percent of litnd enough
nil ion for ihree il.yi of heavy fitStkic
Intnr die lion of Sen Imei of Comnwvealion
e have no evidence ol Soviet contingency planstt political or economic pressure on the Untied Stales or its allies through interdiction of lhc sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the absence of a' NATO-Warsaw Pact war. Soviet naval doctrineconstricts SLOC interdiction only within (he contest ofat. Wc believe thai the Sovicis do not anticipaleajor naval war in othernd thai Ihey realise militaiy operations against such vital Western Interests ss Ihe sea lines would probably lead lo war with NATO
n lhe unlikely event that Ihe Soviets were to opt for an Interdiction strategy outside the coot esteneral war withoteniial target would be ihc tanker routes from the Persian Culf. One method of eiecullngecision would be lo atlack tankers as they ciited ihe Persian Culf through the Strait of ituation in which the Western or rexionil powers were unwilling to lake military action lo protect tha sea lines, the Soviets could stop (he tanker traffic with even lhe relatively small forces normally preseni in lhe Indian Ocean Squadron. Even ihe threat of such action would probably be enough, in fhe absence of Western counteraction, to deter any (ankers from Sailing. Soviet leaden would almost certainly believe, however, thai (he affected states would lake prompt and severe countermeasurcs to forestall lhe interdiction of tanker routes. In lhat event, the Indian Ocean Squadron would be eitremdy vulnerable, and the Soviets would probably assign the major role in sueh an interdiction campaign in lhe Indian Ocean lo Ihe submarines of ibe Pacific Fleet.
roblems of sustainability and long transits would probably convince the Soviets lhal ancampaign designed to bring economic or political pressure would be more effective if conducted nearer to Soviet bases Hy attacking lhe tea lines In locations closer lo the ports of destination, such at near Western Europe or lhe Luton Strait, Ihe Soviet Navy would be able lo bring more resources to bear. Including not only additional nuclear submarines bul also the slower and range-limited diesel boats. Even so. Soviet leaders would eiped such actions to provoke serious counter-measures lhat could lead to mafor hostilities with lhe West.
The Morse lory Colt ol Diilonl Operoiionl
onetary costs areritical (actor in Soviet divisions lo mount military operations In distant areas.
- SrVCtflt
Inistant operation, selected miliiary until would be diverted Irom iheir primary miuloru loorce suitable lo Ute situation at hand Most al the cotli associated wiih iheae iamb, indudiiic devel-opnicnl and procurement ol weaponrr and thc uniu" mual operatins; outlays, would be incurred whether or not Ihc unlit wcic usedistant one rat Ion.
istant operations, however, generatecoils Kor example, the cost of relocation of the designated umU and lhe concomitant logistic train would increase lhe opcialing costs for these particularTlie magnitude of ihese additional colli dependsrge extent on the particular clrcumi(uncos and nature of the distant operation. In lhe end, however.
while thc additional cosl to lhe Sovietsistant operation could result in increased outlays, ihese costs can be expected lo be small when placed in lhc context of Soviet Spending for Other defense activities.
hese costs do noi, of course, cover lhe safe and grant of arms and oilier military assistance lhalprovides ill clients during major Operalions such as those in Angola and Ethiopia. To dale lhe Soviets have0 million of military support lo the Angolan regime (excluding Cuban aid) and aroundillion to Ethiopia. These commitments andof equipment arc al least partially recovered through hard currency and barter repaymentSome arc not recovered a) all.
43
[V. OUTLOOK
Likelihood and Noturc of Cuti.ru Sovici Oiltan! Operalions
hange in lhc makeup of (he Ion Snvirt leadership is highly orobalile in thc neit live years and virtually certain inc do not believe lhatpolicies or long-terra objectives toward lhe Third World will change raibstarrtilily on those ground! alone. We do not foresee lhe present or any likely future Soviet leadership fundamentally altering ihese objectives lo secure short-lerm economic or political benefits from the West. Altliough future Soviet leaden will attach varying degrees of Impor* lance lo detenle relations with Ihe Uniled States and other Western powers, we believe it unlikely that Soviet leaden will be any more dissuaded fromopportunities in the Third World In lhe future lhan in the recent past by coo.ein over advene effects on detente Indeed, Soviet leaders probably "illlo calculate lhat major issues like the strategic arms limitations talks will be largely unaffected and thai costs In less critical areas ol IIS Soviet relations will be bearable.
e believe lhc Soviets will penittteady course of creating and exploiting opportunities in distant areas, utilixing wherever possible llieiradvantages In military instruments ofThey wul continue to regard militaryprincipally arms sales, military assistance, and support of insutgentthe moil feasible way of bringing about the changes Ihey seek in (he political structure of (he Third World. The followinga veil prospects for expanding Soviet Influence in Ihe Third World through military activities. Thisrneralired assessment and does not preclude,In the long run, opportunities thai could develop from events which arc now unforeseen or considered unlikely.
Anus ol Ooarotions
oulhtiail Asia, Soviet support ofand Ihe Friendship Treaty of NovemberHanoi significant external backing for Its Invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) inonethe-
less, Hanoi remains fiercely independent and Soviet influence in lhe region will remain largely dependent onufferance. Soviet aims sales and economic avunanceVietnam will probably increase as Hanoi faces lhe problems of solidifying ils positionand restructuring the economics of bothHanoi is unlikely to grant the Soviets any formal base rights In either Vietnam or Kampuchea but is permitting aome Soviet access lo air and naval fadli-lies. Elsewhere in the region, prospects for expanding Soviet influence are not favorable,
oulh Aila. Moscow In all likelihood will maintain Its position In Soulh Asia over Ihe next few yean
Is do question thai the Soviets have gained ' substantially in Afghanistanesult of last
April's change of government ihere and thai Soviet Influence in thai country probably will continue lo Increase if the present group remains In power. However, (he closer tlie Afghans move to Ihe Soviets, (he better lhe chances that Soviet influence elsewhere in lhe region will luffer.
India has been seeking lo make Indian foreign policy more genuinely nonaligned by Improving relitionj with both China and the West and by reducing its dependence on lhe USSR for arms aid. Nonet he less. New Delhi still maintains close relations with Moscow.
In Bangladesh, the assassination of President Mujlb In5 set back Moscow's warm relations with that developing nation.acca has sought to sdengthen relations with the West and China and maintain correct, but cool, ties with the Sovieis.
Improved dealings between the USSR andhave been given some impetus both by Pakistani unbappincss -ilh tht United States andelief among some Pakistani officials (hat Islamabad has no alternative but to turnoscow. But. Pakistan's close relations with Iran and China, its deep suspicion of Soviet intentions in South Asia, and Moscow's creat ei inleiest In
P.OI-
nulitandall seem toignificant irar>ovrnvnt in relations.
ver llie lunger term, ihe Bbililv ttf any "inside pnwrr to influence South Asian dew-lofirnenlI may diminish, India It alteady live dominant pniit in lhe nvwni. and lliel liec-msrs.- il will insist on being dealt withignificant power, and Ihe less it will brook ouls.de interference init tegatds as ilt rightful spltere of interest.
1 m. Middle IIn eipand
influencei- Midrib' liasl willhI iliainls' on lhe evolution of llie Arab-Israeli pence process and (lie coutse of events in Iran Over the longer term,antagonisms toward, and deepening suspicions of, Moscow's motives will qualify Soviet prospeets. Soviet opportunities could greatly improve, however. If events in the Middle Fas* raise lhe likelihood ol renewed hostilities.esult of Ihe Instability In Iran, the Soviets undoubtedly anticipate significanl changes there and in lhe conservative regimes of lhe I'rtiian Culf area thai will lead lo opportonitiei for new Soviet tics with the oil-producing states and to further reduction of Western influence. Moreover, in thc event of continued civil conflict In Iran, the Soviets may well support one faction in hopes of replacing US influence. In any case, Soviet military assistancein this region will retain iheir lalrly high prolilc.
Lofin America. Opportunities In Latinare less favorable than In other regioni of lhe Third World, except for the continuing Soviet role in Cuba. Thc Soviets have made some economic and diplomatic inroads inlo Latin America since ibe Centralof Ihe Communist Party of lhe Soviel Unionesolution ineclaring Ihis region an arena lor Soviet-US competition. Although ihere willbe Incidents and turmoil that should lend themselves lo eaploitation. prospects are slill limited by prevalent anti-Communiil sentiment and the USSR's inability to provide the kinds of nonmilitary assisiance Latin Americans need. The anti-USoften present in thai area and negative reactions to US policy on human rights have indirectly aided Mnteow, bul must Latin American governments are wary of Soviet Overtures and are concerned as much aboul Soviet eapansiontsm as about US regionalSales ol Soviet militaiy hardware offer some opportunifies. So far. only Peru has purchased Soviet' weapons In significant quantities, but there Is no evidence thai this has given the SovieU rooehwith Pciuvian policymakers.
Thii paragraph of iht earner Denton ofItddressed Soviet military presenceubs fn vieuien it related to ihis metier tmce tsiudnor of lhelunate, ihr paragraph has been deleted. The render Is directed lo more receni intelligencefor Information mid indgniriifi on this subtext!
frica. The best opportunities for eipanding Soviel influence will probably coniinue to lie in Africa, where political instability is commnnnlace and
ilhal ptiwnntr ioiiI niuir-
Ecurtrs will remain rife. Soviet leaders are pleased with the course their assertive and opportunistic policy has taken in Africa and, as iheir long-range capecta-lions are on tbe rise there, they are unlikely lo elunge lhal policy sagnificanlly. Then eflorts in Angola and Ethiopia have tended to reinforce thetr view ofas upholdersreordained, long-termprocess in which power and Influence atound the world are gradually shifting from the West to the Soviet Union. This has tfrengtltened theirto stick with their present policy. Furthermore. Ihey will regard Ihc constancy and siriglem.'ndedness if their policy as givingecidedensuring iheir eventuallhe Westernons
oviet policy will not overlook lhe smaller, less important African states. For etatnpic.iny country on lhe southern coast of West Africa ltdadical, anti-Western, dedicated Mar list, has received increased amounts of Soviet military equipment and additional Cuban anil Soviet advisers over the past year. Its acceptance of Soviet and Cuban assistanceacticalstrengtheningeakening of Western influence in tbe Third. World. Beninotential base for fuiure support of insurgencies in nearby slates and would be of some military value to the Soviets if ihey were granted access Ihere to air and naval facilities
l least over the neatears, Moscow foicseeSsequence of protracted struggles for power by black liberation movements jn Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa which it expects will place the West increa si nitty on the defensive politically and which It intends to use to enlarge the USSR's iole and that of its allies. Soviet ex peel at ioni in southern Africa are fueled by Moscow's perception of the dilemma facing the West io attempting lo broker nonviolent political settlement! in the region Should Western political efforts fail, the Soviets will make every effort to
5
establish themselves as the dominant eiternal patron of the black nationalist.
he Cuban intervention in Areola andEthiopia hat rxobably ifreoetbeoed Sovietin the feaiibility and effectivencu of thiiand enhanced its appeal among political and military leaders in both Moscow and Havana, who probably will be encouraged to press this strategy. Sovici and Cuban leaders probably will believe thai, as long as such aciion docs no! portray (Item as invader* and dues noi threaten lhe West's allies or ils sources of vital raw materials, lhe risk ol* Western military involvement and escalationider conflict will be slight
here Cuban or other friendly forces are not available for use in the Third World or are deemed unsuitable, Moscow would have the option of using ils own ground forces. Although Soviel air, naval, and air defense forces have been involved In conflicts In tlie Middle East, Angola, and Ethiopia, Soviet ground combat unils have not. Crowing Soviet self-confidence In projecting power and in lhe USSR's rolelobal power will diminish whatever Soviet reluctance may have Misted fn the past to employ ground forces outside the Warsaw Pact. At the same lime, there are limited situations in which allied forces would not be preferableoviet poin! of view. Afghanistan is one where the provision of limited Soviet ground forcesurry might well be undertaken.the Soviel leadership would probably view the use of ground combal units, even in modest numbers,ignificant escalation of Soviel involvement The major constraints would be concern over lhe likelihood of Western or regional counteraction and the impact on Third World perceptions of Soviet policy. We believe, therefore, that Moscow would employ ground combat units only where, and to the degree, ll considered such action euenlial io preserve vital Soviet Interests in the region.
here thc risks ofh allied ot even Soviet forces are greater than in Angola or Ethiopia, Soviet leaders are likely to lurgo thatand to rely instead, as ihey have in lhe past, on less provocative military means. They will be especiallyalert to signs lhat the United Stales and other Western powersached ihe point where they can no longer withliold iheir direct involvement in support of endangered govei nment s.
and Allo.nol.vai
oviet efforts to project power and influence in the Third World through military means will continue to labor under the same weaknesses as In the past (discussed undei "Policy eginning aln chapterreservation of Influence gained will remain lhe Overi'ding problem. Many Third World leaders will remain suspicious of Soviet motives and probably would be reluctant clients of tlie Kremlin Many ol those who do accept Sovietcan be eipcclcd to react against Instances of eiploitalive nnhlary agreements, poor-qua lilyand training and interference in internal affairs Moscow will be particularly conscious of lhe strength ol conservaiive and anti-Soviet forces in Africa. Latin America, and the Middle East and ii sensitive lo the misgiving]umber of African leaders have begun to voice concerning the continued presence of Soviet and Cuban military personnel In Angola and Ethiopia. Wider use of Cuban Intervention forces in Africa could well deepen these aportheruaons.'
oviet leaders also know lhaltrong, durable pro-Soviet political baseountry, even wheie Soviel Influence is strongest, tbe USSR Isto unpredictable changes in the local poliiical leadership or in IU attitudes. To preserve Soviel influenceountry where, (or eiample,on Soviet military support has diminished or ei pulsion of Soviet militaryhreatened, Moscow has essentially three alternatives beyond eon-linuation of present policies
first would be lo use friendly outside forces like Cubans more extensively to cany oulpolicies. If these forces wute expelled, Moscow might evade complicity In lhe actions which led to iheir expulsion and salvageinfluence it had acquired. The danger for the Soviets Ls thai lhe outside forces will usurp thb influence and work to tbeir own benefit at Moscow's eipcnse.
secondbeingIn Afghanistan and attempted InIs Io seek to acquire through Soviet advisers sufficient control of lhe military and internal security forces to prevent the leaden of lhe client slate from taking actions (such as the expulsion of Soviet personnel) lhat are In conflict with Soviet interests. This approach loo has ils
*Annri i1 dianuan pcinrHiWi ol Sow* mill' Mrla nrioui irtioiii ol llw lliud World
i lhe behavior ol Soviel advisers in lhe Third World haa in almost every region antagonized and offended clienlhereby ieopatdizing the advancea the Soviets have made
A third allernalivc is lo ganlwn Soviel ttoopi In Ihe client Hate, at in Invilalion, ostensibly to protect the client againsi some external threat but in reality to preserve inovernmcni that is friendly and beholden lo Moscow aid lhat will en lot re policies in line with Soviet inleresls The deploymenl of Soviel troopshird World nation under these circumstances would have unforeseeable ramifications (orforeign relations. It is nonetheless an option which conceivably might attract seriousby Soviet decislontnikcn. Theof Soviet forces for this purpose, however, wouldrastic departure from the policy Moscow has followed in lhe Third World. That policy generally seeks to bring about changes in the world order through smill. sometimes un-noticeablc slops that will not galvanize tho Wesl to take strong countermeasures, possibly Inwith Third World states or even China.eaction could strengthen the very facets of Western capabilities thai Soviet policy has sought to weaken, such as military alliance* and poliiical arid economic cooperation aimed against lhe Soviet Union.
ost African leaders, however, regard Soviel miliiary and political involvement in thc internal affairs of African Slates as interfctence and will be disposed to Inveigh and take countermeasures against such activities where black liberation struggles prevail and Soviet assistance becomes nonessential- In those cases where liberation struggles gradually evolve from armed conflicts into peaceful programs for social and rconomlc reforms and national development. Aftlcan sensitivities to Ihc nature and extent of continued Soviet or Cuban involvement In black Africa will probably become acute. African opinion has been generally tolerant ol Moscow's military ventures on thc continent, where the Soviets were seen as helping one African state land of( attack from another,national boundaries, and assisting national liberation movements. Soviel policy in tlse Third World feeds on political turbulence, military conflict, and civil strife. During lhe neatears, disruptions are likely to continue, especially In Africa and lhe Middle Easi. and lhe major role tlie Soviets have
47
effectivelysource of arms and miliiary aui.uaneerotector ofwill remain relevant lo the raeedi of many countries
to Economic
ontinuing economic problems are forecast for the Soviet Union In theAs the impact of ihese problemi intensifies, they will reinforce the perception among Soviel deriiionmaken thai lhe USSR cannoi compete across the board with lhe West in thefield fnr inlhience in the Third World In addition lo these .xorvocaic problrnu, the USSH may be unable Over lhe next several years to produce enough oil to satisfy Soviel and most East European energy requirements and simultaneously to export oil for hard currency. While some measures lhal could Drovide short-term relief areas reducing the growth of Soviel energy consumption, spending hard currency for oil. and seeking additional barter arrangements lo finance Imports ofwould be unlikely to resolve ibe Soviet dilemma.
he ultimate impact wouldower ratc.of Soviet economic growth which, If not rectified, could have serious economic and probably political coroe-quenccs for the Soviet Union in Ihe long run. Inrop In Soviet oil production would cause severe energy problem! for most East Europeanand confront them with painful policy choices as well. But we believe il is extremely unlikely lhat problems created by an oil shortage In lhe USSR, during llie period of ihis Estimate would cause Ihe Soviet economic posilion lo become so bad thai lhe Soviet leadership would risk an Invailonhird World country lo gain access lo oil Moscow realizeseizure of oil production facilities by Soviet or Soviet-allied military forces would be an act of war thatinimum would fundamentally jeopardize the USSR's relations with all other countries and. In lhc Soviet view, would likely result in Western mill- -tary counteraction
B. Options' for lhe Development and Deployment of Forces for Distant Operations
e do not foresee any rapid change In Soviet capabilities for distant operation', during tlie period of
"Tim* mblcmirp ifdurtiaa Ink latmdorlinina: raiaa af atonal (mJwIu'i. an InaMarienfndiliiciMed cananli Is earnB la pat lor iwond irthmoj, Import! and tnteiialnent
nianivr ini" pure ham
il', nor do we ei pcd tint Ihe primary focus of Soviei military programs will shift fromlor war with NATO and China. We believe, however, lhal. although the Soviets are unlikely to conduct assault operations against Third WorldIhey consider an improved capability for distantn be desirable and ibat gradual imwill be made in those naval, air, nnd nliborne forces best suited for such operations.
Novy
We capvet Ibe Soviets lo press forward du'iug the neil decade wjlh the development of general purpose naval forces Allhough lhe total number of surface combatants in lhe Soviet Navy Is expected to decline slightly over ihis period, improvements will lake place in lhe Navy's capabilities for air defense, antiship. and antisubmarine warfare. Thesein combatant forces will be paralleled by those in logistic support shipsrend toward larger, more seaworthy units wllh Increased capo bill lies for rapid replenishment and self-defense. We believe, however, the SovieU will coniinue lo have problems In delecting crveriiy submarines, in providing targeting assistanee for lhe effective use.of many antisubmarine and antiship weapons, and in rer>lenishing ships al sea.
hc capability of the Soviet amphibious fofces (or distant operations is eapecled lo improve through the continuation of current building prog rami and'l-Im of new deslgni Dyhesewill increase the total lonnage of Sovietships
Theon Bopucha-class has been delivered lo the Soviets al lhe rale of two lo three per year. The Ropucha is smaller than iu predecessor, Ihe Alligator, but, unlike earlier Soviet amphibious ships, litis unit appears to provide Iroop quarters adequate for long periods at sea.
Following the completion of the Ropuchaa new class of amphibious ship is expected to enter the inventory at lhe rate of about two per year in thc early-lo.
More significant, however, Is the construction at Kaliningrad ofton Ivan Rogov class. Thc lirst unil of this class, which has moie ihan twice lhe displacement of any previous Soviel design, is operational, and about four more will be constructed over tbe nextears. The Rogov dassignificant departure In nmphib-
48
loot ship design for the Soviets. With lis limited those bombardment and air defenseapacily (orHormone small navalspace for carrying air cushion assault craft, and ecrornmodalioniully equipped' SOO-man battalion landing team, lhedl tinted lorelf-coeitaineel assault unil In forwardcapability which the Soviets Iiave previously lacked.
acquisition of rolloffwill also improve Soviel capabilities fornf power These ships can rapidlyand tracked vehicles wherever piersand. in the case of amphibiousdirectly into lhe water.
deficiency which limiU Sovietdistant intervention is in tactical air support,fot successful assault operations.are improving their capabilily somewhatarea through tlie production of the Navy's(vertical/short takeoff ind landing)which Is carried aboard the Iwoaircraft carriers. Thb aircraft givesan Initial, though limited, capability forground atlack as well as some air defense.would, however, perform poorly againstWestern and Soviet-built aircraftthe Inventories of many Third World counlries.complement of aircraft on lhe Kievoelicopters and about 15
The SovieU will certainlyrogram to icplace lhe Forger in the long term with more advanced, probably supersonic aircraft which may be operational by the. The Kiev-class aircraft carriers probably will be followed in thearger class of ship capable of carrying more aircraft.8 the SovieU are expected lootal of five fixed-wing alrcralt carriers in addition lo their Iwo Moskva-class helicopter cruisers. By lhe, thereood chance the Soviets will have adapted existing helicopters, or developed new ones,umber of amphibious warfare issks. Including beach assault by vertical envelopment
The SovieU apparently alsoeedontinued naval shore bombardment capability. They recentlymm gun on some frigates, and an even larger naval gun may be Installed as tlie main armamentew cruiser class. The (irst ship of this class wts launched in8 and
could Im operational byuringnetears however, many older cruisers andrmedmmm guru sill be retiredwill be approaching lb* end of their service tile. Nevcttlieless. alone wiih ei peeled improvements in naval aviation, naval gunfire support will be ani fnctnr in Snvin capability fnr direct assault othnre against opposition.
Air forces
he transport arm (VTA) of the Soviet Air 1'irtVi'- Ii-ii ttiigiiifiViiiil(Iiiimir the nextyears. VTA's capabilities will conlinuc to be enhanced by acquisition ofandid lettotaly the. The Candid can carry twice the payload and has Ihree times the tange of theub. which it is replacing
lie Soviets are reportedlyew wide-body let transport thai will probably be roughly equivalent toA This program, if successful, will Improve VTA's capability to transport ouuazed canto such as medium tanks We expect this aircraft to become operational in the early-to-mid-lftSOi
ISC. We believe lhe Sovicls will perceive alo replace the Cub transport in VTA in both number and mission, and bv theill makeew medium transport aircrafl. We think ihis development will meet the Soviets' need
for a large VTA force to maintain their current
capability to perform support missions.
he Sovieis are likely lo continue lo rely on friendly Third World countries for refueling stops for operations in distant arras, especially resupplyAl long as the Soviets can obtain iuch landing clearances en route, they will probably not need the capability to fly long distances in the Eastern Hcmi-solvere without refueling. If, however, the Soviets anticipated losing landing clearances, or they expected lo encounter landing problems or excessive delays, they could pursue development of an in-flightcapability.
Soviet fighter-bomber aircrafl at this time lack an air-lo-air refuelingactor which limits their ability lo provide air support in distant areas. Soviet tactical aviation, however, will probablyan air-to-air refueling capability.
Currently. VTAeasonably goodto respond rapidly lo crisis situations with little or
no warning and subsequently lo conduct latge-scale' transport operations. Yel, the constraints on VTA's capabilities (discussed in) could create problems in long-distance airlifts requiring heavy pay-loads. The Soviets certainly are aware of iheseand we believe they have embarkedodernisation program fnr VTA that, whilea foice near its current sue. will enable il over the next decade lo increase Its lift capability. Ann mins thai lhe Candid will be deployed in lhe number we expect, andew wide-body jet transportewull liampnrl are de-iinyed. tli-vTAs payLwd capability could increase by as muchercent by lhe
divisions, along wfth otherare undergoing some modernization, asmentioned (see. Thesethe introduction of serf-propelledil-oulder-fired air defense missiles, andmobile combal vehicles and rocketmake airborne divisions increasingly potentforces. Improvements In air transportair forces will further Increase Soviet abilityairborne forces in distant areas.
Ihe nextears lhe Soviets willmale modest improvement! in amphibioussupport ships, naval lactical air support,support, and airlift. Such improvements,to current naval, airborne, naval infantry,and control resources, will result Inability to deploy forces in distant areascome to lhe assistance of any ally. For example,might introduce an airborne or navalal the invitationovernment, particularlybelieved there was little danger ofand that the intensity of combal would bothe presence of an armed Soviet contingentsufficient to accomplish Moscow's objectives
e believe, however, thai lhe Soviets are unlikely lohird World country. They have never mounted an airborne assault or amphibious assault operationistant area. Nevertheless, Soviet forces have long been capable of undertaking luch an operation against the light opposition which could be expected in most areas, and the above-proiectedwill expand this capability. But. over lhe next decade, lhe Soviets will still not have built llie foices capable of transporting, landing, andarge Joint assault operation against substantialIn the Third World
T
C. Fuiure Mililory Solei aod AssHtonce
I A3 We do no* foresee any diminution in (besale* and assistance piogramt. whichto flourish. Neither the political noi intercut of the USSR would be servedradical chance in policy that would deny aimito Third World Slates Indeed, armsremain lhe principal Soviet entice to most ofWe eipeet Moscow lo sell arms so loneeiisl and to strike hard bargainimaiimum returns in hard currency.Algeria. Ethiopia.Iraq. Libya. Peru, andlikely Ioon Soviet weaponry and militaryfor at least the neit live years. The ealenlopportunities lo eipand the Soviet marketwill depend largely on lhc willingnesssuppliers to sell arms to Third WorldWestern equipment cannot be obtained orIs too high, the demand for Soviet hardwareIn any event. Arab ambit lorn to achieveIn military equipment over Israel wlD forbring pressure on Moscow for more
lthough India will continue to strive for self-sufficiency in arms production. II will remain reliant on outside support for technologically advanced weapon systems. In selecting weapon systems. India will seek the best deal, whether offered by the West or the Soviets. Should India cease to acquire Soviet arms.
ils current military modernization programs would suffer until It could obtain alternatives for the weapon systems currently protected to be supplied by the USSR. However, because of its indigenous production capability. Its favorable foreign reserve balance, and Ihe availability ol Western arms as an alternative source,verall military effectiveness would not lie scriomlv degiaded
eru as well, despite misgivings about lhc quality and intentions of Sovicl aid. is deeplyfinancially and could not easily disengage from Soviet litpport for more0 million In arms thai ii lias purchased in lhe past decade. Nor could Peru switch lo other arms suppliers without largelythe tremendous financial investment II hai made in Soviel equipment, without disruptingll ion programs, and without degrading military capabilitieseriod of several yearsransition to different hardware.
n crucial, most Third World counlries will continue lo prefer non-Communist arms. Mafor shifts from Ihe West will reflect the dlsindlnallon or the Inability of Ihe supplier to fill Third World orders. Requirements ol lhe big Western customers willconiinue lo bc met by the Western armsWe see no immediate dramatic ci pa niton by tbc Sennets into the other Western armsAsia and Latin America. In any event, these markets are smsll and would not sustain orders for Soviet equipment at the high leveb noted from Middle Eastern and North African countries.
50
ANNEX A
SELECTIVE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATED TO SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD
ar Mft nflo Third Wnrld, -III. |fl
f*n* (KiourJ. CieoSo.lo-.li,.
rto-Wcatfo Inal Cowiwimvenhnwn. New Wine "ai Anh
nalior. UaUi.hrd dlplon.il* nlatlnw .ah
Ihe USSR
,UM.mmSaieoo. Alaaala.
mualr <md
I'je.l
ralm* -frb.il. .meLrd iW iMrnwlio-rJ Commofilsvioinllrit lui Co.-
muni*d accord uo nilnu,. l
Kardiahnd thm Matcwf ru
ome
en th.ouJ ih.u
.nO-Co-raw* toh-'iradaced ihet,nlT, rW USSRa*aw> mm itimn h
So-irt ioro In th.
The aboru-eMngtow bvr Qui awed Mono- to law prtmnM, rJlI-
hr Sorts.CJ.^
idroltuarch .IU olIraa. :
Mt>
oanrd. aad ord. recently
.ofUicace there.
Durlna Ihr Anb-ltrwli -ar lhehe numl*. rrl
VUunchiaf iuri.ee >hiM Inrranranlivt
uied thenrul oneitUn Other Alp. .bo .uCmeMod the So-let aavl rqwdrer. lo thend rome tool un porftioni near US thi pi
'undidTranreort Avtltion <VTA| aldllt to EtVPt
llrlli to North Tei-en.
D"fW SowerI auppf, iniauou an Uh.ll
ot republican lores jMtlincn IruurrectHm by rovallrl rappaei-
tn.elieved lo have been tha lint dim* iaW-nnant olin the Arab Hat. ,
M"diin eniMahedIn Ihe
Al" ru-Mi umU bmanUH. loha
rear, loSoauh pona
.nl, al Aden, Saath Torrara. la.
tn- tm.aad aaaaarTW? alaa
brctat ibePari at Al Borah
SftHtfrT
9
0
9
000
00
000
|1
Auk1
2
Ap> Wi-
SnvleU (radoillvnf nival aie& TV, piloted TU-IS Radf.l.walw (ASW) aienalt no rciatar unittheHorn! aluo-milnce mliaiWar* pared in nation Badaei rn-al ilrileIn EerOt
Soild naval ahiot befiu renulir nar nl Ihr liaiii oon ol llmmaei^ic nanui.
* af anrltiaav- Saavct aanhtair iiagiIn Innleu0umtm peaked1 at nwetvcic nmbat oenonncl. pOmaraV In luitacr-loalr mluilenumbn declined thereafter,i'mu manned tVnd pJoliFail' "heirnmWtfmar aMH aadand VofiUiciDiLel dciarh-
"it deplowrfi- and peiloiinnd fcconnaUitat* niaon
ihe Swei Canit Iiinn Soviet oilou Hum MIC-Eli
meown'in- hi Uraeli
Soviet na-al taniu voted Cuba Im lhe IHatence
United uie oi Afeerun poet of Anmba In- Soviel nival aeilu.
FirstSoviel TUeeonmluancc aircraft lo Cuba.
TWcvap in Sudan ande penee ef Cannaland nipaih.nn (ran thead the neev non of lhe cnn>IV leaxctary niwnl of lhe
CoaiunwiUIIn lheof
nemel Ircoa lhc country and termination of military auiainrn. da thine; tav Ui ii'ir Soviet plana lo ade Sudanea*part r. ea Wee araWCkc Billdlc Eaat and Indian Cnia'1 to rem
Jordanian crfeii Soviet aWplnvmenU of . .land lo the
Medilerranton Incieawd (fromil ten and ihree drntimeri lo four cruiarn and nine ileilm.eril and Soviet ihio> mai nonear US ahlot Inltera Mavbeninean.
Sovietl liei.'li, under ranatroctieo al Clenfuegoi. Cuba.
ied, and Sadal brain hit rite toEevptim Treiiifefit.
An-nvcnt of Soviet mvil ahini all Wefl Afrira VTAlhiein
l4>idae Saviet Treatr of Friendship and Coopetallan aim( Deapile
lhe treaty. Saditvtrv of SaviM lofhienoe Moicoo drilled or
reneard on cmnmltnvenU In delJvrelyitemt, panieutirl, ihcoeed bv iV Foptuna, pendancmpra-cnvW In Sadall roioei toaratd the irSSSt Tlaa Sovwt tat- bncHaied, aa SedM'i icanenveM it ihn ueainwaulcacedquine* to Sortra pre ate. Indo-Sovlel Tlenly of Frlemllhip ind Cuopttalian utoed
l.-vdo fiH-ini an The Uniied Staia and ihr Sows Union each ecplored addxloaul Mail forea lo the Indun Oeeu Felhwlnt the
aerivml nl ihc US aarrrall earrirf tnteepilH. leu Soviet cmtfiwulibe lman The Se-Aeu mali^iinodboth US and Britiih naval (orcO In the IndltnSoviet btllUtie miniledrfvrt luwcd CIIlo.eaf lime,nto the port of AntiCi. TV anlvaaaateport can In OA* mm
April I't In Havana harbor
Iiiqi Soviet Treaty ofind Cnnperitan iltnrA
5?
-stent I
[ul ordered lha bui* af Soviet mmMtf rarftnnael tn Eavol la
-uimj around,elena*.an. aad ioar Savinlhc- ltu-doa
Octaad POL Mitaal Bala..
Som.Ua
Juldcnhnwoi al Sb-icihi.Ii laOahaB.
Oel la* -n TV SoHrli doubled thru ntv.l laacri an the
Mediterranean'ladwdini mm* ciuiir miaaile oali) anduivr.ll.iiie ol Ihc US (kli Final. Sovwi ihiia tool no provoe alive arlloiu Soviet deplnrmeal eat rombal uiwti other ihanaaval
limitedned Harlieeto-.li aiaailt vr.uSyria
Sovietlant aa active Oat Ii operaiianal dnrunaiaulinc aaSt.ll Ai lha Bar li-ne SnXi Sanaa aada* ia actjaval1
he annnaa ala* ia4ai wu VTA
aanfll.
Octnm aa innc-edmedical dnarhrarvi) tad eonlineeat ol
o Syria aller ihr enlbtcat of lhe fiahltat Tail wu (teaofl -Mb Ih* Sariali Cuba provided the priiaaart the USSR
.' the p ll aad other (KiaipmeiU
caiia iktw -b< Inlrudaced Into thr Soviet tarnhant
fleet.
. al Frirndihip and Coonaratvaa aaaaa.
PartrCaatral Caataaattor malutirai aarira. raattaa tn
ollacl lhat llaarai a* luan vie-ad Lata. Aaaartraphere ol
US irilian hat ratl-rr ar aa arena lor Savin-US eonipceiiion
DecSonet naval coanba.anll.ra dieael rabrnartne) bctan
overhaul atbteQuenl to th* rhante3 oi the Tuaottiv mtrltlm* Ita to permit repair nlnaval thipv
nice olr. Soviet pilot 1flev, combat
t-imbtruj miltUrathr Kurdi. but toob cai. in* to Croat Ihe Iranian boidri
tn ibmnBlarn of *va-nUl aaarou. II)
AprILM Mar ASW aircraft betto penod* atalta ka Saeuta.
IonCanal laatanrd
Octairlift to Araaola.
6
NovVTA aliMi ol military eaulpme.it to South Tenvnt lor the
Popular Final fnr Ihe Ubeittron of Oman (l'FI.0)
DeePFLO. wpponed b. th* SovieU. wu defeated br a
lore* afnd Iranian!
Declew Soviet naval abapa eoentiaa oil Ibr Waal AlriCaa oaaat aear
ConaW. war* aanjaaaaaad I*a-ded mltaaV? ember udaaiiafdnd trvnal aitAtrtea. to tapporlnrnlt
DeeSovieuarar Iloatinc drvdoek Inba> al Brebeia.
Somalit. for ma bv alilpa of their Indian Oraan Som
Rati.dleiel lubmtlliwi Ueftn tnchorini retultrlr tl Anaaba, Al,-
for minor-laainlan.nee tnd repau IromSoviet tubnitrlne leaderam.
Aprabrofiial lhe SowrlCcTOiaa Ira-ndthip Inlalr and ordered the
laiiaa Sax itahiinbove ttn- by
aUd-AiW
*prforea aeeapial aoetheen LebanoaL Svrlt't Mwanaiam* anmed
Soviet Irad'ii tad letahad in ain Sanra Mm ddlveiaa few
eifht month)
S3 .fC*lt-|
CMTrealy ofarid Cowritm ivjned
OctSoviet TVXvMrtJ.cuw rirtr.it deployed I* SomJAx.
DecSoviei naval repair tK.rt twit op at at ion off Luanda. Ancoti.
janTU*OS rfMnAituweiodic deployment! H
AneoU
7 nd tauter visitedat the
mvilillnn ol lit* MounbiQitr Government-villi bynaval detachment Co ihn cooaery.
Febnaval onto bcfifi frequent vbiu lo Benin,
Mar-Apr President fodec-rny vfuird Tintanta, Zambia, and Mourn-
Vint toAfrk*ember of the
t hierarchy SoW.MnumbiOueTrqCy of Frkrvdfhlpilkaa timi,
Earlyreportedly begin operaiUg the naval Use
Mayof Soviet military advim from Sudan.
ktpane Mentel BovrtarfUh)
shipyard in Tunisia*
prolriUicd further TV-OSw ffttrfili from Corukry
bot continued to allow Soviet mltKary airU to Land and Soviet naval ship* to use certain port facaliikft.
Novfor yeoo MoacoVi favored dier* in the Horn of Africa,
abrvc*ted Its friendibia treaty wfih thc USSKelted all Soviet military pertOcwidioraupport of BhlopuL TW* action co* tha- USSR lis ermt to Somali aJrfteldi aod the port athe drydock at Berber* waj towed lo Aden, Soulh Yemen* and lhe rommunlcatloro- station wu dfemarYtlecL
Novairlift lo Elbtopia. VTA transports wrir aasitned to ExUopix for
Maylofitrk fUfhl).
Jan*FcbeortfLct TU Soviets augmented their India* Ocean
squadron from in average of Ift (inclu&nt four loeal Oflpsumber of ibtps of the
aovadroo were deployed io the aovAhera Red Sea lo assist In the delivery of npfftea io DhiOfX* and to provide security for Soviet aod Dhtoptsn shipping involved In Ihe sesllfL (For other Soviet invcivmenl see
chronology of evert* inf rhapter II)
Aprdiydock at Aden lowed to the Red Sea, off Brvferia
fgfoauftart
Jimcoup In Sovth Yemen,
Mayfirrt Sovietlatterhler^bc.mben were UemJircd in
Cuba.
JulSovietfo flew from lite USSH torejbabtV ferrrlnc
Soviet teebflidani to replace Oilwe
JttlAN*lfe were rtal-oned in Sovthoviet cc*nwun*<iltoru
smion wu corutrvcted there,eplacemenl for the
(tation Ibeoibat Ularceptort were eWirered lo IJty.-the fire*
delivery of thb eJfcrafl toThird WorW-ere delivered to Aleeria, wbiefc reportedly will receive a
Wuadron.
NovTreaiv of Frwndmlp arvd Cooperaike. dewi
NovTreaty of Friervojbjp and CoopQatioo utnoi
Laten*va! AN-IJand rt-MMay ASW aircraft deptmyyed lo
Early DecThb wu the firstof Soviet taetieal atrcrafl ha South
Yemen.
I
I
' -
ANNEX B
SOVIET AID TO INSURGENT MOVEMENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD
annex provide* some background on lhe level, scope, and motives of Soviel support of insurgencies.
The Middle Easi
Ihe PIOne liberation Organ* rot ion)
oscow has provided miliiary assistance andlo the Palestinian Liberation Organization and some of its member groupsumber of years. This support Increased greatly following the Arab-Israeli war3 as the USSR moved to compensate for losses sustained In Its relations with Egypt and to frustrate US-backed efforts toeaceThe bulk of Soviet aid has gone to Fatah, thc largest group, which is headed by Yasii' Arafat The Soviets have also given assistanceheAs-Saiqa. lhe Popular Front for lhe Liberation of Palestinehich Is headed by Ceorge Habbash but is noember of tlse PLO; and to the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberaiion of Palestinehicharxist group headed by Naif Hawatmah.
2 The quantilies and value of materiel furnished by thc Soviets cannot bo determined, as much of It has been channeled through Arabat different times. Egypt. Syria, and Libya. Theis substantial, however, and has'Includedmissiles. In addition, tbe Soviets have provided military and political training to Palestinians in lhe USSR.
hile the Soviets have from time to time advised the PLO that terrorist attacks both within and outside Israel could prove counterproductive and wereInadvisable, continued Soviet support clearly has not been made contingent on the PLO's abandoning the use of terror.
Ihe PHO (Popofor front (or the Liberation ol Omon)
A. Tlie USSR has given propaganda support,and arms lo the Popular Front for the Liberation of Omanhe PFIX) is bosed In South
Yemen and. unlilonducted operations in Disolar. Oman's southern province. Al lhat lime the I'FIX) membersain* militaryack and haven confined lo South Yemen, where ihey are presumably rearouping and waiting for theto move again
quantity of Soviet aid provided tho PFLOto evaluate. All assistance has beenthrough cither South Yemen or Iraq, and. asfurnished by these nations themselves Is ofit Is hard to differenliale among theamount of aid apparently was imigniflcantwhen il began lo increase.he PFLO reportedly received significantof arms from the USSR, includingmissiles. Since theefeat. lhe Soviets reportedly have continuedarms and other assisunce, but probablyquantities.
Norlh Africa
lhe I'aliiO'io (Weitern Sahcro)
Soviets have given little, if any.to the Polisario. which opcrala inand receives most ef its support fromof Soviet involvement in the trainingelements have been of questionableThough not directly involved, the Sovietsnot placed any resUictlons on Algerianassistance to the organiialion.esult,hsi Income rather well equipped in thoyean with weapons lhat arc primarily SovietThil indirect type of assistance hu enabledlo maintain their credibility with bothand Algeria, while prevenling theof their iclittoni with Morocco. Il has aboSoviets considerable flexibility for futureThev support lhe right ofWestern Sahara, thc position endorsed bvtlse Polisario, and ihey have referred inlo the Polisario organization. This position prev
swam
em the option of supporting themore overtly in lhc (utufe if ihey decide (hb is
Ihe Anson (Swoon)
ovicl barking for the Anvar insurgents inSudan it even more tenuous than llial fot The Soviets have noi defended lhe Anvar
cause in iheir propaganda; they have no direct contact withun. and ihey have provided no direct tuppori for the intutgeney. They have, however.f Ijbya't supplying. iui to Ihe rebelt. and in addition,lo several reports, cither Ihey or lhe East Euro-peant were involved fn transporting such equipment from Libyathiopia for transfer to the An tars in lhe fallinceibyan support lor Ihe Ansart has decreasedumber of reasons, one of which has been Sudan's recent policy of reeoocib-atton with Ihe rebels. As Libyan support for lhe Ansats has fallen, the USSR's remote involvement has further diminished.
Frolinot (Chod liberation Fronl)
here it no evidence of Soviet tuppori for the Chad Liberation Front (Frolinat k. As in the case of the Ansart. however. Ihe rebels are equipped withmanufactured by lhe Soviels which have been suppliedb.a. and there is no indication lhat the Soviets have sought to prevent lhe Libyans from transferring thlt material This policy has again given the Soviets desirable flexibility. Should the Insurgency prove successful, they can claim lo hive been an important supporter; If ll should fall, ihey have been detached enough Io prevent repercussions and lo deny responsibility Inowever, one of lhe Iwo Frolinat factions went over lo the government's side, and Libya withdrew itsboth factions Libya willlo provide small arms and training IO Ihe Frolinat Intuigenls.
Southern Africa
n southern Africa lhe USSR backed successful insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique andto be lhe maior source of foreign support for insurgents In Rhodesia and Namibia Out. Inihese insurgencies. Moscow has been careful to follow overtly tbe lead of (he principal black-ruled slates in lhc area. The USSR has, for example, not
pubiiely challenged Western attempt! to reachsetllctnenls in Namibia and Hhodetia. even thoughave privately advocated continued insurgency We believe that the Soviets would prefer lhal nationalists secure power through miliiarylike lhal In Angola which wouldeak regime dependent on Soviet aid. If one of thegroups gains control through peacelul means, however, the USSR will attempt lo maneuver Itself inlo being the dominant foreign power.
frhoileuo
he USSH. with Cuban assistance, provides lhe Patriotic Fronttenuous alWance of tbe Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African Nalional Uniona range of assistance including weapons, training,tuppori, and money. ZAPU bat received mote of Ihis aid thinaction of the PF thai Moscow flndi idrxtlogically less acceptable Aswith tbc Soviet investment In Angola and Drue-pie. support thus far for the PF has been small, costing the USSR less0 million.
II. The Soviel role in the Rhodesian situation has been limited by lhe leaders of lhe Frontline Slates who hope to see the Rhodesian problem solved without extensive non-African involvement. To limit lhe Soviet role, lhe Presldentt of thc Frontline States havethat military equipment destined for the PF bc channeled through them. In addition, although thc number of Cuban military personnel hat risen in Mozambique, It and lhe other Frontline States have restricted thc number of Soviel and Cuban advisers they allow to work with the PF; Zambia has been particulaily cautious in this regard
he USSR has had lo accept the restriction placed on its activities by lhe Frontline States. The PF controls no tciritory which could be used lo support an expanded Soviel role and Is itself dependent on the Frontline Stales fot facilities lo train Its furces and launch operations into Rhodesia In deference lo the Frontline Presidents, Moscow publicly endorses aPF, hoping lhal il can allay their susptcioni. eipand its influence, and position itself lo lake advantage of Opportunities presented elsewhere in the resrton.
Nonvbio
he USSR provides polilical and militarylor Ihe South-West Africa People's Organizationut Die level of military atsiltance is less
c. tensive lhan lhalRrwrjcsian iojUf,SWAPO receives military equipment from the USSI. primarily throughere it, maincamp* and bates are located. SWAPO tjuerrillas PPU trained by Soviel and Cuban adviicis in Africa, lhc USSH. and Cuba.
H The People's Republic of China was the main supplier in lhe. Recently. Chinese aid to SWAPO has declined, and llie Soviet role as arms supplier has grown dramatically We believe,lhal Moscow regardsi secondary lo its In Angola and Hhodcsra
Republic ol South Alrko
is no insurgency in South Africa, buiUnion intends loole inTlie Sovici Union provides some support forNational Council (AN; j
Atio
Vietnam, ike centerpiece ofin Indochina, continues lo provide some(he Thai Communists, there ii no evidence thaiare directly supporting any Insurgency Indoes, however, continue lo fund localparlies. In addition, some Sovietpass Indirectly to local insurgencies through third
if not foutth part ice One, and pnh.pi the only, cample is Ubyan support for the Muslim Insurgency in lhe Philippines On lhe whole, however, lhc Soviets have meticulouslyolicy of statelo-stale relation) with all of Asia in order lo allay suaphrlont of Soviel intentions and to deprive lhe Chinese of any opporlunitieseiplvit Soviet duplicity or Soviet-fueled regional antagonisms to llieir own advantage.
latin America
e have little information on Soviet suppori for iniurgcnt movements ia Lain! America. Reliable sources, however, have reported thai lalin Americans have been training In lhc Soviet Union llncc the. Third World trainees In (hc USSR are selected by tlve Chief Inldligence Directorate (CRU) of ihe Ceneral Slaff and by the Com mi tie* for State Security (KCB) on lhe basil of ihcir potential for leadership and Iheir attitudes toward the USSR.
e have some evidence that Soviet support lo Lalin American insurgencies is channeied through East European and Cuban embassies. Cubaaining ptostram for Lalin Americanand provides refuge for Lalin American Com. muniilatin American Communist parties are supported directly by Ihe Soviet Communist Party ond indirectlyariety of Communist-dominated international organizations.
57
ANNEX C
THE MOVEMENT OF tARGE SOVIET FORCES BY MILITARY TRANSPORTDEPLOYMENTS
Tlv circumstances ibat wouldttei mine (hc mini- andol any Miliiary Transport Avialion (VTA) lirlifl of large contingent, ot* ceneral purpose: forces lo lhe Third World could vary to widely lhat any attempt to foeecail how ihc Soviets would employ Iheii military air transport* (or thai purpose it uie lea. Therefore, lo illustrate Soviet airlift capabilities for such minion! lo destinations al diffeicnt ranges from lhe USSR, we have considered ihree forcelightly reduced airborne division.lacttcal avialion rcttlmenl, and an air defense fcrcc comprliln*egiment, Iwoatteries, and (woregime nla.
he deployment limes which have lieeninclude only the lime required lo transport lheIhe lime lhe first aircraft departs unlil lhe arrival of (he last aircrafl al lhc oVstlnation Additional lime- -pciliip* three to fourbe requited lo prepare (ho force for deplovmenl. involvingsuch as:
Alerting airborne and (rarupoit aircrafl units.
Making or modifying plans.
Recalling aircraft from other millions.
Performing any necessary maintenance
Deploying altcrafl and airbonvc uniuidields for loading
Loading (lie force.
Ensuring adequate suppori facilities andal Intermediate and destination airfields.
Arrangements for overflight clearances and refueling en routeajor uncertainty, particularly if the operation citends over several days. They could delay lhc movement or force ibe Soviets lo decide between cancellation of lhc supportand unaulhor-lied ovctflight.
3 While (here should be numerous indications of Sovici preparations for deploymentsige force
c
3
ante these have beeneginvery limit notice.
ll should also be noted that, (or the purposes of Ihis Estimate, the dally sotlie capacity of an airfield was determined by cettain assumptions regarding the number of available parking spaces. Ils air traffic control capability, and (he average turnaround (ime for each aircrafl. Adequate luppliet of (uel were abo naimed to be available al all intermediate andalifieSdi Fuel suppliesajor factor In large-scaleowever, and shortages have been experienced al some o( the small Third World airfields in both US and Soviet airlifts
epicts the surge capability of VTA toeduced airborneis. one wiih all of its heavy weapons,ercent of its men,erceni of its trucks, and enough ammunition foi three days of heavy fighting- Noransported by air. The serviceability of the transport force is assumednd each aircraft mates one flight. As shown In (hc tabulation, lhe force comprise* thc approximately SO0 aircralt found in five VTAbut does noi Includen (he five independent VTA regiments:
Aircralt Inrcntorr
VTA.r
Pot
The capabililv for surge delivery decreasesautical miles because of (he range-payload limits of (he AN-IZ Cub. whicherceni of the transport fleet. Thus,ake full use of their lifl capability in long-distance deployments, themust be able lo make stops for refuelingm.
Surge Delivery Capability ol Soviet Military Transport Aviation (VTA)
Without. Prcdeployment ol Aircrews
'airbwAc
tlir*-
to Syria. Mozambique, andselected as representative of possiblein support o( client states. OperaUonsareas such as Mozambique and Cubaseveral refueling stops, and tlte parkinscapacities ol inlermediatc airfieldsbe an important limiting factor. Theparting space would become particularlyif the crews were not augmented or replacedto remain overnight at an intermediateihis Situation would greatly increasereoulred to deploy the unils.
movement to Mozambique withoutor pre-positioning of crews, tbc rate ofprobably limited by the number of aircraftand thc requirement for resting crews citheror in Mozambique. The rules of delivery forroutes from the Soviet Union toin dislancemm.in thc Icfl-hand chart of figureherequire0ours, regardless of the
route selected. Movement of lhe reduced airborne division would require at leasl seven days over the hvijI direct route through Parisian For routes passing through lhc Middle East, ihereequirementefueling and rest stop in Ihe vicinity of Aden. Thc most rapid delivery of tlic air defense forceclicil aviation regiment would rcouirc five In six days and Iwo to ihree days, respectively. If lhe only irrnle available were via Cuinea and Angola, the delivery rate would be approximately one-third of that arhievable using the more directconstraint due In limited Kirfirlrl fncililies in Guinea. While lhe tirst delivery could occur within -IS hours, lhc di-ploy-mcnl nl lhe reduced division would require aboutays.
lo Mozambique could beby crew augmentation or replacement, sorest periods would be required. In thisdelivery rale would be limited primarilyrefueling lime, maintenance requirements,capability at intermediatethese conditions, (he earliest deliverieswithinoours and movement ofairborne division could be completed Infour days, as shown In the right-hand dart ofDelivery of thc air defense force and Iheregiment would require two to three daysto two days, respectively.
to Cuba were selected lodeployments in supportlient stale in tbcHemisphere. Three possible routes werethrough Iceland direct lo Cuba,direct to Cuba, and through Cuinea directEach of these routesinal leg inislance which precludes the use ofaircraft. Tbe movement shown In figure 0on the route through Algeria, whichbc used in such an operation. Approximatelyof tbe reduced airborne division couldinoours; rnovemenl of thebc completed in approximatelyays.ol tbe air defense force wouldto eight days. Deliveryacticalalmost all of which could be moved inby Ihe available Candid and Cock aircraft,essentially complete in two days. Inefueling point in the Atlantic (such aswere available, deliveries comparable toMozambique would be possible.
II. Movements to Syria were considered as being representative of deploymentstate relatively near
lhe Soviet Union. Clven lhe proper drcumstariees. Ihe Soviet! -re capable of moving air-Ira reportable unit* into luch oreai very rapidly The delivery rale wouldelv be limited by ihc priority placed upon iho operation rather lhan by consldcralioni which were limiting In deliveries Io more distant areas such ts Mozambique or Cuba. For Syria, delivery roules might be 6Q0m In length, depending on available overflight clearaiwes. Either airdropping or airlanding of Soviel airborne units is possible for such distances
IS. Syriaumber of airfields near major road and rail lines which arc suitable for deliveryarge miliiary force- Operational caxuaderalions, however, would probably require thai deliveries be coracen-(ratedarticular location, such as Damascus. An unopposed airlanding of lhe reduced airborne division ai Ihree major airfields neat Damascus (Damascus International. Dumayr.r) could be accom-
plished in ooe lo Iwo days given lhc following COndilionST
Availability of luff'dcnl VTA altcraflo GOO (lights would be required willi thc current force).
Aoility toargo percentage ol lhe aircrafl on schedule.
Uninterrupted overflight clearance for theof Ihe operation.
Preemption of all other air operations al lhc ihree airfields (iwo of wliich are major Syrian fighter bases).
AvaiUbilily of auicqaate air traffic control, lies handling, and maintenance personnel
Continuation of operation!4 hour basis.
I
Arrival or departure of an aircraft every sii minutes; average turnaround time of three hours for each aircraft.
nder the aboveelivery peiiod of one to two days is fudged to be thc minimum time to airland the unit in Syria under the most favorable
conditions. Should thc deployment encounter those disruptions which typically surface In large-scaleoperations, the delivery lime would lll^lyWc therefore believeore realistic deployment timeoviet airborne unit from -tho USSR to Syria would be three to four days.
Delivery Capability to Cuba of Soviet Military Transport Aviation
ede ploy ment oladio* oldliiiloa
7
0 1 1 3 St J
61
iKJtfil-
-
ANNEX D
THIRD WORLD REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER
Apprehension and Complacenca
I. Most Th.td World leaden and their adviser*ait appreciation nf (lie magnitude andn- Soviel aiiivrtl fnrcrt BrXMMihcir minion nr -location,arge pari of ihesestrategic and lactical nuclear arsenals, Ihe nationwide air defenses, and Ihe ground and air forces arrayed against Western Europe andlittle direct bearing on developments in lhevert he less. Iheyignificant role in the perception of many Third World leaders who believe that lhe USSH. because of Its increased military strength. Is able to take bolder and more aggressive military Initiative* in support of its policies toward lhe Third World lhan in yean past
2 Of special concern to Third World leaders are Soviel willingness and readiness to employ military means Thc Sovieis have demonstrated in lhe Middle East. Angola, and most recently in Ethiopia ancapability lo respond lo crises and to conduct miliiary operations over considerable distances.Ihese leaders are on lhe whole uncertain about the full eitent of Soviet military capabilities, their recognition lhat ihe USSR has sufficient military power to become Involved in any local conflict almost certainly makes them uneasy.
Third World leaders mostly relate lo ihc USSRource of weapons and military advisers. In this regard Moscow represents its armstbe Third World generally acceptsas military operations bui as essentially commercial-poliiical transactions
Alliludes In the Third World toward Soviet military protection and presence, as is to be eipected. arc conflicting as ihey reflect age-old regional rivalries spurred by new national aspiration! and self-interests. In the area, where regional conflict! are most intense and where Soviet protection of military power could decisively influence lhe outcomes, thesediscussed brieflyplay an important role, though to what catenl Soviet policy in lhe Third World lakes these altitudes Into account is noi known.
Middle Eost
he nation* of the Middle East are generally uncomfortable with Soviet military presence in ihii region. The eev-isrivalive stales (prineiitally SaudiOman, and Iran) arc Ihe most apprehensive of Soviet military eapabililies. In their view, the ultimate Soviet objective In the Middle East is to gain control of lhe Red Sea and eventually the oil-rich Arab Peninsula by establishing hegemony in northeast Africa,the Horn. They have long believed thai Ihe Soviets would attempt to protect power In the Middle East, but primarily through clandestine support ofand national liberation movements, which they see as the greater current threat- The recent events inom, however, appear to have convinced the conservatives that Moscow is now ready and willing to move in an overt manner as wellarge eitenl Egyptian leaden share these perception!
oviel naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean are regarded as the only protection of Soviet military power lhal currently threatens the Middle East, although Iran certainly Is aware of its vulnerabilityoviet Overland invasion and sees Soviet weaponry in Iraq and Afghanistanhreal by proxy.
hough the current socialist regimes In Syria and Iraq lean politically toward Ihe Soviet Union, which furnishes the bulk of their weaponry, ihey remain independent and fearful of being labeled as Sovietyrian altitudes toward Soviet militarythere are somewhat contradictory The Syriansoviet balance lo US support of Israel and wouldoviel promise to Intciveno directly if Syria were threatened by an Israeli aitack. Yethas always been wary of Soviet intention* and has tried to minimiie Soviet military presence in Syria during periods of peace.
8ntervention in Lebanon6 and its attempt* to control the leftists and PalestiniansSoviet leaders and resultedlowdown of
Soviet umi deliveries for eight months The maneuver had Utile effect. Even though Syria is heavily depend eni on the Soviet* fo. jimi. it maintained and even nlengthened ilt forcei in Lebanon and has given no ilun nf withdrawing. Since then, however, lhc focus of Syrian opposition in Lebanon hat become theoir acceptable target Irom thc Soviet pi mil of view In addition, Sadat's peace initiative toward Israel has brought lhe Soviels and Syrians closer tocether. and they Iiave signed an arms agree-mcnl valued al an estimated SI billionrcsi-
lent Assad remaim distrustful oloviets, hrtwi'vrr.
anil hits steadfastly refused loriendship Ireaiy
wiih the USSH
of Africo
3 Attitudes in the Horn differ markedly. Tbe Ethiopian regime looks favorably on Soviet miliiary support, at least in tbe short term, as Ihe mainstay of its fight against guerrilla* In Eritrea and thc Ogaden. Somalia and Sudan view Soviet presenceirect threat lo their security and sovereignty la Djibouti. President Com led and most of his fellow. Issas share ihis concern, bul the Afars are for the most part willing to accept Ethiopian. Cuban, and Soviet support lolhcir ethnic group from being dominated by the Somali-backed Issas. Kenya prolesso serious alarm at the Increased Soviet influence in eastern Africa and holds the USSR responsible for arming Somalia and Uganda and strengthening the threat lo Kenya from both those directions. Kenya's closest ally in Africa remains Soviet-backed Ethiopia, an alliance based on common distrust of Somalia.
hc Ethiopians are grateful for. and impressed by. the massive military assistance they have received from the Soviet Union. Although thc Ethiopiangovernment had Its own ideological motives for inline with the Soviets. Moscow's ofler to build the nationtrong regional military power and help repulse the Somali invasion assured lhe Sovietstrong position In Ethiopia Nevertheless, whileleaders in the near term see no alternativelose miliiary and political relationship with Moscow, ihey perceive that their interests and those of lhe Soviets will not always coincide. Meanwhile, the nerd for Soviet arms to confront Eritrean and Somali guerrillas and Ethiopia's historical concern about "Arabnow by thclhat it is surrounded by reactionary Arab states allied with tbe Uniiedcontinued dose Ethiopian-Soviet military tics.
tl.esult of Soviet assistance to Ethiopia, the ^omalii moved from seemingly slavish adherence to ll* Soviet line7 lo ihr forcfroat of nations decrying lhc menace ol Mmcow'sdesign" for Africa which the Somalii Mtcve includes rlsubiuga-lion ol Somalia and Djibouti To some eitcnt Somali Icart nf Soviet intention! areat-tempi lo gain political and material support from regional and Western powers. Clearly. Somalia'sconcern is ill drive lo wrest ethnic Somalis tnwn Klhionian conirol Nevertheless. Mogadishu is urn ninety apprehensive oviet moves in the and lhcir long-term implications and believes thai military power is crucial lo lhe achievement of Soviet objectives- The Somalis believe, moreover, that Moscow will try to pressure them into makingaccommodations, to use subversion to undermine the Siad regime, and even to support an Ethiopian invasion.
too is apprehensive of Sovietproject military power, but thb isewby the shift In Moscow's alliancelo Ethiopia. Sudanese officials for Ihe pasthave warned th* United Stales aboutand have been outspoken both io publicin describing whil they believe to be thethreat to thisnamely, an attackby Libya. They perceive that in tlse longseeks to be the dominant foreign InfluenceHorn and the Bed Sea.
The Ftootticx S'oiei
southern Africa, the three Frontline are most directly invdved in the Tanzania, and view Soviet military assistance for theof Rhodesia aanecessary evil, having failedthe West to provide military aid andthat such help has not been forthcomingThe Frontline ['residents are suspiciousmotives and wary ol the entree thatfurnishes for Soviet penetration andof lhcir govern men Iv They are cognizant ofof Soviet involvement and influenceirect result of Moscow's militaryihe Ncto regime and determined to avoid aol that process in their countries. Theytried to confine the Soviet role loarms and military advuexi for their regularZambiiut arid Moiamhicans also have reluctantly
-
mlew Soviet advisers to work with the Zimbabwe (black Rhodctun) insurgents on theirTbe Presidents view the Cubans as lesshrcai lltan thc Soviets, and are somewhat mote willing to have Cuban military personnel training anil advising nationalist gioupi. Nevertheless, President Knunda. who hosteduban advMrra ai nl the Inllas wanted lo limit Cubanhough thai may bc difficult.
sia
iHillii-aslm-iilsi'iirect miliiary threat to Iheir countries from the Soviet Union, though tbev frciauenily call attention Io Soviet military poweray ol encouraging thc United Slates In maintain Its stabilizing military pretence in this region. The natrons of Southeast Asia aresuspicious of and basically hostile toward the USSH and view Soviet activities mostly In theof the Sino-Soviet rivalry in which Moscow seeks to counter every Chinese move and statement, thm creating needless problems In Southeast Asian relation* with China. In this regard they fear that Soviei support of Vietnam in its disputes with China will complicate Ihese relations and ultimately goad Hanoi toore aggressive policy in the region. Thev are particularly eoncetnad lhat the Vietnamese will serve as Moscow's surrogates to expand Sovicl influence.
I of in Amarico
oncern among Latin American countries aboul Soviet conventional military prow en Is much greater than the threat lhe USSR's current capabilities pose io this region. The views of many of ihese countries arc affected by iheir own internal security problems, their traditional distrust of Communist and Marxist ideology encouraging revolution, and tlicthat Soviet naval deployments threaten their lines of communication This last concern is most prevalent in lhe more southern LaUn American countries
ft. Regional Miliiary Balance
IS. Tbe degree to which Soviet military assistance to Third World countries affects regional balances of forces it dependentariety of factors, chief of which is whether lhe opposing side has sources of military aid adequate lo offset lhe iirenctlienine. ol tbc Soviet client's military capabilities For eramplc, al-
|Ikkh:Ii the USSR has provided miuive lid lo lhe Arab side in lhe Middle East. Israel has mnre than tomrten-tatcd by obtaining large quantities ol sophisikaled iimi fn-ti Ihe United Slates In llie Eltoocan Somali
nn. however. Somalia wai unable Inaid from Arab or Western sources In
VwiM MipfUll nl Ethiopia..
n this regard, tlic USSR's ability lo provide large quantities of armselatively short limeaior advantage. The West, because of lis more cnmplet decisionmaking processes and ils limited
tfoilt nl jvaifcildr |nr ramiii.
often needl long lead limes to provide arms in Urge quant i( ici
Another Ley determinant of ihe impact of Soviet aidegional balance of lorces is lhe inherenl military potential ol thc recipient relative lo other regional slates. India, fot cample, has thc largest and best equipped armed forces In South Alia. With llie eiceplion of China, no olher country In thaiof outsidetlie population, economic resources, and defense industry to match India's potential. Soviet military assistance lo any of ihese nations, including India, would not affect ihis basic dispaniy. allhough India would look wiihon any miliiary aid to its ncighbori
A final consideration is the level of military technology which the Soviets are willing lo provide. Whereat thoy have readily introduced certainweapon syttems into parts of (he Third World, they have withheld these same systems from otber parts primarily, we believe, because of the likely effect on lhe regional militaryase In poinl is North Korea, where the Soviets up lo now have refrained from introducing advancedas MICnd SU-tO fighters andurface-ioairihey have nported elsewhere
learly, it ii in Moscow's inleresi in some instances lo limit arms shipments in order lo maintain atough parity In military forces In regions where the opposing side has prompt, open-ended access tn foreign sources of advanced militaryand where lhe United States is deeplyto lhat side's defense. This is basically lhe case in Korea and lhe Middle East In areas such at Angola and Ethiopit. however, where these conditions do not obtain, Moscow hasoncerted efiort loits elienls wiih the military assistance required to gain military superiorily in lhe region
St-tw
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