CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
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MEMORANDUM
SOVIET POLICY ON OUTER SPACE
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Ul1 Committee on the Peaeeful Uoee of Outer Space, particularly through ite ecientifio and technical subcommittee and ite legal subcommittee, hae eerved ae the foeal point for internationalonpaas issues. As the number of epaae-oriented aotivitiee hae grown, however, eo has ths numbsr of international forums concnrned with epaoe issues.* US-Soviet negotiations beganossible Antisatcllite (ASAT) Treaty, and_ Francs proposed an International Satellite Verification Agenoy that would internationalise diearmament , Italy propoeed the furtherof outer epaceeeting of the UN Committee on Disarmament.
This paper outlinee and examines the main Soviet positions on outer spaas issuss that span mors than one international forum, in particular thoss that are relevant to the ASAT talke."' These issues are;
-- The righteceiving oountry to restrict broadoasts from direot broadcast eatellitee.
"Space Activities ondeview of the activities and resources of tho UN, of its specialized agencies, and of other competent international bodies relating to tho peaceful uses of outer space (United Nations, New) [
This rervrandum vae prepared bythe Office of Political Analysis
and hae been coordinated with theee oj ACTcntt/ia Intelligence, the Office of Weapons Intelligence and Out Arms Control Intelligence Staff. Ccmmente and queries may be oddreesed to j
D-IDC4Z
The aolleation and dteeemination of rem
eeneing
-- The definition of the lower limit of outer
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pathe and ueee of epace ehuttle eyeteme.
General Principles
Soviet policy oh outer ipaco is governod by concorn for the physical security of the USSR and the political security of the Soviet regime. Since jtho launch of Sputnik inpace activities by the USSR, as well as by other countries, have continued to increaseumber of peaceful and military purposes, including mass communications, education, tolccommuni-cations, meteorology, geodesy, hydrography, cartography,and collection of intelligence, including for arms control verification purposes. Moscow views many of the space activities conducted by other countries as threatening to its control over its own resources, activities, and populace. Tho Soviets have thus objected to and obstructed initiatives taken by other states that Moscow perceives as threatening. Tho USSR has also proposed international agreements that would prohibit or inhibit the utilizationariety of space techniques that they see as having potentially hostilo military, economic, or political applications. At the same time, they have sought to protect their own civil and military activities in opaco.
The Soviet concept of national sovereignty and the Soviet definition of -peaceful purposes'* are central to Moscow's position in all theseViolation of national sovereignty"erm used by Moscow to dosdribo actions that it considers to be threatening not only physically, but also economically, socially, politically, or ideologically. The Soviet Union has consistently used tho term "for peaceful purposes'1 to moan "non-military" in contrast to the usual US interpretation of the same phrase to mean "non-aggressive" or "beneficial."
The ASAT
! SAT negotiations focused on tho prohibition of cortaln acts against'satellites,uspension of testing anti-satellite Bysteyui.* The Soviet positions on prohibited acts rgainst satellites are of greatest significance for Issues negotiated in other forums (tho Soviet position on eliminating tho testing ASAT systems, also relevant to other forums, is discussed below, under space trancportatlon systems').
purposes .
than the troaty term "space object.
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he!two sides have defined as adestroy it, or displace it from
trajectory. Moscow has agreed that thc treaty's pro-
jection from possible ASAT; techniques should apply to satellites used exclusively by either the US or the USSR, and has proposed to
USOd -ointlyhird ?lthinfranewort of international coope?-
:*nd US0SflPaco "for Peaceful
Jha* *Rytreaty nest not provide protection from ASAT techniques for satellites engaged in "hostile"
country. The Soviets
consider hostile orhose acts that violate national air space or torritory, damage the environment, or are violations of state sovereignty. Moscow statesostile act exclusion
aiCt Dnlononcerned with non-wcapons-related activitiea carried out by states against each other by
Tilol ^iltilil or aexample, tho Soviets cited television broadcasts from satellites without permission of the state to which the broadcast is directed.
Information Cr.ntrol and Direct Broadcast Satellites
Partlcularly concerned ovor direct broadcast tn hnriif! 'thevcapable of transmitting programs Sr5?J2 toicvl8lon1"cfivor. directlyoreign broadcasting service. Mowcow clearly fears that DBS would bo inimical to the
allies p] nd to those of their East European
rThf SovlaJtoward information control is basic to the Soviet position onhe USSR sees tho media as tools ovor which the state must retain full sovereignty if it is to retain control over and mobilize society. All information from abroad must be censored, therefore, to exclude what is considered slanderous toward tht USSR. Tho Soviet Union insists on tho right to be the final judge of which broadcasts are "illegal" and constitute interference in its internal affairs. Soviots have cited as examples broadcasts that incite to war or advocate national, racial or religious hatred or violence.
has constantly tried to establish constrainingk orking group
fcJf SPaco Committee to study the social, legal, cultural, and othor implications of DBS. It also took tho lead inroup of experts within tho UNESCO framework to assist in tho formulation of "proposals concerning the international arranyemr-nta and conventions to promote tho uoo of space communications for tho furtherance of UNESCO's alms."
Pressuresrcor international flow of information increased in thosesult of tho negotiations loading
?k c Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Soviets first tried to deflect these procures, but
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then realized that they would have to deal with the issues raised if thoy were to achieve their broader political and security objectives in CSCE. Although the Final Act of CSCE inoludos frovisionsreer flow of information by moans of radio and television broadcasts, it also provides that any corwutmcnts to this end cannot involve interference in thc internal affairs of any state and that the implementation of these commitments is subject to the domestic laws of tho states
concerned.
In two UN forums, Moscow initiated steps to water down tho impact of the CSCE provisions. At the annual UNESCO Conferencehe Sovietsroposal (which eventually became8 Declaration on tho Mass Media) that was designed to gain international sanctions for their views on tho need for state control over press, radio, and television broadcasts. At tho same conference, UNESCOeclarationto8 Soviotthat "satellite broadcasting shall respect the sovereignty and equality of allndrovision for prior consent of the receiving state. The same year. Foreign Minister Gromyko proposedetter to the UN Socretary General that each country be given the right to restrict satellite television broadcasts and to take any measures noccssary for that purpose within tho country, in outer space, or in "other places beyond the bounds of national jurisdiction of any state." To date, the Outer Space Committee has agreed on all aspectsreaty regulating DBS except for prior consent, program content, unlawful or inadmissible broad-asts, and "spillover" (transmissions intended for domestic reception in one country that are received in an adjacentt9 session of the Outor Space Legal Subcommittee, the Soviets threatened to move tho issue ro the UN General Assembly, which they beliove is more likely to vote in favor of their positions. Thoy assorted that the subcommittee had failed to reach agreement on;one of the most urgent political issues for all UN
nder the auspices of thenternationalUnionhich has responsibilities In the tochnical areacornmunicationa, the Broadcast Satellito Administrative Conference assigned frequencies to individual countries in the Eastern Hemisphere. These assignments made direct television broadcasting illegal without the consent of tho receiving stato on the grounds that tho government of tho rocoiving stato must mnko tho necosaary frequencies available. Given both the growing availability of DBS Technology that will occur innd the deterioration of Soviot relations with the Weot that will increase Moscow's fearseturn to the broadcasting practices ofa andfl, tho Soviets undoubtedly will continue to press for international conventions restricting direct satollito broadcasts. y also urqo moving tho issuo to tho UN Gonoral Assembly.
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Remote Sensing Systems
Tho collection by another country of data about thomoans of remoto sensing dovlces in spaco and thesuch data to third parties greatly concorns theroot of this concern is that such data could haveparticularly to the Chinese. This concernin Sovietjnegotiating positions, even though theoffer data do rived from their own remoteto Third World countries for resource
Although the fundamental Soviet attitude regarding any data gathered about the USSR remains protective, Moscow has agreed that the United States can legitimately use "national technical means" to gather data necessary to verify tho USSR's compliance with the bilateral SALT agreements. The Soviets add, however, that they regard the gathering of intelligence for 'military purposes beyond what is required for SALT verification as an infringement of thc USSR's national sovereignty. The Soviot Union has not, however, defined what it believes are the limits to the legitimate collection of data by national technical means of verification. At tho ASAT talks, the Soviets have reserved the right to uso ASAT techniques against satellites that violate their national sovereignty,
In tho UN Outor Space Committee tho Soviets maintain that the USSR has sovereignty over resource data about tha Soviet Union and that such data cannot be transferredhird country without Soviet permission. In the ASAT talks they have maintained that only those joint US-third country satellites that aro usod solely far "peaceful purposes" should bo protected from ASAT lochniqo.'S. They havo argued that photographic data of bettermoter resolution has military and economic value. Thoy continue to maintain that there are no demonstrable, legitimate "peaceful uses" for data of bettor resolution thaneters, and that it should not bo disseminatedhird countryhe consent of tha target state.;
At9 meeting of tho Legal Subcommittee, the Sovietsew definition of remote sensing that spelled out their view of tho military value of data gained by theso means. Th* Soviot definition included thc collection of data not only about tho earth's natural rosourcos and environment but Also about manmade objects and forma*-Ions. When queried, the Soviets indicated that the definition was intended to include objects and formations of significance to defense. The Soviots undoubtedly aro concerned over tho1 launchS civilian earth resource satellite (LANDSAT) with improved remoto sensing capabilities, and tho planned roloaso of its bettor quality data to third countries, including China, to which Washington has recentlyANDSAT receiving station.
*Tha US allows othor countries to receive data diroctly from tho romoto sonsor, tho USSR dooslnot.
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Dgftnlng tho Lowor Limit of Outor Space
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Tho Soviet Union has maintained at the ASAThat deliberate intrusions into its air spaed by satellites exemplify the typo of activity that should be exempted from protection from ASAT techniques. Neither the lower limit of outer spa en (whore7 Outer Space Treaty applies) nor the upper limit of air space ation has sovereignty) have beer defined, however, although the need to define or delimit outer spaceroblem that has been on agendas of the UN Outer Spaco subcommittees since their inception. This question, of course, relates directly to tho military and defense activities of individual nations. It alsoiiroct bearing on the claims made by equatorial countries to sovereignty over segments of the geostationary orbit that lie0 kilometers above their territory.
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Moscow proposed at9 meeting of tho Legal Subcommittee to define outer 6pace asilometers above sea lovel, while leaving undefined the upper limit of air npaco. Thus the Soviets areasislaim that satellites in orbits belowilometor line violate Soviet national air space. | I
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Even if tho upper limit of national air space is notagreement on the lower limit of outer spacefor military activities regulated by scvoral 7 Outer Space Treaty forbids the sondlngor other weapons of mass destruction into outerinto orbit. It does not ban conventional weapons, missiles, or weapons that complete less thanrevolution. Also involved is'the provision ofTreaty stating that each party undertakes not toor deploy ABM systems or components that are
Moscow has given no reason for its choiceilometers as the lower limit of outor space and has boon unable to point out what advantages this definition bestows on space nations or what problems would bo ro'jolved by its use. Although the Soviet definition provides for the right of free passageilometers for satellites; being launched into orbit and for those returning to tne launching state, the Soviets indicated at the9 meeting of tho Outor Space Committee that it is tinto to have tho Legal Subcommlttoo considor the necessity for "developing rules for flights of shuttle systems on their first orbit after take-offs because such systems pass over other states during first orbit." In addition, the Sovietwould establish an arbitrary boundary that takes into account neither futuro developments in spacecraft nor tho ever lower perigees at which salcllites function.
Tho Soviet Union soes its proponed definition of outer spacoa way to undercut tho claims of equatorial countries to tho
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SEOfibT
portions of tho geostationary orbit over thoir territory .ind Third World demands for reserving parts of the orbit for thoir uso when thoy have achieved tho nccesnary technical ability.7 Outor Space Treaty doclares outor spaco to be the province of all mankind and not subject to claims ofhese demands provide the Soviets with Incentive to press for adoption of thoir definition of the lower limit of outor space prior to the46 ITU-sponsored conferences on planning spaco services (which wore recommended by9 World Administrative Radio Conforonco).
' Transport .it Ion Sy_stoms
The Soviots will probably introduce and pursue in the UN committees this year measures to control space transportation systems. They aro concerned over thc capabilities of thc US shuttle systom to maneuver close to Soviot satellites in order to alter their position or rcmovo them from orbit. Acuto Soviet intcrost in tho antisatellito capabilities of the US shuttle system was apparont atSAT negotiations during discussions on provisionsest ban of antisatellito systemr. Tho Soviets assertcdithat.since both sides were agreed that anti-satellite activity includes destroying, damaging, oratellite from its orbit or trajectory, thoy would not agree to suspond testing of tho Soviet orbital interceptor unless tho development of all other means of damaging, destroying, or changing tho trajectory or orbitatellite is also halted. Moscow pointed out that it meant to include in tho proposed ban tests in space of reusable space craft.* l
At the9 mooting of the Outer Space Committee the Soviots indicated that it is time to have the Legal Subcommittee consider "forbidding tho use of shuttle systems to rcnovo objects of other states from outer space without tho state'snd "the necessity to develop rules for flights of shuttle systems on take-off because such systems pass over other states during the first orbit." F
discussions on the tost ban tho Soviets asserted that they had serious doubta about eliminating systems birilt specifically as an antisatolllte weapon without also banning those systems with potential possibilities for use as on ant:"atollite weapon. | |
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Original document.
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