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The Kurdish Problem in Perspective
National Foreign
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The Kurdish Problem in Perspective (u)
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The Kurdish Problem in Perspective (u)
The fall from power of the Shah of Iran and the instability that has plagued the Khomeini regime have focused International attention on theistinct ethnic group with their own language and culture, the Kurds for several thousand years haveountainous region, historically known as Kurdistan, which includes parts of southeast Turkey, northwest Iran, and northern Iraq as well as smaller enclaves in Syria and the USSR.
Although the Kurds constitute the fourth most numerous people in the Middle East (after Arabs, Turks, andhey have not achieved territorial independence because:
Tribalism, differences In religion and dialect, and national barriers have prevented the development of any real Kurdish unity;onsequence, Kurdish nationalist groups have tended to act independently of one another.
Competing groups within Turkey, Iran, and Iraq have almost always been able to unite to frusiratc Kurdish separatist or autonomist aspirations, (u)
The chances that the Kurds will be able to achieve self-determination in the future are not good:
Even though the Kurds in Iran have assumed dc facto control over much of the prcdominontly Kurdish area of the country, the revolutionarywill not permit infringements of its ability to conduct foreign, defense, or economic policy to go unchallenged. Most Kuroish leaders recognize thai when the government's forces are sufficiently rebuilt, it will, if necessary, use force to reestablish its control over the Kurdish region. Moreover, most Iranian Kurds probably would prefer to settle for autonomy than risk open' conflict with the government.
The Turkish Government will not grant the Kurds in Turkey greater political autonomy, although Ankara might allow its Kurdish minority greater freedom of cultural expression.
The Iraqi Government will continue toombination of military force and economic Inducement toesurgence of dissident activity among Iraqi Kurds.
The Kurdish community In Syria has been assimilated by the local societyreater degree than Kurdish minorities In neighboring counlries, and
a nti govern ment activity by the Syrian Kurds seems unlikely "JJJJJJ
iSSOCOS TRA
Although full-scale conflict between the Kurds in Iran and the revolutionary government does not seem likely in the near term, an attempt by the government to extend its control in the Kurdish region led to serious clashes in late July. Guerrilla activity, especially by Kurds in Iran and Iraq, is likely to continue. Over the longer term, the possibility of more serious conflict between the Kurds and the government! of the states in which they live probably depends on two factors: whether future events so weaken the control of the governments in question as to provHe the Kurds with an opportunity to press for greater self-determination; and whether any of the Kurdish communities is able to obtain substantial outside aid such as lhat provided by Iran to the Kurds in Iraq before
The Soviets would undoubtedly like to use Kurdish dissidence to put pressure on neighboring governments that arc not considered pro-Soviet. They are inhibited from providing large-scale, direct support to such minorities in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, however, by their desire to avoid severe damage to their relations with these states. At the same time, the Soviets may indirectly support the Kurds by condoning third-party transfers of Soviet equipment. As most Kurdish dissident leaders have ties to pro-Soviet Communist parties, such arrangements would be relatively simple. In doing so, they would hope to encourage continued instability in Iran and create problems for the increasingly anti-Soviet Baathist government in Iraq; such action would also serve to remind area states ofthe Soviet capability to create dissension among their minorities.H
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Judgment!
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Ethnic Origin
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of Society
end Social Situation
Rise of Kurdish Nationalism
Kurdlih Problem and Government Policy
Policies and Altitudes 11
Altitudes, Groups, and Leaden
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with Neighboring Kurds
Policies and Attitudes
Organizations aad Leaders
Policies and Altitudes
of Kurdish Separaliim
and Policies Toward Kurds In Neighboring Slates
Toward Kurds In the Soviet Union
Biographies
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ancient limes, the Kurds hove inhabited Ihe mountainous region stretching from southeast Turkey across northern Iraq and into northwestern Iran, with small enclaves In northern Syria and in Ihe Transrnucosus region of/the USSR. The total area, coveringquare kilometers, has neverormal political entity, despite il l- fa led attempts over the years toeparate Kurdish slate. Nevertheless, this area has historically been labeledther small communities of Kurds have emigrated from the Kurdiih heartlandore economically advantageous urban areas or have been relocated by the governmenls of the states in which they live, (u)
Ethnic Orisin
It Is generally thought that ihe Kurds are the descendants of Indo-European tribes that settled in the Kurdish areas perhaps upears ago. The Kurds consider themselves, inaccurately according to some historians, to be the direct descendants of the ancient Medes, conquerors of NinevahC, who were defeated by the Persiansears later. In physical appearance the Kurds vary throughout
Kurdistanesult of mixing with otherroups over the centuries. They are, however, regardedistinct and separate ethnic group, (u)
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Population
Most estimates of the number of Kurds living in the region range5illion inillion inillion inn Syria,n ihe USSR. Estimates by some Kurdish sourcesopulation of aroundillion seem high and may be designed to justify territorial ctrims. Although theremaller number of Kurds living in Iraq than In Turkey and Iran, Ihey account for someercent of Iraq's population, as opposed to approximatelyercent in Turkey and Iran. The Kurds in Syria constituteercent of tht toul population, (u)
Although most Kurds In Turkey Inhabit theus area* in the southeastern part of the country, some1 are found in central Anatolia. In addition, several hundred thousand Turkish Kurds have migrated to Ankara and Istanbul in search of employment, (u) !
Iran, ihe Kurd* are found mainly in ihenorthwestern part of the country, althoughnhabit the mountainous area northwest of Mashad along the Soviet border. Iranian Kurds are also found southwest of Khorramabad. near Shirar. near Birjand in eastern Khorasan Province, and south of /ahadan in Baluchistan va Sistan Province. There are also Kurds living in Tehran and other large cities in the country, although no figures are available,
Most Iraqi Kurds live in the mountainous region of the north, although some are also found along the Tigris River south of Mosul, along the Tigris River southeast of Baghdad, and in Baghdad. There are several large towns in northern Iraq, but only Sulaymaniyah Is predominantly Kurdish. An Iraqi Government Kurdish resettlemenl program initialed5 has forced Ihe re loci lion of thousands of Kurds lo the area south of Baghdad, although most have since been permitted to return north. |
Most Syrian Kurds are located in the northern section of the country along ihe Turkish border and in the northeastern Jaiirah area between Turkey and Iraq.0 Syrian Kurds live in Damascus.
Kurds in taeSoviet Union live in ibe republics of Armenia. Georgia,rbaidzhan.izable Kurdish minority in Ihe Georgian-Turkish border urea, as well as some Georgian Muslimsumber of Armenians living along the Turkish border, was deported loSovicl Central Asia in anticipation ofa Soviet military move against Turkey. J
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The Kurdish languageentral clement of Ihe cultural hcrilagc of the Kurds. Their demand thai Kurdish be adopted as ihe official language in Kurdish-speaking areas has longerious point of contention between Kurdish groups and iheof (he countries in which they reside. In Turkey, the teaching of Kurdish in schools was forbidden, as was the case in Iran before the revolution. Unlike the Turks, however, the Iranians allowed (he printing of Kurdish books and the broadcasting of Kurdish radio programs. Since the Shah's overthrow, the Kurds in Iran have proclaimed Kurdish an official Language, and in towns such as Sanandaj, Mahabad. and Kcrmarwhah. the Kurdish language reportedly is being taughl in schools. Currently in Iraq there is some
indication lhat the Baathist government is considering granting some linguistic autonomy to the Kurds and will permit the expansion of Kurdish-language radio and television broadcasting. As recently as two years ago. however, the government was accelerating its efforts to curtail the teaching of the Kurdish language in elementary and secondary schools In the Kurdish region, as well as doing away with all Kurdish studies in Iraqi universities. The Kurds in ihe USSR are permitted to use Kurdish in schools, radio programs, and newspar.
Kurdish belongs to the Iranian branch ofthe Indo-European family of languages and is related to Farsi, Baluchi, and Pushiu. It has been characterized by one scholarspecial language, the sister of Farsi. and perhaps the more ancient of Iheurdishdivided into two broad classifications of dialects: Kurmanji, spoken throughout the northwesternof Kurdistan, and Kurdl. prevalent in Iheregion. Zaza. spoken by Kurds in central Turkey, fs some limes listedhird major dialect, although it mayeparate language. Many variations of these groupings are spoken by Ihc Kurds and arc known throughout Kurdistan by their IocjI names. In Iraq, for example, the major dialed used In the dominant Kurdish tribal areas and among most Kurdish urban dwellers is Sorani. which is closely related to the Kurdi dialect, (u)
Differences in dialect tend lo offset any unifying influenceommon language might have. Some spoken dialects have diverged to the poini of mutual unintelligibility; to complicate matters even further, in some areas the Kurdish dialects have been so heavily influenced by neighboring languages that in their vocabulary they often more closely resemblerabic, or Farsi. (u)
The most common form of wrilten Kurdish ispublished in Kurdt (orhich is based on Ihcialect. Itodified Arabic script. Some literature in Kurmanji has been publishedcript based on the Roman alphabet. Kurds in the Soviet Unioncript consisting largely of Cyrillic charactersew Roman characters, (u)
Ketigitm
Even though the majority of Kurds arc Sunni Muslims of the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence, religion has actedivisive factor. Many Kurds are drawn to various Dervish orders, and differences over practices and adherence to Sufi mysticism have added to overall tribal divisions. In addition, many tribal leaders combine hereditary religious leadership with their temporal authority, adding lo the intensity ofistinctions. In Iraq and Iran, where some Kurds are
eligious difference* ire further compounded, lnnlnn Kurds En the Kurdish provinces of Kermanshahan and Ham arcll Shlit and identify with fellow non-Kurdiih Shias. Kurds from the more northern Kurdiih region of Iran do not regard the Shim in the south is Kurds at all and frequently refer lo them as Farurds In the USSR have Included Sunnis,nd Yezidisinor. pre-Muilimul these distinctions have become blurred over the yean. There are also small groups of Jewish and Christian Kurds, but their present status is- H
Strut-tart of Society
Tribalism has also acted to promote disunity. Over the centuries, it wis the tribe that received ihe prlmury allegiance of most Kurds, and even Kurds who have been tented for many generations maintain their tribal affiliation. Such fervent tribal loyally, combined with ihe mountain isolation which inhibited intertribal communication, promoted tribal feuding and mutual suspicion, which still exists loday. During the height of the Kurdish uprising In Iraq during the, some tribes fought on the government's side, and others switched back and forth. Some families assured their fortunes either by having one branch stay neutral or by making sure that one group fought on each side ofthe conflict am
In general, the Kurds have refused lo be assimilated under any central governmental authority; they have Instead looked lo their tribal leaders or aghas for support and guidance. The aghas spent most of their time negotiating, or feuding, wiih the government or other iribes, conducting Intertribal business where tribal all in nces existed, and resolving dispules within Ihc tribe. In return for their leadership, the tribes supported theot whom were wealthysharecropping on tribal land or through direct contributions in Ihe form ofn some instances where Ihc tribe had no title to Ihe land it used, other than traditional grazing rights, ihe aghas werecquire legal possession of ihe tribal lands, thereby safeguarding their Incomes and acquiring large lindholdlngs In the process, (u)
Information available on (he role and significance of individual Kurdish Irlbet outside Iraq Is very limited as well at deled. In Iraq, ihcmportant iribes ire Ihe Barzani, Tilabani, and Jaf. Historically the Barzani tribe has been regarded at the most warlike and independeni of all the iribes. Located in northern Iraq around the village of Bar/on near ihc Turkish border, Ihe Barzani)ettled tribe, chiefly Involved in farming. They have long feuded with nomadic tribes thai migrate seasonally across grazing lands regarded by ihc Barztnis as their private lands; in its conflicts with thehe government has often been aided by their tradiikwul tribal enemies, both settled and nomadic. From Ihentil his death Inulla Mutlafa Barrani' was (he undisputed leader of th:
Some members of the Talabani iribc are located in villages northwest of Khsnaqin. while the majority of the tribe lives In the area around Klrkuk. One faction ofthe Talabani tribe, which like the Barzanisettled tribe largely engaged in agriculture, iiof followers of Jalalrincipal opponent of Mulla Mustafa Barzani for leadership of the Kurdish movement. Olher factions of ihe Talabani tnbe arc led by various familyJ
The Jift are believed lo be the largest of all ihc Kurdish tribes. Most Jafs lives in three areas ofKirkuk. and Sulaymaniyah. Untilfrom doing so by the Iranian Government in the, (be Jafs migraled io Iran for summer grazing, and some have remained there. Since Ihe.i have turnedexistence. In the, they were described as neutral in Ihc conflict between the government and the Barzanis.^^
Although the majority of Kurds todayettled agricultural or seminomidk existence, tribal pride and identity continue to be important. Tribal disputes center on tuch topics as grazing rights and marriage
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runners. There are Indications, however, (hit tribal bonds among Kurds areraditional ruling family may retain wmc control ir. settled village communities, but the customary social order is no longer close-knit. Within the urban areas, tribal identity is leu important economically. Although belongingarticular tribe may still have some social significance, many better educated Kurdswith the overall Kurdish cause ratherarticular tribe. Kurdish leftists have accused wealthy Kurdish tribal leaders, alonguent Kurdish merchants and religious men, of perpetuating the expression of the poorer Kurds, (u)
In Iran, the Shah's land reform laws broke up most large estates held by Ihe Kurdish landowning class, destroying much of the Influence of the Iranian tribal chiefs or khans. Kurdish tribesmen In other countries are also breaking with the tradition of financially supporting their leaders. While younger Kurds, as well as those now living along the periphery of traditional Kurdistan, still maintain their sense of ethnic Identity, many are straying from tho old tribal traditions. The effect of these changes, along with the policies of individual governments intended lo incorporate Kurdsentralized authority, has been lo reduce arsi. in some cases, eliminate the political power of many traditional tribal chiertaJM^^H
Economic in if Social Si mm ion
Yean of unrest and resistance to central authority, indifference by the various governments, and ihe mountainous terrain have checked the spread of modem health practices and education among the Kurds. The traditional nomadic way of life led by most Kurds has offered little opportunity for economic Improvement. In recent years, however, somehave come to recognize the need for economic and social improvements In the Kurdish alor no other reason than to improve security. Under the land reform laws0 In Iran, large Kurdish holdings were broken up and lurned over lo the Kurdish peasants who farmed it. Since the end of Ihe
Kurdish revoi: In Iraqhe government has moved some Kurds from iheir isolated mountain homes to "modern model villages" supplied with electricity, running water, schools, and medical clinics. In tbe USSR, life on the collective farms offers the Kurds more security than their former nomadism, but at the expense of their traditional lifestyle.
Although there are still some nomadic pastoral tribes, most Kurds are now settled farmers. Despite the useraditional farming methods and equipment and the difficulty of the terrain, Kurdish agriculture is believed to be fairly productive. Where conditions permit, tobacco is the principal cash crop,l
The illiteracy rate of the Kurds is somewhat above the generally high levels prevailing In the Middle East. Nevertheless, over the last fewmall Kurdish intelligentsia has developed among (heand professional class of Kurdish society. It was this almost exclusively urban group thai provi<ied (he impetus for the nationalist aspirations of (he Mahabadnd has played en Increasing role in national movements since then. Graduates ofin (he Middle East. Western Europe, and North America, Ihe educated Kurds tend lo leave (he Kurdish areas to seek employment in urban centers or even oulside the country. In the USSR, some educated urban Kurds are involved In the media, (caching, and, at times, local government, (u)
Tbt Rbe of Kurdish Ni tioMlbm
The early history of the Kurds records little evidence of Kurdish unity or national cohesion, althoughKurdish principalities flourishedew areas. Located between the rival Turkish and Persianindividual tribes aligned (hemselves with one side or thr other and often fought each other. In the
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Kurdish womrn in tribal dms.
17th century, the Turkish-Persian frontiers were finally stabilized, with three quarters of the Kurds falling under Ottoman rule and the remainder under theynasty of Persia. The few attempts to penetrate or pacify the Kurdish area, however, were unsuccessful.eries of Insurrections In theh century, there was no sign that the tribes were becoming one nation. The first Indication of Kurdish political nationalism was the revolt led by Ubaydallahof Shamlnan In the laaOs which was aimed at uniting the Kurdish peoples of the Turkish and Persian empires into one state, but this failed when both empires cooperated to eliminate the common threat, (u)
In the years immediately before World War I, Kurdish intellectuals established secret nationalist societies but modern Kurdish nationalism did not take shape until the end of the war. The promise of *elf-dctermination held out following the defeat of Turkey raised the hopes of the non-Turkish peoples of the Ottoman Empire, Including the Kurds, lhat they would be able to control their own destiny. The Treaty of Sevres signed by Turkey and the allied powers in0 acknowledged the existenceistinct Kurdish community and called for provisional recognition of an independent Kurdistan made up of territory lhat today composes part of southeastern Turkey, (u)
Tito Treaty of Sevres was never ratified, however, and in3 It was replaced by Ihe Treaty of Lausanne, which ignored the Kurdish minority. "SouthernOttoman province of Mosul, which was under British control when the warmade part of the newly created state ofwas placed under British mandate. The remainder of Kurdistan fell under the control of Turkey and Iran, with small areas in Syria and the Soviet Union, (o)
In the years immediately before World War I, Kurdish intellectuals established secret nationalist societies but modern Kurdish nationalism did not take shape until the end of the war. The promise of self-determination held out following the defeat of Turkey raised the hopes of ihe non-Turkish peoples of the Ottoman Empire, including (he Kurds, that they would be able to control their own destiny. The Treaty of Sevres signed by Turkey and the allied powers in0 acknowledged the existenceistinct Kurdish community and called for provisional recognition ofan Independent Kurdistan made upof territory that today composes port of southeastern Turkey, (u)
The Kurds in Iran fared little better between (he wars. The government of Rcza Khan, later Shah Pahlavi.ew national unity by defeating tribe after tribe by force of arms or intrigue. He placed influential Kurdish leaden In enforced residence In Tehran or elsewhere. Revolts,0 led by Agha Ismail, known as Simko, of the Shikak tribe, were suppressed. Efforts were made by the Iranian Government to Impose the Pcnian language on the Kurds and to replace traditional Kurdish dress with Wesiernevolt1 by Sheikh Tafar of the Hamadan tribe wai put down hanhly, after which the government declared with some truth thai "it had no Kurdishu)
Inevolt by Sheikh Mahmud in ihe Sulaymaniyah area9 was put down by Ihe British. Another revolt3 by Sheikh Mahmud, who proclaimed himself the King of Southern Kurdistan, waa again suppressed, but II secured for the Kurds (he right to teach Kurdish In thelghi incorporated in the terms of3 League of Nations mandate lo the Uniied Kingdom. Although British foreign policy was not actively hostile to Kurdish desires for autonomy, the discovery of oil in southern Iran and ihe possibility that oil was also present in northern Iraq worked against Britishfor an independent Kurdistan. The discovery of oil7 near Klrkukoncession held by US and European oil interests acted to limit Western sympathy for the Kurdish Independence movement, (u)
2 Iraq, which had become independentnacted constitutional safeguards for the Kurdish population In order to satisfy requirements forIn the League of Nations. In Ihe same year, however, efforts by the government to establish firmer control over the northern regionevolt led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani. Aintrikes by the British, whoilitary presence In Iraq after Independence, forced Mullah Mustafa and his support-en to withdraw into Turkey. The Barzani) again revolted3 and were not subdued5 when Mullah Mustafa fled lo Iran, (u)
The Soviet-BrilIsh occupation of Iran in1 provided the Kurds with the opportunity lo form the only independent Kurdish state in modern times. The
Soviet zone of occupation included most of ihe Kurdish region of Iran; for over four yean, the Kurds and Ihcoth of whom revolled against the Iranian central government at Ihe time of theeffectively ruled themselves. Inoth national groups proclaimed independentIhe Democralic Republic of (Iranian) Aztrboijan and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. The president ofthe Kurdish republic was Qazl Mohammad, who had headed the committee that had ruled Ihe district since1 uprising. Only the presence of Soviel troops prevented Ihe Iranians from reasserting their control over tho district; when the Soviets, reluctanlly adhering to Ihe termsreaty concluded with Iran, withdrew Inhe two republics collapsed. Qazi Mohammadumber of other leaders of Ihe Kurdish republic were executed. Mullah Mustafa Barzani. who had taken command of the armed forces of Ihe republic, fled lo Iraq and shortly thereafter lo the Soviet Union, where he remained forean, (u)
The decade following ihe collapse of ihc Mahabad Republic was relatively peaceful as the governments of Iran and Turkey moved lo disarm and subdue their Kurdish populations. This period of tranquility was followed0 by another uprising in Turkey, where the Kurds took advantage of political instability accompanying theoverlhrow of the government by ihe Turkish armed forces to demonstrate forcibly against repressive government policies; the army, however, moved lo crush the rebels, (u)
In Iraq, government refusal to meet Kurdish demandsonflict that was to last with occasional cease-fires forean. The return of Mullah Musiafa lo Iraq from the Soviet Union shortly after Abd-al-Karim Qasim look power In8truggle between Ihc Barzani) and other Kurdish tribes. Although Mullah Musiafa extended hit hegemony over much of the Kurdish population, Qasim, fearful that the Barzanis were becoming too powerful, began lo aid traditional enemies of Mullah Mustafa. Hostilities began wiih government bombing of the traditional stronghold of Barzan in1 in retaliation for an attack on army forcesribe allied wiih the Barzanis. (u)
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Mullah Mustafa's return to Iraq also marked the beginninguccessful effort on his part to control the Kurdistan Democratic Partyhe principal political organization of tbe Kurdish movement. Founded6 in Iran from the remnants of prewar Kurdish political organizations, the party revealed in its program as well asolitburoentralCommunis! influence. Despite the Soviet sponsorship of the party, however, control of the party has largely remained in the hands of leaders devoted more lo Kurdishthan social revolution, (u)
ullah Mustafa expelled membersro-Communisi faction from the party and moved the orientation of the party to the right. The party remained, however, essentially an urban-basedwith Its greatest appeal among educated, detribalized Kurds.ore militant party leaders, including Jalal Talabani and pony secretary Ibrahim Ahmad, attempted to depose Barrani as he-id ofthe party, but were forced by Barzani's tribal supporters to flee to Iran. In later years, the Iraqi Government reportedly subsidized ihe Talabaniia an effort to weaken Barzani. (u)
1he governmentumber of offensives against the Kurds, but none were successful in suppressing the Barzani-led forces, in large part because of Irani willingness to aid the Kurds and to allow its territory to be used for their supply and support. Despite Iran's experience with its own Kurdish minority, the Shah perceived support for the Kurds in Iraqeans ofro-Soviet socialist neighbor. Both the Kurds and the Iraqi military, which at limes had as much asercent of its forces deployed against the rebels, sulTered heavy losses. The military wing of the kdf, the Pesh Merga, meaning "those who faceonstituted the principal Kurdish fighting force.
, conscious that the strains caused by the war In the north had broughteries of regimes. Ihe Boalh government under Saddam Husayneace agreement with Mullah Mustafa. The provisions of the accord between the Kurds and Ihe central government granted Barzani and the kdf greater concessions than they had ever received. It recognized the binalional character ofeffect establishing
the Kurds as free and equal partners with theKurdish linguistic and cultural rights, and provided for economic rehabilitation and development of the devastated regions of Kurdistan. Most important, tbe accord provided forelf-governing region of Kurdistan. An official census was to determine those areas in which the Kurdsajority, (u)
In the subsequent four years during which the accord was io be carried out, the two sides were unable to agree on ill implementation. Disagreement over the disposition of oil-rich Kirkuk Province prevented agreement on tbe territorial limits of if: proposed autonomous region. The Kurds accused Iheof attempting to Arabize the Kurdish area by settling Arab tribes there and granting cultural rights to olhrr minorities in order to undermine the Kurdish position in Kirkuk. Several attempts io assassinate Barzani and his sons con firmed .he Kurdish belief that ihe government did not intend to honor the accord, (u)
An autonomy law unilaterally promulgated by the government inhich in effect would have restored the control of the central government over Ihc Kurdish areas, was rejected by the Kurdsiolation of0 accord. Fighting broke out the same month and lasted until the following year. Byowever, as Iranian military units became increasi igly involved in border incidents with Iraqi troops, the Shah's perception of the advantages of continued support for ihe Iraqi Kurds clearly began tochangc. It is doubtful if Ihe Iranian leader reallylear-cut Kurdish victory. His main goal was to keep the Iraqis so preoccupied thai they would be unable to interfere with his policies in the Persian Gulf. He apparently came iourdish victoryreater threat to Iranian unity and security than an Iraqi Government victory, (u)
Consequently, in5 in the Algiers Accord. Iraq and Iran agreed io Ihe demarcation of territorial and maritime borders and "ihe establishment of mutual security and confidence along their joint bordersinal end loall subversive infiltration from eithern Ihe agreements following the Algiers Accord, Iraq made several concesiioni. both
territorial and political, to Iran, Iraq had longArab and Baluchi resistance lo the Shah and had laid claim to the Khur.lstan Province In Iran as part of the Arab homeland. The Baathuu governmentall claims to Khuzistan and agreedoundary along the center of the Shalt al-Arab. Ii also acceded to other territorial border arrangements long sought by Iran. Iran, In lurn, stopped aiding the Kurds. In return for Its concessions, Iraq was able to reach an agreement with Iran ending the Kurdish revolt and the threat of foreign Intervention, (u)
Since the end of the fighting inraqi military vigilancerogram of economicto the Kurdish minority have kept the level of anti governctivitiesinimum, although some incidents and attempts to assassinate Kurds who have cooperated with the government have occurred.0urds fled to Iran after the Kurdish front collapsed, but by the endhe majority of the refugees had taken advantage of an amnesty to return to Iraq. Although Barzani left Iraq for exile In the United States, where he died Inis sons Idris and Masud have sought to assume leadership of the kdp.
Attempts by Kurdish nationalists In Iran to take advantage of the fall of the Shah in9 resultedumber of clashes with government forces, with some areas In Iranian Kurdistan remaining under effective Kurdish control. At the same time, the revival of Kurdish dissident activities in Iran has contributed to an Increase in Kurdish nationalist sentiment and activities in Turkey. Some escalation of dissident activity was evident In Iraq's Kurdish provinces inith amall clashes occurring frequently between Iraqi army patrols and Kurdish guerrillas, but there was no major Increase in fighting.
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The Kurdish Problem and Gownolicy
The area traditionally known as Kurdistan includes territory in five slates: Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, end the USSR. An examination of the policies of these countries toward their Kurdish minorities and tho Kurds throughout the area follows, (u)
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From thentilhe Shah's overnmenl wu able to keep the Kurds in Iran relatively quiet byarge-scale military presence in the Kurdish area, selectively arming Kurds loyal to the government, exiling tribal leodersof antigovernment activities, and increasing economic development and educational programs in ihe Kurdish area. Kurds who advocated Iranian nationalism as opposed to Kurdish rights were among the most prominent supporters of Prime Minister Mossadeq in the; under the Shah, an increasing number of Kurds came to see their future linked to that of Iran, (u)
The more thanurdish tribes and confederations in Irantrong and continuing tradition of disunity and fighting among themselves, and there is no single leader toajority of the tribes give allegiance. Land reform, which tends to weaken the authority of tribal leaders, has been applied more rapidly and effectively In the northwest than in any other area of Iran, although some tribal leaders thought to be loyalhe government have been allowed to retain large holdings. In addition, the movement of many younger, better educated, and more ambitious Kurds to the cities has reduced the number of potential leaders and linked the welfarerowing number of families to Iran proper, (u)
Kurdishent activity In the year before the collapse of the Shai-'s regime was probably motivated largely by the same sentiments that stimulatedof the government thioughout the country, although resentment over anti-Kurdish actions by the government may have strengthened those feelings. Many Kurds, Including some who felt little sympathy for the Kurdish revolt against the Iraqi Government,
ense of betrayal over IheS agrccmeni with Baghdad ending support for the Iraqi Kurds. This resentment was heightened by the "pacificationsubsequently undertaken by the Army against the Kurds along thean border. Stronglyincreased autonomy and possessing established guerrilla groups, the Kurds were able to takeof the weakening central control more quickly than other ethnic gruupv f
Goiemmenl Policies and Attitudes. When PrimeMchdi Bazargan look office ine foundoose federation of well-armed Kurdish tribal, religious, and political leaders, backed by guerrilla forces and armyad assumed control in much of the area of Ihe northwest where Kurds predominate. Tensions quickly rose, and several violent incidents occurred as Kurdish factional leaders, government representatives, and local pro-Khomeini leaders maneuvered for position, (f)
Government and religious officials appeared to throw their supportrominent citizen of Sanandaj. Ahmad Moflizadeh, naming him in April the Kurd's "sole religious and politicalhey alsoexpected that Shia Kurdish religious and political leaders could take charge in their own localities, but several of tbe Shia dignitaries reportedly fled the area after clashes with dissident Sunni Kui
The government, fearing an open rebellion by Kurdish dissidents heavily armed with captured militarysent delegations to persuade the Kurds toompromise. Although their promises that the area would be granted substantial autonomy in the new Islamic republic helped to calm the situation, tension remained high. Relatively minor incidents sparked five days of bloody fighting between government troops and Kurdish irregulars in March at Sanandaj and clashes between Kurds and Khomeini supporters at Naqadeh in West Azerbaijan Province In late April. Inhomeini supporters and security forces were still contending with Kurdish leaders for control of the local governments and population in the area. The Kurdish Democratic Partyn particular, seemed to be aggressively trying to expand itsand membership sometimes byorder to establish its preeminence in as much of the Kurdish area as possible. |
The Bazargan government's policy toward the Kurds reflects Tehran's limited ability to project itsThe government seems to be playing for time with its offers lo negotiate and assertions that the new constitution and new laws will provide substantial autonomy. Official spokesmen have stated several times, moreover, that instruction in the Kurdish language and customs will be allowed in the schools and that Ihe use of Kurdish in radio, television, and ihe press will also be permitted. The draft constitution, published on IS June, provides for local councils to govern "each village, district, town, city, or province."
Political and religious leaders fear that the Kurdish autonomy movement encourages other Iranianto agitate for equal treatment that could cause the breakup of the slate, and they have tried to limit the stop's growth by hindering its expansion into areas of mixed population, trying to deny full political status to its leadership, and apparently arming anti-KDf or neutral inhabitants of Kurdish areai.l
Kurdish demands, made publically on include:
Control of an area determined by "historic,and geographic" considerations and decidedeferendum. This would include Kordcstan Province and large parts of neighboring provinces.
A popularly elected Kurdish regional parliament and local control of all government, law enforcement, and mililary units.
Use of Kurdish in Ihe schools and as the autonomous area's official language.
freedom of speech, press, association, travel, employment, and unionization.
In in intervieweeting with Khomeini in mid* May, Kurdish Sunni leader Sheikh Ez-cd-Dineemed to reduce Kurdish demands for control of cultural activity and local economic affairs, official use of Kurdish, and freedom to choose their own -politicale specifically renounced the demand for control of the armed forces in thepoint the government could not have conceded. It is not known if the press account of his remarks was accurate or if other Kurdish leaders would accept bis modified position; all seem to agree, however, lhat foreign affairs, national defense, finance, and major economicis. economic grants for development inbe under central government
Sheikh Ex-ed-Din Hoseini. the principal Sunni cleric in Mahabad, the capital of the short-lived Kurdish republic, appears to be the most popular andKurdish religious figure. He has led several efforts to negotiate with the principal religious and political leaders of Ihe revolutionary government, although he is deeply suspicious of Khomeini and his intentions. Inoseini and other Kurdish clerics met with Khomeini, whom Hoseini described as notto Kurdish autonomy, and with Ayatollah Talegani. whoettlement betweenKurds and pro-Khomeini forces earlier this year,
As ofuidish leaders and their followers were actively protesting ihe tesi of the newand the process by which it would be apprjved. Theotherthat the constitutional provisions for regional autonomy and respect for Sunni Muslims are too weak. Hoseini has said the Constitution's provisions for minorities are "old concepts with new names" and that in specifico-tion lhat Shia Islam is the stale religion is "certain to provoke sectarianhmad Moflizadch. the government's designated Kurdish leader, has also criticized the text of the draft Constitution and has called for the elimination of its reference loShia Islam as the state religion. Moftizadeh and Hoscini haveoint protest calling for an Islamic republic without reference to sects and for minorityon the council lhat will review theconsiitutionaliiy of atl new laws.
Weapons captured by security forces In Iraq, Iran, and Turkey have shown thathriving arms trade among the Kurds across the three borders. Kurdish dissidents recognize that they will be strengthened If they canecure base area, andertain extent the Iranian borderow servingunction for activity In both Iraq and Turkey aa well as Iran.*]
Relations between the Kurds of Iraq and the Arab-controlled central government in Baghdad have been shaped by yean of conflict andeep-seated Kurdish distrust of Baathbt schemes for Arab unity, which they regard as detrimental to their ownAlthough the Kurds have taken advantage of periodi of weakened central authority and promises of outside assistance to stage several revolts against the' government, for the most part they hove notndependence from Iraqi rather ihey have fought for equal rights with ihe Arabs and self-roteingle Iraqi state. When Kurdish Nines for autonomy and equality were quashed by Oasim following8 revolution, they beginean of Intermittent revolt. Failure to end that conflict contributed to the fall of three Iraqi governments In, (u)
! !f
Kurdish ambitions came closeal to fulfillment0 when the Baathbt government under Saddam Husayn signed an accord with Mullah Mustafa Barzani recognizing the national rights of ihe Ku-dish people and granting them regional autonomy. Kurdish was to be the official language in the Kurdish autonomous region, and Kurdish educational institutions,niversity at Sulaymaniyah, were to be established. Kurds were to be appointed to posis in the military,olice, and the univenllies in proportion to their number in the general population. The kiip was officially recognized, and the Baathist government promised tourd vice president of the republic. Barzani was permitted lo retain hb heavy arms, while Ihe government promised to pay hb Pesh Merga troops, who hadhe rebellion, toadrontier force. PJSSJ
The Baathist government, in power only two yeann need of internal security and stability, had made major concessions to Kurdish aspirations. Barrani gained control of more territory than he had everurdish newspaper and radio station beganion. and the Pesh Merga remained armed and intact. Over the next four yean, however, relations between the central government and Mullah Mustafaas Iheis consolidated their control of the government and as the Kurds esca la led their demands for territory ind oil reve iucs(
Ptlh Mtrm trotyl surrrnderifii
lo Iraal Army In April.
renewil of fightint In4 was probably inevitable. The government wai unwilling to grant the Kurds economic and political privileges that it denied the rest ofopulation. Of particular importance wai the government's refusal toensus In Kirkuk to determine the ethnic makeup of ihe city. The autonomy plan put forth by the Baathiit government in4 granted nominal telf-rule to the three provinces where the Kurdsajority, but in reality gave the Kurdsemblance of self-rule. The members of the executive and legislative councils established by the autonomy law were chosen by the government. The progovcrnment Kurds who were appointed as Cabinet members and as vice president were careful not to test the extent of their authority. Inyear rebellion of the Iraqi Kurds agaimt the government was effectively ended by the Algiers Accord between Iraq and Iran, whichthe ability of the Kurds lo resin government efforts to pacify the Kurdish area.ataaajjaaajajaajj
Goicrnmrnt Policies andhe Baathlsis are determined to deny the Kurdi Ihe opportunity to regain the capacity for independent action. Ai ofhe governmentignificantpresence in the north, while at the same time il was allocating large sums for the economic and social development of the region.
Baghdad keens five of itsrmy divisions in the norlhern provinces, as well0 police, border guard, and reserve brigade personnel. Military control
in the traditionally Kuidiih region is thorough and sometimes oppressive, especially in areas near the Turkish and Iranian borders. The Armyighly visible presence with armed camps and outposts on the hilltops and soldiers in thekilomclcr security zone has been created along the border with Iran and Turkey in which the regime has destroyed villages and forcibly relocated largeof villagers tosensitive areas in the north. In areas away from the border regions and outside the difficult mountain terrain, Ihe Iraqi military presence is more discreet, and village life appears to be normal.
Iraq became increasingly concerned in the spring9 about the possible resurgence of dissident activity following reports of Kurdish unrest in Iran and Turkey. Throughraq and Iran had conducted Joint military operations aimed ntof the border. Baghdad's concern aboul ihc increased availability of arms in the area, ihc lack of border controls in Iran, and "hot pursuit" of Kurdish lnsui.,cnls led to ihe overflight of Iron's border and bombi.ig of Iranian villages In June
Housing built by Irani Go'ttnmrnt at Sulaymaniyah /or rtlocatrd Kurds.
governmenl has tempered in threats to use military force and other repressive tactics with offers of amnesty and promises of generous economic and agrarian reform. Inn an act clearly aimed at the Kurds, the government announced an amnesty for all political ciiles living abroad. In9 an unknown number of Kurds who had fled to Iran5 were allowed to return. Most of the Kurds resettled in the south after the end of the civil war have been permitted to return north, although not to their traditional villages. Instead, they are being "encouraged" to settle in small groups in newly constructed reservations scattered throughout the north. Families of missing Pesh Merga fighters or suspected saboteurs apparently remain in enforced exile cither in the south of Iraq or in Iran.|
The government also isassive economic investment in the north.rip by Saddam Husayn to Sulaymaniyah and Irbil in late March, the government announced thatercent of9 developmentmoree spent on programs in the three Kurdishe largest shore of the money.ercent, will be allocated for the improvement of transportation and communications, necessary for mililary operations as well as civilian use. Education received the smallest allocation,ercent. Baghdad also has been
promoting tourism in the region and building extensive resort facilities, hoping eventually to tic Kurdish economic interests to tourism and continued stability.
Baghdad has tried over the nasi several years to contact representatives of the Barzani and Tolobani factions in order toeconciliation. The Kurdish terms, however, are unacceptable to the government. These usually include demands for an expanded autonomous area to include Kirkuk and its oilfields: the withdrawal of government forces from the autonomous region and the assumption of security functions by the Pesh Merga; and thef all present govern ment-appointed Kurdish members of the executive and legislative councils, to be replaced by elected representatives.
Kurdish nationalists were concerned last year by the government's decision thatercent of all instruction in Kurdish schools, excluding language training, be given in Arabic. Although Baghdad argued that the purpose of the reform was toalanced educational program. Kurdish nationalists siw the moveurther at tempi by Baghdad to Arabize ihe Kurdish homeland.|
"Sktci
wmc escalation of guerrilla activity wn* evident in9 and small dishes were occurring almost daily inetween Iraqi Army patrols and Kurdish guerrillas, there was no major upsurge of dissident activity. Continued guerrilla activity,has exacerbated government fears of outside meddling. Kurdish guerrillas mount hit-and-runagainst isolated Army units, but fighting between the various Kurdish factions, difTicun maintaining supply routes, andovernment military pressure have weakened their ability to strike effectively at government forces. The freedom of action the Kurds have acquired in Iran and their access to large stocks of weapons seized from Iranian Army garrisons could pose problems for Baghdad in the future!
Kurdhh Orgaalzaltow aad Laden. As ofhe Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq was inleaden in exile, its factions badly split. Its organizations virtually nonexistent. Attempts by rival leaden to patch over their differences andommon front against the Iraqi Government have failed. Instead, factions loyal to the Barzani family and those loyal to Jtlal Talabani continue to accuse each other of signing secret agrecmcnli with Baghdad or Tehran aimed at Ihe liquidation of the ot hcr.^
F.vcnix in Iron and the death of Mullah Mustafa Barzani apparently have done little loela lions between tbe disparate Kurdish factionsd been discredited to some extent by ihc loss of ihe civil war and by revelations of aid from US, Israeli, and Innian intelligence services. In exile in the United Statese had only minimal contact with his former Pesh Mcrga Tighten and the kdp. Before his deatharzani apparently recognized thai the Kurds had few options and wis considering casing his demands.
Several contenders are vying to replace Barzani. His sons Masud and Idris claim leadcnhipofwhat remains of the kdp and of the exile communities in Iran and urope. Masud, the youngest son of Mullah Mustafa,ember of the kdp's provisional leadership and at one time rcportcd'v favored coming to terms with the Iraqi Govern menasud appears to be the military commander of the Barzani faction, travelingbetween Syria, Iraq and Iran, while Idris acts as the political negotiator in Tehran. Both Barzanis rely on traditional tribal lies at their base of support.
^Secrft^
second major challenger Tor leadership of the Iraqi Kurds Is Jala) Talabuni.ember or (he kdpongtime rival of Mullah Mustafa. Talabani was based in Damascus until the Iraqi-Syriantalks began and over the years has received Syrian. Libyan, and allegedly Soviet aid Tor hi< forays Into Iraq. The differences between the Barzani* andycar-old Talabani arc more tactical than ideological. Talabani has the image of being leftwing in comparison to the Barzanis' current pro-Western identification, but these labels are not very meaningful in the Kurdish context- Talabani. who advocates the use of terrorism, maintains contact with Polestinian rcjcctlonist leader George Habbash and was probably responsible for the abduction of French and Polish workers in northern Iraq innd the assasstna'ion of pro-Baghdad Kurdish ofHc'ais1 alabani's followers may also have attempted to assassinate Iraqi Interior Minister and Revolutionary Command Council member Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri in Sulaymaniyah in early
Talabani and the Barzanis have made several attempts at unifying their forces to fight the common Iraqi enemy, but these efforts have all failed. In7 Talabani and Masud Barzani signed an agreement pledging to join forces. Orchestrated by ihe Syrians and entered into reluctantly by Ihe Bamnis, ihe agreement was never implemented. The Barzanis objected in particular to Talabani's penchant for urban terrorism. Within sixhe two factions were fighting each other again pjaj
A third contender for ihe leadership of the IraqiMahmud Abd el-Rahemerged in the past several mo.iths and appears to beid for leadership of Kurdish dissidents. Known as Sami, Abd al-Rahmanember of the Iraqi Communist Party inut became an influential member oflhe kdp in. He apparently was trusted by Mullah Mustafa and represented him in negotiations both with the Iraqi government and with Talabani. Abd al-Rahman was one of the five pro-Barzani Kurds appointed to the Iraqi Cabinet following0 armistice, and served as Minister for Northern Affairs until fighting broke out againe is described as the head of the Provisionalmall group of former kdp loyalists]^
Turkey
In the early days of the Turkish Republic, Ihe government responded to Kurdish protests againstodernizing and centralizing reforms by ruthlessly suppressingti govern ment activity and by attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to eliminate allions of Kurdish culture and nationalism. With the adventultiparty democracy in the, however, the governmentolicy of attempting to co-opt the Kurdish minority. Since then, Kurdish leaders, particularly the wealthy landlords and religious leaders, have been recruited into the ruling eliic. Ferit Mclcn. an interim prime minister in ihe; Deputy Prime Minister Hikmctne of Eccvit'% close advisers; andntil recently Ihe number two man in the opposition Justice Parly, are Kurds. As ofhe legislature included abouturdish deputies, ted by indcpcndenl Minister of Public Works Serafcitin Elci; this group generally supports Prime Minister Bulcni Eccvit.
The resurgence of Kurdish separatist sentiment in Iran and persistent Kurdish unrest in Iraq have helped to revive fears among Turkey's leaders that Turkish Kurds may follow suit. Even limited Kurdish unresi while the country is beset by deepening economic and internal security crises, mightest for the Eccvit government and for Turkey's democratic institutions.
'Setet biofriphlc ippcmli*.
Ankara's efforts to assure the loyalty of individual Kurds have not been matched by any comparable development effort in the Kurdish region. Although data are sketchy, one Turkish publication claims that the eastern provinces have received onlyercent of state industrial investment andercent of all commercial investments. Public services such asand education facilities are thinly spread among the larger cities. Unemployment is above the national average ofercent, illiteracy in Turkish among Kurds Isercent, and such amenities as electricity, piped water, and passable roads are lacking in more thanthe villages. Although this neglect can be explained in large port by the remote and inhospitable nature of the Kurd'sh region, it is also attributable to the continued hostility between Turks and Kurds. Educated Turks are reluctant to live and work in such "alien" rural areas. The most conspicuous symbol or the Turkish Government, the Army, has at times been viewed by the Kurdscolonial" occupation force.
The taboo against public and official discussion of the sensitive Kurdish issue has dissipated in the past few years. Newspapers, perhaps spurred by events in Iran, have been less hesitant to acknowledge that Kurds exist and to discuss their living conditions. At the height of public concern about Kurdish separatism last April, six ministers look the unprecedented step of accusing Minister of Public Works Seran Eki of having Communist sympathies and stacking hiswith Kurds. Elciublic controversy when he openly declaredurdeated exchangeeporter. Responding to pressElci insisted that acknowledging the existence of Kurds in Turkey was not tantamount to promoting separatism.
Persistence of Kurdish Separatism. The Kurds' sense of separate identity has not been significantly reduced by the government's attempts to co-opt ors them. The Kurdish language has flourished, and clandestinely published Kurdish literature isobtainable in Kurdish areas. Kurdish leaders, fearing that development and modcrnizalion would undermine the highly traditional social structure and thereby their own positions, have often been unrcccptive to Ankara's efforts to extend aid to Ihe Kurdish regions. Kurdish notables reportedly often deliver the votes of their followers to politicians in reiurn for pledges of noninterference in local affairs. Urbanization is laking place, however, and it has somewhat weakened to some extent the hold of traditional leaders. Nationalist Kurdish sentiment now seems strongest among politicized urban Kurdish youth, many of whom are educated.
In the post several years, several overtformed
to promote trie :ucu uiuiusium" andThe appearance of these groups broadly parallels the growth of Turkish radical leftist student groups that appeared in the. These radicals often included demands for greater Kurdish autonomy in their programs, and until the Kurds began to form their own associations, Kurds were prominent in these
Mahir Cayan. the meat prominent martyr of the Turkish left after he was killed by government forcesurd. Because avowedly Kurdish organizations are still illegal, the overt radical groups feature noneihnic names such as the Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Association and the Revolutionary Peoples LiberationThey insist thai they art interested mainly in social progress and Turkishrecognition of long-denied Kurdish cultural rights?
The driving forces for Kurdish nationalism, however, sufTer from the same factionalism that has weakened their Turkish counterparts. The cultural associations have small memberships.!
probably resultseneration and cultural gap between youthful, educated Kurds and the more conservative and tradition-bound majority led by ccopted elites. The activist groups themselves,have long quarreled over whether to remain separate from other Turkish radical groups and seek independence or to cooperate with the TurkishIn its "battle against capitalism"eans of ultimately achieving Kurdish autonomyurkish state.l
.urns in turkey nave snownlittle inclination to collaborate politically with their Kurdish neighbors in Iran and Iraq. Tribal loyalties appear to be more important than ethnic lies. The warring Talabani and Barzani factions In Iraq, for example, have been aided by some Turkish Kurds and opposed by others during their skirmishes in Turkish border areas. Language differences may partly explain this lack of cooperation. Althovgh approximately half of all Kurds speak the Kurmanji dialect, in Turkey only the Kurds of Hakkari Province speak tins dialect.
Syria
Relations between ihe Syrian Government and Ihe Kurdish minority have not been marked by the hostility and conflict that have characterized relations between the Kurds and the Govern men is of Iraq and Iran. Since Syria was granted its independence by Francehere has been little significant antigovernmeni activity involving the Kurds.Syrian authorities have feared lhat unrest among Kurds elsewhere could spread to Syria. During times of major Kurdish unrest in Iraq, for example.has kept close watch on its own Kurds. Moreover, from time to time, Kurdish nationalist leaders have been arrested in government moves against theThe government's sensitivity to Kurdish involvement in Communist activities is not altogether unfounded since the founder and leader of the pro-Soviet, legal Syrian Communis! Parly (scr) Khalid Bakdash.urd, and the scr has long recruited heavily from tbe Kurdish minority, (u)
In recent years, the Kurdish minority has participated relatively actively in Syrian politics. Some of Syria'sdistinguished leaden have been Kurds, including two past Presidents, Husni al-Za'im and Abid al-Shishakti. Under President Assad, himself aof the Alawite minority, the status of most minority groups in Syria generally has been quite good, (u)
Most Syrian Kurdsarc distrustful of central authority, and their loyally lo their tribe is probably stronger than their loyalty either to ihe Syrian stale orurdish nation. Relatively peaceful residence in Syria and gradual assimilation, however, have mitigated their distrust of the Syrian authorities. Damascus, moreover, has encouraged Arab settlement in the northeast lo weaken the Kurdish hold on ihc area. In the last two yean, however, there has been ainflux of Kurds into northern Syria from Iraq. These Kurds are less assimilated than those long resident in Syria. |
-sunt.
erenrcr.d
local Kurdish parties or any prominent Kurdish political leaders who espouse Kurdish nationalism In Syria.
ussr
Attitudes aad Policies Toward Karat in Neighbori nB Starts. The possibility of Soviet manipulalion of their Kurdish minorities hasatter of serious concern for Ihe Governments of Iran. Turkey, and Iraq. The Soviets would certainly like to make use of the Kurds in neighboring nates to advance their own objectives in theto put pressure on regimes that have adopted anti-Soviet positions. Soviet inclinations to directly support Kurdish minorities in other countries, however, arc inhibitedesire not to push these stales loo far and thus risk serious damage to bilateral relations. Funneling assistance Indirectly lo Kurdish minorities through third parties, however,empting and very real option for the Soviets.l
In Iran, the Soviets have sought to advance their relations with the Khomeini-backed regime in order to preserve their economic assets there, encourage continuation of the government's anti-US policies, and prevent repression of leftist elements within the country, especially those that are pro-Soviet. At the same time, they would likencourage the emergence
ore pro-Sovlel regime. At portona-tcrm effort to undermine the government and promote leftist prospects, ihey have supported the Tudeh Parly's efforts lonited front of all leftist parties and to infiltrate Khomeinis forces. It Is worth noting in this regard that kdp Secretary General Qescm'u has longstanding lies lo the Tudeh PartHeuieh activist during the Mosadeq era and remained active In party affairs while In
Because they hope toore pro-Sovietemerge in Iran If the current regime is unable to control the situation, the Soviets have an interest in preventing the regime from stabilizing the country. For ihis reason, the disruptive activities of Iranian minorities, including the Kurds, complement Soviet interests.
Before the fall of the Shah, there had been little indication of Soviet involvement with ihe Kurdish movement within Iran in recentreflecting the Soviet perception lhat the government's control of the Kurds was virtually complete and that efforts to meddle would antagonize the Shah. Wilh the upsurge in activity among Iran's Kurds in recent months, facilitated by the breakdown in Iranian
trol of moven Ihe border areas, ihe Soviets have probably been tempted toore active role, (u)
Through their clandestine radio in Baku, the National Voice of Iran, the Soviets have expressed their support for Kurdish demands for autonomy within theof the Iranian nation.1
' The Soviets mikeeleir distinctionthe "lej Itlmstof mlr>oritj- iroupi for local luionamy Ifld whit they term "ImwrlsliM-bicked icpsrstlM" deltahis reflect, their own claims tc-hiva grantee! inch itiionomy to many oT theirtll asdesire not to provide anyhese irour" to mike separatist claims.
'ever, thatecorne directly involved in any large-idle lupportive efforts, given the efTectof such activities would have on relations with ihe central government At the same time, they would probably condone the Tunneling of Soviet arms lo the Kurds by third parties;olicy would enable them both to deny involvement and to indirectly sustain destabilizing activities within Iran.
In Iraq, Soviet support for the Kurdish cause has fluctuated over the years in inverse relation to Soviet success in courting the central government inDuring the. Moscow vigorously supported Kurdish autonomy In Iraq, And. in ihe, the Soviets iricd to mediate between the Kurds and the Baathist regime with which they were building close ties. With the collapse of negotiations between the Kurds and the Baathbt regime4 and the renewal of fighting, the Soviets gave their fullto Baghdad. This decision was madeime when the USSR saw its overall position in the Middle East deteriorating: Egypt had turned to the United Slates, and olher Arab stales (including Iraq) wereoriented economically toward the Wcsl. The Soviets, clearly aniious not to lose Iraq's friendship and eager to sell arms for hard currency, presumably had little difficulty making the choice, (u)
Since the Algiers Accord ofhich effectively ended the Kurdish war in Iraq. Soviet-Iraqi relations have deteriorated steadily.
The Soviet Kurdi enjoy the utcomparatively large number of culturaleflecting the importance the Soviet regime attache* to its Kurdish minorityotential foreign policy asset. Kurdish is taught in the schools in Kurdish villages. Thereurdish newspaper, Rla Tata, published in Yerevan, the capita! of Armenia, and there is some radio programing In Kurdish. The center for Kurdish studies in Yerevan, the only such center In the USSR, offers courses In Kurdish language and culture and publishes In Kurdish periodicals and works of Kurdish poets and writers, some of whomeputation in Kurdish communities abroad. One of the main purposes of the center is to support Soviet claims that the Kurds in the Soviet Union enjoy cultural facilities that are not available to those in other parts of the Middle East. |
The regime has little reason to fear that its policy of fosteringational consciousness abroad will encourage troublesome pan-Kurdish sentiments al home. The number of Kurds in the Soviet Union is small, and the regime can count on the more urbanized and educated Armenian majority lo act as ainfluence. The Armenians are unlikely to forget the Turkish massacre, in which the Kurdsart, and Moscow on occasion has had to warn the Armenians not to discriminate against the Kurdish minority^
Toward Kurds In the Soviet Union. The small number of Kurds in the USSR, estimated9 or lessercent of the total Kurdish population,asis for the Soviet claim to an interest in the Kurdish question. Most of the Soviet Kurds live in scattered communities in the Tra.iscaucasus. and many, particularly those in cities, arc gradually becoming integrated Into the dominant cultures of the region
The vast majority of Soviel Kurds speak Kurdlih as their native language, bt1 knowledge of Russian and other languages of the area Is becoming widespread. In Azerbuidzhan, for instance. Ihe older generations speak Kurdish, but the younger people Increasingly speak only Azabaidzhanl or Russian. The most concentrated settlements of Kurds are in Armenia, and here ihe Kurds have preserved their traditional way of life and Kurdish cultural traditions are strong.|
Outlook
The collapse of the Shah's regime and the assumption of de facto control by the Kurds in much ofthe predominantly Kurdish areas of Iran have raised aspirations for greater autonomy not only among Iranian Kurds but also among the Kurds ofTurkey and Iraq. To at least some degree, relations between the Kurds and the governments ofthe other slates in which they live will be determined by the course of events in Iran. If the central government in Tehran is able, through negotiation and compromise, to reestablish its authority over Ihe areas untxr Kurdish control, the prospect for continued pence between the Kurdish minorities and the other govern* mentsofthearea will be enhanced. If. on the other hand, Tehran is compelled to use force, the resulting conflict could spill over national borders and involve the Kurds in neighboring states.J
The relationship between the Kurds in Iran and ihe Tehran government will dependarge extent on each side's interpretation of the balance struck be-iween minority rights and central control under the constitution now under consideration. Government and religious leaders do not want to gram the minorities rlghta that could threaten national cohesion; on the other hand, they want lo reach an accommodation that will keep the minorities quiet. The Kurds, Tor their part, do nol want to lose the benefits of Iran's oil wealth: at the same time they are unwilling lo give up ihe de facto ailonomy ihey have established, and individual loaders want freedom io compete with ihcir rivals foe politicalurd
Full-scale conflict between the Kurds and thegovernment in Iran does nol seem likely In the near term, although an attempt by ihe government to extend lis control in the Kurdish region led to serious clashes in late July. There is little prospect that the govcrrment will icon be able lo rebuild the military or develop its irregular forces io Ihe leci needed lo reestablish its authority in the Kurdish areas. For their part. Kurdish leaders do not seem prepared for an all-out effort to remove the remaining ccnirr.1presence in the area. Moreover, the local population, despite its strong ethnoccnirism. is unlikely torotracted armed struggle in lis towns and villages. |
If ihey chose, the Kurds, even hampered by their disunity, could carry out sustained dissident activity and disrupt Iranian overland trade to Europe and the USSR. The Kurds' challengeentral control would grow more serious if most of the Kurdish iribcs were willing to cooperate, Longstanding religious, tribal, and personal rivalries among the Kurds, however, seem to have been only temporarily smoothed over by the revolution and the local autonomy ihey now enjoy. These differences probably will reappear and may even be intensified as the various leaders try to exploit their new relationship with the central government. The most serious liability facing the Kurds, however. Is their luck of continued, substantial mpportjeighboring government such as that provided by the Shah to the Iraqi Kurdseither Iraq. Turkey, nor the USSR is
likely to playole: the USSR would provide such support only If Moscow decided that iis best nterests would be served by trying to topple the Khomeini regime and replace iteftist govern-ment.
As long as the present unstable situation exists, the .entral government and Iran's Kurdish leaders will carefully monitor each other's activities. At the same lime, the lenders of the various Kurdish factions can be expected lo compete actively for influence among their fellow tribesmen. Relatively minor incidents or miscalculations could cause armedof which could beKurdish and central government forces, dissident and pro-Khomeini Kurds, and supporters of rival tribal leaden. J
In Turkey, the government would fiercely resist any attempt by the Kurdish minority to gain greater political autonomy, although it might grudgingly concede the Kurds greater freedomtheir cultural heritage. The Kurds are aware lhat the government has large army and security forcesin the provinces and is capable of reinforcing them quickly. The most important deterrent to the realization of the desire of the Turkish Kurds for greater autonomy, however, is Ihe absenceingle leader capable of uniting the disparate Kurdish groups. Many important Kurdish leaders have been co-opted or intimidated, while Kurdish leaders active in Turkish politics often hold opposing political views, gj
Nevertheless, the Kurds in Turkey will remainto separatist and pan-Kurdish sentiment as long as Ankara fails to assimilate them Into Turkish society. Turkish Kurds could be encouraged io defy Ankara if Iranian Kurdsreater degree ofrom the new Iranian regime or If the government in Ankara fails to come to grips wjih Turkey's staggering economic and poiitic.il problems. |
Sierat-
ability of ibe Iraqi Kurds lo effectively oppose ihe Iraqi military depends on ihe Baghdad government'* domestic political strength and external support for the Kurds from Iran or other countries. As ofaghdad has not been sufficiently distracted by the troubles in Iran or potential problems with tbe Shias in the south to shift its attention or its troops away from the north. The government is unlikely to permit anything more than the token autonomy il has already granted the three Kurdish provinces in tho autonomous
Iraqighly centralized political and economic structure with no room for decentralization as envisioned by Kurdish nationalists. At best, the Kurds may beider role through the already existing mechanisms of the executive and legislative councils. They will not be accorded rights anddenied the rest of the population. Most Kurds, however, are likely to regard as acceptable the narrowly defined political autonomy offered by the government. That majority probably does notilitary solution to the problem of assimilation and is unsure that the alternativesaathist Government would improve conditions for the Kurdsag
There is little rhancc that the Syrian Government will gram the Kurds more autonomy in the future. There is tittle pressure from the Kurds themselves to do so. and the government would be reticent about providing any minority group autonomy for fear that others, like the Druze. would demand similar treatment, aaj
Although the desire not to da mage relations with Iran. Turkey, and Iraq probably will continue io deter the Soviet Union from directly aiding Kurdish minorities in those states. Moscow will probably maintain contact with selected Kurdish groups and may indirectly support them through third parties. In Iran,support for the Kurds serves to foster continuing instability, which may eventuallyore pro-Soviet, leftist regime. In Iraq, such an approach also serves to put pressureegime that is increasingly independent and anli-Sovict. At aSoviet support for Kurdish cultural activities within the USSR and expressions of sympathy for "legitimate" Kurdish requests for local autonomy will serve to remind ihe stales involved thai the Soviets retain the capability to encourage dissension among their minorities-!
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of Coejriihted Photographs
Franz Font
Baghdad al-ThawraS
Sygma
Turkish Dally News Diplomacy
Akhtrsa'ah Cairo VPI
Wide World Photograph!
Original document.
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