NORTH KOREAN REACTIONS TO INSTABILITY IN THE SOUTH

Created: 12/20/1979

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Director of

Central

Intelligence

North Korean Reactions to Instability in the South

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NOFOWMROCONTRACT

9

NORTH KOREAN REACTIONS TO INSTABILITY IN THE SOUTH

Information available aa of9 was used in the preparation of this Estimate.

I

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief ofntelligence, Department of

KEY JUDGMENTS

The emergence of fighting between South Korean military factions and widespread civil disorders in South Korea would prompt Pyongyang to consider forceful reunification of the peninsula.

However, Pyongyang wouldrucial imponderable in attempting to determine the US responseorth Korean attack, given the presence of US ground forces in the South

2. In considering an attackilitarily weakened South Korea, Pyongyang would weigh the attitudes of its major allies and, most importantly, the US security commitment to Seoul. For years, Moscow and Beijing have cautioned Kim, but their influence has decreased as the North's military self-sufficiency has grown. If Kim were otherwise convinced that military intervention were in his interest, it is doubtful that China or the USSR could veto the venture.

8. believe that North Korean militarywould likely take the Cornarge-scale,ground, naval, and air assault against the South.

11, The USSR and China, as treaty allies of Pyongyang, almost certainly would respond cautiouslyorth Korean attack on South Korea. Both would want toirect military confrontation with the United States; the Chinese in particular would be loath to jeopardize their developing relationship with the United States. Nonetheless, because of their mutual rivalry and the strategic importance ofonhostile state in North Korea, the USSR and China would feel compelled to provide at least some material assistance to Pyongyang.

Original document.

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