North Korean Reactions to Instability in the South
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:
rhe Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.
Also Participating:
The Assistant chief of staff for intelligence. Department of tlie Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
El
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Department of the Air Force
NO I'M
This contingency estimate addresses the likelihoodorth Korean attack on the South if severe fighting between South Korean military (actions and widespread civil disorders develop there daring thu next two or three months. Itevol of instability which may not develop.
KEY JUDGMENTS
The emergence of fighting between South Korean military factions and widespread civil disorders in South Korea would prompt Pyongyang to consider forceful reunification of the peninsula.
However, Pyongyang wouldrucial imponderable in attempting to determine the us responseorth Korean attack, given the presence of US ground forces in the South and the virtual certainty of their being engaged. With the
/United States preoccupied with events
lh iron and possliuy elsewhere, tho North would probably calculate thatcapabilityulve to cioiVnd ;ionth Korea had been weakened.
In view of the magnitude of the decision facing Pyongyang and the risk involved, we cannot judge with confidence whether or not it would opt for military action. We believe, however, that the chances of such action could be as high as SO-SO under this scenario.*
If the North nhould decide to intervene, it would most probablyaasive assault designed to destroyresistance and consolidate its control over the South.
Th* Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes it impossible to calculate odds in circumstances that demand so many subjectiveincluding North Korea's perception of the risk of war with the United States and lots of so much of the progress of which North Kore.ins are so proud.
He agrees, however, that there wouldignificantly higher risk of hostilities.
DISCUSSION
Korean President Kim ll-song would viewof fiqhting between South Korean militarywidespread civil disorders in the wake of SouthPark's deathnique opportunity toKorean Peninsula on his terms. imthat the North would not stand idly by ifconditions" developed in theentimenthas subsequently publicized. Privately, Kimthe unsettled period between the resignationRhee0 and the military coup1 asopportunity that the North was militarilyexploit. Given the significant expansion of Northcapabilities over the past decade, Kim is nowbetter position to take such action.
The Deterrent
In considering an attackilitarily weakened South Korea, Pyongyang would weigh the attitudes of its major allies and, most importantly, the US security commitment to Seoul. For years, Moscow and Beijing have cautioned Kim, but their influence has decreased as the North's military self-suificiency has grown. If Kim were otherwise convinced that military intervention were in his interest, it is doubtful that China or the USSR could veto the venture.
We judge that North Korea would attack the South if there were no us military presence- The presence of US ground forces, however, and the virtual certainty of their being engaged during any sizable North Korean assault must give Pyongyang pause. The North has long recognized that the presence of us infantry north of Seouleterrent above and beyond the us treaty commitment to South Korea.
We continue to believe that one of Pyongyang's key objectives throughoutas been to end the US troop presence in the South.
The North would also consider US concerns andoutside Korea, lt might perceive current US preoccupation Ln the Middle East and Southeast Asiaactor that would decrease its degree of risk in taking military action. On the other hand, Pyongyang mightus frustration and anger over the Iranian situation and evidenceenewed mood of American assertiveness as ominous indicators of Washington's willingness to respond to an attack on US forces in Korea. The North would also assess US ability to respond rapidly. If the United States were to become militarily involved elsewhereajor way, we would expect the North to see the degree of riskreduced. ey indicator for Pyongyang would be the continued presence of US forces in Korea and elsewhere in Northeast Asia, or eatmarked tor use there.
In view of the magnitude of the decision facing Pyongyang and the risk involved, we cannot judge with confidence whether or not it would opt for an all-out assault. We believe, however, that the chances of such action could be as high
Military Opticus
might consider either: omelimited military intervention that would minimizeUS resolve, and add to the process ofthe south,ajor offensive, wethat Pyongyang would reject the first course. Korean war, the North haside varietymeasures with little success. In view of those the North might well calculate thatwouldet loss. US and South Koreannot accurately gauge the North's limitedif so, the North's risks would not be lessened.
In tlie past, the assumptionenacing posture by the North hasnifying effect upon the south, and Pyongyang would have little reason to judge otherwise tlii3 time. Finally, measured North Korean military action would yield limited gains at best, and yet could help to suspend us troop withdrawals indefinitely.
S. Thus we believe that North Korean militarywould likely take the formarge-scale,ground, naval, and air assault against the South.
See footnote onn the Key Judgments for comment of the Director. Defense Intelligence Agency.
SEOBET
9. Although control of the Seoul area would beobjective, we believe that the North'swould be the unification of the entiremilitary conquest. |
10. In our view, North Korea would attempt to invasion and to consolidate control over the southas its military operations were successful. Thenumbers of military units, personnel, andpermit sustained operations far longer than wepossible even two years
11. The USSR and China, as treaty allies of Pyongyang, almost certainly would respond cautiouslyorth Korean .it. Lack on south Korea. Both would want toirect military confrontation with the United states; thearticular would be loath to jeopardize their developing relationship with the United States. Nonetheless, because of their mutual rivalry and the strategic importance ofonhostile state in North Korea, the USSR and China would feel compelled to provide at least some material assistance to Pyongyang.
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