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The Afghan Insurgents and Pakistan: Problems for Islamabad and Mosco
of Pakistan's immediate worries in the wake of the invasion of
Afghanistan is that Soviet operations against rebellious tribesmen there will lead to Soviet incursions into Pakistan.
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So far. the Afghan insurgents have not depended heavily on Pakistan for help or the use of territory. If the Soviets push the insurgents back toward. border areas, however. Pakistani support could become crucial. Pakistan might be unable, even if it were willing, to comply with Soviet demands to curtail insurgent activity. The Soviets would attempt to deny the use or Pakistan to the insurgents, and Moscow could decide to take military action on Pakistan's side of the border against the insurgents, or even against the Pakistanis,
Use of Pakistan
in Pakistan have been useful to the Afghan insurgents but not essential to the survival of the rebellion. Almost all insurgent operations have been launched from within Afghanistan, and much rebeJ action has taken place in areas thai arc not contiguous to Pal isian
Although the Afghan tribesmen are able to purchase weapons and ammunition in Pakistan, most of their military supplies were either in their hands before the insurgency began or have beendesertions andthe Afghan military. Some insurgents probably have been trained in tribal areas in Pakistan and have stockpiled military supplies and even taken prisoners to Pakistan. The rebels, however, control enough territory in Afghanistan to obviate the need for bases in
Some exile groups maintain headquarters in Pakistan and use itase for directing propaganda at both the Afghan people and the foreign press. The contribution of these groups to the amorphousjribal-based insurgency in Afghanistan, however, has been
Despite repeated public denunciations by Kabul ud Moscow of Pakistani aid to the insurgents, there have been no serious border incidents. Cross-border shellings have been brief and ineffective. Occasional air raids have been made by single planes, and their penetration hasusually been too shallow to give the Pakistanis time to intercept them.l
The Refugees
and Kabul arc aware of the risk of pushing Pakistan into retaliatory action or greatly stepped-up aid lo the rebels. Although Pakistani leaders haveilitary response, so Tar they have limited themselves to diplomatic protests to avoid increasing tensions with Afghanistan and the LSSRa^
The AfghanPakistani officials predict will soon number halfajor point of contention. Despite Soviet and Afghan charges, there is no solid evidence that the refugees have played morearginal role in the insurgency. Most are the very young or arc women and elderly men who are unfit for military action. Althoughndoubtedly have joined Ihe insurgents, and insurgent groups have
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occasionally entered Pakistan under Ihe guise of refugees, most refugees have fled Afghanistan simplyit became loo dangerous. But Pakistani territory makes an important contribution to the insurgency byafe haven for the families ofrcbcls.mm
The Pakistanis do not have much control over the refugees.ercent by onein government camps. Most have cither been living with related Pakistani tribes (many tribes live on both sides of the border) or have built numerous encampment without government permission or^
The refugees arc lessomestic political problem for Islamabad in the bordc areas than they would be in heavily settled areas away from the border. Furthermore, forcible return of the refugees to Afghanistan would be unpopular wilh fellow Pathans in Pakistan, would probably be resisted by the refugees, and might reduce their number only temporarily!
In the past, despite the formation of several short-lived fronts, rivalries among the various exile groups have limited their effectiveness. Now under pressure from both the Pakistani Government and events in Afghanistan, the groups appear to be movingore lasting coalition that could lead to the formation or an Afghan governmcnt-in-exile Althoughoalition would have major difficulties in directing insurgent activities in Afghanistan, it couli' serveore effective channel for foreign assistance to the insurgents. The establishmentovcrnment-in-exilc. moreover, would tncviiably_und<;rcul the legitimacy of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul!
Establishmentovernmcnt-in-exile in Pakistan would annoy the Soviets. Pakistan is clearly able to prevent the exiles from operating openly in Peshawar, the major city near the Afghan border. Moscow and Kabul could hardly view the establishmentovernment-in-exile on Pakistani soil as anything but an indication of increased Pakistani support for the insurgency ah
Problemsif it wanted to. Islamabad would have difficulty controlling the supply
Islamabadarms to the insurgents from Pakistan. Although the Pakistani Govcrn-
menl may have indirectly supplied some weapons to the insurgents through related Pakistani tribes, most of the military supplies obtained in Pakistan by the insurgents have been purchased from private dealers!^
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Bolh the manufacture and sale of Pakistani copies of foreign arms take place in areas where many Pakistani laws do not apply and where enforcement has always been difficult. Although the Pakistani Government could clamp down on the armsoperateswouldacklash in tribal areas, and Islamabad could not eliminate manufacturing and smuggling compietcly'^^B
Pakistan would also have difficj'ty restricting the use of Pakistani territory by insurgent groups. Most of the border is uncontrolled and unmarked. Ii is ignored by the tribesmen who seasonally migrate across it. Pakistan could make cross-border movements more difficult, but only with considerable effort and by moving more military units to the Afghan border. Thisoculd lead to clashes with the insurgents and with Pakistani Pathans. who arc always sensitive to government control in the North-West Frontier Province. The government might be criticized more widely in Pakistan for appearing to knuckle under to the Sovicis.l
Any Pakistani effort to crack down on insurgent activity could also bring foreign criticism. In Islamicthose important to Pakistan, such as Saudi Arabia andaction would be seen as aiding the Communist effort to suppress Isla mfl
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and for Moscow The question of how to deal with insurgent use of Pakistan already sc be preoccupying Moscow. The Soviets have publicly charged that the insurgents arc making extensive use of Pakistan and receive substaniii foreign support there. Moscow may have an exaggerated notion of the support the insurgents are receiving. In any event, Moscow is undoubtedly concerned that lhe UnitedSiaics and China-will use Pakistan to funnel
supplies to the rebels
At least in the short term, while Soviet forces are involved in consolidating their hold in Afghanistan, border raids by the Soviets arc unlikely. At in officialvoid pushing Islamabad further toward the Unitednow seeking cooperation from Pakistan on the insurgent issue and saying that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan poses no threat to Pakistan. The Soviets, however, have coupled this approach with pressure to close the border and move Afghan refugee camps awaj from the frontier. Soviet officials also arc spreading the word that Moscov reserves the right to take military action against the rebels ins possible, that if Moscow thought President Zia was about to decide to increase support for the rebels, the Soviets mightilitary action against Afghan targets in Pakistan to indicate the danger ofourse.
Military Options
ihc longer icrm. il seems likely that Moscow will become involved in protracted efforts to quell the insurgency in Afghanistan. In such circumstances, the Soviet interest in curtailing insurgent use of Pakistan is likely to mount. If Soviet counter!nsurgency efforts arc fairly successful, they probably will force many rebels along Afghanistan's eastern frontier to flee and make them more dependent on facilities in Pakistan. On the other hand, the more difficult and cosily the anti-insurgent campaign becomes for the Soviets, the more pressure there will be on Soviet political leaders to authorize military action into Pakistan. In cither case, the Soviets may conclude that an effective end to the rebellion would depend on the eliminationafe haven in Pakistan for lhe insurgents J| ^
Initially. Moscow would intensify pressure on Pakistan to deny its territory to the insurgents. If Pakistan were to defy Soviet demands or become more extensively involved in supponing the insurgents, the Soviets mighi lake more aggressive action. Given the damage to the Soviets* international position that has resulted from the Afghan invasion. Moscow ts unlikely to be significantly constrained from such action by anything short of the threat of military counteraction. Comments by Soviet officials already have suggested the justification the Soviets might make. They have said that Pakistan is unable to control the Afghan refugees and lhat Moscow, therefore, would have to do the job for Islamabad
Moscow's first military response might be to try to seal the Pakistani-Atghan border. This wouldery difficult task since the long border is crossed by trails at thousands of points. The high altitude and difficultnorth of the Khyberthe prospect of nighttime movement by the rebels limits the effectiveness of Soviet airpowcr and mobility. The Soviets, however, could control movement through the main passes. The Soviets probably would also be able to disrupt the movement of large groups and substantial amounts of supplies, but soe insurgents have not had to depend on an extensive logistics system.^HK
If Ihe Soviets moved against the insurgents in Pakistan, they would have several options:
could use Afghan forces against Pakistan in the hope of forestalling sharp international reaction. In view of the growingof the Afghan military,ourse would seem to offer link hope of disrupting the insurgents.
The Soviets could relax restrictions on their forces aimed at preventing violations of the border. Underolicy some border violations would be inevitable but probably not serious enough to leadonfrontation with Pakistan. This most likely would do no more than make it marginally easier for (he Soviets to deal with insurgents on the Afghan side of the border.
The USSR could allow hot pursuit of rebel bands. More serious border violations would result, and the chances of clashes with Pakistani troops would increase. Nevertheless, depending on the size and depth of Soviet penetrations. Islamabad might try ioesponse as long as possible, perhaps until it was clear lhat the penetrations were deliberate policy and became widely known in Pakistan.
Moscow could raid rebel camps in Pakistan, either on the ground or by air. Because the camps are small and dispersed, such raids ^ould have little effect on rebel capabilities, but they would increase the riskesponse from Pakistan. Pakistan would almost certainly appeal to the United States and China for assistance.
iet forces could attack Pakistaniexample, tribal gun factories or even Pakistani military installations. Islamabad would have difficulty regarding raids of this type as anything bul an act of war. Any government that failed to react strongly would face severe domestic criticism and might fall. Moscow would be unlikely to risk such action unless it was confident Pakistan could not count on outside help. In such circumstances. Pakistan might have no choice but to give in to Soviet press urc
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