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SOVIET INTENTIONS AND OPTIONS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA: NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Moscow's wiUingness lo pay what it anticipated would be an appreciable political and economic price for its intervention in Afghanistan stemmed from the deteriorating situation in that country and overall Soviet strategic interests in the region.
Regardless of the precise mix of motivations and interests underlying Moscow's decision to intervene, the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan has placed the USSRosition to exploit the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of Afghanistan's immediate neighbors.
The Soviets will continue for tactical reasons toertain receptivity to proposals for troop withdrawals. In the next two to three months, however, they will probably continue their buildupotal force of at least eight division equivalents. Following this spring's counterinsurgency offensive, they are likely Io conclude that even more forces are needed. Regardless of iheir success against the insurgents, the Soviets intend toignificant military presence in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future to reinforce their broader regional influence
Moscow sees its current best option in Iran as one of continuing its attempt to curry favor with the Khomeini regime. The Soviets are also maintaining relations with the Iranian left and with Iran's ethnic minorities, but they are proceeding cautiously lest they further arouse the anti-Soviet suspicions of Khomeini and his entourage.
Moscow would clearly prefer to achieve its broader aims in Iran without using military force. However, it could respond to large-scale Afghan rebel activity in Iran with hot-pursuit forays and cross-border raids and might consider more massive intervention in responsehreat of Western intervention, countrywide disintegration, or civil war
A key element in any Soviet decision to intervene in Iran would In: Moscow's perception of the likely US mililaryresponse Moscow recognizes would be influenced by Western economic and security interests that are far greater than those that were at stake in Afghanistan.
The Soviet approach to Pakistan will likely remain one of keeping Pakistan sufficiently uneasy to discourage too much support for the Afghan rebels and too close an alignment with the United States or
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China, while keeping alive the option of accommodation to Moscow. In view of Pakistani rejection of US aid offers, the Soviets now are probably more confident that pressure tactics will continue to work against Islamabad.
Moscow looks upon India as an asset in the effort to limit damage from its Afghan invasion and realizes it must now be more forthcoming to maintain that asset. If the survivability of Pakistanuffer state seemed threatened, however, the interests of Moscow and New Delhi would diverge.
DISCUSSION
memorandum focuses on Soviet tntrntiom In Southwest Asia as they bear on likely Soviet behavior duiuttt the next si* toonths.
The Decision To Intervene
Thr Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan was mad* with careful consideration of the etpectrdand potential problemi Although the Soviet leaders certainly dismissed the possibililv of direct US military opposition. the> probably did anticipate such advetir international consequencesetback to US-Soviet relations, an accelerated buildup of USincreased Sino-American securily cooperation, and negative reactions in Ihe Muslim world
As lot thr continuation of the atmosphere ot detente with the United States, Moscow already saw it as bring in jeopardy Moreover, tbe Soviets believed iheconsequences ol intervention would be reduced because of the US preoccupation with Iran and the internal disarray in Iran and Pakistan Although the Soviets may have underestimated tbc costs, we believe that they wouldntervened even if ihey had foreseen what has actually transpired
Moscow's willingness to pay what It anticipated would be an appreciable political and econornic price for Its intervention in Afghanistan stemmed from the deteriorating situation within that country and Irom overall Soviet strategic interests in the region Moscow sa* that Afghan political and military institutions lhal it had helped to mold were on the verge of collapse and believed that this wouldistinct decline in Soviet influenceountry that was a
longstanding Soviet client, perhaps transforming It info
another milltanlly Idamic stale
Apart from more immediate concerns, the Soviets were also motivated bv geopolitical considerations and strategic calculations On the one hand, they iearedumiliating reversal in Afghanistan wouldlow lo iheir prestige, slow the momentum of their advance in the Third World, and damage theirwith other chent regimes On the other hand, they hoped that consolidation of firm political and military control over Afghanistan would facilitate furtherol* their influence into other parti of Southwest Asia and the Middle East.
Over the longer term, the Sovyeti hope through their presence in Afghanistan to reduce Western andinfluence and promote accommodating behavior throughout the region This could facilitate theirefforts lo gam increased access to air and naval Utilities on the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf The Soviets will attempt lo manipulate and eiplottperceptions ol their ability lo threaten vital oil resources. They will entourage beliefs lhat Soviet cooperation is required to ensure stability in oiland that it must be fostered by providing the USSR with improved acceu to the oil resources of the rerpori
Afrjharsiitan
The Soviets did not invade Afghanistan with any expectation that they would be able quickly toeffective control over the entire country To date they have concentrated on consolidating Iheir control in Kabul and some other key cities and over mayor lines of crromuoication. However, the Afghanhave continued Ihe lighting even in areas where Soviet forces have been active The Afghan Army ha> continued to disintegrate in areas of major resistance, and the Soviets cannot count on the loyalty of the few effective units that exist.
The most senous Soviet problem over the near term ll the failure of the Soviet-installed government of ltabrak Karmal lo control the cities Themaiority of ihe populace views the governmentoviet puppet, and nationalist and Islamic fervor is fueling broad popular opposition to Ihe Soviet presence
Even before lite urban disturbances in lalethe Soviets were com milting additional forces Several weeks earlier, ihe Soviets introduced one division that they had been holding In reserve and began forming several specially configured hetiborne units for counter insurgency operations The Soviets, moreover, are continuing lo improve their logniir capabilities along the border for moving men and vuppiies into Afghanistan. Soviet units withinsome of which are being regrouped into highly flexible brigades, have recently begun more aggressive counter insurgency operat ions
Afghanistan and the more involved they become in fighting Ihe insurgency there.
Iranian officials have publicly proclaimedtheir "Muslim brelhren" in
that limited material assistance has already been pro-
vided Since the invasion. Pak man and Iran have moved closer together, spurred byoviei threat. In the coming months. Tehran will probably provide the Afghan rebels wiih media access for propaganda purposes and support (or liberation offices and refugee camps in Iran It will probably tolerate cross-border arms smuggling and rebel movements The Iraniannlikely, however, to provide large-scale suppon to the Afghan resistance, at least until il sees how much support other Islamic nations provide
While the Soviets have been large indirect benefi-ciaries of the US loss ol influence in Iran, their own bilateral relations with Tehran have not prospered under the erratic Khomeini regime Even before the invasion of Afghanistan. Moscow failed loatisfactory working relationship with Tehran
The Soviets have two basic strategies fur enhancing their influence over their strategic southern neighlot
Iron
Since the collapse of ihe Shah's regime in earlyoviei policy toward Iran hat been aimed at encouraging anti-Western attitudes there, improving economic and political relations with the new regime, andavorable climate for an eventual pro-Soviet government The Intervention in Afghanistan has greatly complicated these conciliatory effort* and will continue to do so the longer the Soviets stay in
Thewe believe, the preferred-Soviet strategy has been to seek crucial leveragenitary Iranian state in which the Tudeh Communist Party could eventuallyignificant factor. At the same time, theince ihe fall of the Shah, have reportedly increased their covert activities among Iran's ethnic minority groups and' iheir efforts to strengthen the Tudeh Communis! Party Thev have proceeded cautiously, however, lest they further arouse the anilsuspicions of Khomeini and htt entourage. Moscow has taken care not to derail what will remain its primary focus of attention so innst as Khomeini retains dominanttbe improvement of state-to-stale relation* with an Iranian regime whose foreign policyarked anli-Western orientation
Failing in an effort to achieve primary influence with aIranian state, the Soviets might alternatively seek to encourage centrifugal ethnic force* in tbe country, break down centraland eiploit Ihe ensuing disruption. Moscow clearly would prefer lo achieve its broader aims in Iran without usinge v :
Iranian support for ihr Afghan rebels remainsrn low level, ihe Sonets are unlikely In retaliate militarily However, conspicuous large-scale Altthan rebel activity in Iran could lead to hot-pursuit forays and croas-border raids. Furthermore, the threat of Western intervenlion, Khomeini's death and the loss of central control over the ethnic areas, or widespread chaos might tempt the Soviets tohreat lo their security and intervene. In so doing, they might use1 Soviet-Iranian treaty ai tbe legal (unification, or the cbim that they were asked in by the Tudeh The USSR has refused lo accept Ihe Iranian abrogation of1 treaty provisions lhat allow for direct Soviet intervention in Iran if the internal situation in thai country or foreign intrigue threatens the security of ihe Soviet Union.
Since. the Soviets have increasedsurveillance of Ihe border with Iran and. more recently, have raited iheir state of military prepared new They have no doubt prepared contingency plans for armed intervention. Some exercises in the Trans-taucasu' Military District earlier this year may haveart of ihii preparation andey element In any decision to intervene in Iran, however, would be Moscow's perceptionikely US responv-Moscow no doubt recognizes that Western economic and security interests in Iran are considerably higher than In Afghanistan und that the likelihoodtrong imhtarv US response Is thus abo far greater
Pokislon
Pakistan will almost certainly remain under Soviet pressure to crate all support for Afghan insurgents Pakistan's aid to rebel force* so far has been limited. Even so. Afghan Government forces in the past year have occasionally shelled refugee concentrations across the border Tbe Soviets have confined themsebes lo diplomatic and propaganda threats against Islamabad and hate been cautious in their own militarynear the Pakistani-Afghan border They are probably planning, however, for the contingency of hot-pursuit raids acmsa ibe Pakistan border and in any event will attempt to have the border sealed
Islamabad recognizes Ils vulnerability to SovietIt has publicly stated il will resist any attacks from Afghanistan, but there has been no significant reinforcement of Pakistani armed forces near the Afghan border. While Pakistan may escntuallyto mtricl the use of its territoryanctuary by Afghan rebels, the government willifficult to move conspicuously in this direction because of President Zia's carefully nurtured Islamic image and because of the numerous kinship and ethnic ties between tribesmen on both sides of the border
Tbe issue will become increasingly troublesome if intensified Soviet mililary operations force the Afghan rebels to rely more heavily on sanctuaries in Pakistan. For Islamabad the issue will be complicated also by the fact lhat China and some Arab countries will continue lo pressure Pakistan to increase its aid to the insurgents, although even the Chinese reportedly do not want to eet too deeply involved in activities thai would merely be provocative toward ihe USSR or India
Islamabad views ihe Soviet military presence in Afghanistanong-term mililary threat that is far more serious than the immediate border security problem raised by Soviet counterinsurgencv efforts In Afghanistanoncerned that Ihe Soviets may intensify their covert contacts with Baluchi and other tribal separatists in Pakistan or that they may in other ways attempt In lake subversive advantage of tbe country's political insiabdily Even with the new Soviet threat, however. Pakistan Hill fears India as in primary enemy, particularly since the return to power of Indira Gandhi Pakistan's feeling of vulnerability has given Moscow Important additional political leverage
In view of Pakistan's rejection of US aid offers, the Soviet! now are probably more confident that pressure tactics will continue to work against Islamabad Coun-terinwirgeot activities have brought Soviet forces close to the Pakistani border, but. so long as Islamabad appears lo be keeping the United States at arm's length. Ihe Soviets are unlikely loheavy military pfrsaitrr
Moscow'sakistan, particular Is in the short term, are subordinated to Soviet aims relating to Afghanistan and India The Soviets have recognized the concern in India created by the Afghan invasion, they prefer not to act so precipitioudv in Pakistan as to compound thai alarm
On balance, the Soviet approach likely will remain one nf keeping Pakistan sufficiently uneasy totoo much support for the Afghan rebels and loo dose an alignment with tbe United Stales or China, while keeping alive in Islamabad the option of accom-modnlwn to Moscow as ibe prlco for Soviet restraint.
India
Afghan developments have underscored Moscow's basic Interest in preserving and enhancing Its close ties to India, which because of its sue, population,poution. and importance in global politics, is its maior Asian counterweight to China Moscow looks upon India as an asset in the effort to limit damage from its Afghan invasion, and realties it now must bo moremilitary and economicformaintain that asset
India has been alarmed at the implications of this Soviet aggression so close to home, including the danger that Pakistan might cease toiable buffer Tbe Gandhi government has nominally accepted tbe poutron (bat Soviet obiectives in Afghanistan are at this point limited to securing controleak client border state, but. beyond thai. Soviet diplomatichave so far not been sufficient to ease Indian concerns. Nevertheless, the Gandhi government sees no realistic alternative to good relations with the USSR
Accepting Moscow's refusal to commit Itselfithdrawal from Afghanistan. New Delhi now sees overall stability in South Asia threatened principally by US and Chinese efforts to strengthen Pakistan militarily The Gandhi government may try to counter this with renewed efforts to ease tension* withMoscow would not object to this, so long hi it look placeontext consistent with Sovietthrough threats and .'orlimitidentdication with China and the United Stale* and its assistance to the Afghan insurgency
If fighting should erupt on the Afghan-Pakistani bonier. India would almost certainty presseaceful resolution involving Pakistani restraint in aid In Afghan dissidents.osition would not run counter lo Moscow's presumed interest in limiting military incidents with Pakistan
Given the increased polarization that Afghanistan has brought about, Moscow Is probably relatively sanguine that it can forestall Ihe movement begun by Indira Candhi during her first administration (and continued bv the Janata government) loward greater diplomatic flexibility and easing of tension with China As it was. the movement toward>ith China was stalled last year by China's invasion of Vietnam.
If maior fighting erupted between Soviet andforces and particularly if the survivability of Pakistanuffer seemed threatened, the Indian revponse would be Iras predictable It might seek lo pressure the USSR by improving relations with the United Slates and resuming the process ofwith China. India's aim would be to avoid the dismemberment of Pakistan and lo enable It to surviveuffer stale
Original document.
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