Yugoslavia: ook at the Society on the Eve of tbe Post-Tito
Host of Yugoslavia's postwar years have been spent trying totate that car survive the death of oneBroz Tito. Over 'he past decade, tbe effort has focused on allowing Yugoslavia's eight major nationalities andmaller ethnicreat deal of autonomy in order to convince tnem that their best chance for retaining their national identities is within the Yugoslav federation. Tbe task has not been easy, but there has been progress. Nonetheless, nationality problems are bound to surface in the post-Tito period and couldajor disruptive factor.
Despite the relative tranquility since the Croatian crisis0he perceptions and passions that fueled this and other nationalist outbursts have not disappeared; indeed, because of theirand mutually reinforcing religious, cultural, and linguistic roots, they could easily be reactivated by an economic crisis orost of other stimuli. With Tito's departure, moreover, the regime will lose an unchallenged leader with an unimpeachable reputation as an ethnic nonpartisan.
Deep-seated rivalries among the country's various nationalities have resurfaced over the past year, in partesult of continuing economic problems on the one handeries of government reforms oo the other. Albanian nationalism in the autonomous province of Kosovo has disturbed Yugoslav officials, including Tito; Fadilj Hodza, Yugoslavia's most prominent Albanian politician, was one of the select few to visit President Tito in the hospital in February. This widely publicized meeting was clearly intended to convey Tito's personal concern for the Albanian minority.
Croatian nationalism, which brought the nation to the brink of crisis in the, is alwaystroublesome. For the eoraent at least there are
no signs thst it will surface and disrupt the succession period. There are, however, reports of increased Serbian nationalism. The Serbs' discontent is inesponse to Albanian nationalise). (Serbia maintains that theAlbanian inhabited region of Kosovo ishallowed Serbian ground and thathave the leading voice in theerbian nationalism also arises from the Serbs' latent desire to play what they view as their rightful, leading role in the Yugoslav federationhole.
A new ingredient has recently been added to the Yugoslav nationalitynationalism. There areillion Yugoslav Muslims, and concern about potential unrest among them reaches into thelevels of the Yugoslav leadership. Last November, Tito personally warned against clerical opposition to Yugoslav unity, asserting that clerics who exceed the limits of acceptable political activity eust be rooted out, "even if it means harsh measures." Tito alsoagainst foreignreference toin9 of possible Albanian meddling in the Kosovo, as well as to the pan-Islamic movement.
Even before Tito became ill in January, there were indications that the leadership in Belgrade wasard look at its past nationalities policy. The federal government has attempted over the years to encourage ethnicut it is now apparent thathas not been able to make the progress it had hoped in reconciling this particularity with the need for Yugoslav unity.
Collective Leadership
The collective leadership Tito has built is designed in part to defuse the nationality problem. Collective leadership at the top of nearly all party and stateis designed to give theense of participation in the country's management; the system's rotation of official positions has been designed to break down regional, ethnic patterns of thought among the country's several nationalities and to helpider, Yugoslav national consciousness. Introduction of these practices at the highest levels appears to be
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while preventing any one of then from dominating the process.
Economic Issues
Frictions between nationalities residing innorthern regions (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and vojvodina) and in the south (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro. Mtvedonia, and Kosovo) have been accentuated by pronounced economic disparities. Per capita income in Ihe north is double that-of the poorly developed south. Surging population growth in the south also creates difficulties in improving job availability.
The problem is most critical in the mountainous province of Kosovo,illion Albanians make up 3omeercent of the population. The Albanian problem is complicated by the fact that up until the purge of Tito's onetime confidant, Aleksandr ftankovic, the(with the exception of the gypsies) were the mostminority in Yugoslavia. Since they gained recognition as an equal nation within the Yugoslav system in the, the Albanians haveto catchthe country's other nationalities. Kosovo's per capita income,is still the lowest in Yugoslavia and has been failing further behind in recent years. Economicgoad the young impatientaverage age of the population is now underperiodic acts of frustrated defiance of Belgrade.
Belgrade's attempts to reduce regional incomehave failedtheaggravated norlh-south frictions. Southern development is impeded by low management and labor skills and lacx of These factors, together with sentiments of economic nationalism in the north, have limited voluntary northern investment in the south. The gap has not been filled by the substantial federal program of long-term investment loam and social welfare subsidies instituted in the. But the program, which is funded by taxes on enterprise income in the north, has caused northern resentment.
Nationalities issues will become even sere sensitiveseeasimposes restrictions on Yugoslavia's current rapid economic growth andeconomic system. Yugoslavia's high balance-of-payments deficit threatens to outrun available external financing. Just to bold the deficit even will require curtailment of economic growth, with direct centralon credit and demand very likely toajor part of any restrictive program. rowth slowdown, which would boost unemployment and reduce consumer gains, would be felt with particular keenness in the south, where growth expectations and needs are highest. Slack expansion would also generate wider nationalisticexample, between Serbia andhave beenheck by the balm cf prosperity. The imposition of central restrictions wouldhird problem: increased resentment by all nationalities at reduction of their independence from Belgrade.
Political Dissent
For the moment, Yugoslavia is not troubled bypolitical dissent. The country doesmall number of dissidents, but the regime has contained the problem they pose. The relatively free politicalin Yugoslavia may be the best explanation forsuccess. The well-established system of rule by self-managing committees in all economic enterprises hasandid grass-roots political and economic The frustrations of beingoice in local politics are thus not as widely felt in Yugoslavia as ir. other parts of" Eastern Europe. In addition, thedoes not prohibit intellectuals from acquiring materials in the west or from contacting their Westernare the intellectuals bound by rigid ideological restrictions. The regime also has an open borderpermits thousands of Yugoslavs to work and travel in theis thus unable tocompletely the ideas and political practices to which the population is exposed.
In addition, the Yugoslav press actsafety valve by criticizing graft and corruption and bywidely on world events. Moreover, the dissidents share with theommon opposition to the USSR. Both oppose Moscow's heavyhandcd suppression of Soviet
dissident activity, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Kremlin's attempts to outmaneuver Yugoslavia internationally.
There are, however, limits to the freedoms in Yugoslavia, and it is these limitations that the dissidents oppose. For example, Tito's person is beyond reproach, the basic tenets for self-management and Yugoslavia's nonaligned foreign policy may not be questioned, and ranking regime leaders may not be criticized in the media by name. The regime's measured response to the dissidents appears to be paying dividends,ontinuation of this policy by Tito's successors should help defuse this potentially disruptive element in society in the post-Tito era.
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Despite serious nationalities and economic problems awaiting Tito's successors, there are positive signs.
Progress has beenyears ofinugoslav state. The system Tito has built recognizes the strength and durability of ethnic and regional interests and does not try to fight them; it attempts to build on them. The rotating collectivesystem also guarantees that each republic and province willhare in the decisionmaking responsibilities of the federal government.
Not all nationality questions in Yugoslavia threaten national unity. Indeed, two national minorities are actively working to preserve the system Tito hasthe Macedonians and the Slovenes.
Belgrade has recognized and encouraged the development of Macedonian national ism. The regime has been sothat Macedonian nationalism within Yugoslavia hasolitical dynamic of its own. Skopje, capital of the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, neverhance to castigate neighboring Bulgaria for its denial of the existence of the Macedonian minority within its borders. occasionally uncomfortable over the assertiveness of Macedoniancontinues to encourage the concept that the Macedonian nation's best hope for survival is within the Yugoslav federation.
Looking into the succession period, Belgrade'sappears to make sense to most Macedonians. The republic does not have an adequate economic base to survive as an independent state. The only alternative, union with Bulgaria, offers little enticement toMacedonians because of Sofia's sycophanticwithMoscow and its denial of the Macedonians' separate identity.
At the other end of Yugoslavia are the Slovenes, who have gained the reputation of being the ones who have made the Yugoslav system work. Edvard Kardelj, the father of self-management and one of Tito'slovene. The Slovenes appear to feel that the Yugoslav federation can be made to work along lines compatible with their own goals and objectives. The memory of being formally incorporated into Nazi Germany during world War II hasasting mark on the Slovenes. 01 they showed little sympathy with the separatist aspects of Croatian nationalism and argued with Zagreb not to disrupt the system that Tito was building. ey figure in the succession process appears to be Stanelovene, around whom much of the political life in the higher party circles revolved in.
External Factors
There are foreign developments and factorsthe succession over which Belgrade has no control but whicn, nevertheless, havewill continue toeffect on the Yugoslav societyhole. For example, the Yugoslavs are united in their opposition to the aSoviet intervention in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Soviet move into Afghanistan may have done more than anything else to unify Yugoslavia's divergentbehind Tito's successors. The economic problems and nationality bickering have apparently been put aside in their condemnation of the Soviet move.
The response of Yugoslav society to Afghanistan is similar to that following the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia. Applications for party membership, for example, have shot up; the federal and regional parties are responding as one in their condemnation of the Soviets; and the Yugoslavshole see the soviet
move into Afghanistanotential threat to their independence.
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The festering dispute with Bulgaria over Macedonia also affects Yugoslav societyhole and could figure prominently in the succession picture. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria have used the Macedonian issue against each other for years and have exchanged charges andin the past year. Given the current level of the dispute, the new Yugoslav leaders will undoubtedly try to use the problem to project the prospectoreign threat to Yugoslav national unity and to atteapt to tally the people behind them.
Original document.
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