SPECIAL ANALYSIS
POLAND: Party Cotgress
Firat Saoratary Gterek'e regime oill street continuity of policy uhan tha aighth congreaa of the Poliah Comuniat Party opene Wary. Tha regime's opparant decision not to ahcrngathough it hoa failed to make much headway in alleviating theany eocnomie and sociopoliticalthetl immobility that haa characterized Poliah daeiaicmaking in recent yaara.
Tha congress takes placeackdropadly faltering economy. Last year Poland's real gross national product fell for the first tine since World Mar II. Industrial production increased onlyercenthe grain harvest waa the poorest in the decade, and transportation breakdowns hinderedof vital raw materials.
In addition, the trade deficit ran an estimatedillion lasthigher than0 million planned. By the endoland's net hard currency debt to the Meet reachedillion, up about 3 billion the debt service ratio equaledercent of exports to non-Coirmtunist countries, coe-pared toercent the previous year. This year,requirements are likely to exceedillion, compared toillion fJB
Poland's scramble to reset its debt servicehashadlj^tleisucceaa. Somo of the Poles'
)me close to debt re-
Some bankers are becoming much less willing to lend to Polandong-term basis, thus frustrating Poland's attempts to lengthen the maturity structure of its debt. If Western bankers become more reluctant to lend to Warsaw. Poland's financial plight could worsen.
Yi^egijoB'seonomic problem is to relieve shortages of consumer goods while bringingign debt under control. Polish leaders, however, have been reluctant to takedrastic and politically risky remedial W
Gierek and his team haveolicy ofonly half-heartedly because they do not want to admit that many earlier decisions were ill-considered. The regime's abrupt attempt to raise consumer prices incaused countrywide strikes--reinforced its caution. %
The current leadership is still inclined to use stopgap measures. Gierek may well endorse furtherof economic reform, but primarily to. keep the* allegiance of the party's moderate wing and perhaps to '. placate Western lenders. ^LflauV
Church-State Relations
The selection.of Pope John Paul II in8 .and his emotional homecoming last Juneremendous boost to the already vigorous Catholic Church. Church leaders, however, apparently cautious about wielding 'their considerable influence for Church gains, arepresent more concerned about riots and aof party conservatives, and appear willing to-support Giorek as the least objectionable party leader.
opc
The party realizes that it faces real competition as it seeks to win the ideological allegiance of the populace and particularly of young people. Nonetheless, the Gierek regime is unlikely to change its pragmatic and
0
occasionally conciliatory policy toward thedespite an occasional show of1eng as it needs the Church's help in preserving domesticfjj^
Dissidence
The tremendous growth of organized dissent hasmajor development since the last party congress. failure to stunt the growth of dissidentperiodically brought pressure from conservativeprobably from thea Such pressure has probably increasedMoscowougher attitude towardlate January. Although the Gierek regime mayinto taking some more punitive measures, itchanging the main thrust of existing policy^ can still argue that the dissidents arethat the dissidents are dividedand that the international embarrassmenttrials has been avoided,
Gierek's
iereJe remains the most important politicaln Poi.ir.d, and it appears that his position as party leader is firm. An adroit politician, he continues to enjoy, the Church's support. The Soviets also back him, even if they are somewhat uncomfortable with his liberal domestic policies and hisfailufe to bring economic problems under
Gierek may make some changes in his leadership team during the congress that will, if anything, strengthen; his political held. He may remove several Politburoto promote some of his loyal supporte-si. heis considering taking on added duties as head of state, probablytime after thend he may be prepared, later in the spring, to shake up theleadership.
The recent cooling of Bast-West relations couldpressure on Gierek to make more sweeping changes. The possible decline ofa consequent decrease in Western financialan urgent need for effective domestic economic solutions both to bolster the confidence of Western lendersownturn in East-West relations and to reduce eventually Poland's dependence on those lenders.
Over the long termposition is not His standing with the public and even within the lower ranks of the party has eroded considerably, and he appears to be getting more of the blame thathad fallen alstost exclusively on his advisers orbureaucrats." His standing, however/ could continue to deteriorateonsiderable tine without causing his fall. His predecessor, Wladyslaw Gomulka, was able to hang onto power during more than five years ofdecay. enure probably depends in large part on Poland's continuing political paralysis, which prevents any potential rival fromestablishing himself -as an alternative party leader. sa*
II0
12
a*
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: