IRAQ: REFURBISHED EQUIPMENT SOUTH OF 32 DEGREES

Created: 11/30/1995

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Intelligence

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National Intelligence Council Memorandum

Iraq: Refurbished Equipment South ofegrees|

Aey Iraq's recent campaign to repair military equipment, and the movement Points of some of that equipment south ofd parallel, only marginally improves Iraq's overall military capabilities and its ability to threaten

Kuwait.

lias distributed most of the refurbished equipment north ofdotal ofdditional armored vehicles and seven multiple rocket launchers have been shipped to southern Iraq since

August, n

Baghdad docs not appear to be deliberately challenging the US/UN restrictions regarding the enhancement of forces in the south by moving this additional equipment belowd parallel. Rather, based on deployment patterns, the regime appears to be trying to improve its internal security capabilities in the south.

Ihii memorandum -oi prepared under ike outputs of ihe National Intelligence Officer far Sear Baa and South Asia and ilw National hiltWgenc* Officer for General Purpose Fortes. Principal drafters

emorandum was coordinated by representatives fromT^ and

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN LANDRY NIO .'GENERAL PURPOSE fOftCIS

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Iraq: Refurbished Equipment South ofegrees

Inraqomprehensive campaign to repair military equipment in an attempt to combat declining operational readiness rates and unit morale. This year's repair campaign was unusual for its scope; il included retrieving obsolete, second-line equipment from depot slocks. The level of effort was likewise unusual because lhc participation was force wide, wilh Ihe Iraqis fixing everything from helicopters to

rifles.

The repair campaign also was accorded an unusually high levelThe program was linked directly to Iraq's leaders and wasof llie continuing propaganda campaign intended toBaghdad's ability to resist international pressure and Iraq'sin the face of continuing UN sanctions. Saddam's eldestwas nominally in charge of the initiative, which was

As part of ihe propaganda, several hundred pieces of repaired andmilitary equipment were put on display this summer in Baghdad. These items and dozens of others restored to service were distinguishedark-toned paint scheme!

marginally improves capability]

ihe propaganda and the exertions of maintenance personnel, the repair campaign only marginally improves Iraq's military capability. Iraqi units remain under strength, with regular Army infantry units in the south atpercent strength and heavy divisionspcrccnt strength. Limited evidence suggests that the repairs were low quality and incomplete. Moreover, much of the refurbished equipment is second line even by Iraqi standards. Major and lasting improvement still depends on lhc lifting of sanctions. I

all the refurbished equipment is north ofd parallel (V)

has distributed most of theercent of the equipment we haveofd parallel (sec table onhe majority has gone to internal security forces, with smaller amounts assignediecemeal fashion to regular Army and Republican Guard units. Refurbished armoredtanks, and artillery have been noted in garrisons north ofd parallel at Al Kut, As Suwayrah, Karbala'. Shaykh Mazhar, At Taji, Tikril. and Karkuk.F

Iraqi Forces: Equipment Southd Parallel*

" APC* ARTY MRI.S

O 12

)

30'

<ypc* (Manned/Active Unit Associated)

AHCs

All types, regard Vvt ul'configuratina. Out it, 1FV.TGM, SAM.DEF. RECON. command andnd Armor(hlanncd/Aciive Uniltypes of field emu and bowii/crs, lowed(Manned/Active Unit(Manned/Active Unit Associated)

Corps' KWi Armored Division operates and trains botil norrh and south ofd parallel and straddles lhc line. Other lOih Division brigades nave periodically been deployed lu work with tnl&nuy elements in coo nie (insurgency operations. On olbereriodic unil training cycles, lOlh Armored Division elements located neard parallel move hack and forth across lhc line duri nil exercises. Therefore,h Armored Division equipment is induded in the ublc.l

figures includek tuned (refurbished) vehicle* moved id ihe souih. which arenolcd in parentheses.J I

(able

of Ihe deployment

mid-August, Iraq began deploying some of the dark-ioncd refurbished armored vehicles south ofd parallel. Since then, Iraq has moved at leastf these vehicles io the south, many of which are old, lightly armedrmored personnel carriers. Several others arc unarmed command and control vehicles. So far, the Iraqis have moved only four dark-painted tanks to the south.

addition, Iraq recently shipped seven refurbishedm multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) to the southern area. The additional firepower provided by these systems isarginal increase in southern Army corps' artillery capabilities which, prior to die arrival of the MRI,s, consisted ofuns and howitzers, along withm MRLs.l

Movement of Additional Unitsd Parallel Since September

Inaghdad moved the major combat elements of twn RGFC armored divisions and some corjis level combat units near the Kuwait border UN Security Councilnjoined Iraq to willidraw those forces. Iraq went beyond the stipulations ofnd moved all RGFC units north ofeven those that had been garrisoned at Qnl'at Salih south ofeforr October, including major elements of an RGFC infanlrv division which did noi move toward Kuwait

Sime die withdrawal of the RGFC from the south, Iraq has not permanently relocated any major Army combat elements from central or northern Iraq to south

Last February, the Iraqis tem/>orarily reinfoned III Corps units protecting engineer pmjecls on the Euphrates River by sending additional commandos south pom the II Corps in northern Iraq. These light infantrynumlsenrd no morewith no heavy equipment. At the time, Iraqi forces were grappling with an upsurge in Shia rebel activity. The II Corjts commanilos were returned to noi them Iraq in kite

Marth.

Someorps units normally move back and forth acrossarallel as it bisects the corps' area of operations. Specifically, elements ofh Arnwrcd Division have periodically moved from iheir garrisons, which are located on or just north of the parallel, to fielddeployments in the Al' Amarah-Qal"at Salih area just southhe AV Amarah-Qalal Salih area is along one of thr main supply routes into sttulhem Iraq and hasajor target for rebel attacks The Iraqis consolidated one ofth Divisions brigades southnmmer of

Table 2

Refurbished Iraqi Equipment

Total

tomxrd

This if blc >i

Total

of 32

32

JJ

Most of (he additional refurbished vehicles have not been organized into single combat units, nor do Ihey represent the addition of new units belowarallel. The bulk of the equipment is spread throughout southern Iraq, assigned in small numbers to various regular Anny III and IV Corps forces]

behind the deployment

of this additional equipment south ofd parallel does not appear toeliberate challenge to the US/UN restrict inn regarding the enhancement of forces in the south. Rather, the regime is apparently focused on its internal security problem, bolstering local forces with equipment enabling them to react more quickly incountcrinsurgency and protection missions. Accordingly, many of these refurbished armored vehicles have been assigned toand commando units at the brigade, division, and corps echelons in order to improve their mobility. Iraqi forces in southern Iraq have been actively engaged in countcrinsurgency operations since the end of the Gulf war.!-

is also unlikely that the distribution of the refurbished vehicles in the south represents an effort lo infiltrate Republican Guard or additional regular Army forces into southern Iraq as part of covert preparations for an invasion of either Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. The limited numbers of tanks and artillery dehvered into southern Iraq do not significantly increase the firepower already available belowd parallel. The additional command vehicles likewise do little to increase the mobility and combat power of Iraq's III and IV Corps. Moreover, BTRs are second-line herns of equipment considered obsolete and of little value on the modem battlefield. I-

Original document.

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