MEXICO: REFERENDUM KEY TO PROGRESS IN CHIAPAS

Created: 8/24/1995

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Intelligence Report

Office of African and Latin5

Mexico: Referendum Key to Progress In Chiapas

The Zapatista National Libtrattonationwide referendum on Sunday to determine the level of public support for its entrance into the politicalyes"we see as most likely, given the way the questions are framed-would enhance the group's confidence in its posts ettlement prospects and provideretext for laying down arms.

EZLN's United military wherewithal is

steadily eroding, increasing the Zapatistas' incentive toeal soon.

Nevertheless, public endorsementolitical role for the group couldast-ditch push by tht rebels for concessions on national-level political reform.

A thumbs down vote would reduce prospects far quick progress In the peace talks.

We believe the rebels would optwo-track strategy that would combine renewed dialogue aimed atay to preserve the group's local sphere of influence with disruptive tactics in Chiapas designed to revive rank-and-fde enthusiasm and regain some credibility.

We doubt that tht EZLN would completely abandon the talks or attempt armed attacks on civilian or military targets, however, because such action would increase Ihe likelihood that Mexico City would ratchet up the military pressure.

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Talkstalemate

Government and rebel representatives have made little progress in bridging their differences in peace negotiations that began In April. When the fifth negotiating round ended In late July, major points of contention included:

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Terras of the Referendum

The stalemate in talks between the rebels and the government has led many observers to look to Sunday's referendum toreakthrough. The Civicongovernmental organization, and the National Democraticoose alliance of leftist political organizations associated with the EZLN. are organizing the vote at the rebels' request Participants will be asked the following five questions posed by the Zapatistas:

Should the EZLNew and independent political force?

Should the EZLN unite with other forces and organizations toew political organization?

Are you in agreement that the public demands of the Mexican people are land, lite, work, nourishment, health, education, culture, information, independence, democracy, liberty, justice, and peace?

Should the different democratic forces unite into one large opposition front and fight for theforementioned principal demands?

Should the political system be reformedrofound way in order to guarantee respect for the vote, reliable registration lists, and recognition of all political forces? I

By

mih'iaiy's presence ran isolated the rebels and that illness, lack ofshortages of water and food, and the stress of being besiegedjungle had sapped their effectiveness and

The advent of psace talks in April added to disarray in rebel ranks by separating some units from their leaders for extended periods of time.

have reduced rebel strength to fewer than

rmed mcmbere-from ann February-and that the group's demands on the local populace for scarce food and medical supplies are costing it support.1

reflecting the military squeeze, Zapatista leaders have not been able to work

onsensus among EZLN factions on mililary' or negotiating strategics.1

indigenous

w(;uld prefercuttle thr talks

At least some rebel factions are anxiousuick"

M-;tlc:ncnL In contrast, groups providing important assistance to and continue the armed rebellion

Public Opinion Referendum Key

Faced with declining leverage and confused over tactics, the rebels have focused on lhe referendum io assess popular sympathy for iheir cause and to try to rally support for their agenda. Although the nationwide vote probably will suffer from organizational difficulties and attract only limited public busiest, it is likely to produce sufficiently positive results to allow the EZLN to claim acceptance of its goals and to jusufy its entry into the political arena. Arrangement* for the vote-the public recognizes thisapatista initiative, and the group's symbol will be on ihc ballot-will drive away moderate voters likely to register "no" votes. Moreover, the

EZLN appears to have designed the questions to eliciTa

jxwmve fMpoflse. Results of two trial polls of Mexico City residents in mid-June suggest reaction will be generally positive.

Eighty-iwo percentespondentsoll carried outexico City daily approved the EZLNs list of principal demands. Forty-five percent said the EZLN shouldew political organization on its own but anotherereenl said the Zapatistas should do so in conjunction with' other groups,

Ninety-five percentespondentsurvey carried outespected independent magazine registered approval for the political aims

contained ir the referendum Twenty-five percent said they favor the EZLN acting on its own toew political organization, whileercent said the Zapatistas should work with other forces. |

"Yes" Vole Could PresaRC End of Rebellion

Wc Judge avote wouldet plus for peace talks by increasing rebel confidence in the EZLNs postseitlemem prospects and byace-saving pretext for laying down arms. Positive public reaction would strengthen rebel moderates, perhaps tilting the balance in favor of an agreement Out ends thenonth belligerent status.

Although public endorsemcni of EZLN aims could spur the rebels toast-ditch push for fulfillment of their national demands, we beliew the group would settleompromise formula. It might include some of the following elements;

Government agreement to recognize the EZLNegitimate political force and to provide amnesty to rebel cadre

EZLN agreement tn renounce violence and lay down its arms.

An offer by Mexico City to formally consider rebel demands on national reforms, perhaps in the context of multiparty talks.

Agreementackage of political reforms for Chiapas that addresses indigenous concerns, possibly including changes in the state's Constitution and its judicial system.

Rebel endorsement of government soao-econnmic development programs in Chiapas

"No" Vote Would Hinder Talks

Lack of support for EZLN goals and entry into the political process would undercut Zapatista claimsational support base, further marginalizing the group and sharply eroding prospecs for an early settlement. Divisions that have slowed discussions would be likely to deepen, forcing the EZLN to reassess iu options. In order to regain political momentum, we believe the Zapatistas wouldwo-Uack strategy marked by:

Renewed dialogue with the government aimed atace saving wj of preserving the group's local sphereinfluence

A more miiitani posrare-short of coordinated military acriori--to generate raiuc-and-file enihusiasm and regain credibility. For example, the rebels might use thectober local elections in Chiapas as an occasion to stage protests and engineer takeovers of public or private assets in support of EZLN demands. We judge it unlikely, however, that they would abandon talks altogether or attempt high-profile armed attacks on civilian or military targets that would almost certainlyilitary crackdown.

Although the Zedillo administration almost certainly wants to avoid military action in Chiapas, particularly until afterctober]

>tentattve support to proposed military contingency plans to isolate

Uie rebels and apprehend their leaders if peace talks fail. By late July, preparations were reportedly complete and troops were on alert to facilitate quick response to any Zapatistarolonged rebel absence from talks or fruitless dialogue, particularly if accompanied by escalating political violence and clashes over land, could persuade Mexico City that an Army crackdown would be less cosilyopular perception that the government was noi in command.

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