PROLIFERATION DIGEST

Created: 3/29/1996

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

China Seeking Foreign Assistance To Address Concerns Aboutuclear Stockpile Under CTBTI

efill of growing intern Jtiimal pressure ioomprehcmis'c Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and limited nuclear testing data, China his been scrambling in recentcquire the equipment and technologies necessary to maintain itir credibility of il* noclca- forcenuclear leslsng Russianeapons taboratones remain Beijing's primary source ul equipment *ndut* also is approaching Woinn countries, ofiea under the< if joint research sent jits or technical conferences tTmj warn* to acqune us nuclearj h>afay lechnoloey.

[and

It may press Hit lllk iniormaiton in CKCtiunge inr conpcinlmn inTBT

China Seeking Foreign Assistance To Address Concerns Aboul Nuclear Stockpile Under CTBT I

a result of growing international pressure loa Comprehensive Test Ban Treatyand limited nuclear testing data, China has beenin recent years to acquire lhe equipment and technologies necessary to maintain the credibility of its nuclear force without nuclear testing. Hussion nuclear weapons laboratories remain Beijing'ssoune of equipment and technology, but China also is approaching Western countries, often under the guise of joint research ventures ar technicalChina wonts to acquire US nuclear security and safety

m exchange

for cooperation in

for this information inI'BT.

Limitations of China's Nuclear Testing Program

[

From its inception, China's nuclear weapon' program, under the direction of the China Academy OfPhysicsay been limited in scope andc

Evolution of ChineseArtenal f

elatively small number of nuclear tests,weapon designers have developed analthough limited, nuclear deterrent. Beijinghasuclear stockpile estimated byCommunity atmiChinese designers have been able tothe developmentimple fissioninor theo theof large, mullimegaton fusion warheads forrange ballistic missile force (includingrangeith a

he Chinese also havetnalLenhanced radiation (neutmn) warhead,it intendedhort-range missilethat iheytheir efforts onmall,thermonuclear warhead.

China has conducted at leastuclear testsfar less than the number of nuclear testsby the United States or the former

weapon concepts and limits, China's idling program apparently permitted research only of thoseessential to meeting specified warhead designr^^|

indicates that with the exception ot nuclear cnects testing, China's nuclear testing program appears to have been restricted to developing warheads that met the design constraintsarticular weapon system. Alter the constraints ol weapon size, weight, and yield were met. the design was certified (or production. There is virtually no evidence that China conducted nuclear tests to study the design parameters of nuclear weapons. In contrast to US and Russian testingthatide range of materials,and esoteric shapes to research potential

tt Uunh IVtfi

wiih intentionally degraded' components will limit the ability of Chinese scientists to assess the effect of component degradation.

Chinese high-speed electronics, massively parallel computing systems, and three-dimensional radiation-coupled computer modeling codeslag behind Russian and US technology, China's abilitytudy critical warhead parameter* and to use computer modeling to eMropolalenuclear lest dala is limited. Equipment andshortcomings also will hamper Ihe ability of Chinese scientists to accurately assess the overall impact nf design changes made either tn correct deficiencies or lo meel new mission demands! I

A design or reliability flaw in any warhead in China's arsenal, which containsimited number ofmodels, would significantly impact the overall capability of China's nuclear force;

for example,ingle ICBM warhead design,ritical design or reliability problem wiih ihearhead would temporarily deny China the ability to striVe al the continental Uniied locvalujte and ensure the viability of their nuclear arsenal (see inset) rhe Russian nuclear weaponsAll-Russian Institute fnr Theoretical Physics (VNTfTF) al Chelyabinsknd theInsiiiuie furperl mental Physics (VN1TEF) allo he Beijing'? primary

andhnology According to frhe Chinese

also are approaching Western couniric* for assistance and thete have been unconfirmed reports that Iheretain) aty fiance from

action with China terminaied afier China'snuclear tesl in October

3?oth Russian

nuclear weapon laboratories are continuing toChinese

Id work with

CAEPon

shock wavesonaiion physics, afier December

theedium-range ballistic missile and thentermediate range ballistic missile probablyommon nuclear warhead,ajor design or reliability Haw in this warhead would temporarily eliminate much of China's abilityarget Russia and India.

Toarhead-design problemarticular missile system. China could use warheads from other missiles, forexample, thearhead could serveeplacement warhead for thef its warhead was deemedengineering modifications to the replacement warhead probably would be necessary. If the problem is related todegradation and reliability. China couldnew warheads, f I

njj 1i> Address Weaknesses [

li it Ji -

calcs ihal in recem years CAEP officials have aggies-si very pursued the equipment and technologies needed

iding nuclear materia! io nology probably has

Russian

improved China's stockpile stewardship and

Recent evidence of continuing cooperation includes:

araaslcxs Cctarc

inpinata

r.iihKiii.iJci

CounterpArt*"

1etailedat iwicleai-fehiert lechn iW.srcPrntileraicn DigeuOlIKRuisMJquipmcni .iiut Terrmnltigy hi Chi

Original document.

---

---