SCC MEETING OF 7 NOVEMBER 1980: SECURITY FRAMEWORK

Created: 11/7/1980

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEUIGENCE

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of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Meeting Security Framework

1- Action Required: None; the following is for your information, iff)

2. Background: The meeting, chaired by Dr. Brzezinskl, wash SCC on developmentecurity Framevork for the Persian Culf and Indian Ocean. Although the topic scheduled for primary discussion was the DoD paper ofctober as updated, the meeting was completely devoted to the broad policy and budgetary Issues involved In the proposal. (C)

3. Discussion: As preamble Dr. Brzezinskl began by stating that the President has committed the USolicy whose purpose is to ensure security of the region over the next decade. olicy is vital and say be the most important legacy of the Carter Administration. The President, he said, must be told that successful Implementation Is going to be expensive. Furthermore, "before we stare looking for new jobs, we owe ic to the nation to bequeath the best possible security framework to the new Administration." tin

4. Secretary Brown then focused the discussion by noting that we cannot off-set the Soviets everywhere principally because we concede then the militaryhus Our Initial moves In most foreseeable power projection situations will be essentially reactive. ecurity assistance program, including MAP, we cannot build che necessary bridges to some strategically important countries. "Uee continued, "to convince the Congress that FMS and HAP are viable US defense tools and not give-away programs. Unless ue are able to forcefully sake that point.

we olght as well forget the Issue." SecDef seated that he well understood chat indigenous forces would be unable to stop the Soviets on their own whatever the level of assistance but that credible capabilities co resist aggression were necessary adjuncts to effective OS actions. TT

Ambassador Newsora replied chat the DOS supported the effort to identify various regional strategic options as well as the thesis that FMS and MAP were necessary. He worried that the levels of enhancement proposed by the DoD paper wouldegative impact on foreign econocic aid. Secretary Brown responded that the Congress would likely slash such aid in any case. Dr. Brzezinski then said it was important to quickly tell the President chat the SCC considered theey issue and that it would cost more coney than was currently budgeted. F)

OMB (John white) entered che conversation which became quite animated and vas characterizedpirited exchange of views. Basically the battle lines were drawn over the mechanism for introducing the desired level of enhancement into che new budget. The majorityeld roost strongly by the Pentagon team representatives with some supporting fire fromas that the enhancement should be presentedighly visible "add-on".to che budget. This position not only squarely addresses the essentiality of the increase but also makes it immune to departmental or agency juggling. Additionally, this approach would save.lower priority programs from any managerial inclination toward rejuggling.

OMB responded that insufficient attention was being paid to established budgetary policy and the zero base concept. The budget was characterized as already deeply in deficit and any enhancement for supporting the security framework should be addressed in the context of other needs and priorities. This should, it was argued, be done whether the increase was purely additive

or interleaved In the current new budget proposal. OMB's final shoetrong plea for laying all of these cards on the table along wich the proposed enhancement so that the President could decide how "vital is vital."

6. Ambassador Koner counterattacked by strongly implying that without the high visibility implicit in tht additive option, "we will continue to be choked by bureaucratic miasma." His recommendation was to give the President the package in relatively gross terms making it clear that it should be done as an "add-on". David Aaron, trying his hand at mediation, entered the discussion saying that while the President should be presented the package as Komer suggested, it vas also necessary to lay out the full consequences. Including possible effects on other programs. Ceneral Jones then pointed out that one component of the 'consequential' presentation shouldecognition that increased MAP funding was contrary to previous Administration policy. OMB agreed and embellished this point with allusions to other potential 'sticky-wickets' such as Egypt-Israel, Greece-Turkey, ecc. All agreed chese would have to be sketched-in wiih some detail for the President. iSJXf)

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9. Dr. Brzezinskl directed BCen Odoa to lorn an ad hoc working group forthwith towo or three page paper on the subject which should go to the Presidentay or so. Ambassador Newsoa cautioned that this paper should keep the Syaington-GlemAoendoent In nind. Secretary Brown smiled and said that considering certain cotanents that "proliferation was none of our business" this should not be toooncern. On that note the meeting ended. No scheduleollow-on session was

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