Created: 1/1/1981

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORAUTIONDitdcnura Subject lo Criminal Sonet iom



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NfCMportaWtl On*,

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Gcmnnnm Information









The Legacy of

Foroei lot


The Debate Over

Reform Under


Reform and the New

n white Reaction


Prospects for Change Through

ImnUcattoos for


This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum represents (beCommunity's first in-depth assessment of Internal South African political dynamics as they pertain to the process of racial reform. The ruling Afrikaner minority's thinking on the need for reform of the apartheid system istate of flux. Hence, the memorandum'sare limitedelatively short period of time; the next two years, i' Follow-on assessments by the Intelligence Community will probably be required within this time frame

The memorandum was prepared under the auspices of theIntelligence Officer for Africa. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency participated in its drafting. It has been coordinated with Intelligence Community representatives at the working level. Research was completed on


The United Sutejongstanding interest in the rcspotuaveness of White South Africans to Nonwhite aspirations for political, economic, and social equality. At stake are declared American principles as well as US objectives In preventing racial conflict In South Africa fromUS economic and strategic interests there and from creating openings for the Soviets throughout the region.

The pressures for change in South Africa's racial policies are the productomplex dynamic. The major external forces for reform have been increasingly hostile international opinion and the steadyof Black nationalism in southern Africa. However, the mainof foreign criticism and the threat of international sanctions has been to spur the South African regime to greater efforts toward military and economic self-sufficiency.

Internal factors have been more telling In their impact:Apartheidoctrine has been seriously undermined by its failure to achieve the physical separation of the races. This goal has become increasingly unrealiiable in the facerowing Black population and the influx of unemployed Blacks to the urban areas.

Blacks are increasing In economic importance as low White birth rates and decreasing immigration make the pool of Black labor the more necessary to maintain economic growth The Soweto riots6 accelerated the breakdown in the White and particularly Afrikaner consensus on apartheid. The government saw the needore coherent strategy to maintain White control. Tlw subsequent relaxation of some of the restrictions of petty apart bctdebate over the necessity for far-reaching changes in racial policies.

As the debate has continued if has become clear that there Isno quarrel within the Afrikaner community over the long termWhite political control and protection of Afrikaner privilege and identity But three rnain lines of argument have emerged regarding the strategy and tactics for maintaining ihii




Moderate Afrikaners, theioetligics, wouldroadof restrictions In the economic and labor fieldsague promise of eventual limited Nonwhite participation in (herealm.

The more progressive among the moderate Afrikaners advocate reshaping the political structureonfederal system with decisionmaking powers granted to Nonwhiles. albeit in veryareas.

The scope and pace of change over the next two to three years will In large part depend on the attitudes of the Afrikaner community at large. Although Afrikanersroup appear more receptive to change now than at any time In the past, the conservative Afrikanerremains powerful enough to hinder any push for reformby Prime Minister Botha's government.

Botha has categoricallyne-man, one-vote formulanitary state. He and his supporters believe, however, that apartheid must be modernized In order to assure White survival and have movedariety of ways to signal the seriousness and urgency of their push for change. It is clear that Botha is not workinglueprint and is moving in an ad hoc manner that gives him the flexibility to press or back off from given policies as circumstances require.

Nonwhiles have grown pessimistic about the prospects forchange and have,esult, rebuffed new government initiatives and rejected most of their leaders who have consulted with White authorities. Urban Blacks, as well as the younger generation of Asians and Coloreds who identify with them, have demonstrated (heir lack of respect for the government's timid reforms by consumer boycotts, labor unrest, and student demonstrations.

The pace of reform over the next two to three years will not be sufficient to satisfy Nonwhite demands, particularly if reforms arewithout consultation. Racial tensiorj will rise in urban areas as Nonwhite expectations continue to outpace the ability of government to deliver reforms. Indeed, reforms will likely stimulate more strident Nonwhite demands for change. Prospects, then, are as follows:

overall pattern of urban unrest, interspersed with sporadic and spontaneous violence, will mark the next few years.will remainower level in rural areas, but tbe growing poverty of the government-established homelands may result in increasing rural unrest Rising urban and rural unrest canbe contained but only at the cost of harsher repression.

Black insurgent groups, primarily the African National Congresshich is backed by the Soviets, will continue to pull off spectacular terrorist operations. The ANC may also expand its activities in rural areas and will increase Its efforts to infiltrate Nonwhite student and labor organizations. Government security forces, however, probably will be able to prevent ANC activities fromerious threat to stability.

Faced with racial unrest and conservative resistance to hisBotha will be tempted to move away from parliamentary institutions to concentrate power In his own hands. He will be aidedew elite, dominated by the military but alsobusinessmen and technocrats, who see change as the only way totrong economy and national security. Whites would probably acquiesce, albeit reluctantly, in this shift of power if Botha found it necessary to deal forcefully with rising Nonwhite violence 3nd White costructionism.

Botha Is not likely to find himself under pressure to this degree before Ihe endut he appears to be positioning himself to rule South Africatrongman at some point in the future.



The United State*ongstandn* latere* ia il*of While South Africans to Non-white aspiration* for political,and social equality Al Stake are declared American principlesn IS objective* io preventing racial instability in South Africa from tronardiiing US economic andntereit* their and from creatine opening* for

Ihe Sovieti throughout the region. US reiauont ebe-

where In Africa are abo involved

Z Thai memoaandam "ill address the qiaesUoa of whether Prime Minbler P. W. Botha's administration and (he ruling Afrikaner -dominated National Party are willing and able to posh reforms far enouah and fan enough lo keen racial vtoljnoe from escalating. The Colored riots In0 near Cape Town, mounting Black labor and student unreal throughout South Africa, and Botha's recent unwillingness to buck ihe right wing of hb parly have all given special pointl question '

3 Tho memorandum will review Botha's reform policies is theynfolded since he took office two vein ago. discus* hi* Style and strategy, analyze the reaction of Non whites and White* to the program, and draw conclusions about the prospect* for chance over the neat two to three yean Special crnphaiii will be given to the implications (or internal stability. This paper foe nam on the degnettic Smith African polttkcal

e It nt- ilM ?>

hich disciuaod South AfHca'i overall strategy for survival In an Increasingly hostile world. The metnorandum's prosecUons are based on auumpttntu ihal eMernal pressure* for reform will nolaswnssvasstaaVavisles Has W

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uvcrsasedraasa4icaUy over current levels and thatwill continue lo believe in the efficacy of ihe economic, military, and foreign policy aspectsi* overall wiateanr.

The Legacy of Apartheid

* The National Party rose to power In South Africa8ledge to intend patterns of; rrciacy and racialstatutory and custwnsryhad developed over the previous two centuries. The party. In fact, coined ihe word' meaning "apartness or "separation.'* toits pledge and to serve as III campaign ling in The appeal of that pledge and slogan reflected the rise Of Afrikaner identity Bad the depth even the* of White concerns over the impetus that post-World War I! forces of Industrial uation. urban! rat ion. and nai imahwn gave to procure front other racial groups for wider political, economic, and social rights.

S During the I'jrjOs. sucrsssnve Natsonal Partyenacted laws thai more strictly codifiedseparation In the social, economic, and residential spheres Under frame Miairrer Vervroerd. the party embraced as doctrine the concept of "grand" Vcnvoerd's theory cantered on the notion thai the tribal rearrvatsons that had already hern set aside for eichnlve use of the main African trfboa couldnominally independent stales where Blacks could fulfill their political aspiratkass In ewsence. the thenrythat Black* provide labor for the White aeea* of South Africa but return to theiror 'hornelands- upon comptetKm of their con-tract No plan was offered for even theoretical for Colored* or for Asians, who had rically orefined tcrriloiul bases.

8 Workmg from Verwoerd's blueprint, lucorisivr Nationals*s by theadthe eompies and interwoven polioes ofpolitical, and social discrimination and control known as "reswatehe main feature* of apartheid are by now well known:

As the rvauh of the ranees* of enforced territorial segregation, roost Bbcisen made legal

tour Pretoria to embarkrogram lo make South Africa militarily and economicallythus loss iiucepllble to outside leverage."

itenal pmwm haw been accompanied byunrest. Indeed, as Blacks havn become urban-kted and consequently leas chvtded alone tribal Jinn, they have abo become men aware of the worldSouth Africa's borders. The decolonizationin Africahendmany Nonwhite In South Africa to believe thai historical trends Improved the prospects for ihedot ruction of the apartheid ryslcm During this period Ibe African National Congress (ANC) and ihn Pan-Afrtcajslst Congress (PAC) organised large-scale aattaparthnd drmonitr attorn which culminated in the Slrarpevllle massacreubsequently both were banned, and Black political activity In general vnasong period of Quiescence ended wilh the Sowelo riotshich were par daily linked lo the coming to power of Black majority governments In Angola and Mozambique.

has ako been unoVrsnbted bv itslo meet Us Own goals, particularly the phyucal separation of the races. An annual growth rate of ilerceni in the Black population and the meager

opportunities in the homelands have resulted fn Increased migration of Blacks to urbanrever ul of tbe flow Verwoerd cmiwoned MacksWhites In almost all urban center* nnd the relative numerical poaitxei of Whiteso de cline. (See population mtiniatet in

rVeatarea. When the Nationalto power Ingriculture and more ha Ihe economy than didend commercial interests.hereversed: industry and commerce werefor more than hall of the nationalemand lor Black skilled labor thatbe filled within the constraints of apartheid,birth ralesecline in WhilesSgruficanllv slowed the eipansion of thepool0 new While iobteefcersthe laborhere werenew While workers. The increasing!!of skilled labor lias re*olted in iheiob reservation* in all but two sectori of the

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The growing economic importance of Binnow compriseercent ol ihe new entrants Into Ihe labor market andpercent of (he labor force in Ihe ind nil rial nearthuid aroundbeginning lo give some skilled Black workers leverage.hen Nadlllonally docile Black labor thockcd ihe While community by engaging in moretrikes nationwide, urhm Black) have been making use of this leverage lo demand better working cwd.lK-m. Higher pay. union recognition, and.eneral easing of apartheid restrictions

It monoicr. one of the major tenon* ihe gosern-ment drew from ibe riots6 was that high levels iJ iinem ploymentrious danger to interna) stability rretoria currentli estimates that the eeonu-mt nredi to maintain an annual growth raleercentlo hold unemployment at the current level Thus, continued economic eapamon, once deemed importanl largely because of the material benefits derived by ibe While community, has now become vilal into keep Nonwhite frustration* in check.

hen Ihe Nalkonel Party first came to power, these economic problem* would have been mainly the concern of English speakers, who then owned most industriesfrikaner private busineaaexcluding agriculture, had grown from leas thanerceni In 1m6 to almostercent. Furl her more, the National Parly, to counter English domination of the economy, ha* created or capandedublfeI bat central, among otherthe iron, steel, and coallectrical production, and the manufacture of armament* and syntheticfrikaner com me- rial and industrialhoan Increasingly sign if leant segment of ihe Afrikaner elite, now comprehend thai ihe continued adherence to separate development hamper* ecnnomlc growth

The Deboie Ova* Reform

It Despite the Heady erosion of apartheid* fourhtalioru. Ihe broad Afrikaner consensu* against any lagsuf kant modification of the syytem did not Start In breakuntil after the Soweto riots ofhe upheaval In rhis large Black township outsidenexfaurg ccntrsbwtrd so the undercurrent of unease setbv 'be emergence ol hostile Black regime*

in Angola and Moiambtque wilh csoto lie* lo loo USSR, the onset of the wort raraanoo naotnd increasedfivlim against apartheid

iewing itself threatenedtolal onslaught" oi hostile esremal and iriternal forces. Prime Ministerovemmeni sooght so rartorataze and or-cheslrale domestic and foreign policies in order loa more coherentfor nalnti hite control As pert of this effort, theelaialien of apartheid reatrktions In such areas as iporti, urban home leaseholds by Blacks, penalties for passbook "iolalionj. lob discil ml nation, andof public facilitku. These measuresrag-malic response lo the tisin( asternal and Internaland lo the prospect of increasing Isolation from the West. The main Impact, however, waa toebate conducted until then larger*ver the necessity of more far-reaching changes In racial policies.

s the debate has Intensified and spread within Afrikaner ellles during ibe past few yean. It hasclear thai the quarrel is not over long-termfrikaners remain collectively committed lo maintaining White political dominance andtheir privileges and identity Progressiva andAfrikaners altko rule out any one-man. one-vote formulassswiri' state,thai WhMc* would quickly lose control regardless of anyThree main lines of argument have tseveidped. however, over issues of strategy and tactici

Conservative Afrikaners, popularly labeled cer-iiumi'iii iiitrnlly. cramped ones) oppose any significant tinliarlng with apartheid. Ver iramjlfi contendo minor moddicaiicm in ihe principles ol separate development will eventually undermine the entire tyilem. Even among ihethere are gradations Some of tbem belioe that certain aipects of petty apartheid can and should be eased toInternational critics Others would improve Ihe livelihood and general well-being of Nest-white* but strictly wilbin the dogma ol separate development.i* Verwocrdian model prove* unattainable, there are nrrl'ii motes who believe that Afrikaner! ihoaiid retreathiterather lhan riperimerit with modification! of ihe present syilrm.

The more politically moderate members of the Afrikaner elite, called tsrrffafet (enlightenedecognize thai the Verwoerdfan model is seriously flawed and ihat domestic andpressure* for change will continue to build. They are prepared to throw up various facade* of reform and of consullalton and collabcrrnllon Willi Nonwhite elites but refute any compromise or the fundamental principle of maintaining the 'hue political iisonopoly Their programnotollback of much ol petty apartheidroad lifting of restrictions In tbe economic and labor (fields, but also vague prom isrs of eventual political conclusions In return for the cooperation and collaboration of Nonwhite leadenhe mainstream ontsgiegoes, should be dispensedactical basis lo maiimiae their political impactand within the Soowhit* tommunities while mitsuniUng tbe practical effect on White power and on Nalkeral Party unity.

Progress* ves In the orrhgUcan be termed tbe rerfief* vanguard and who are mainly (nurnallsls andprepared lo eiperlment cautiously In the political realm. They would reshape the South African political structure by Involving Colored* and Asiansimited form of deeitionrnahing and wouldurban and homelandroader political confederation with comerumpowers over certain matters. While*maintain authority over the great bulkational resourceseto over any policy that might adversely affnel While intorosii.

V cerfiftyj seek to co-opt Cctoreds, Assam, and limited number* of urban Blacksew Non-white middle class that would actufferlack revolution VerhgU irgomenu. o* it least ihe mainstream tfrategics. have found rympatbetie an-dienens wilbin important sector* of the Afrikaner community Businessmen want freedom fromregulations that hamperfficiency, including apartheid reilnctloru on tbe mobility, train' ing. and employment of Black lubnr

he largely Afrikaner officer corps in theForce also has embraced eeriigt* view*rials, coupled with lite disappearanceWhite buffer states, have created thewhat South African defense planners Irarof internal revolt and esternalembarkedrogram of forcefasanlse* Increasing rtcnUteaiat of Nonwhileselimioalion of petty apartheid within the

lervkes, the military ha* made- pi*in In conotrn lSal civilians are lagging behind in making change) In

en domestic and International dlacontant

fhfU view* nave abaympathetic audience In the increasing number* of urbanized and rducaled Afrikanen Tbli growing upper middle class hat drified away from traditional tuhure and vaJues Inlo an Increasingly aflluent and more related lifestyle Thete Afrikaner) are have ibe governmeoi devise more lleoibl* and pragma he spproache* to race relations. Verllglr views are also making inroads iraoti( some youssger clergymen in the Out eh Reformed Church,ast ion of veraranip" doctrine, at well as on campuses of the traditionally conservative Afrikaner unlversitiMirampte argument appeals lo aquarter In the Afrikaner community; lower-level civil tervssisti. including the police, blue collar work-en, peimariry In tbc mining sector, and farmers Theac groups, which feel mosthe need for either lob protection or the sapptv of cheap Black Ubor that aiurthod hasormed thef Ihe National Parly, altTiough iheir Influence is declining. Led by Transvaal party chief Andrsea Tieumlcht (seehe nerliraimplr faction in

Ibe part, -estimated to command the royalty of up tofationalist members ofbeen able to block some orrllfle Initlalivtss byoins on Afrikaner traditions of corssesvsuslon ma king and the party's hotoelc fearpilt. In addition, the Treorrncht faction could probably count on the lupport of as many asther members of the party caucus onoes.

Reform Under Botha

hen he took oil Ice two years. Botha (see figuread been in the public eye for more thanears as Defense Minister and bead of the National PaKr'i Cape Province branch. Cape polilklanselatively niodarate tradition within ihe Nationaland during (he years Botha held the defensethe mililary lusd begun to drop racial borders la the defense forces Bat Botha wars generally regardedardliner because of hli role as architect of SouthIntervention in Angola3 and because of his clashes with government leaden over this, and othernd most observers placed him on the orr-trampre ude of the debate over racial reform

is previous reputation notwithstanding. Botha has led the way in changing the style and tone of gov-

. 1* i-




dealings wilh the Nonwhile community, adopting ihc rhetoric of change, ind becoming the first South African prime minuter tolacka homeland. He has con-lulled with someleaden andurbanSaleries of reform propmal) wilh corislderoblc fanfare.

tl Sew Contlituhonal S'lmeiarea Efforts at constitutional reform began6 under Prime Min-iiler Vorjter when Botha, then Minister ofabinet committee lhat drewlsn to ctesile separate Colored and Asian parliaments at the national level that would have limited autonomy In local affairs This plan was endorsed by the National Parly but rejected by Cosoreds and Indians on the

grounds that It ignored the political iratlons of


fter men-tog up to Ihe prime ministershipBotha scrapped this plan and art up aunder ihen Interinrhnd

Iter native Wutsons. Hoi has new ptass for conUttu-tiniiil reform -at revealed earlysn In an interim report by the itchlebissrh commission and given legal lifetitiintimjl amendmentm May. The prindimlinnova-linnthe PresldVnl'seliberative body


ofhites. Coloreds. and Asians under the mansbip of Stair Vice Prrsidcnl Schiebusch new poal was created by ihe amendment

ZS The Council, whose memSm are appointed fos five-year lerma, was officially Installed on fii tea.oloreds. five Asians, and One Chinese South African agreeing lo serve on It; meal of lite Nan white members are not rocostnl/ed leaden of their communities. Botha appean intent on makiiai the Council an Important component of the government. To enhance their< wnciiwill receive the same salaries as oiembers of Par-liamem and will be bosued io new.ffkva In Cape Town, ihe country'scapital. The Council has five subcommittee!constilutsonal. scl-enlrfic. economic, planning, and CoosaMiattiIn which specific peobleuii between the races are lo be discussed.

The Tsehlebuscb proposal alsolack advisory council of urban representatives and home' land leaders, on which Ihe PrvwdenT* Coursed could call ai its discretion foe advice andBi'ha dropped the concept altogether alter malor Black leaders oblrcted lo the secondary status it cunfetied on Bfcuha Black* still hate no repersrntation on the na-Ifeuul level

omeland/ Policy. Under Botha, the govern-menl has continued to posh ihe Homeland*figureowardr.oei*ndriii* Botha recently admitted that Ihe rtotneksrsds are not economwsll*thereby tacitlyedging that for allpur peart the classic homelandi policy of apart-held hai faded. Theowever, are central to Botha'a revamped "eoniteilaimn of state*"concept devised originally to strengthen and reinforce clisting economic links and taystem of and informal arrangements foe military cooperation between South Africa and Hi relatively dependent neighbors In southern and eastern Africa. Following Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe.scaled down the plan's geographical limits to the Republicomelands

9 Veeda became the ihsrd nominally In-dependent homeland Ciskei will probably soon Ise-coeoe ihe fourth The government has failed, however, to persuade the vast majority of Black* thai there are political and economic benefits to be derived from tes-Hlencc in Ihe homelands

olitically, one malor sticking point has been the dues!loo of citlzeradilp. As Transkel. Rophu-thsttwsna. and Vessda have becorne irsdrpeodent. iheir realdents along with tiibaDv related urban Blacks have lost South African citizenship and attendant rssrhts. This has aroused better opposition arnong Blacks, who contend thai the government is trying lo make them aliens within their own counliv.

he issue* of land consolidation and economic aid have been equally c'ntentlosn The consolidation of the Reographleally disparatenon-independent bom*land of KwaZuluade up of al leastragment) ofrequire Ihe acquisition of large amounts of White-owned Aside from coenmiqaocung new studies of the prohlrm. ihe Botha administration is unwilling lothe considerable economic and political castaerious cocrsoudatlon program would iiscur.

otha's economic ant program for the home-bnds ha* not differed sagssifkanUy from Vorsterv Pretoria continues lo provide operatingseconded Whilefor the hoovefaixhut developrnent asd remains scanty Botha's effort* to persuade the Snulh African private serine to aasume some of the burden foe improving economic conditions in the Impoverished homeland) have been unproductive so far

mired Assloaosssa,/or Croon Black Comma-ai'liVi Despite his unwllllriannu to countenance acosuullatlve role (or Blacks In the newmachinery. Botha has continued Voeiter's cauiloui program for est ending limited autonomy to some Blackn0 thepublishedntends to submit towhich would establish municipal autborttleawould replaceanting constantlyThese now local Black authorities would havestatus equivalent to that of local Whitehe decision* of the Black municipalities would, however, be subfect to tbe veto of theof Cooperationeiopersent Unless the government wins the approval of key Black readers, Its new legislation will suffer the fate of past aoliatianaam above it will be made meaningless and unworkable by the suspicions and passive resistancehe township resident*

'si. Familu Homing. An acute shortage of Non-while bousing throughout South Africa ha* led the government to relax enforcement of the Croup Areas Act for Colored* and Allans. The Act require*of residential areas and is one of Ike mostpillar* of apartheid. Estimates of ihe shortfall in tuning are nownit) for0 for Coloreds. and per hapsanyorn tbe Black township of Soweto alone, therehortage of at0 units

0 budget, which reflected the dramatic increase in gold pdcei. providedpercentincrease for the national liouling fund, but this doe* not begin to meet the precsfng need* of NonwhileWhile admitting the need lor ihc diver-tkm of greater lenusircc* to housing, government of-llcial* have eipresaed hope that much of the slack will be taken up by ihe privaterumple, by employers underwriting the mortgages of iheir work-en Botha's administration has tried to eusc Black fruMrationS by fotto-ing through on Vomer's promise lo est endear leaseholds to those few Blocks who qualify for "permanent residence" in the township* If tesrulattOo proposed fear1 parliamentary sesuon passn, more Blacks would qualify for leaseholds. In addition some inheritance right* for qualifiedcould be si lengthened making home ownership more attractive.

dncarwm.he government hasspending on Black education and training Dro-


byercent' and has given even higher prlor-itymprovements In Colored schooling The gap Io be nudenormous, however. Pretoria spendsimes as much money per iludml on While education as It don on Mack education

he government recently innouneed thai compulsory education lor Blacks up lo the age ofill be gradually phased In grade by grade in seSOCtlve urban Black tmsnsfatps beginning in1 Government official* have admitted, however, thai the prs>gram will probably nol be implesnessiedountrywide baars lor anotherears.

abor Hiformi. In reiporae both tofrom the business sector for relief frombottlenecks that prevent more rational uselabor and to White rarscernt over ihefor labor unrest, the Vorsler governmentestablished two commissions lo study ihelabor law and adminislration. The (woafter iheir chairmen.andyear submittedwhat In iheAfrican contest wererecommend*lions.esult of abacklash some ol the morewere dropped and ihe Intent of other*or neutral tied ih rough legislative drighl

nder bws that ostensibly Implement Wiehahn Co mm lis molack unions, which previously had no official Matin, now are offered the opporlumt. lo register and bargain roBectivdy In industrial councils lhal decide wage demandsnion accepts registration how ever, at insist submit to government oversight and refrain from politicalThe rovemmeoleined two new bodies to encourage more efficient use of manpower' theManpower CrennuVsJooewndustrial Court

he government ha* amended regular Ions that formerly prohibited Black enlry into several (killedand has eased travel and Other restrict mm on urban Black obboideei Al the same lime, however, other new regulation* make il more difficult forBlacks lo live and seek work in urban area* by imponng steep fine* on employers who hire Blacks


tO Be/onss in far Mititon,hen Botha Kill held the defenseludv by the Defense

'Tniilume. alee- -It* the rjeevtmn one lor U*woaet. dees rvallaleintoneouolSoothAlrleaiInftaiinw


Force recommended recruitment00 Nonwhile* into the services as parteneral force ei tension. In part, this goal reflected shrinkage of the available pool of While manpower as the booming South African economy absorbed more and more skilled manpower. The Defense Fore* has increased Its NonvilUle volunteer component fromen7 toenoloreds make up tbe largest Nonwhile group in Ihe services, followed by Blacks and Asians

The mililary recently has accelerated its recruitment of Blacks, and Botha has announced ihe formation of four Black battalions- Although there are still slight differences in pay scales and separateand housing facilities for Nonwhites. Ihebenefits and the gradual elimination of pelly apartheid within the services have made military duly attractive to them. The military also appears serious about accepting more Nonwhile* for training in highly skilled technical specialities.

Noriwhite soldiers serve tours of duty in the operational area In Namibia where they shatefacilities witlyWhilc troops Botha has held up (he rumple of racial cooperation in ihe mililaryodel for the nation. - *

Botha's Commitrrsenr

Botha's actions over the past twoquestions remain over the nature of hi*to racial reform and tbe specific* of hischange Reflecting hi* Cape background. Bothalo have greater sympathy for Coloredlo be less impressed by ihe fears of Ihefell by Afrikaner* in area* of thetbethereater. Like Whiles across Ibc Southspectrum, however, he bos ruled out theof one-man. one-votenitary Stale.thai flu Botha best is thaioliticaldescribing hi* approach lo racehimself has recently been claiming lo be"the art of the possible."

otha. perceiving lhal the momentum of Blockrowing, appear) to attach someto Ihe need for change Indeed, he appear* to believe that White survival may depend on ihe success or failure of his administration's efforts to adaptapartheid to current realities Botha has not. however, spelled out any specific blueprint orfor change. Instead, hi* approach to raceover the past two year* has been ad hoc. Some of his proposals appear to have been aimedattracting


mpport Others were IrUl baAooaaoe limit, or While toleration for changethe case. Botha ha* remainedressing oroffiven policy a* circumstance* have required

otha'sthat ofew middle cleat ofuia. and urban Black* <vlih enough Mike in (hetoto defend R. aloaapideaainet outUden and. if neeeaaary. tgairut leia prtHlegrd Sooth African BJocki. HU vMon Is thaiarge multiracial bloc, dominated byn which there are to many layer* of partial privilege for Nonwhltei thai Ihe line* of racial confrontation which salst todaybecome blurred

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irciedwau tad offw a* rail paVtkal chiltraar la Mdloml Parti naW Tnty hax (Da* on manl a* liv lot th* IMaSWal rt obrtov* rarlal ilia iliiilaalkn aad un aUMldt nwvrf id wn* tana of ladanhwa TWre rh So beaui*t

aataaea Uw Eaaaak wiaaiu fcaa.,w. TV haw r

fVt.waaaawaarv awn mta >wi*I. aiw*Wlac Kaoaaal Party i i III |ni

ersanaaidurimuJ Ufa* lai'ii.m iDpaand Is ha MaaStfcUIke Km* luvub

Be I'm.Ihe Salsanal Party (falna It*.hlinal Party DailUwalary


otha ha* been reluctantush for teak too vigorously in the (ace of concerted oerarampte resistance. During the initial phase of hi* primehe acted a* though tbe right wing ol Ihewere Irrelevant, admonishing tbe orriVramplti to "adapt ornd giving Ihe impmston be preferred them to leave the party rather than have them actrag on racial reform. AI tho lime, however.ot prepared to push change to an eileM that mightplit In tbethepilt occurred9 when catreme rightists broke away lo form ihe HtnUatt <flecon*tifuted) National Party, which has ibe* far noteal in Parliament In icverd recent lonfronla-ii'.ni ever reform-masted issues. Bothahowdown with orrkremple leader Treurnlcht'

Reform orvd lb* New Pontics

otha, while reSuctanl lo confront theead on, bat ahowo no tucb hesitancy about trying to cut down to star another major impediment toswollen South African bureaucracy, which employs up lo hall the Afrikaner work force. Most civil servants are National Party members and err in the cerlrompre camp. The vast maioeitv ofare lower level bureaucrats who possess only modestt adrrdnistratras of apartheid regulation* they are Intent on enforcing the eautlng has; Indeed they are dependent on them for their livelihood Moreover, Ihe mas* ol legislation that forms the apartheid system tlelegates lo these bureauthose In the Department o( Cooperation andeffective power lo pick and choose bow and when to implement esus-ge.

it Botha has sought lo overcome ibis bulk-Inwllhln the government In two ways. First, he ha* cut the numberveinmenl departments by more than half and Is0 lobs vacant He kai aimew tier of department heads and has begun to lill ibis manafesnenl level with people who have beenIn adminiWrsiion and management ouUde the civil service. Second,hai has been dubbed "government by permit and eiemptlnn. he hat permitted owners and operators of restaurants,ports arenas, and similar larthties lo apply for ipecial permitsem from apartheid resiM.tir.niha has encouragedds**tiialists lo proceed wilh otuaiudv* me* seaea wacb as the deaetp**salioo of taciaWea at thetr plants without waiting for ihe necessary legislation or atlmtnlitralive notices In complete their slow ioutaey through ihe bureaucracy

oth* has abo moved to urengthen his ability to induce change throughflat. The Senate, wtiach huloricaDyelay andad ton. waa abolisbed ibis summer a* part of the oonuniitiooaj reoovalion entailed in the ealaUobment of ike Preai-tlent'i (Council Botha ha* abo greatly eipendnd hit own Piirne Minister'* OffW and formollxed the role of Ihe State Securityabinrtlevrlpatterned on the US National Security Council In ihort. he hat created within ihe necutneartwal miaagoih nscreanng ab.bry in aad coordinate poises on it* own. bypesnog ear-hampu cterucUoattti In ibe National Parry'scaucus.

n staffing ihe top posts of his administration Botha hu gone outside traditional National Party car-ete* and broughtariety ofcademies, think-tank prof eutooah. bulln<iimen. and financier) hair all found their roles ihlfling from the periphery to the center of government strategy planning. Botha baa aan packed the Cab.netoterie of w'lgr* pollliclani, Including Cerrlleading oerligle theorist.

ven more Influential are the sensor military officers Botha brought with him when ha moved up from the Defense Ministry. Not only does General Ma gnu Malan (set figureow ill in the Cabinet as Minister of Defense, but military officers are now so strategically placed on every important executive committee and working group of both the Cabinet and Primeffice that they have the opportun.ty to infhaeiscv and morntoi policy decisionsay no parliamentary member and few Cabinet ministers can. Malan, atounted among the oeWigie vanguard, having formulated theO'1 theory whlch bolds thai onlyercent of the threat loatemal. whileercentand the result of Nonwhile grievances. Botha probably believes thai giving mare political influence to military Waders will be palalable to the Afrikaner



of its respect

nother halhnaik of the new politics under Botha has been the proliferation of government-ipon-sored coemdtative and investigative eommisfcocu Finding parliament inadequateource of new ideas, the government ha* used these commission* to gainer facts and make recommendatiom on issue* of ma lor concern More important. South African* of all race* whose view* would otherwise have never been hourd by pollcvmakers have been able lo leaiifv on such topics as Black labor and influ. control. Black education, consolidation of the homelands. Ihe future of ibe consUtuiton. and the cause* of Norm hale riotv Commission report* receive widespread publicity and serve both to educate White* on pressing problems and to condition them to tbe need for change. In the case of the Bsekert. WWhahn. and Scfuebusch commissionsew others. Botha has used their findings and recommendations to pressure parliament lo pass legit-ktson it would nee have otherwise.

he mod pronounced feature of ihe sewBothaihe one which seems to have the greatest implications for racialihe entente that baa developed between the government


e private sector ol the economy rrrfcrtiiaffinity lot the businen community reflects ihifti In thinking thai began during the taller yean of Ihe Vonler regime In the wake of the SneW rlota ibe Vonter admire* rationaterious threat to internal liability.concluded thai optimum economic growth could be achieved only by providing: the private sector with Ihe scope and Incentives (os rapid expansion.dministration began frsdually lo curb growth hi ihe public lector ami in bureaucratic cwWroli over prlv. ie business

otha has takenpproach to tbesector and put bed II further and faster,to enlist the aid of biasir-ras In brlrsgtnghe is unable or unwilling to effect inThe most notable single event In ihisinBotha met in fohameea-

burgusiness leaden lo persuade them that ihoy shared common concerns wilh the government.late controls. Botha asked for private Iridustry'i hefp In continuing to ripand the economy and thereby create more lob* for Nonwhiles. He abn aiked for greater private sector Investment in such areas at industrial Job training program! and development prolects for the tsomelands To prove hit good faith. Botha's neat budget included,umber of other nimublive measures, even more eilensive ta> coneeiiiom for business

uiinesnnen base welcomed Bothacallul have made plain their feeling thai the government must do more In complaining about tbe growing shortage of skilled labor,st men have pointed out that tho policy of separate and Inferior education foebota*>ng their induttrial trainingoting thai wry few Blacki reach an educational level high enough lo qualify for apprentice training. Recently, two tnasoe Fnglnn-ipeiking buiinru groups appealed to thelo relaa Inllui controls furlher and lo peovide snore and better rousing for Blacki Both groupsressed concern over the long-term contradiction! inherent in ihe gnveinmenl'i effort lo create ancenacany while'MiMlf

Nonwhile Reaction

onwhile altlludes toward Botha's approach to

n^l lhtrom

an Inmal wait-and-see stancerowing pe**miIm

ever the proipeeti for meaningful change ManyNonwhite* who have participated in the dlstui-Mune with Ihe government have become diarredited orDespite wrong arm lacttcs by govern-ment tecumv forces, urban Blacks,nd Ccaored* have become IncreaOngly bold in rejecting governmeM Initiative* Student demomt rat Ions, core turner boycotts, and laborby violence--have become commonplace

omeland Blecka. The leaders of the nouln-ekependent homelands have proclaimed severalon which future negotiation* on independence ihould be based, including the retention of Southnatlonahlv (or homelandhe homeland Iradert have been critical of most of the governnsent'* proposab for changeeeting in0 withomeland leaden refused nvembership In Ibe proposed Black Advisory CmmciL demanding that Blacks be Included In the Prratdsrtvt'i Council along with Coloreds, Asians, and Whites

omeland leaden have agreed, however,.In. continue meeting with governmeM officials In discuss reform peuposali Black critics argue that these meet-', ingse faclo Black advisory councilborne Und leaden are the most likely Blackfor pnrtli ipiti-ii In any multiracial politicalhe national level, largely because of the leverage tbe orrvrriiraeni hasem. Manyleaders, while having tribal chieftainould net occupy pnuliooa of political leadership without government backing; ihe constituency (hey eventually must answer lo is not Black bul the White bureaucracy in Pretoria

WtnWeai. Catsha rUalteivn. chief imntster of KwaZuhi. is the one homeland leader who does not fit Ihe mold (see figureie has buill his Zuhi-baied political organisation Irtkatharass-rooli orga> niratjoi embers,rowing following in Soweto and other Mack urbanTlie Zulu* are ibe largest and most aogresnve of South Africa's Blackutbeierl hi* advocaled peaceful change. He indicated In lite Sehlcuu*ch Ciwamlaimn inthat he -eld support anrogram of piecrmeal bul concrete reforms such as the abolition of influi contrail and the Group Areas Ad. Roth*'i failure lo initiate such reforms and theproposallack advisory body with only coeauhatlve poivri diaDuUoned llutheleai.

leceolly. Bulheleai has refused to participule personally in any future meetings between hnmeland

leaden and government officials. iirtiMtiig instead oo bilateral nx^Ungt with Preh-ta'iulhrleH'i move Bp wan aimed in pari alstirag him from other homeland leaden who might eoni-promise with ihe government Butheleri he* altoommission ol iiu own lo study prospect* for racial reform In Natal Province, In pari al least to boh iter Kn claim lo special Hatus among BUck leaders He hai naked hra political future on the government* eventual wjlllnmess lo offer Blacks tome oinanlogful ihare of political power, and. by solidifying hisas the one raatlooal Black leader with whom Pre-i.ust deal, he boisra to gain real cotiCe^lKXU

retorit has so tar apparently refrained from usint the sameining tattles on Buthelen rl has employed on other homeland leaden. Whilea*oice of moderatioa during recant protests,o has often warned that hu ban against violence is not an absolute one. The specter of anrg*uvi*ationalanileoveisuneot militants tlsarty tempan PretoriaV thinking about Its options lor dealing with him.

one,orking against Bothelm's aspiration* for notional Black leadership Theake* for tbe government lo propose acceptablethe more skeptical Black* wtfl become about the wisdom of But herag malic pobcy of nonvyo lence Many Blacks already believe lhal Ikrihcinl Is only seeking power for the Zulus Many urban Black) who have refused to negotiate with ihe government unless it abandons the pobcy of aeparate development argue that Buthcleil. because of his positionomeland leader and hi) willingness to negotiate wHk the government, doe* more harm than good to the Black cause

rtrnrn Block (aaderaAip. Most urban Black Waders have aho rejected thei peopomh for change Prominent Black spokesmen, *ueh aa Dr. Mhalo Mo*Una (see figuref the Soweto Corn, mil tee of Ten. oppose any cooperation with the gov-eriimenlgirei to negoeule on the ossestion <rf power sharing Mollana refused to participate6oweto Community Council, and hs* boycott, coupled with ihe nonpartypatsoo of Inkalha. resultedoter turnout oferornl

or ihe most part urban Black leaders have been unabW to translate their cfemands into effective action Recent atternpti by the Com mi "or ol Ten toent Strike, for example, have been un*

. . .

ut One* they emerge Into tbc public eye. ihw urban Black leadersparticularly vulnerable to arrestunni.i' When venom inch ai Fan yam Minbuao., of tbe Soweto Teachers' Act km Committee, Cuntf Naondo. tuspanded president of the Aranian People'i Organisation, and TboumUa Botha, lormer heed of the Port Eluabeth Black Community Organisation, wereublicensued but no eflactive pressure wet brought to bear sgslntf Pretoria. The vulnerability of urban Black Leader* lo government reprisal! In large part accounts for their msbdity lo ceganiie an effective ron-ilituency.

uhoo Desmond Tutu, secretary geeanral of the Smith African Council ofne of the lew urban Black spokesmen who canonstiluency. both within South Africa and abroad Tutu recentlyelegation of church officials lo meet with Botha to discuss race reUtioei Although ibe meeting was crrtlciaed by tome Blackho warned Tutu

was at laws*0a* Swats.aead ol Hail nullar .aats eht and Bat Collin) Kil-inei olA tyfaavlartlcwaf Iowa. Una! au aa-wlaUui al In lam,aawVi. awJ araaaal lawasfawna*tua-Niii ansribe aeeeilef againstSouth Africanarsh critic of Botha's polk-in Lasttraveling abroad, he called lor Internationalfrom South Aliici and subsequentlypassport lifted Tutu also advocates civiland was arrested lot part ici pa ting In aagainsthe mcent wave ofdemiwiu/ations. Job actions, and consumer reflect* the general discontent of and Allans with the pace of reformha. The unrest has bean largeti ursorga tilled and

ii tin goiernmrnl .'in

through ihe failure nf Hi traditional lactic* of arresting or banning ictiviti leaders Much of the increasingly open dissent appears to be an outgrowth of the Black coruciousnesihilosophical and cultural resection of White attitudes and lifestyles thai enoour-age* Black pride and self-help

uring therefciu outlawed th*amrationi that formed under the banner of Black consciousness. New groups, most notably the Amman People's Organization and several undent bodies, have emerged, although they are kept under tight goaern-contiui and surveillance.aguely defined

social and cultural movement, ho waver. Black coo-Kioosness continues lo spread, port leu lariy among Nonwhite urban youth. Thii new genera'km hat Utile relpeei for Nonwhlle leaders, particularly Ibotelo work (or change within tbe existing tyjtem. It resents Botha and (he txrllgtei collectively (or trying lo buy off Nonwhite* wilh economic and social palliatives.

olored* andlthough Botha hata handful of Colo red* and Asian* to serve on the President'i Council, he hat not won ihe cooperation of these communities Both groups have longtandard of living considerably higher than that of urban Blacks, and. even before their inclusion on (he President's Council, (hey had advisory bodies similar to (he one recently ixopeaed for Blacks.ho once were able to vote for White* to represent them In FuriMntent, still bitterly resent the National Pirly't moves lo dltcnf ranch be them.mall minority, are subject to prejudices from both Whites and Blacks, with (he result that (heir leadersradilion of fence sitting on issues affecting rare rcUtion*

he most credible Colored and Asian leaders have refected Botha's overtures. Tbey have made it plain that their demand for full crtla^rahip and full participation In the political process must extend to Ihe Black population as well The Coloreds arecynical aboutleas for patience. knowing (he Afrikaners' historical concernoliticalbetween Coloreds and English-*pc*king Whiles that would send the Nationaldown to electoral defeal.

rowing community of Interests and grieva-scet, (he younger grrseration of Allans andeginning lo identify closely wilh urban Blacks. Colored and Asian students and workers, some of them Black cntitciouiiies* adherents, have participated in and orumber ofontigovernment demonstration* Organization* wilh policies of noncolkbaration wilh theost notably the Unity Movement among ihe Coloreds and the Natal Indian Congress,onstituencies among politically sophisticated Colored* and Asians.

The fnaurgenflthough the Pan-Afrieonist Congress is still attempting to recover from the setbacks It suffered in ihend thethai has plagued it since, thehowing signs of resurgence. During lis yean in exile, the ANC was sustained by its longstanding tie* to (he South African Communi*and the CSSB. ahis unable lo develop contactsnewly canarging Black acttvtw inside South Ainu- The ANC, however, bag benefited signifies ntlv from the racial uoeest oayce Soweto and from the dbappearane* of White buffer states It ha* won new recruit* Irons Nonwhite youths fleeing police crackdowns at home and hat gained springboards abroad for staging attack* The result has been aIncrease In tbe revel end aopbutkcallon ofmarkedW by dramatic attackshin Inn hank near Pretoria, and the SASOL synthetic fuel plants

hese operation* have enhanced greatly the ANC* appeal to young urban Black* In fact,ANC Pirakdenl Nebon Mandela (tee llgureas become Ihe symbol of liberation for Blacks. ANC theorists have recently begun to emphasize iherole Budent boycott* and Black labor unrest could have in intimidating the White community and in breaking down While authonly. The ANC, however.ill net an effective orgnnlxad resistance lorce mode Sooth Africa Sucresf ul ANC operations, in (act, have resulted in hetghtened governmentmeasure* and base laitgla neigh ton ng countries rhat tupport ihe group under increased pressure from Pretoria

Prospect* for Cbonpe2

he scope and pace of change in South Africa's racial policies over the next Iwo lo three year* will dependost of variables, not the least ol which will be the aHlludes of (he Afrikaner community. A( ihe beginning of Botha's third year In office. Alri-inner* have more favorable views toward change than al any juncture in the country's history. TbU reflect* both the Impact of oetkgte admonitions over the need for reform and the conditionins effects of tho limited changes already implemented. Recent polls showubstantial majority of Afrikaner* prefer Botha'sapproach to change in race relations over any oerhampu retrenchment. Yet, Treurnicfit and like-mindedowerful constituency, and even many Whiles who consider thernselvea

rAfite* believe that significani changes have already occurred. Tho*musteneralbyis first as Primecontinue to move gingerly on racial issues, advancing In (hose areas where White lesistance Is low and withdrawing or postponing proposal*ignlficanl White backlash

he easiest andunge* will continue to take place in tbe .ealm of petty araartrstki. More ho-le'.i.nd ibealen will be opened toore permit* will be itaued (or mixed-race sportingnd the gradual desegregation ofiraroportalioe willumber ofstatute* are scheduled to be ebmirsated In an omnibus bill In ihe IWfll parliamentary session. On the other hand, the Mlied Marriage* and Immorality Acts -il its al aOehbood remain on ihe bonis

oreover. In order tomall Black en-Ireprcneurial claa* and revjtaliir the economically moribund urban buslnesabe government wil probably follow through with it* plan* lo revise ihe Croup* Area* Ad.emit. Nonwhile* would be allowed to eilabloh small businesses in central part* of Ihe currently all-White crises A* long as such revision* do not affectost Whiles will havetrouble accepting them.

To. Pretoria will eitend greater local autonomy lo the town council* and Oliver government-created bod-let in the larger Black townships in order to enhance

Iheity of cooperative urban Block leaders.

probably even ceding some control over ihe raising and allocation of revenue The neii two years are alto liaelyee significant Increases in governmentfor us-ban Black housing and for encoding basic

Services such a* water and electricitybe Black


otha can be erpecSed lo encourage industry lo close the gap between White and Nonwhile pay. and the government may become involved in the current effort by Nonwhile labor group* toerabon between industry and government in oaring the shortage of skilled labor I* Inevitable Training a skilled Black worker isrJne lime* a* expensive as wbudiiins the poaaogekilled White immigrantprivate industry, despite the provision of lasas yet to embark on trainingensiveent In the shortage The goveromenl tor.-srvaisctvilv wiH prrabasbly lotion through withplan*elp establbhaining center* aodew Black technicalncluding one in Soweto

7B. To meetemands for "trainable" en-tranls into the labor market and to help dampenunrest. Botha appear* prepared to undertake *ag-nsfaranthe education system His rrsost likely course will be lo setommon syllabus for

Blacks, which could be followed by creallonntie Ministry of Naitonal Education lo administer separate education (or each racial (roup.endlturf3 for Nonwhile* migtMuantum leapntiled educational antnaatry. dtffeserxe* wiH remain between per caplla spending for While and Nonwhile undent! Brmgirsg Nonwhile facilities up to the laveJ of White fools lea would alone eariail staggering coats, and Whites will not condone having their ownuandaid lowered lo subsidize lmproverr*ents for Non-hltea.

rogram* for ihe eipantan and consolidation of the hcawehnda will hi al likelihood continue to eattt largely on paper; lb* political and financial coats of buying up While-owned farmland and transferrin! II to Black control will remainver tbe neit two to three yran. Soma incorporation can behowever, alone ibe linea of Mafeklng, andiBreued White town that was absorbedeighboring Black homeland, with eitenilveforncluding tbe retention of their South African culrenship

otha will undoubtedly lace up to ihe Black ciliirrshlp Issue byonvoluted planBlacks IO become cHliens ol tbe Independent homelands whileommon South African Identity and panpeai Thai and other aspects of future homefands policy win nol go down well with the oerJrornplei. who will arguehared economy and common national identity oil) inevitably fuelfor political power sharing.

s partew regional approach to economic developmenl and planning for the homelands. Botha is trying to breathe (If* Into plans lo buildas-rtM of Industrial parks along homeland borders and to targe* ealsting Industrial cent en near the homelands forgovernment and private investment, la an ot-tcmpt lo makelans work, the government will probably share control over the Industrial parks with Ihe horneliiidi goyernmenU and wilt probably gjve Ibeortion of ibe Use* trad profitsNevertheless, the homelands remainlo offer lb* iob* that would stem the flow of Blacks Into the cities, or even to achieve much productivity in Iheir basically agrarian economies

n discussing possible future political "iiperuatioos (or Nonwhites, Botha ha* hinted al aonganlr-Hon of Soulbolitical structureonsociations! and confederal basis thai would,

irdlng lo some of his Uvtarprelen. resemble lb* Swiss cantonal system Cooperation and Development Minister koornhof has described thes on* In whichpresumably other ethnicchoose local governments, which In turn would b* Involved wilh decisionmaking onis*oc*onfederalfederal level

hatever ether UiiWurlonal Innovations Bolha iMrooSsea* over the neat two to three years, ihera mat ton ha has *hown lo dealing ihe President's Council ruggsstt that It figure* Importantly In hit plana Botha ha* ret to reveal Its exact furactyoos be-yund vsgue generahlles. For tha short term, thewill play ooiy on advisory role; II* five standing cio-jTuttee* may replac* lonva of ihe many inveatiga-tory and consultative com minion* appointed by Par tUrnent

he govemmenl will probably devise some mJocemeot (or ibe rejected Black odvbory council Black* could eventually be allowed membership on tho Presldenl's Coancil. Insse, urban and no**iod>pe*sdent homelands leaden may be Included In the lwith mine associative role (or thehomelands.

Implfcalidrvs for Sfobdiry

ovemment reform* will continue lo lagNonwhileons and wdl undoubtedly be rejected by Nonwhile youths and intellectuab Policy changes thai would have partially aallafled Nonwhile demands several yean ago are only now being uudu la* oddatSoss,oloreds. aad Asians alike rec ogniir that flotlia's objective Is not ihe creationultiracial government but the preservation ofWhale control Covemment persistence Ul on) laterally ilrviaing formulas for change and then, under the guise ofpressentirig refarrmans will continue lo reinforce ihd

ver the long term. Botha'* programresult In significant improvements in living con-dilions for someithin ibe maturity Black populibon however, the primary brnef actrars of gov-ernmenl programs will be theo IS percent of Black* who have urban raideocy rights Life for homeland and rural Blacks wiD probably rwmaln one of grinding poverty. Equally Important, II will lake several yean for Improvement* to materialise forBlacks and an even more volatile situation could

t best, many urban Blacks will remainio gavernment-created bcd.ei luch a* the Soweto Community Council If Black leaders such as Motions or Bulbelezi agree to paxOelpoIe In new ColUborativ*hey will probably use them a* platform* for demanding even more change. Both*then be faced with Ihe choice of eosvrtsng some of these demands lodibtllty to those wiling lo cooperate wilh live government, or ignoring theand cresting even greater tensioeo than would have occurred In ibe absence of the collaborative structures.

80 Blackewerercent of whom are now unionised, will become more organized and more confident of their abilities to forcewell as(ram management and government Black consumers, as they have in recent moniht. will conlirrue to support striking worker* by boycotting product* and protesting Increase* In thef living. The geaveinenent could respond to these developments by cracking down on Black unions and consumer organ! in lions Such actions, however, would Only work against attempt* lolack middle Haasested Interest in maintaining the *talus nun.

ith Botha unlikely to introduce reform

quickly esoovajh to satisfy Nonwhile demand:.. Iks

tempo of racial violence will probably quickenneat two yean. The government win. be forcedsimultaneously wilh two distinct fomu ofby laborer* andat improving economic condition* andkef* focused domocutrallon* by militantyouth* seeking more fundamentalmi. be Increasing linkages atrsong these group*

or their part, the Black Insurgent group*,the ANC, veil) continue lo pod off occasional spectacularossibly wilh IncreasingCovexisfnent aecurily Ice era however,will be able to prevent urban terrorism froma serious threat to the governhe ANC will increase Its effort to roftitrate student and labor movements but will tonlirtue to be hampered by gov-enuoesvi security measures. Civet* tho growing poverty and despair of rural and homeland Blacks, the ANC may find It easier to expand Hi octMIses lo rural areaa Voeshelc-B. ruralkelr to remain lea*than urban violence.

etween now and the endacialCOuid at times be ol If suf latently interne and widespread to raise questions about Pretoria* ability lo contain It.he overall pattern olb likely to remain that of Largely hieruptions over specific local grtevaoeeo. Lackingorgs i"nd leadership, theart disturbance* will probably coratiwe* to be quested by harsh policeCrackdown* against octlvtst leader* will (ollow, along with remedial bui incomplete re/oririk South Africa Is hegsdy onllkeiy to break out of thai soof-prnietuallng cycle of violence and partial reform over ihe neit three years Indeed. Botha, who ha* notto use Ihe tool* of repeesaoo to the past, may (easl compelled lo dcritotratrate lo his White cnnstltoency that, while he il determined to give Nonwhile* adealqually tSrterrnined to move hanhl. agsinst Nonwhiles who reliue to do It his way. Botha recently hlnled (or lb* lint bine that the Army could be deployed IctskSe South Af oca to contain vvoleasc*.'

aced with racial unrest and urraiampcvc* to ha reform program. Boa ha will in allcontinue toconcentrale power In hi* own bands and those of the newe at tbe eiperue of Parlhrnent So far there has been littie White egsposrtion to the shift in the loco* of power Although Wlutes are attached lo llteir par-

Original document.

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