POLAND: REVIEW OF WARSAW PACT READINESS

Created: 12/24/1980

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

SPECIAL ANALYSES

POLAND: Review of Warsaw Pact Readiness

asriZtWry posture with forces around Poland that probably can be sustained for many weeks. This will permit ths Soviets to react to events in Poland with considerable speed and flexibility. egMM*

The Soviets may have been planning to intervene in Poland by -id-December, under the guise of combined oxer cises. The timetable apparently was deferred, perhaps snortlybefore the Warsaw Pact summit meetingecern

Some reporting attributes the delayoviet decision, announced at the summit meeting in Moscow, to give Polish leader Kania more time to over

Preparations Nat Complete

Some intervention preparations continued to take place after the meetinc

'that

itlons lor movement intoToland probably were ne ^otoc^tadecember. Sinceecember, we messmm

B can determi moat of the divlsionsWM^pToTiably have not yetigh state of readinefl. Sj

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Furthermore, the Soviets have brought some ot their divisions in the western USSR along the Polish borderigh state of readiness. Three normally low-strengthfrom the Be'.tic Military District and two froa the Carpathian Militarybeen augmentedallup of reservists and civilian trucks. (TSR>

Limited or Major Intervention

The Soviets probably have sufficient ground forces prepared toimited intervention within aboutoours. Several ground force divisions from the western USSR could ba usee, along with the two Soviet divisions now in Poland, perhaps one or two Czechoslovak divisions, and one Soviet division from Czechoslovakia. The Soviets might also call on some of their divisions in East Germany, which are routinely at. higher readiness than forces in the western USSR. Sx

With about three to five days of additionala major Intervention force on the order ofo

Lid be readied for use in Poland.

--continued -Tap -JBcrgtecember0

Th* Soviets presumably hope that Polish military leaders and some political leaders would cooperate withat least acquiesce in the entry of Soviet forces into Poland. Even if Polish political and militarydid decide to cooperate, however, they would bea risk. Some members of the Polish military forces and the general population would consider the entry of Sovietrovocation, ando' majorresult.

Original document.

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