oil market. At this point Brzezinskllni-SCC on Irsn/Irsq forecember to discuss whether we should be taking any initiatives.
State (Undersecretarytate (rfc^liSS^Inrs to make.
There should be more funds allocated to military construction in FTor Kenya and Somalia to make our new relationships credible. '
We must get Congress to go alongon-fonaal agreement with Egypt over the facility in Ras Banas.
Once again raised the need for security assistance funding in the key states of Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. Defense believes this funding shouldudget add-on in the range of one billion dollars. 3rzezlnskl asked Secretary Killer to support this as his support would be critical with the President. Killer said he was not familiar enough with the issues to give outright support. Homer and Newaoa would meet with him immediately after the SCC to brief him. (jK
4. Brzezinskl then distributed the Presidential Directive. He said he would like comments by COBecember. He hoped there would not be too many changes. This particular Presidential Directive codifies what the Security Framework has been doing. Brzezinskl said that the Presidential Directive should be considered an historic document that, in time, could be viewedajor achievement similar to Truman's decision on Greece and Turkey. There was some debate on the art form, but Brzezinskl wanted to keep the Presidential Directive even if we later supplemented icummary of the Framework process. The only change suggested ac the meeting, and approved, was the addition of actions the PresidentWACS to Saudis, ships to Hormuz,n the wake of area developments. rC*f
The Secretary of State The Secretary of The Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Energy
The Director, Office of Management and Budget The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence
Gulf Security Framework (U)
In my State of the Union Address to the Congress inalled special attention to our interests in the Southwest Asia an< Persian Gulf region. Furthermore, in light of the Soviet invasion oladeoint of public record that;
"An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by the use of any means necessary, including militaryt. strategy to meet this commitment and to defend our vital interests in the regionhole by:
building up our own capabilities to project force into the region;
assisting countries in the region to deter internal and external threats to stability:
diminishing radical influences in the region by working for progressomprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement;
^ improving access to facilities in the region whilesensitive to the snecial historical exoerience of the
JlrTvirw on December 0
region and not placing in Jeopardy our wider diplomatic and political relationships or the internal stability of the countries concerned by insisting on formal basing arrangements;
egional approach to securing our economic and
political interests rather than basing their defense wholly on any sub-set of countries in the region. tsf
There has been considerable progress in improving our security posture in the region and in shaping an effective security framework In order to ensure that this trendirect that the Persian Gulf Security Framework be pursued in terns as follows. SfiT I. The Military Component
The Department of Defense has principal responsibility for initiatives in this area but assisted where appropriate by State. This component will consist of efforts to improve the following area:
Forces Capabilities, including forces, lift,exercises,and presence in the region.
Defense Capabilities, improved throughadvisory programs, and enhancement ofand military capabilities.
. Force Projection anddeveloped by joint planning, combinedand any other means for achieving abetween local. force caoabilities.
Implications for nato, assessed for our ownand coordinated with our allies in Eutodc into get nato to build up its forces more raoidly.
hift. resources to the security of the Persian Gulf,
The Foreign Policy Component
The Department of State has principal responsibility in this area. This component will consist of;
in which progress roust be achieved asfeasible,
Northern Tier, including Turkey. Pakistan, andwhich improved security relations are the objective,
Arabian Peninsula in which, we will assist theto enhance their internal stability and tofeasible and consanant with our other objectives.
Horn of Africa, where we seek improved tiesand Djibouti and, where possible, with Ethiopia.
Allies, in Europe and Asia, from whom we seekrailtiary assistance in meeting our mutualin the Persian Gulf region, fl
III. Economic Issues
The Departments of State, Energy, Treasury, and Commerce will share responsibility in this area. Economic subcomponents are:
o ensure availability of oil at reasonable
and to reduce Western dependence on Gulf oil.
Economic Assistance, in which our goal will beaddress economic problems in the region throughand unilateral efforts.
Financing of Regional Security "euds. in whicha more comprehensive, region-wide use of Saudi wealth
to meet regional security needs. D. International Monetary Policy as it affects our relations with states in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia.
IV. Intelligence Issues
The Director of Central Intelligence has the principal responsibility for developing an effective, regionally integrated intelligence orogram which is fully supportive of the tasks and ob-
in thsmilitary, diplomatic, and economic components.
Each agency will be responsible for and will identify the program, in its area which are required for implementing this directive. In addition, each agency will propose appropriate priorities for these
The Office of Management and Budget will monitor agency programs in support of this directive, will insure that such programs are indentifiable, and will insure that they are receiving an appropriatel high priority in all agencies. Coordination
Interagency coordination for the security framework shallo be accomplished by the SCC. 'Original document.