USSR-POLAND: MOSCOW'S STRATEGY

Created: 3/13/1981

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

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USSR-POLAND: Moscow's Strategy

The USSR is increasing pre8sure on the Kania regime to take more resolute action against dissidents and against the militants in Solidarity and to complete plans for the possible use of martial law. Ths Soviets are pursuing these tactice partly to strengthen the reeolue of the Polish party and to test the. reliability of the Polish military. They presumably want to sss whether this line of action ie effsatioe before deciding on their own uee of force.

Tha communique following the summit laat week iny Moacow between the Soviet and Poliah loaders' underscores the Kremlin'a dlaaatlsfaction with the Kania regime's performance. It states that Poland "waa and willrather thanreliable link in the socialistand for the first time raised tha Brezhnevin reference to the Poliah SituationsJ^Hsw

The growing ferment among rank-and-file members for liberalization of the Polish party ia of increasingto the Soviet leaders. Soviet confidence in First Secretary Kania and the Poliah party appears lower than at any time since the crisis began laat July. Moscow's approval of the unprecedented appointmentilitary officer. General Jaruzelakl, toommunistIs the clearest indication chat itrecognizee that the Polish party has become bankrupt. fMM)

A Polish diplomat in Moscow reports that the Soviets told Kania last week to delay indefinitely theparty congreaa, which had originally been scheduled for early next month. The Brezhnev leadership's fear6oming party congreaa in Czechoslovakia would ouat the remaining pro-Sovista and institutionalize party liberalizationajor factor in the deciaion to invade. Moscow apparently has similar fears abouta Polish congreas and wlshea to take no chances. {MMM*

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The Soviets have no clear alternative to Kania as party leader. Despite his poor record, they probably do not doubt his loyalty or rear that heotential Polish Dubcek. They probably also consider that his rephis pointardliner might further damage the Polish party. Nevertheless, one of the few remaining moves the Soviets can take short of military action is to sack Kania, and, if he balks at fullyMoscow's current strategy, the Soviets will consider playing that card.

Demanding Action *

The suraiBie"*comraunique alsohat Moscow will no longer-tolerate procrastination and compromise by the Polish party. It stateafirm and resolute rebuff" to Poland's internal and external enemies ls "particularly urganCL. andradical improvement" of the situation-is necessary, ^km^1

he Soviets apparently want Kania immediately to fulfill his from

The Polish regime's brief detenUons over the lastays of dissident leaders jacek Karon and Adam Michnik appear toirect outcome of the summit in Moscow. Tho Kremlin will press Warsaw to follow up on these moves to isolate the dissidents fromfirst step in an attack that the Soviets will wontto be aimed at the union itself, ff""*

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Outlook

Moacow apparently ia pushing Kania toora forcet-.ii policy, even thouch it haa doufata aboatt hla

ability to aatke It

some Soviet military leaders queation the reliability of the Poliah armed forcea if called upon to enforce nar-tial lav. ihe Sovleta probably believe that under these circumstances thereigh risk of uncontrolled violence that would require diract Soviet militaryffaammamamnamv

At this point, lt is unclear whether Moacow haato accept thia risk. The Soviet leaders'proeafrly still hope that the regime can somehow contain theby Solidarityrackdown on tha dissidents wouldf public order does break down, however, the Sovleta .vould beetter position toilitary intervention to world opinion. jM***

Original document.

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