POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND REGIONAL TENSIONS

Created: 9/14/1981

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POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND REGIONAL TENSIONS

VolumeAnalysis

I

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The foJfa**ing intelligence orgonno'ions po* 'kn the preparation ol" the

Estimate:

Iha Cenuol litallJgerx* Agency. the Orient* inltUt^prxfl Agency. Ih* Notional Security Agwtey. eM the intfkgcoc* orgoniiono" ol the Deoo-tmert of State.

Also Participating:

'he AvMionlof Stoff 'otepartment of thr- Oitsdc* of Novol intelligence. Deportment ol the Navy Tht Atiltlont Chief ol Stall. Intrasigence. Derxvimec ol tha Air Force The Director oforpt

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CONTENTS

KEY JUDGMENTS

THE SATIRE ANDSIGNIFICANCEOl" THE PROBLEM-.

Inli-rnulI Regional Tensions

|jmitv in Forecasting

Regional Variation*

Exploitation by Ihr

Suviet Interest in Instability and tensions

Assistance lo Opposition Groups

Use of Oliver Stales and

Restrainingon the United Stat**

REGIONAL

Europe

Spain

l-.mii

Source* of Instability

Cuban and Soviet Subversion

Critical Areas S3

Prospects and Imp n

Swb-Saharan

The Horn-of Alrka

SokthcfB

The Middle

Tlie Atab-lsraefi Conflicl

Egv pi Political and Economic Difficulties ol Presldenl Sadat

ImlabitK) on the AnsbaM iVsiaSssaila

Political Tormod la

Iraq. The Uncertain Future ol Presldenl Saddam Hussein

South Asia

The War in Afghanistan and Soviet-PaLisuni Relations

.

Internal Instability in

atyi)illjJiiHM

(ft

KEY JUDGMENTS 1

This Estimate addresses areas of high geopolitical importance to tlie United States, outside Ilk' Soviet Rloc and China, in which polilkal instability or regional tension* are most likely to create praUetM of major coiisenueiice for the United States during the next two to threeome nf these will reunite crisis management, while others still call for sustained policy attentionedirection ol Intel lie.nice efforts. The tslimate addresses the principal sources of instability and tensions in each urea and thestent to whieh thesr prohli ms aren be. manipulated by tlie USSR or other outside turners. It also discusses the implications of these questions for the United States

Regional Tensions

The principal areas where regional tensions and armedare most likelyand to necessitate USare:

Israel-ArabPakistan

Iran

Central

The Horn ofKorea-South Korea

Southern Africa

Domestic Instability

A. The principal countries in which major change detrimental to key US interests has at least an even chance of occurring iu the next two or three years are:

TV- tmiWnolnntr <

fe-aW*w

piVmnl J uouTk IMPKaildA*,

raunr.in Cuba Ii I'.Vi or Irar.B Urtrbpnwnit shut wt ndMaa

Wid MHhkW llirlrlmiixU inuntutiWa-aL.il. alln'l ISW

At um mtd -ah iW > *e

rwlm ixhot -lirao u fe a

irlratlu jl tmlmtv. Including ttirmiun. lhat dor* ft* mntkiwuner

irrafamtairdrlUinlitflraiiniliiiUmon. siakitlutrrtrniial forntdtvm whiimHnrnt. and ihr IMrwi IVmnwU prmtgV

Thr.Sir.

UV daaam ol* ^nubtr in* in MatMnotu. elk-ariMw i-

.iilrr

B. The principal counlries in which major change detrimental lo keu US interest*ignificant, although lesser, likelihood of occurring in the next two or three wars are:

C In certain other important countries, political stability appear* lo he fairly well assured in the next two or three years, hut there are deep-rooted social and economic forces at work thai mighl undermine stability and lead to major changes of great consequence to the United States. These countries are.

There it no Bh4wl imUbilit, as such, bulyriad olami interstate conflicts Many ol lliese conflicl*beor Ihe Luted Stales primarily. U'eauvr die USSR or lis close associates will continue lo awrjvjir. exploil.ome caseshe...

R-vause Ihey arr so oflrnlusive amiertain nev, mseserupt uithnui uaM.imj This willwill, respect lo regional conflictsn

coups and oilier internal disruplions

In the lew developed worldiledll cntinur at limrs lo face the dilemma of tillier accommodatingbulpnosil.on forces, or supix.it.nv; Ineffective ami sometimes oppressive governments. In seme instances. Ilie continuation in power oln-bent rulers may increase pressures forerm LS ob.vcltve ofhainsnonvioleni means

The principal sources of instability ami tension Mill remain localn many inslances exacerbated bV outsiders-particuiarlv tbe I'SSR and Usales-seekins; genpolilkal advance The ix.tei.lial

SEltfET

fur influence bi tht* United Stales or other friendly countries Hill vary from case to case, and those Western actions that are tailored to thecharacteristics of each situation will have the best prospects for being effective

I li.rc e.i.liuv lli.il dt'spili-flrrcil Ii,iiled Slate* or government* friendly to it. certain crisis situation* will work lo Soviet advantage particularly those ari*init from racial divisions in southern Africa and the Palestinian question in the Middle East. The

USSR and its Friends have thu* far Iseen better able than the United States to identify with posit Mter* on these issues lhat enjoy widespread

popular support.

Some cases of instability in ihe less developed world, however, can almost certainly be resolved to US advantage In many areas, the United States enjoys respect and influence while the USSR and its closehave sometimes bunded iheirCertain new factors, moreover, especially world reactions It; events in Afghanistan and Poland, are enhancing: the abilityore determined United Slates lo influence events in theeveloper

THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM

Instability ond Regional Tensions

I. Widespread instability andll! particular Is in the Ins

drvekiped iii Kew ol lb* landerlspoJJern* hoeaghl

1 Interstate (onlbtts growing out of acute regional tension* are likely to present the most serious danger* to US interest* during the coming years Many of these tensions reflectational rivalries nrantagonisms Post-World War II ilrrolonizalion. by shattering earlier jot (colonial alliance* andthe influence ol majorermitted many of these tcmaoos to break into the open The immediate issues may involve boundary dispute* access toor natural resources, or local arms race* and the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons.

ecolonization has aim encouraged regionalbvn* of new- actors into international polities and multiplying the competing claims loional kraderthip Many ol these new slates refuse to pray by old rule* A* seen mostet ween vome Middle Easternval government* Irequently regard each other as target* for violence and wibversion. not as legitimate membersorld community

nternal ImtaMitu is largely the product nf acute social and economic discontent that product* pressures loo great for governroeigt and societies tn contain, manage or deflectopulation growth and meager resource* are it* most deeply rooted sources, making it difficult for many governments to meet materialhe energy price spiral has exacerbated this difficulty dunnv the past decade. In particular,ound of oil price Increases debilitated the economies ofless developed countries iLDOi. which lavt teat saw their oil import bill fumperceni and their current arraant drfkil rue to *j9 billion Largely because ol higher luet coats, most of these counitw* had slower economic growthSO than in any other tear5 Where taptd economic development is still possible (mmtly In nil-exporting Males) it oflcn spawn* other problem* disruption of traditional vmlal tturc lures, Increased emnomn- inequality and accek-raledilting in crushing deenamh nn puMta seriice* and thr km ol stabilising lie* In fa milt, village anil evlablivlreil

5 There is no simple and direct retatN-mhin. ItcMr-evet, between such ditficultie* ami the level ofMull depends on lhc client lo wludi people Irarn ol dllferem.es in living conditions perheir own (ontlltlon toroblem, and become etpoted In alternative solutions The gi'iulh nl education, literacy, and modern mawecent tears hai heightened awareness on allam pie. the number uf radio rereisprtlapita in developing eountrie* nearlt diruhled*5 Nueh burBeomn^ ii! llrl>>yrmirsate ideas ha* helped lo generate and lours grievance* ami has increased Ihe 'ally trieatite proiiorlion nf Ihe populatioti in many eonnliiev

h DiHoiitenl leads to instability wheie the -cul fabric it weakere arc no strong political inviilultont capable of converting disrnulenl intochange Many LDC* lack vih.Ii iu>liiuti>>tts. because mrnt of ihem luve nr* developedof political comnrraniwoyal opposition In vonse o( these Jatev ihe regime's heavv relume on loreram support ami it* snweptilalrty to foreign milium' run counter lo lutiortalist sentiment Widespreadinetf K'teniv. and abuse* of power loiterm ion and distrust of government intate* So ilo ethnic, tribal, and sectarianhe boundariesuin ihe colom.il era place many people under ihe rule of longtime advrrv.it lev

7 filmic divisions ami lack of nalural irvmn aie irremovable and rt'ing energy price* amilolul ecotsnniic developments are beyond the isurinJ ol" rnntf governrnrni* Vulnerable regime* Jill liaseLatitude in trying to cope with these and igher problems, but often they mint ghOBSf anxtnai equally unatlraclive allerrutive* They mighthoice between antagonizing ihe left and antagonizing

1

ri*hi or between the coxrv ol itagrsaliofi ihr

risks of modcrni/allon. bul ihey cannot make such dilemmas vanish

8 Tb. principal chokeoil en between dx-cl-tcrm ami long-term Instability Postponement nl eeonomH reforms und austerity measures, such as red in! Ion of-i'. fond subsidies, avt-ds immrdutr prc-trsts but rvecrSMUles more drastic and painful striis later Sirm-larly. harsh internal security pralines maypoutioii mo.emeiits but abo incrrasi- hatred of the regime fueling stronger ocnioution in the future The tendency of most imvernmrnts is to address iinmedlate ii "i- at the expense ol longer leim nnes Isrcaiisc nf this, man* unstable lefimes will surslse the per mil ol this Estimate, buying time with repression or with stiendmB that surpasses iheii means. Imi will cmcrse even nv-re tuinerahte than they are now

s> Internal instability and regional conflicl are fre-uuenrly related

Mans insurgencies rereise sanctuary or other support from neighlwinns stales (as in southern Sir tea and Central ^mericai

Inlernal ur-lahihty may offer ihe orjpotiiHiiiy toeakened and distracted enemy (as Iraq was ImiiMrd lis turmoil in Irani

A slale mas miersrnr in an unstable neighlmciim country to forestall adverse political change (the ISSK in MgruniUanr lobanc' that has alread) occurrril Haii/aiiia in

Ugandail).

wlersrntw* in an internal conlhct nflrii thrratens .alter -Jatex and risks espainaon Into inters!,itc war iViHiuinrsv fnnes in Kampuchea asathreallo Thailand.

with thear IUI. severelyii.ermu.nl spnrl tas happemdhan altereaths India

HIers frequently es|4oit ml.riialand regional le.nlons. agiua.nlirl -un-lgr.-opshnd llie character ol possibleibnal csgiflirls. imias well a>u.l intemali--nal protsleni* as ihey have brcorne entwined with East-West issues Nevertheless, the principal siHirccs of instability and tensions remain indwrrv-us Outside attem|g. to capitalize on. or lo reduce, such instabilils and temsorn are apt lo tie onh ptuliallyhey do not take full account of llie local roots of conflict.

Limits to Forecasting

Ahhoush the sources of instalahti and tension mas be clear, the specific esents thairisis are nflen unforeseeable. This is particularly true of internal disruptions, which generally lack indicators as clear as the military drphr,nsersts llut sometimes [Nitlend Ihe outbreak ofalfllyst of political change may be as small and dilfnuli In track as anullets immune lo political analysisatural disaster. We cannot fnrrcast clarify when an unstable situation will erupl into crisis, and ihus neither can we fnrecasi which of the many unstable tiluatiom around ihe world will rrupt during the period of this Estimate We can. Imweser. roughly estimate the probability of each potential crisisIhe most unporUMhat owld grtwtatc new contlicts. ami assess the degree to which these forces might strengthen abate, or lie contained. We can aha identify those countries andthe ones mentinned In ihr key Judgments of thisthat will require the closest attenlinn by iheCommunity because ofential lor'S interests or because el gaps in ouredge of those areas

Increases in internal instability are oltnihut ihcre are no reliable and uinirrsalb applicable indicators of when instability has reached ah-sel Sliikrs. nigs and similar disorder* doeeias my sigmfr I'Sc.iuse in many stales tliey are habiiu.il and esiTestedl eypression Normal lesels ol suin-si varyf rrnii ot-rloeiit sum rnii.ni

i riiHist imlemv mi. imlHaleleselol instability Terrorism, etpn lallsallaskv by mhihvii.U imhtrvtly. by pro-

yoking reprrswiHi coups, or other impo-nuLl limit by ptJRkll leadersmvuiiIsung*irrt only onainnunl nf violence bul Oi ihr and resilience of ihr nniety and on the wixloui jikI forhvaraucc of thr .nil booties

urner iiiiivrtalnti Involves ciiunliles orthai do not appear important to the I'mled Main now but cinild bnoine to liecausrowers get involved, materially orlnuuclcountry of. or strategic would evolveaim etnas if it came to be perceivedest ol die ptMhM, resolve, or restraint of tlie United States or the USSR. For example, livein Ll Salvador is impoitant largely hrcausc of Soviet and Cuban support io (he rebels and because nfashingxpanded commilment to ihe gosern-mellt

IS The pattern nfome unliable areas,II lie larvely delermined bynstances milslde either superpower's conlrol4 coup in Ethiopia, for example, drastically revisedsin.ii rivalry in and around tbe Morn of Africa Other unexpectedinitiators by localhave comparable effects on the Stakes ami stupe of the superpower competition elsewhere

Regional Variations

lb The sources ami cimsequenccs of instalMbti base lircome increasingly inter national Because ol economic interdependence, worldwide inflation and recession buffet nearly every country Because of modern mass communications, people are more aware ol iniuoality Thev are also more exposed to ideologies lhat foster resentment ol tnequalllv and lomelinite for allerlnt il Mass media hase made dif'etrnt publics rryponuve to certain nf the same issue* and base made il paaable for unrrff in ovar cmiiiirytimulate it in another Weapons How lieely across international boundaries, wilh opposition groups obtaining themariety of private and governmental sources, sometimes with financing from likr-mindcd foreign governments Despite ihrve links,ere is no such thine asi rode lource nr pattern of inslabiUlybut inylead an assortment nl disparate problems in many dilferenl unstable areas The types of events that can precipitate .uses, tlie suvtt-pi.bilitv of prob-lemy to ton Ian manipulation, and ihe lonieiiuencc* of iioliihility fur I'S interesls all saryily from oneot lo another

I* The Ifinbk apnti where crises jicilelsduring tlie nliscussed

in ihe reiExaial annries No sjnaxraphirtan loudly and fairly ilcpwlol instalnhly. There is at least asw llhin regions as amoim them Fort hergeographically focused problems cutvent tonal legbonal boundaries For example,rivalry in the northwest Indian Oceani'itisei|uencrs for stales in Aflscs.ilh Asia Similarly, ihe rflects ofrevirgencc are fell in portions of all ihrrewell as in Soutbrasl Asia Some local

fritsiirtc. such as between Libya and African stales lo its south, cross regional boundaries

IS Nevertheless, there are several broadamong live sis res Ions discus veil in tins volume .becilining all including

- Economic problems a* contributor* (oSimple lack of resources and the inahatity lo meetneeds are the chiefust of the develtsping world Hut most European government are relatively moreabout ml latum, unemployment,nd other problems olconomies In some oil-ex porting vlales ol Ihe Midsilr East the principal economic threat to liabilityhr disruptive effect of sudden wealth

Political weaknesses as contributors toAfrican and Middle Eastern omnlrles have generally made the leastoiv.ird broadern .il participation jnd the development nl pluralisticmns. Political cultures are tela-lively more conducive to stability in Europe and.oser extent. Latin America, where most states hate long been iridcpendcnt andhail greaterto evolve politital tradition* ami in.lilulionx

Iribal, and religious divisions as con* tributoM lo inslabililyi Tlie mini drstablllniiK ditisions vary hum regionlon. with racial and Irihal distiricltnn* being important in Africa

and feii.. or sectarian lemiiitiv hemejprnrmi in ihr Middle fjti and Souih Vmj

Strengths und wcaknevvev of outside powers; The ability ind desire of each owMde powet to influence events lend In vat* from one regnaieaothrr, partly becauve nt geography and huliiti cal lies. Thr tame colonial connections lhal hateourer of retcnlment mat also beaj channel* (or inlhienrefor ituithe Weil Kurnpean* hate larger rnles in Africa and lhc Middlehan in olhcThe lulled Slates has ll* advance in Latlinof pruumitv and of numerous economic and political linkv bul also the disadvantage of brum widely perceived as an imperialist potter, paillv because ol pau inlrrs-mtkm* The USSRimilar mit nf assets andhe Middlend South Asia, where ils invasion ofis especially resented bul also servesrminder of Ms capacity for military inlenen-lion or inlimldation in these areas Chinaignificant player in Fail and Soulhessei one in Africa, and of relatively little otmsnauence tksrai heie

Salient rrgmual issues: Certain itsur* oriiens pervade the politics of an entire resit n. akhough they may arouse much less interetl elsewhere In thr Middle fcasl there is thedalestinian homeland In Africa there is opposition to while minority rule in soulhern Africa. Hestdes being direct causes of regional cotdltct these overriding concern* reduce the fletibilily ol governmenls in solving otherandripportunl-tie* for ixrluden to etert influenir

Exploitation by the USSR

Soviei Interesl in lrt*tot>ility ond tensions

If) Tlie Soviets see both opportunities and hazards in political instability and regiunal eonlliM. Instabilitypro-Western stale* may offer1 of Streiiglhening leftistai rtatsrls. and bringing anti-Western anil even pgr> Sotiel elemciils fn power Klsetvhere. however, it canotiei interests Tin-eaon lhal instability cut* botheflected in their tdeniigi. cal distinctions between progressive' and reaction art rastfcUral change The Soviets find iheiropportunities, in the less developedof whkh .a. colonized hy Western pottershn it*

.ountmt at Culu. Angola. Mhmpia. South lernen. and Vietnam, detmle tlx- setbacks II has suffered inCc

oscow hat reivraU'illy and emphaticallyimed ils commitment to resolution and siipporl nl whai it call- national liberation' groups. This<wt<

Promotes Ihe formation of anli-Wetlem and. Moscow hopes, pro-Sovlel goternmenlv

Knhancet the L'SSH's standing among nonaligned countrie*keeping it on the popular side of seteral internationalurtlcubtly those ol PaWtine and of white minority rule in southern Africa

Reinforce* ihe USSR's statusreat power

Off*rts the efforts of China, which hat provided smaller amount? ol aid to revolutionattud has crullengeilell prmlaimed role a* ihe vanguard ot world revolution

he USSR scartHimcc atlemplt in createit rt far more actnd successful in espJoit-liig it where ll already ciltU- because mililaryis one ofost . means of etnanding it* influence, the Soviet, are best able tn make inroads in areas where the potsiUtlily nlviolence or warfareemand for arm* In this regard, regional lensktro may benefit Moscow by making military aid appear mure important to the stale* imohcd than the economic and technical assist arvee the West i* better able than the Soviets to provide Similarly. Soviet ties tn insurgent groups are frequently basedMoscow's ability to supplyand Iraining

he Sovieti try to profit from instabthty in Iwo other ways, which do not necevsanly rei'iurc the establishment <if pro-Soviet regimes One way is to play on ihe fears of vulnerable nonahgitcd or pro Wevlern governinentt to push them toward policies more fat-oroide to the I'SSHcurrent target Is Pakistani Piesadent Zia bt threatening-ti> subvert hit government.vidently hope* so intimidate

iii mid n> minimize his support for llie Afghan inswgenls

il inutbet Sovieto attempt lo duaredrtVtnl through pn isagarxLi and cmert activities Instability and local tensions expand Moscow's uppoe-tunitie* lor linking Western government* to disruptive and unpopular ui lions For example. Iih- L'SSH helped to spread live lie through thr- Islamicululed State* was involved In seizing ihe Gland Mosqueeccaore recerst Soviet propaganda tire me is thatuled Stales intends lo intervene nuhlarily in HI Salvador The I'SSH ha* long umxI the "Nalional Voice oflandestine radio operating Irom Soviet territory, lo promolr anti-Amencan themes in Iran Thr Soviets also support Cuba's extensive propaganda aimed al the Caribbean, latin America, and other parti ol the Third Work)

As sis!0 Opposition Groups

be t'SSRide range u( suptHirl Iu oppositionlapon* and training to such armed resistance nvoverrsenl* as SW^PO and iheesides suchislance. Soviet aid Include* mono, propaganda, salehaven for exiled leaden, and intelligence support

also assists and seeks influencelhal aie not challenging their governmentscould do so in the future ll provide* linartctalguidance to Communist parties and otherpolitical movements It brings militaryyoung intelligentsiahe USSR foror other training This gives Moscowto indoclrirtalr llie trainees inlo cultivate proSoviet sentiments inindividualsho might be etploitedserveand generally to make inroad* intoestablishments of the countriesWhere possible, ihe Soviei* also directlypenetrate Ihr mililary. lhc civiliuch mass organiratHms as labor unsom and wmleiil

ggnBknMa

opposition element* supported orMoscow appear lo have little chance lor powerneat term. But lhc Soviets cannot prophesy events

SI.Support for intrriMiional Ttmrrvm and Heiofurlonarv VrorVnce.ai IflSl in ututalsle situation* any better than we. and iheyposit Mm tbemselve* Inevploit any opporlumlie*arne Theyarge number ofthat some will ragf for

year*

decision* on uhere to place theserelied the economic nr geopoliiit jlspecific countne* and the anticipated responsespower* In selecting specific teci pie illsaturally prefers leflisl ret olutionaothelw ue pav* less attentionnwipito its prospects for success and its supportstalehe LSSR has igtenMarxists in lavor of non Marxists whoto have more popular support Internalis also iitip"itant: sometime* (he Sovietsatsislrd recipients of their (overtas Ihe PLO. SWAPO. and the Patriotic Frontafter such mm ernesreby mlwt stales, the Coiledrsuch a* the Organizatuvs ol AlrMan Imtycase* Mnscnw is probably acting not only loover ihe guerrillas hut also to preservecredentials, and its standing withlev

Use of Olhar States ond Orgorsifolions

Soviets make useumberand organizations in providing materialinsurgent* and opposition group* Thesethe Soviets' Cuban and East Furopeunradical stale* a* Libya. Syria, und Southcertain Palestinian groups In some Instance*,or organi/almns serve as conduits lor Sovietrelationship is less direct in otherithgovernment furnishing aims from il*and in Kirn being resupplied bv thedegree of collusion between Mstsmw andvaries lontulerahly It is far -linerfor example, lhanLibia, .mil any nfmay assist opposiliou groupsSoviei support better enables Usassist revolutionary groups with weapon*,even rriasp*

* slaying al arm's length from someIhe Soviets are less likely lo antagonize other partiesispute ami can more easily extract

^iH^ET

tbrmw-hr*ot inc. cause KiKllmtrmr* wilh ihr roup

nuy also Ih* able to aviml llir yiicuialieiug inn-IrobVdlealTin- linkhr crraieU kindxap In niwrdlv pcn-Smii'l parlies In trying In orguuwr androadly

bjw-d

Thr interests of ihr L'SSH andoctate--iili-iiili.il bul oftenraders probably consider nrmr nf thruaetitsantagnius In ihr USSHin iiituIK Hilling In pav this price tnibya fof rvampli dr-

npilrnpredictability. (an large amounts of lijul currency for Soviet army and inuld lieeornr imixrtjnisrowource of oil

Restraining InHyentei

il The inilutkotif eoupv. insurrec-honvevolutions in area! outsidemme-duli sphere of iiifluenie mas noi always terse Soviet inter.-Us Inv-no> that WjI pro-Nnviel eirrnents are too weak to jr. mi me oHittul and lhat prodding litem into grabbing furprematurely would be courtefpeoduclive ll often mvs greater advantage in doing business wilh

liiiverninenlv- paitieulailv governnieiilv.

vmh j*ranl and India that have had frictions stith thr Untiedin attempting to oscnhmu ihcm

Accordingly, the Si>virii at lirne* courarlio Communist parties and olbei proli-ge groups, ami (reiiiHiitb igher prioriti on good Stale rekilH-rn than on siippr-fl lo lotalMai cow apparently views certain radical nationalistsuch as ihos. in Syria and Ubya. a* wiving Soviet inlrrrtis well rtvoupjh thai the mkv of attempt lug lo replace (hem with Communist governments would lie uiiacc-eplablr Heuiions wilh mine nvnderale or onsetsalive regimes, especiallyithresources i* commodities lo sell ismh as Moroccan phosnluiest are abo beneliclal enough to ihr Soviets thatooH- not toem with serious lupport to radical opp-wiliun groups

nr an anciv ruler lotuni away Irom the LSSH and Inward tin- WrU las President Nimeiri didoupim kgig-getoiiiiierioup In rightists tas occurredIf the leftists suc-red. their seizure nl pnrif could in some cinutnstartees ehcilrom othrf MM Neighboring coimlrirs miifhl wvki.dn.vi military cooperation with Ihr lulledther Weslein posters I'ubli. npunon in llirould tn-cwnr more niih-lam. delay-tin inter national nisiotialions ami

m-TOtl vt>t

34 For unnlac reasons. Moscowyomeliniii cii-rnmsprct in ruiendina main* soppoi' to leftistthat have taken povtrr peacelully Close Soviet tiry lorgirne couldolitically fatal domestic backlash (as against Chile's Allende* Western intersenlitai ias against rben/ int is probably lo avoid compurabb-reai turns llul ihr Soviets liave so far been hesitant In csiend mami aid duectii to the retoltilionaiyin Nicaragua and Crenada

ocal wars can abo entail vuhotanlial covty and rtrsks to M. As with ibe Iran-Iran conllicl. war may make it more difficult to maintain good resaliorrt wilh Imth belllgereiils ovici client is militarily inferior lo Ms enemy. it risks def tatthlow lo Sovii'i piesliyjr (Syria viva-vis Israel, for evamplel More imprttant. where both superpowers have hgrhS-Soviet mililary eon!ranUtionanger Vkacow can avoid iheses long at tensions do not erupt into open warfare Moreover, these risks will noi deter Moscow from exploiting many interstate conflict) (such as those in the Middle Fast and snulheins well as opportunities im-irnted by internal imlabiliiy las in El Saltador and

Impact on the United States

gainst the possible benetils of bringing its friends lo power Moscow must weigh potentially high tost* An unsuccessful leftist coup or insurrection can

be ib-vlructioci andausetl lisiiisurgrnciri. and regional wars can Inflict uc-.ili.anlleil Slates and other ihird pjrlut. rrgarflless of trw- imlitiial ouU-nnie of such conflitis. Oaiuneite imlodiov shipment ol strategic resources, may bf interrupted and foreigner* ned property destroyed The iHeakdownUiwmay rase llir pri-dnctinn or ihipnsrnlIIkiI

SEIWEI

par colics, as il hai In Iran Refugees may bi-souii*eighboring countries, or for ihr United Slatesavrn ot last resort rx"ianii cottt ran hr tutntanlial interruption of oil export* by the Iraq-Iran war lor rumple, would bate been lar mure damag-nut lo Western economies were it not tor softness in the world ml market

uled Main suffers leu directly bul MM -M. Irom the anti-Western aspects ot ferment in unstable areas. For moil LDGs. inih-pendence meant freedom from Western rule Decolonization has not ended accusations lhal wealths Wetlein slateseierilte "neorolrsniahst"r theharge the USSR has largely managed lo escape As ihe leading Western power the United Slates is the prime large! of such criticism even though It neverizable colonial empire

M IS economic and cultural infhsrnces are wsde sptead in developing countries Exposure lo the more affluent US lifestyle make* the gap between rich and poor more obvious ll nurtures resentment over the gap as well a) the belief llial llw rich, lo stay rich, must be exploiting Ihe poor Moreover Islamic funda-mcntalittt and others anxious to return to traditional ways nf life oppose US influence as culturallyretutrd!css of lite economic post* und benefits

psurges of thesee tits can hurl USin several ways US citizens, diplomatican become special targets ot violence New regimes that ride anti-US or anil-Western themes to power are disinclined to cooperate openlyWashington. Mosl important. Iriendlv but insecure gciveinmenls become more cautious in supporting US

harp changenternalowever, doe* not necessarilyomputable shlll In lis foreign relations New regimes face many uf the same constraints and economic imperative* as the uld usually including the (iruntia! needpurt natural resource* lo wherever the* are in demandovernments radical rhetoric and domestic policies will diverge sharply from it* day-to-dayrelations, at suggested by ihr desire of suchibya. Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe to do business with the West

It Dependence on foreign of *'hifh arc W'esleruanother economic link lo ihe West that many LDCs would probably leiatn even if they underwent political chance Al liar Matt1 non-OPFCwere each carrymghan fl Inllmn ot eilanwl ilebt. withillion) ami Mexicobillion* heading the list Brazil's drbl will probablyillion this year, and Ihe current account deficits andill also continue lo rise Staying in good graces with the lendVr* i* an inducement lor debt ridden gosernmentt in atotd radical or doctrinaire economicartkularl* any lhal would harm or mire- away loretgn invest-merit

Al Military and inlHIigrncemi luttixdarly the use ol facilities by IS force* are more likely than economic relations to hecomc casualties ot political change Military links are inntpkimut and wideli perceivedompromise ol nonaliunmenl The removalS mililary pietence could lead to the introduclion of Soviet or other foreignl vsdl not neceuarily do so in every case Suite the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan and Ihe resultant neakeninc of Cuban and Soviet influence in the notialigned movement, non.ilignnirnt has shed some ol Us earlier pro-Sitiel bias Bulegimeoviet military presence ultimately depends on whether il avoid* heavy reliance ond andiJlin depemis on how much aaxrtlaitce II can secure from Western sources

Ai.egime closely associated with the tinted States falls US presligr might also decline Other governments might interpret llie eventesson in the 1 azard* ot cooperating too eknrli with

Washington, and thus become less naaperative

themselves

egional conHicts can pose ili reel problems for the United StatesS ally is involved This is true evenespeciallynominal ally such a* Pakistan, whose interests divergeagnilacanl respects from those of ihe Untied Stale* In such OHiaiton mightifficult choice between risking ciilrupmctilocal war by providing summit and risking damage to the credibility of USt men IS by slaying aloof In othern ally mighl lake abrupt action* lhal limit US policy' options or damage IS relations with others occurred with ihe recent Israeli sinkr against theuclear lacilily

11

siseei

utiu andntied Si ul In certainitintotably In Fity |it Sudan,Minimis haveMI ami toward tin- West lietaiLwailed roup, in diva p| ami lingTin-K wjr encouraged adull In Iron and ili>tra>inl Iran

from etloels In rxpurl lit revolt* Nm There cmhange* rjin unttablrthat ww base anti IS recinm IranotMttaixlinr; example akhnurdi any markcdl*inran* tU-

IBnulnhl.inepressure ui Tclirau

eviorul conflicts and foreign militaryvmiettme* make tieadnlet more wll'tiiKcooperate withilted Mate* on security nutlets Tlie luipltmi war. lln- Soviet Invasion ol .Mirli.itn.tL.ii and Ihe Vietnamese Inter tenltnn in ham-IWiihea bale all bail this ellecl In some extent The ulliluiles ol (he moderates, however, will alio continue io del- nil mi their percent Ion* ol US strength and deteiimtiatioii Moreover mans friendly tionatigiicdre lest inclined llian Washington to tiett their security in leniu ol Fasl-Wril competition. Some oltale. wouldxpansion ol IS military activity on their territories, holies nig ll to be an mli tiultahdilt and ol lillle Isrlp in counter-itu; whai they regaidell principal ihreal*

ome Iriendh governments might acceptsecurity Iset wilh lb. United Mjtevm-gjlne ia>htHal impait in their countries,the* salue their reialmnthlp withlaher reatons amiaul lo damage it-Egyptian Presidentommitment lo1 Middle Fast peaie it one reason 1stUS activilnt destnle Kgi|giati tetnallvity|irnenic k'reptng I'S activity at

asale level in such tmiulries will require considerable US discretion in bwtuiKmil local setisititi-tict against broadit seiunly ohicrllvet

The Untied Slales will in many instances luteimited mid indirect ability In alleviate instami regional leiiMnn* US assistance can smiielimes lotinter Ihe most immcdiale thre.iltw league red Boienimetil and expand Its nplions in dealing with oilierl solutions to those problems will Still depend oil llie lori-sight. leadership, and political cmrafiehe local rulers. Economic aid. lor example, does nol elmiinaie economic inequality, nor dues it usually pint tile Stillieienl leverage lo induce an nthir-ttise stubborn retime lo cn.ul needed reforms The Untied Slates will at lime, la- caught betweenvermneiits and populut but anti-US iipixmilinnn Such cases, actions aimed simply ot tet.iiiiiiii! Ihe iiKiimlienly und theirndetniltie lone-term stability by increasingp pressure* fur change

JS.ome unstable areas, actionest Euro peaiiutiluiini historical tiesormerbe more elfectivc* than anytaken by the United Stales In other cases, conceited allied support to moderate elements* titeful. as il wa* during the Portuguese reiolution US and allied ohyecdves ill some critical areas,are apt to difler--over lite relulive importance of eixtmnnic and military relations, forthe management ol instability and reirjoiiulolential source of friction uilhin US alliaitccs

espite ci'iiliiiuing cotisUaltiti. live Untied States might have snmetvhat more ability lo influence events iu unstulili- areus ol llie iion-Coiumunisi world during the nctt couple of years than il did durinc, because ol.

"lite widespread perception (hat (he current US administration is mure assertive iu lureign aflaits-ihan were its recent predecessors.

The rediictiori ol the USSR's support andparticularly ttt Southwest Asia, caused by its invasion of Afghanistan.

Mosiow's focus on problems tn Poland

These develoiwrtints lute marc ma Oy increased thej nt least vine got em rn cutsila-"i' ii' to accept till*adtice cooperation.he United Stales in preferenceose ol (lie USSR

BACKGROUND

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