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POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND REGIONAL TENSIONS
VolumeAnalysis
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The fotbf'mg tntetbgenee Ofganito'iorts participated in the preparation ot the
Estimate:
Ihe Control Intelligence Agency, the Detente iMetiLgence Agency. Ihe Nolionol Securityifiyml the Deportment o' Stale.
A/io Participating:
>he Awitionl Chie' ot Slot! tor WeHgence. Department ot the- Director ot Novo)eportment ot the Navy Ihe Aulttani Chiet ol Stott. Inteftgence. Department ol the Air Force The Director ot tnH*pence. Heodovo-terv Mot.no Corpi
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contents
KEYGMFNTS
THE SATIRE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THEliiMalnlilv amiTduinm
UmiU In
II.v'.j! Variation*
b> Ihr LSSB
Yaw 1
Interest In Instability and icnsions
ntffHUM lo Opposition Group*
Use of Other Stales and
Restrainingon the United Stales
REGIONAL
Europe
state
l-.mii
Source* of Instability
Cubaa aod Soviet Sub>eruon ..
Critical Areas s3
Prospects andr,
Suh-Sahfiran
The Homo* Alrka
TtMm i ii i Alrfee
The Middle
IV Arab-Israeli
Il Political jud tciuwimic Difficulties ol President Sadat
Instability on ihe Anbiaa
Political Turmoil la
Iraq. The Uncertain Future ol President Sa<ldam Hussein
South
Thr War inoviet-Pakistani Relation
taow pakistan .
Internal Instability in
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(ft
KEY JUDGMENTS 1
This Estimate addresses areas of high geopolitical Importance to the United States, outside ihe Soviet Woe ami China, in which political (tot ability or regional tensions are nit-sl likely lo create prnblems of major comeqiieiic* lor the United States during the next two to threeome nf these will reinihe crisis management, while others will call for sustained policy attentionedirection of tntrlihfwirr efforts. The tslimate addresses the principal sources of instability and tensions in each area andteni lo which iIh-m- prohli ms aren lie. manipulated by the t'SSH nr other outside ixnvers It also discusses the implk-alions of thesr questions for the United States
Regional Tensions
the principalure regional tensions and armedare most likely to escalate and to necessitate US policy
responses are:
Israel-Arab
Iran.
Central
The Horn ofKorea-South Korea
Southern Africa
Domestic Instability
A. the principal countries in which major change detrimental to key US interests has at least an even chance of occurring iu the next two or three years are:
SEMET
fur influence bv the United Slates or other friendly countries will vary froin case to case, and those Western actions that are tailored to thecharacteristics of each situation will have the best prospects (or being effective
I li.rc isi.il despileHrreil K.iled Slates or governments IrieruJU to it. certain rrhif situations will work lo Soviet advantage, particularly those arising front racial divisions in southern Africa and the Palestinian question in the Middle East. The
USSR and ils Friends have thin far In-en better able than the United Stales to identify with positions on ihese issues that enjoy widespread
popular support
Some cases of instability in the less developed world, however, can almost certainly be revoked to US advantage- In many areas, the United States enjoys respect and influence while the USSR and its closehave sometimes Initialed theirCertain new factors, moreover, especially world reactions It; events in Afghanistan and Poland, are enhancing the abilityore determined United Slales lo influence events In the less developer'
5ESBEI
the nature and significance of the problem
Instability and Regional Tensions
ll pe'visl
lit.- ! revt Cable . . in ihr S
developed *orkl lewlh* ghl
1 Interstate mnlUtts growing out of acute regional tension* are likely to present lite most serious dangers lo US interesl* duriiiB the coming years Many of these tensions reflect longstanding national rivalries nrantagonism* Post-World War II decolonization, bv shattering earlieraines andthe influence ol majoc powers, permitted many of these temiom to break into the open The immediate issues may involve boundary disputes access toor natural resources, or local arms races and the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Deraloni/jilion has also encouraged regionalbv bringing scores ol new- acton inlo international polities and multiplying the competing claims lojorul leadership Many ol these new slates refuse to play by old lulesseen most dramatically in nit.llicise Middle Eastern regimes. rival governments Irequently regard each other as targets for violence and subversion, not as legitimate membersorld cnnunuiiity
nternal imtaMitti is largely thr product nf jcule social and economic discontent thai produces presauies loo great lor governnieiiti and societies to contain, manage of deflect Rapid population growth and meager resources are it* most deeply rooted sources, making it difficult for many governments to meet material demands. The energy price spiral has exacerbated this diflieiiltv dunnv the inist decade. In particular, theound of oil ptice Increases debilitated the rconoinie* of nnii-nll-rtporting less developed countries iLDCsi. whscli lavt year saw their oil import lull fumperceni and thru cunent account deficit iu*illion Largely because ol higher luef coats, most of these counirirs had slower economic growthSO ihan in any nthrr tear5 Where laptd economic development is still(mostly In nil-PKportingt often spawns other problems' disruption ofhuh
luies. Increased rsinvnoin ine*i'ialily and aneleialed urbanization resulting ini.service* and the Uws n| subduing lies in fjmilvl rsljiilnhnl rutiorn*
5 There is no simple and direct relationship. Imw-ever, between such ditf iculties andrl nf dmon-Irnt Mull depends on lhc client to wtiiih tieople learn ol differences in living conditions,heii own (ondltlon toroblem, and become etpowd tn alternative solutions The giowlh nf cd neat ion. literacy, and modern massen! years hat Itriglilencd aw-jieness tin all tliesc cmots Fit etample. the winsber uf radio receiversapita in developing countries nearly doubled between I'M5 Such borgeeinins; n! llr,ii-srminote ideas bos helped to generate ami loco grievances and has increased the 'jilt sensitive iirnportion of the population in mam countries
i> Discontent leads to instability wheirial fabric it weak and iherc* arc nolnsiilulions capable of converting discontent Intochange Many LDCs lack >iuh institutions, because mint iri ibem have not developed tradilKHw nf political coniprranisroyal opposite* In wnse of these stales, ihe regime's heavy relianceupport ami its viiwrptilalrti to foreign inllia-ncr run counter lo liationalet wnlimenl WidespreadinellKieniy. and abuses ol power lostei further cvmcum and distrust of government in many ul these slates So ilo ethnic, tribal, and sectarianince the boundaries inherited Irom the tnloni.il era place many people under the rule of longtime adversaries
7 Filmic division* and lack o( nalutal im-ii'is aie irremovable and rising energy prices ami cthei (UmI economic cirselopineftts are brtoud the imrinJmoat governmmi*ulneiableILatitude in trying to cope wilh thrsr andproblems, but often ihey mint .home jmona eiiually unatlr-clive alternative* They mighthoice between antagonizing the left and antagonizing
1
n/ht ut bft-rm the costs of ihr
risks of modern!rat ion. bul they cannot mate inch dilemmas vanish
8 Th. principal cbokrt% ofien hrt-cmt-lctm and long-term Instability t'ottponemriit of economic reforms and austerilssuch as "eduction'. (ond subwdirs. avtwh immrdutr protests hut rM-crssitalrs more drastic and painful Uri* Ller >rtrni-larly. harsh internal secuntt practice* may chock opposition mosemrtiti but abu increase haired ot thr rrgimr fordo* stronger opposition in thr future Thr tendelies olgovernments is In address immediate ii "i- al ihr rspensr ot longer trim nnrs Ret just tit this, man* unstablell wrvhr thr prrind ol dm Kslinijle, buying timo with rrpreuion or with sjiendmR iliat surpasses thenmi will rmerse nrti nvnr .umcrahte than they arr
y Interna) instability anil regional conflict arerelated
Mans insumrnvie* rrvrisror other suiiimrt from noighlmnnsas in southern Sirica and Central America'
Internal notability may offer iheeakened and distracted enemv (as Iraq was IraqMed In turmoil in Irani
Amay intervene in an unstable imghlmnini country lo forestall adverse political change (the ISSK in Uchjnistanr tonal has already occurred in
Uganda
n internal conlncl nflen thrrairm .nhrr stales and rnl* evpanuon into inlcrst.itc war iVirliuim-ti- fnncs inhreat to Thailand.
thrajkoawfOl atec-relyo.eriiiu.iil siullJIII9TI oW-alln India
Hi Outside powers frequently ex|4nh utlirualawl tegmiialiis.atin< andr.niiwhnd ihe character nl ixnsihlefliris. incVmliajmmas writ a>ir.l internal*-nalas thrs hasr hrcocne rntwmrd wilh riaM-Wrst issued Nrvrtthrlrsi, the-pitucipiil source* ol insuhilih aiul lemlons itmiiln indigriKxMapilaliir on. or to redth-r. such instabtlilt and Irmtom arr apt t"S iwiliallyit ihey do not tuki- (nil bcuouM ofbrat runts ol conflict.
Limits to ForecastirKi
Although the nweajd lenvton mat br clear, ihe sperlfH events thairtfli an: nflen unforeseeable. This is particularly true of internal diuuptions.hich generally lack indicator* al clear as thrri^nmrMs UmI sometimes [Niitcnd Ihe outbreak ofatalyst of political chinaji may be as small and dilftcull lo Irack as uniullet.s immune lo political analysisatural dtsastrr. We cannot fnrrcafl esaitly when an unstable situation will erunlisis. and ihus neithn canforecast whteh of the many unstable siliuliotn around thewill rtupt during the penod of thu fcstttnate We can. hnweser. roughly rstimatr the probability of each potential crista, tdc-nli-fy the rrxis* unpnrunt forcrt thaietatr newmi atsess the degree to which then- forces might streirelhen ahale, Of lie contained. We can alwthov countries andthr ities mentioned In thr key Judgment* of (histhat will require ihe closest jltenlion bt theCnmmumiy became ot iheir iwdrntial lot Hr dangrrlii* US mlerrst> or beeauseaps in our know ledup ol those areas
Increases in internal instabilgt are oltrii divt there are no reliable and um.crsjUi applicable Indicators of alien instability has reached aIrnH Sillies. rtatV andItlisordrr* doanfrsMtmu,'S interests. Iwcjusc in many stales tliey are habitual and .'MMtl.ilfinal letels ol tuin-siiiu- rnimn
11IiriMrncvrilK.il Ii-mIoI iiisUbdih leinumn.lalb inihs-mniliule allacLs by luluhsli.geiKiaMl can hriNgsiinn-indirrvtli. In peo-
voline repression. OQQPjV or otheriLiior KMirKi (oree* Change thus
nly on the antouig ofbul ob ihe and resilience of ihr society and on ihr woiloui jikI fori- nf thr authorities
urner unre rial titInvolves count (let orthat do not appear iuipor'anl lo the United Male* mm but could brc-sme so lircausrowers get ininKrd. materially or sylniKvh-ounliy of little* economic ot strategic would evolveagst crisis if it came Id be perceivedest ol llie ptMOf, resolve, or restraint ol the United States or the USSR. For example, Ibein El Salvador is impoitant largely because of Soviet and Cuban support in the rebels and becausexpanded rommitinenl lo ihe
IS The pattern nf Fast-Westome unitable areas,II lie largely drlermincd by ilrcumslutices outside either superpower's control4 coup in Ethiopia, for example, drastically lev isiiIaliy in and around the Hun of Africa Other ones peeledinitiatives by localhave comparable effects on ihe Slakes ami dupe of (he superpower cumprtilion elsewhcic
Req.or.nl Variations
lb The sources ami cmurquenccs of instalMbty haveincreasingly inleinational Rrcausr ol economic inierdeprndence. worldwide inflation ami recession buffet nearly every country Because ol modern mass communications, people are mine awarenequality Thev are also more exposed lo ideologies lhat foster resentment ol inequality and lo revolution-ary mrilnal* for alining il Mass media have made dif'etrnl publics reswcwive to certain of ihe vameand have made it paublr for unrest in oge oMiiitry to stimulate it in another Weapons llrm freely across internaoundaries, wilh opposition Stoops oblalnine themariety of private and governmental sources, sometime- with financing from likr-mindcd foreign govrrnmenls Despite ihrve links, mm ever theie is no such thing istrode wsufce or pattern of instabilitybut instead an assortment ol disparate problems in many different unstable areas The types of events thai tan precipitate .uses.lusceplibility ofto Inn inn manipulation, and the lonieiiunices of inslahilih for t'S interests all vary considerably from onentn it her
I" The ImMl Mirts where crises aic must hlelvduring tin- permd ofiscussed
in ibe regamal annexes No get-graphic breakdown, hnwrver tail totally and fairly depnl worldwide patterns ol instability. There is al least as muchlhin nylons as amonguther more, several Keoviaphically focused problems cut across conventional leglonal boundaries Kot example, the LS-Soviet rivalry in ihe northwest Indian Ocean has political ,for stales in Allies, ihe Middle East, and South Asia Similarly, ihr effectshe Islamicre fell in portions of all ihrre of these regimu at well as in Southeast Asia Some local teiisiirtis. such a* between Libya and African states Io its south, cross regional boundaries
IS Nevertheless, tliere are several broadamong ihc sis regions doc us veil in this volumeatncluding
- Economic problems a* contributors toSimple lack of resources and ihr inability lo meet lasu- needs are the chief economicin most of the developing world Hut most European governments are relatively moreaboul inflation, unemployment, currency flows, and other problems ol Indusinaliacd ecomuniei In some oil-ex porting stales of ihe Middk- East the prim'pal economic threat to stability is ihe disruptive effect of sudden weakh
Political weaknesses as contributors InAfrican and Middle Eastern countries have generally made the least progress loivard broader political paiticipation and ihe development ol pluralislic institutions. Political cultures aremore conducive to stability in Europe and.esser evtent. Latin America, where most state* have long been IisoVrjendciil amiad greater oppi nt unity to evolve political traditions and imlilulions
Ethnic, tribal, and religious divisions as con* tributoM lo inslabdilyi The mosl deslalilllniiK divisions vary from regionlon. with racial and tribal distinctions Iseing imporlanl in Africa
and feii.. or serlailan tensions Inncappareni in ihr Vliddlr Ijtf and Sonih
Strength* and weaknesses u( outsidelie ability and drsire of each oulslde power lo influence event* tendati from oneartly brrause of geography and hntiiri cal lies. The tame colonial connection* lhal haveourer of resentment may alio behannrb for inlhaence largely forhr Weile lanter roles in Africa and the Middle East lhan in olhrr areas. The lulled Mates has ihe advantaeetuiof pruumits- and of numerous rionomw- and politicalul also tbe disadvantage ofdelv perceived as an Imperialist power, imi lis because of pau intervml ions The USSRimilar mu of atsrts and liabihliex in the Middle L'uxl and South Asia, where its invasion ofis especially resented but also servesrounder of Ms capacity for military inlerxcn-linn or intimidation in these arras Chinaignificant player in Fail and Southeswt one in Africa, and of relatisrls litlleew heir
Salient regional issues: Certain issues or cam-paivns pervade the politics of an entirehey may arousr much less, interest rhrwherr In the Middle bast three isalestinian homeland In Africa there is opposition lo while minority rule in soulhrin Africa. Fscstdrs being dtiect causes of regional eotdhct. these overriding (oncrrns reduce the flexibility of governments in solving otherandfor uutuden to esett influemr
Exploitation by the USSR
Soviet Interest in lnstob.Lt, ond Ixmsiorw
lte Soviet* see both opportunities andpolitical instability and regional cotillictpro-Western gates mat offer
Strengthening tetlistine assets, and brimnng anti-Western anil even pao-Sovict rlemcnts In power Klsewhere, however, it canosiei interests Tin-ealization that inslabililv cut* Itotheflected in these tdenlnfi-cal distinctions hrlween progressive"eaction art pdUraJ change The Snsleti find iheir nwrt promising opportunities in the lew drveJoped world. MMwhichoWixed hy Western powers The
omntnes as Culu. Angola, Mhmpu. South irrnrn. and Vietnam, despile tlx- setback* il ha* suffered in "thr. LDCs
oscow ha* repeatedly and emphaticallyimed il* commitment lo rrtolutum and support of what ii calls national liberation' groups. Tha* "nip 'ii
Promotes thr fnrmalion oi anli-Wrslem and. Moscow hopes, pro-Soviet govctnmcnl*
Enhances tlietanding among nonaligned countrieskeeping il on the popular side of several iriteinational Istues, particularly those of PaWiine and of white minoiiit tulr in southern Africa
Reinforees the USSR'* statu*reat power
Offset* tbe efforts of China, which has provided smaller amount? ol aid to revolutionary groups
has (hallengrdroclaimed role as thr vanguard of world revolutionhe USSR sometimes attempt* In createar more active and successful init whereeach exists. Because militaryts one olost effeeiisr means of expanding its influence, ihr Soviets are best able In make inroads in areas where the possibility nfviolence or warfareemand for arms In this regard, regional tensions may benefit Moscow by making military aid appear more important 'he Mates involved than the economic and technicalthe West is better able than tbc Soviets to provide Similarly. Soviet ties to Insurgent groups are frequently basedMono**'* abibti to supply wrap, on* and Irainlmi
he Sox-irti ti> lo profit from instabdity in Iwo otherhich do not necessanlt require ihe estahhslimenl <if pro-Soviet regimes One way i* to play on ihr fear* of vsilnerable riotsaligned or pro Western government* lo push them toward policies more favorable to theuireut target is I'aLislatu President 7jj hi ibreateningUi subvert. evidently hopes to intimidate
iii and to minimize hit support> Afghan
ilro attempt lo due West throughanda and roverl activities Instability and local tenuous kijuI Moscow'snities for linking Western governments to disruptive and unpopular atur rumple, lln' USSR helped lo spread live lie through ihe Islamic world thaiiiled Stales was involved In seizing ihe Grand Mosque ol Meccaore recess) Soviet propaganda theme is thai (he United Slates intends lo intervene militarily in HI Salvador. The USSR has long used the "National Voice oflandestine radio operating Irom Soviet territory, to promote anti-Amencan ihemes in Iran Thr Soviets also supportertslve propaganda aimed at the Cambbran. latin America, and other parts of the Third World
a sslio Opposition Groups
he USSRide range u( support In oppositionl furnishes weapons and training to such armed resistance movements as SWAPO andetides such military asscJartce. Soviet aid includes money, propaganda, salehasenlcd leaders, and intelligence support
also assists and seeks influencelhal aie not challenging their government*could do so in the future ll provides financialguidance lo Communist parties and otherpolitical movements ll brings militaryyoung intelligentsia lo Ihe USSR foror other training This gives Moscowto irtdoctnrulr llie trainees inlo cultivate pro-Soviet srrmntrniv loindt*obe exploited In wis rand generally to make inroads intoestablishments of the countriesWhere possible, the Snurl* also directlyIn penetrate Ihc military, the civilsuch mass orurns at Ubor umm ami vludent
opposition elements supported orMoscow appear to have liltle chance for imwrrneai term. But the Soviets cannot prophesyuusialile situation- any better than we. ami ihey try to rjoutlim themselves loecploit any opr-irlunities lhal mudrt arne They rge number of brly expecting that some -ill nig pay off for
sears
Soviet tic-visions on where to place theserefled the economic orjispecific countries and the auticltsated responsespowers In selecting specific recipients forMoscow naturally prefers Lrflislothrlw ises attentionrivip'tto its prospects for success and its supportstale interests. The USSR ha* nttenMarxists in lavor of mm Marxists whoto have more popular supportis also iint-.rl.int sometimes (he Sovietsassisted recipients of their roveilas Ihe PLO. SWAPO. and ihe Patriotic Fn.nlaflet such mmcmctil* were(he Unitedrsuch as thecases Moscow is probably acting nol only loover ihe guerrillas but also tond its standing with
Us* of Other StotBsoni tot ions
he Soviets make use ofnumber ig* other states and organizations in prostding rnalerial support to insurgentspnsiliori groups These associates include the Soviets' Cuban and East European allies, such radical stales as Libya. Syria, and South Vetneti, and certain Palestinian groups In some Instances, juch States or' serve as cuftduits lor Smtel aid The irbttonthip i. less direct iu olhri instances,ath ii government furnishing aim* from ils own stockpdr and in turn being lesupplied by the USSA The drgne of collusion between MmpM and its associates varies considerablyar closer wjih Cuba, for esample. lhan with Libya, ami am of these states may assist opposition groups independently Regardless. Sovlrl support betler enables its associates to assist -evolutionary groups wilh weatmns. training, or even iriopt
v slaying at arm's length from somehe Soviets are less likely lo antagonize other partiesispute and can more easily extract
thrniwl.es Irom Losing MM Furllierutiac . i'i with ihrroup
mate able to avoid the iitcma ol bringolledreat umcr Tlie link .
MHIlilir-i (hr greatest " to Hiss edit prn-
Sntirl parlies In trying In organize androadly lnv.il
Thr interests of ihr USSR andassociatesideniii.il bill often complementaryiei leaders prohabl) considerof thruat tn iltrt Invantagrnus tn ihr USSRit< iiituIK tiillnig In pay tiny price tnhr Ubya.
spilenpredictability. pays latgr amount* of haul currents fnt Soviet army and could Isreomrin Moscowource of oil
Restraining
il Tlie imitationnstigation of coup, Utturrrc-turnscvoluhnm in area; oultidrSR ssphere of udluenie mat not alsvays serve Soviet irgcri-st* In rnoU cases. Moscos* no doubt judge* thatn*-Soviet clruients arr too weak to assume mnlml and that prodding them into grabbing for pt-ssrr premalurely would be courtt often tees greater advantage in doing business tiiih
uiivrrnineiils- paitii ulailt governments.
such asrazil and India that have had serious trot ions wilhini States--than in attempting to oseiihrou llieiu
-iig or lb ugly. ihe Soviets at limes counsel re-str.niil to Communist parlies and nthei |imli-ge groups, ami (renin-nth igher priority on good Stale relation* than on yiipport to total Communist* Mo* coh apparently views certain radical nationalistsuch as those in Syria and Ubya. at seising Soviet inlerrsis well enough thai lhc risks of attempt iok in replaceith Communist governments would lie unacceptable Relation* wilh some mnderalr or conservative regimes, especiallyth impig-tant resources or commodities lo tell |smhncc-anre aho hrneficial enough to ihe Soviets tint they choose not In jeopardize (hem with tclhjut tupport lo radical oppnsilion groups.
Mr an ancry ruler loluni away Irom the LSsH and invsard tin- Wrrf las IVsidciil Nimeiri didllempts againstudan' or can liimrervnuierinnp by riehtitls las trccurredf the Musts succeed, their tenure nf pnrtf could in tome ciKiimslanceselKil damagingIrom odvf stall's Neighboring countries miifhliner lies luding military cooperation with Ihc Unitedtlvri Weslrm iinwers I'libli. opunon in llie Urt could leeume more mile lain, delaying international negotiations ami agree-
s
34 For similar reatniis. Moscott is tomrlimesxleisdinai mainr ynppoii to leftistthat have lakni power peacelully Close Soviei tiey loegimeolitically fatal domestic backlash tat against Chile's Alh'ndrr Wrslerii interventioti Jmt against rbenz int is probably to mid comparable rrat limit lliat ihe Soviets have to far been hesitantamr aid directly to the ri'tohilMsnary M'gimes in Nicaragua and Grenada
ocal wars can also entail substantial tints and risks to Moscow At withace Iran nuiflMi. wat may make it more illftKiill to maintain good relaiions willi both belligerents ovel client is iiiihtaTily inferior lo Hi enemy. il risks defeatthn Soviet pieshur (Syria viva-si* Israel, for example) More impKlani. where hnth superpowers have highS-Snviet mililary conf ranUtionanger Moscow can avoid these risks, however as long at tensions do nut erupt into open warfare. Moreover, these rtsb will ryot drier Moscow from exploiting many interstate conflicts (such a*he Middle Fail and southerns well ui opportunitiesby internal instability tas in FJ Salvador and Guatemala)
Impact on the United Stoles
gainst the possible benefits of bringing its friends lo power Moscow must weigh potentially high costs An unsuccessful leftist coup or insurrection can
3ft The drMrurtinn and disruption caused hs revo-hilioiis iusutgi-nciet. and regional wars canini Stales and other third pari nn. regartlless of thr itohtnal outcome of such conflicts. Onimetie imliidinv thiprm-ut of tlralegic rt*srwrces. may le imertupled anded proiiertv deslroyiil The iHrakdown of lawmat ease llie priatudirm or shiprnenl <g* iIIk-iI
sew el
par colics', as il has In Iran Refugee* niav becomeeighboring countries, or for ibravm of lastcosts can br turntantial interruption of oil export* by the Iraq-Iranji bir rumple, mould hate been lar mored to Western economies were it not for softness lu thr world od market
STated Males suffers less dirrctlsM. from the anti-Western aspects of fermrnt in unstable areas. For moil LLXlt. independence meant freedom from Western rule Decolonization has not ended accusationt thai wealthy Weslrin stateseocxJoniaJiSt" domination osrr ihrharge the USSR has largely managed lo escape As the ledum Western power, the United Slates is the prime large! of such criticism even though it neverizable colonial empire
M US economir and cultural infhjences are wide spiead in developing countries Exposure to the more affluent US lifestyle makes the sap between rich and poor more obvious II nurtures rnenlniem over the gap as well a) the bdiel dial the rich, to stay rich, must be exploiting Ihe poor Moreover Islamic fuuda-mentahsts and others anxious to return to traditional way* of life oppose US influenceulturallyregardless cf lite economic coals and benefits
psurges of these sentiment* can hurl USin several way* US citifrnv diplomaticr businesses can become special targets of violenceregimes that rider anti-Western theme* to power are disinclined to cooperate, openlyWashington Most important, friendly but mserure aosernments become more caution* in supporting US puhcies
harp changeountry's internalowever, doe* not necessarilyomputable shlll In Us foreign relation* New resumes face many uf the same constraint* and economic imperatives as the uld usuallv includint the financial need lo evpurt natural resource* lo wherever Ihe* are in demandovernments radical rhetoric and domestic policies will diverge sharply- I'om itsy ihe deuie of suchibya. NiearaKua. and Zimbabwe Inuness with the West
It Dependence foreign of which arc W'rMernanother economic link to live West thai many LDCs would rsrobably irtatn even if they underwent pohlaral change Al live start1 non OPEC LOCs -ere each uanaljjj om lhan tl IhIImmi of rxirrnal ilrbi. -ill Brarildlionl ami Mexico ;WU billion* heading ihe list Brazil's dehl will probablyillion this year, and the current account deficits and financingmanyill also continue to rise Staying in good graces with the lenders t* an rnducemenl lot debt-riddenlo avoid radicaloctrinaire economic policies, particularly any thai would harm or ware away foreign unest-merit
Al Military and inlHIgtrnce lies, anduse ol facilities by IS hirers are
economic relalions to hr*-ome casualiirs nf, j! change Military links are conspicuous and widely perceivedompromise of nonalignmenl The removalS military piesence could lead to the introduction of Soviet or other foreignIminot necessarilr do so in every casehe USSR* invasion of Afghanistan and Ihr resultant nrjkeninc of Cuban and Soviet influence in the nonaligned movement, nonalignment has shed some nl us earlier proSinet bias Butegimeililary presence ultimately depend* on whether il avoid* heavy reliance ond and this igirn rleprmh on how much assistance il can secure from Western sources
ii.egime closely associated with the tinted States falls US prestige might also decline Other uoseinmenl* might interpret the eventesson in the political hazards of cooperating loo cinch with
Washington, and thus become less cooperative
themselves
IJ Regional conflicts can pose direct problem* for the United StatesS ally is invoked This is true evenespeciallynominal all* such as Pakistan, whose interest* diverge in sismf-mt trxprets from ihose of the Untied Slates In such caws.mightifficult choice between rokmg cnlruumctilocal war by providing mpport and risking damage to the credibility of US com mil men IS by staying aloof In othet inslancrs. an ally might lake abrupt actions lhat limit US policy option* ot damage IS relations with othet gosrrnrnenls. as occurred wgh the irsenl Israeli itnkehe Iraqi nuclear facility
11
Sifcfffcl
mtjblhty and regional conflicl sometimes hciicfii lit' Uniied Miiii'i In certaineveral limes ittoubly inlit Siido.ii. andcove Minimisived abruptly away limnMI amie Wesl Ihijiw of an externalailed roup, or divjpianuliiiv; Soviet Mii>jmrt The Persianimilar albeit less abrupt dull Innd ilotractrd Iran frmn rtlorts lo rxpnrl ilsThere couldla-hangcsradrrsliip in unstabirlhat now base anti IS rrcinm Iran istbr <mtslandinK rxamplr altkiiuirji any mjrlrdly proin Iranian pofefci would ran*unc ;amen.ressure ui Trliran
at.confute and foreign militarys-aiirliitve* make ticarhv moderateliii-onperalr with live United Male* onTin- Itaq-lraii ssar. lln- Soviet invasionand Ihr Vii'iisaniese Inter veiilinn inban- all bad llus ellefl In some extentol (be moderates, however, will aliodei- nd mi llielr uerceiKioits ol US slienxthMiiretwer many friendlyare lev inclined llvan Washiuglnu lo viewin terms ol East-Weil competition. Someg.ne* would resist expansion of ISlis its. on iheir territories,it In beriulitlle lielp in counter-
itm whai iLa regard as ibeir principal threat*
ome Inrndh gjwrrnrneot* might aicrptsecurity lies -ill lb< L'nilrdlitKjln iheir muntrievthrv value iheir rrtainmchlp wilhighn reasonsl wantt-I . n .
ne reason lieUSespite KkiiHi.hi seowlinlylorriim ruilitaiv lirnence Ki-cpiug I'S activityIrcrl in such tries will require
roiixiderablr llS discretion in hutuiicmil localagainst brnader sen inly obiectives
The Untied Slates Hill in many inslanees haveimited arid Indirect ability lo alleviateamiiM."is US assistance caninner Iheipiediale threalsv.nimeul and expand ils nplions iu dealing with oilier problems, bul solutions to those problems will still depend on ihe foresiiibt. leadership, and political CHirafie of tin- localconomic aid. for example, doe* imi eliminale renin nil iv inequality, nor d'O il usually pins nlr Siilliclenl leveraue In induce antubbiirn regime in enact needed reforms The burled States will at lime> la- caiitihl bc-twecn ineffee-live tin verm units and pnpulal but anti-US iipposiliOri forces, lu Such cases, actions aimed simply ot retainini! Ihe iiicimibenty and theirndermine lone-tenn viability by increasing pen Iup pressures for
chaiiee
JS.ome unstable areas, actionest Euro pejiiutiluinu historical tiesoriiierhe more effective than anytaken by*itcd States lu other cases,llied siipporl to moderate elements inuld In*as it vsj> during the Portuguese revohilicin US and allied nhfcctives in some critical areas,are apt to difler--over live relative importance of ecomnnic and nulilary relations, furihe management of mslability and regionalotential source of friclion within US alliances
espite conliiiuiiig constraiuti. live Unitedight have somewhat more abilityinfluence events iu unstalili* .ire.is ol liveiii;imist world during the neit couple of years than il did during, because of.
Tlte wide-spread perception that (he cur nml US ddministration is mure assertive iu fureitiu affaits than were its recent predecessors.
The reduction ol the USSR's support and credi-bililv. particularly in Southwest Asia, caused by its invasion of Afghanistan.
Moseow's focus on problrm- in Pobml
TIk-Si- developments luve ma rys ma My increased tlie uilliniinesv of at least some gov-eminent* andtn accept tlli*iTiiperatiou. .ifid example nl thr United Stales in preference to tlmwe ol the USSR
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