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of Poland
Implicationsoviet Invasion ol
The Sovici leadership almost certainly recognizesarsaw Paci invasion of Poland would encounter significant, widespread Polish resistance by civilians and possibly by some military forces. Not only would it require large invasion forces, but ii would also mire some Soviet military units for years in occupation and policing tasks. Soviet prospects for quicklya viable indigenous vassal regime would be dim, thus probably involving the Soviets directly In administering Poland for the indefinite future. Civilian morale and productivity would tumble and the economy would fall into further disarray. The important role of Poland's armed forces in Warsaw Pact war plans would be seriously undermined even if these forces stood aside and acquiesced inaSoviet invasion. If they actively resisted, their current principal Warsaw Pact role would be at an end for a
long period of time. J"
The resulting costs for the USSR would be very large. They would include:
A global propaganda defeat occasioned by the intervention, arrest ofnd spectacle of Soviet troops rooting Solidarity elements out of Polish factories.
The need toarge Soviet occupation force and to replace the Polish ground force divisions opposite NATO with Soviet combat troops.
Long-term subsidization of the Polish economy, which alreadyrain at the current level ofillion per year. Even if Poland's fixed capital sustained no damage, this drain would at least double if the Soviets sought merely to keep economic activity from collapsing.
Imposition of Western sanctionsevel anduration considerably greater than after Afghanistan. Particularly painful would be constraints on access to Western grain.
A political setback to Soviet efforts to splii the Western Alliance.
The need to absorb at least some of the economic burden imposed on other East European countries by Ihe invasion, loss of Polish deliveries, and Western strictures on East-West trade.
Tail paper was prepared; by lbc Office of the National Intelligence Officer for USSR led Eastern Europe, based on contributions by the Offices of Political Analysts. Strategic Rescatch, and Economic Research. It also incorporates most of Ihe maierial already presented in Probable Poluk ReactionoMti InvatiomiPAX.SR,repared by ihe OTtees of Political Analysis and Strategic Research, fl
PAShiom
04
A partial, if only temporary, blunting of Sovici initiatives in ibe Thirdihe Middle Easl.
A possible acceleration of defense cooperation between ihe Untied States
are offsets to these costs, some of which might be actual gains:
The invasion would shore up Soviet influence in other East European countries, at leasi in the short run.
Many West Europeans would conclude thai the invasion had. at least over the medium term, weakened the Warsaw Pact and thus reduced the urgency of heightened Western defense measures.
An invasion would nol destroy West European financial and industrial interest in trade with the Soviet Union, and this interestinitial West European agreement to selected commoditybegin to reassert
Two additional serious penalties the Soviets theoretically could be made to pay if they did invade Poland would be:
The loss of key Western imports,lobal embargo on grain and severe consiainls on steel products. If the Soviets could be persuaded that theyigh risk ofoss, it would actar greater deterrent than likely NATO aciidns, heightened COCOM controls, or imposition of Western financial restraints. At present, however, Moscow has reason lo, doubt thateally lough Western embargo would be politically sustainable for long.
Placing Eastern Europe under the Western sanctions umbrella. This could effectively double the impact of sanctions on the USSR. Measures against Eastern Europe, though, would be tbc toughest to obtain from US allies.
Actions along these lines taken by the US administration looviet invasion, or raise its costs after the fact, could prove counterproductive both from the standpoint of domestic US politics and of US-West European relations. Moscow would hope, in particular, that heavyhanded US pressure on Western Europe to heighten its defense effort would deepen fissures in
n
Implicationsoviet Invasion of Poland
ecent typescripthe National Foreign Assessment Center examined what the consequences might be if the Soviets did not intervene militarily in Poland. The present companion paper, equallyexamines what the consequences might be if the Soviets did invade Poland. This paper also assesses the efficacy of various steps the West might take to deter or increase the costsoviet intervention. Clearly, the Soviet leadership would have toegree of resistance to invasion far surpassing that encountered in Hungary6 or Czechoslovakiay the same token, the costs of Invasion would also be far higher than they were previously; indeed, the magnitude of these costs no doubt explains in large part why the Soviets have not already intervened. What the costs would be and how the Soviets might perceive them are the focal issues considered in the analysis below. I-
How Much Resistance The extent of Polish military and civilian armed resistance to an outright toaSotiet Inrasion? Soviet invasion would dependumber of factors, including the intensity of Polish anti-Russian sentiment, the disposition of Polish armed forces, directives from the political and military leadership lo resist or not, the position adopted by the Church, the military's command and control over individual units, and the degree of brutality demonstrated by invading Soviet forces. We believe it is likely that:
The Polish political and military leadership would urge the population not to resist and would either issue orders to military units to remain in garrison or not issue orders at all.
The leaders of the Polish Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II would immediately condemn an invasion but would almost certainly advise the population against armed resistance.
Nevertheless, virulent anti-Russian feelings widespread within theat large and in the military, exacerbated by initial bloodshed, would generate powerful grassroots pressures to fight back.
The degree of organized resistance by ground force units would depend on decisions made by divisional and regimental commanders. Some would probably decide to resist. Without organization and control under central authority, however, open military resistancearsaw Pact invasion would be fragmented, not sustainable, and in the end largely ineffectual.
Spptt*
Solidarity would calleneral srikc. (he occupation of all major factories, the hampering of Soviet troop movements, and prevention of seizures of food by occupying forces. There could also be coordinated acts of sabotage, such as flooding mines, cutting communications and rail lines, and banking blast furnaces in steel mills.
< There would also be substantial spontaneous active resistance to invading forces by the civilian population.
Altogether then, wc would anticipate significant and widespread resistance by civilians and possibly some military units with much bloodshed. While any overt resistance by Polish military units probably could not be sustained for moreeek or so. armed resistance would probably assume the form of guerrilla warfare or terrorism, and passive resistance would grow in intensity as the invasion phase mergedoviet occupation of Poland.
The Soviet Assessment There is reason to believe that Soviet leaders may have felt at one time that and Sonet Options ( if Warsaw Pact forces could be inserted into Poland in support of the
introduction of martial law by the Polish regime itself, there might be lessin turn would permit the USSRntervenemaller force. The Soviet leadership may also have entertainedcreeping invasion" (beginning, perhaps,akeover of theail trunk lines linking the USSR with Eastr the possibilityro-Soviet military coup that could be supported withedium-size. Warsaw Pact interventionary force. However, we believe that by now the Soviets, in contemplating military intervention, no longer see any viable alternative to an outrightto be sure, with whatever "invitational" cover could be
Given the Soviets' likely assessment of the substantial resistance that Pact forces would encounter, we believe they would feci compelled toarge invasion force of atnd perhaps as manyivisions. Q
Early Soviet objectives would include the seizure of Warsaw, theof Polish political and military leaders, the arrest of some Solidarity officials and proreform members of the intelligentsia, and the establishmentuppet regime. The Soviets would also seek lo gain control of urban centers and seize lines of communications and other key military targets. They would move quickly to isolate Polish armed forces garrisons and discourage resistanceapid show of overwhelming military force.
They would also act quickly io put down any Polish units offering military resistance. This wouldarge undertaking and, no matter ho* massive the intervention, there wouldigh likelihood of substantial damage to the transportation system and other parti of the economic infrastructure of Poland. Q
Betweenoccupation of Poland's factories would pose the biggest problem
andthe Soviets in the immediate wake of the invasion. These enclaves would
provide the focal point of resistance, giving heart to those fighling the Soviets, countering Soviet propaganda claims over factory radio-iransmissions. and denying legitimacy to the quisling regime, r
The Soviets could not rapidly or easily remove these centers of resistance. The quickest course would be to shell the factories, but this would inflame hatred of the Russian occupier still more, destroy production facilities, and further blacken the international image of the USSR. If Soviet troops were used to clean out the factories, this would like time and could become progressively bloody. Q
Poland inSecurity. Once the initial invasion period had ended, the Soviets
face monumental problems, and it seems almost inevitable lhat they
would be dragged even deeper into fulfilling basic adminisiralive tasks, including those in the security field. It is doubtful thai the Polish police or military wouldeliable force for internal security duties, particularly if, as is likely, there were prolonged passive resistance. The Soviets would probably have to bear much of the burden for policing the population for an extended
Passive resistance and noncooperation wilh authorities would become the rule, but this would be punciuatedubstantial amount of violence against the Soviet occupiers and Polishhe Church would counsel against excessive violence but would be careful not toollaborationist role. Although Solidarity would probably be officiallyand limits would be placed on the Church, Solidarity would become the core for an extensive underground Polish society,ide variety of services for the population ranging from underground schools to noncensored communication to organizing demonst rat ions, strikes, and other forms of
ft* it iterationunctioning Government. Obviously, the Soviets would prefer to use their own forcesackup to riew Polish party and government leaders who would take over the day-to-day governing of the country. Whether they would have more success in establishingunctioning indigenous regime than :hey have had so far in Afghanistan it not certain. They would have difficulty finding enough quislings, especially if the inlial invasion had been particularly Woody. The party, especially at the lower levels, would probably disintegrate, and much of the governmental apparatus would slide further into passivity or obstructionism. Tbe Soviets could certainly not count oniable pro-Soviet regime with anything like the speed with which they did so in Czechoslovak ia, and even the medium-to-longer-term chances ofadar-tyrx regime enjoying some legitimacy in the public eye would be slim. Thus, the Sonets would probably be heavily and directly involved in administering Poland for the indefinite future. [
Economic Disarray. Probably the best economic situation tbe Soviets could hope for in the wake of intervention would be to encounter only general passivity in work places. Production in Polish industry would decline rapidly at morale and productivity fell to new lows. Critical bottlenecks soon would appear in essential services such as transportation and distribution. Civilian disruptions would be made worse by the military's prior claim on the transport network. Widespread hoarding and the withholding of output by private farmers would add to the shortages. Finally, foreign trade probably would quickly grindalt. Even if Western ships were willing to enter Polish waters, there would be no guarantee the ports would have the capacity to unload civilian cargoes or that the Poles would be working the docks. Acts of sabotage and damagelant and equipment would of course make the economic plunge even steeper, j j
The Warsaw Pact- Because Poland's role in Soviet plans for war against NATO isoviet invasion could do substantial damage to the war-fighting capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. Poland's armed forces are ihe second largest in the Pact. Their principal wartime assignment is lo form andilitary from (army group) by themselves. They are abo assigned responsibility for supporting the wartime movement of Soviet iroops and supplies through their territory and securing Soviet lines of communication to Central Europe. Their combat and logistic assignments exceed those of the Czechoslovak oi East German forces and make Poland in some respects the most important of the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies.
Even if all Polish mililary units stood absolutely asideoviet invasion {which we regard asoscow would not be able to interpret that passive response as ensuring the continuation of Poland's current role in Warsaw Paci plans for war. The Polish military isonscript force, and each year itpercent turnover in its conscripi troops. It also relies on mobilized reservists for much of its wartime strength. Thus the Polish armed forcesubsequent wartime mobilization would be composed for the mosi part of troops who probably would share the antagonism of the Polish populace toward the Soviet invaders. The fad that the Polish military did not actively resist the invasion at Ihe time it occurred would be no lest of how future conscripis and reservists would respondrisis with NATO.f-
Acquiescence by the Polish militaryoviet intervention almosi certainly would leadrastic deterioration of morale, even for officers and NCOs, andoss of Polish popular support for the armed forces in general. As in Czechoslovakiaoviet invasion would probably cause massive resignations from the armed forces and continuing problems in recruiting qualified officers and NCOs. Consequently, the Polish military's combat capabilities would sharply decline, and Soviet expectations as to Poland's ability to contribute to Warsaw Pact military strength would bereduced.^
Resistanceoviet invasion by the Polish armed forces probably would put an end to Poland's crucial role in Warsaw Pact war plans for five toears. Even if the resistance were localized and slight, it probably would convince the Soviets of the needhorough purge of the Polish military. Until this purge was completed, the Soviets would place little or no faith in the reliability of Poland's armed forces,urge would take years to complete. This was true of ihe Soviet purge of the Czechoslovak armed forces after the invasionhen ihe Czechoslovak mililary offered no resistance to the Soviet invaders.
Finding an alternative means of fulfilling the wartime responsibilities now emrusted to the Poles would be difficult and costly for the USSR. Current Soviet plans for war are sufficiently flexible to allowomewhat lessened role for Polish combat forces. But ihe Soviets have not exercised plans for securing their lines of communication through Poland wilh their own troops and do not appear to have forces allocated or prepared to assume such support assignments. An invasion of Poland would certainly require Moscow to lake on this task. Moscow might even have to compensate for the loss of most, if not all, of Poland's armed forces io the Warsaw Pad. These
b ^mCn PCaCCtime ando" double7'dtask for <he Soviets, and ^ed.fficulty would be all the greater in lightf the sizable additional
Poles, and of the need toma.ntain the USSR's current commitment of troops to Afghanistan.
Economic Costs. The most immediate cost for the Sovietof the invasionprobably not loom large in Soviet eyes, even if the Poles offered substantial militaryar more significantburden would be imposed by the large Soviet occupation force that would have to be kept in Poland, possiblyong time, to cope with the widespread popularresistance, insurrection, andthe Poles could be expected to mount. Maintenance oforce, plus the need to replace Polish military forces opposite NATO, wouldajor reordering of the Soviet force structure and missions. The increased force requirements would comeime of growing Soviet manpower stringencies, especially inasmuch as the forces would have to be combat troops that would be drawn largely from the Slavic rathci lhan the ethnic minority population The cost implications of all these measures for the Soviet defense budget are difficult to estimate, but they would be substantial. | |
An additional, indirect cost of Soviet military action could be theof the Soviet harvest. The harvest season runs from July througheriod during which Sovici agriculture relics heavily on the military for help. Preemption by the military of much rolling stock and civilian vehicles would also cause extensive and prolonged dislocations in Ihe already severely strained transportation system.
The most serious and longest lasting economic cost for the USSR, however, would be that imposed by the need to restore the Polish economy to some functioning basis and to sustain iievel sufficient to reestablish some degree of political stability. This wouldainful but inescapablefor the Soviet leaders, since they would want, in the short term, to minimize the effects of the crisis onrade and economic activity and, in the long term, to shoreadly shaken Warsaw Pact alliance. J
The cost to the Sovici Union of subsidizing the Polish economy is already substantial: on the orderillion this year. This cost would ai least double if the Soviets did little more than provide enough grain and other foodstuffs to keep Polish consumption from dropping precipitously, and
enough energy and industrial materials to ensure that key Polish industries and mining operations were maintained. If the invasion resulted in extensive damage lo fixed capital, the costs would be much greater still, as the restoration effort might Ihen require rchabilitaiion of flooded mines and
Poland's hard currency debt service obligations would not need lourden on the Soviet treasury. Moscow would not want to see Poland default on its debt, since that would reflect badly on East EuropeanBut it might encourage Poland toebt moratorium andpen discussions on rescheduling. At the same time,ingle Western creditor's demands could plunge Poland into default, andossibility cannot be ruled out. Q
Moscow is well awareloody intervention in Poland would lead to lhc imposition of Western sanctions on the USSR. What costs these sanctions might impose would(denend on their scope and duration. The United States by itself could do little io hurt theough sanctions program adopted jointly by the United States. Western Europe, and Japan, however, couldar stiffcr price than did the post-Afghanistan sanctionshe strength and durability of allied cohesion on this issue would depend in part on how bloody the confrontation in Poland became.j
A sanctions effort limited to denials of equipment and techiwrogy sales would not create muchardship, simply because few large projects are on tbe horizon. The notable exception is the proposed gas pipeline from West Siberia to Western Europe. It would be an early casualty of Western sanctions,tartup date completely oul of reach. Particularly painful for the USSR would be constraints on its access to Western grain. Agreement among the US. Canada, the EC. and Australia lo limit sales would leave only Argentinaotential supplier {although even Buenos Aires has staled it would consider joining an embargo if the USSR invadedestern denials of industrial goods would also be cosily to Soviet planners facedrowing gap between domestic production and needs for items such as machinery, steel, and pipe and chemical feedstocks '
Impact on Soviet Relations With Westernoviet invasion of Poland, particularly if it were bloody and actively resisted, and ledrotracted armed struggle, would destroy optimistic West European assumptions about an East-West security relationship that have persisted
since (ben the short term, the Soviets realize, an invasion would heighten West European perceptionsoviet threat and seriously set back Moscow's efforts to weaken the Western Alliance The Soviets would not believe, however, that an invasion would destroy West European hopes for eventual East-West rapprochement, or nullify the economic and political desires that drive West Europeans toward accommodation with Moscow. Q
The ebb and flow of Polish developments have given NATO some time to prepare its immediate reaction to an invasion. Moscow is probably aware that the allies have agreed on an economic and diplomatic sanctions posture, including trade curtailment, recall of ambassadors, and scuttling of the languishing Madrid review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (although nol of the Helsinki Final Acthile allied armed forces would be placedtate of heightened readiness, giving NATO some enhanced miliury flexibility. Moscow would not anticipate that NATO would lake any serious military actions. Q
West Europeans have viewedcareful construction of lies meant to constrain and define the boundaries of East-Westmaking war in Europe less likely, and increasing mutual confidence in the motives and policies of competing powers. Some West Europeans have expected that detente would increase the Soviet sense of regional security enough so that Moscow would not need to fear social evolution within the Warsaw Pact. T
A Soviet invasion of Poland would undermine these assumptions, reviving Wesi European doubts about Soviet intentions, exacerbating West European perceptions of the Soviet threat, and thereby reducing public confidence in the East-West relationship. Detente, inense, would cease to exist,
The West Europeans, however, wouldeed toew basil for East-West relations, and would begin to do so once the Polish situation had stabilized. Many would believeialogue with the East was still necessary to reduce dangers of war. Some would argue that the Soviet invasion occurred within the USSR's own sphere of influence, and therefore constituted an understandable, if deplorable,nore common, ir less immediate, reaction would be that economic interests required an East-West modus Vivendi, despite the intrusion of mililary diplomatic shocks. Resumption of an East-West dialogue would not be far behind j j
i
Soviei mililary intervention in Poland might helpime to defuse West European oppositionATO military modernization. The allies probably wouldaccelerate implementation of Long-Term Defense Program goals. But the allies probably would not significantly increase iheir defense spending. While incremental adjustments in defense budgets would be possible as part of an initial, angry reaction loan invasion, few West Europeans would be willing to sacrifice social welfare andprograms for the sakeefense buildup. Indeed, on reflection. West European governments might well conclude that the invasion had, at least over the medium term, weakened the Warsaw Pact and thus reduced the urgency of heightened military spending. The allies perceive little benefitilitary buildup because they do not believe that ihey can match Soviet conventional strength, and do not want to increase reliance on nuclear weapons lo counterbalance it. An invasion of Poland, therefore, would at besi only temporarily help NATO's effort lo deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces. I
The West Europeans would retain their long-term interest in arms control. While an invasion would freeze or end existing arms control talks, the West Europeans would continue to believe that arms control offers the best road to military sccurty. LRTNF talks, even if suspended in the immediateof an invasion of Poland, would be quickly revivedest European condition for missile deployment.| |
A similar pendulum swing would be exhibited in the area of East-West trade, since an invasion would not permanently destroy West European financial and industrial interest in such lies. Initially, the West Europeans would agree to selected commodity embargoes, although these wouldbe of limited duration. Negotiations for the construction of plants, pipelines, and other major economic facilities probably would be suspended, but not permanently terminated. Although West European governments would agree to limited application of economic pressure, they are skeptical about the usefulness of broad economic sanctions. They have complained in the past that such measures hurt their own economies at least as much as they hurt the Soviei economy, j j
The extent of individual countries' financial exposure in Poland probably would have little impact on their initial reactions,ebl moratorium would undoubtedly be declared. If default did occur, it would be unlikelyause widespread bank failures or serious jeopardy to the international monetary system because ceniral banks would step in. I-
I
A Soviet invasion of Poland couldrofoundly negative impact on the fortunes of West European Communist parties, which these parties would attempt to forestall. Italian Communist Party leaders have already strongly hintedoviet invasion of Poland would lead the PCI to break relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Spanish Communist Party, as well as the smaller British, Dutch, and Belgian parties, would strongly condemn an invasion. Even the French Communist Party would denounce an invasion; the legacy of its stance against the invasion of Czechoslovakia is the sole remaining source of the PCFs claim to "Eurocommunism' status. The PCF has alreadytronger anti-invasion line as part of the price for participation in the new French Government.
Otherthe short run atoviet invasion of Poland would shore up Soviet
in other East Europeanof course, would have
one of the primary objectives behind the invasion. An invasion and subsequent rollback of reforms would put an end to any "spillover" effects of Poland, reinforce the more pro-Soviet elements within the other East European regimes, encourage the imposition of hardline internal policies, and strengthen pressures for still closer alignment with the USSR.|
The main costs to the Soviets in Eastern Europe would probably beAn invasion would,rolonged period, further reduce Polish deliveries of coal and manufactured goods to some of the other East European countries (notably East Germany andisrupting CEMA economic tics and forcing the East European trade partners of Poland to seek more costly substitutes. The capacity of the East European economies to cope with their economic difficulties by introducing modest reforms would probably be further inhibited. The East European countries could all expect to suffer from reduced credits from and trade with the West, although the severity of the impact would depend in part upon thewith which individual East European regimes were seen in the West lo have fulfilled their "fraternal obligations" in invading Poland. While the Soviets would undoubtedly be unwilling to underwrite all the costs to their allies of an invasion, they would probably be compelled to absorb some of the burden in response lo pleas that failure on their part to do so might spread destabilization within the "Socialist Commonwealth."[ |
Elsewhere in the world, the Soviets could count on few benefits from an invasion of Poland, although many of the costs would probably prove to be transitory. An invasion would obviously not improve the Soviet image within
ihe Third World and in ihe nonalignedif this had few operational consequences. An invasion might also have the effect of partially blunting Soviet initiatives in the Middle East and inspiring somewhat greater toleranceS military presence. Most importantly, from the Soviet standpoint, an invasion of Poland could lead to an acceleration of defense cooperation between the United Slates and China and. perhaps, to further crystallizationBeijing-Tokyo-WashingtonH
Costs and US Actions While the present paper is premised on the assumption that the USSR
would invade Poland and that the Soviet leadership would incur the costs outlined above, it Is conceivable that some additional Western or US actions beyond those noted above could either enhance the deterrent nature of costs already anticipated by Moscow to follow from an invasion, or intensify these costs in the wake of an invasion. US leverage in either instance is quiteby the fact that many of the penalties the Soviets would have to pay would be independent of Western action, and by the limits of US influence over relations between US allies or third countries and the USSR.
From the standpoint ofoviet invasion, what is most important is sustaining Moscow's perception (hat those costs which are potentially within Washington's capacity to impose would in fact be imposed (and that they would not be imposed in the absence of aneterrence, to the extent that the United States can effect it. depends on the Soviet leadership's reading of the US administration's willingness and political ability to get Congress and the American public lined up behind threatened responsesoviet invasion of Poland, and its ability to achieve and maintain agreement wilh allies over punitive actions. Similarly, further raising Ihe costs of an invasion already unleashed by the Soviets would depend on sustaining the US reaction and that of allies and third countries.j j
Potentially, the most profound additional deterrent against an invasion, and most serious further penalty the Soviets could be forced to pay if they didPoland, would not be possible NATO actions (which the Soviets wouldeightened COCOM controls, or the imposition of Western financial strictures, but the anticipation or reality of losing most Western grain imports. The USSRrain import requirement of perhapsillionear, and an add-onillion tons for Poland, assuming the latter is included in the Western embargo. Argentina in recent years has had an export capacity ofillion tons of coarse grain and wheal.
Thus even if Argentina failed to adhere to an embargo, denial of Western grain by the US. Canada, the EC, and Australia wouldajor setback to Soviet consumption and the livestock sector- Moscow has reason to doubt, however, lhatomprehensive Western embargo would be politically sustainable for long in the face of tumbling pricesorld grain market that would quickly become glutted.rj
The West could effectively double the impact of sanctions on the USSR by placing Eastern Europeanctions umbrella. Indeed, putting the burden of additional support for Eastern Europe on the USSR's shouldersime of increasing domestic economic stringency would prove far more disruptive to Soviet plans and options than would Western measuressolely against Moscow. To the Soviet requirement of at leastillion tons of Western grain would be added an East Europeanof aboutillion tons of grain. Eastern Europe also depends on the West for substantial amounts of industrial materials and advancedand equipment. In terms of impact, its denial wouldultiple of the actual value of the trade lost. Only by supplying the Bloc from Soviet production could Moscow replace forgone Western trade; even if the USSR were willing, comparable replacements do not existumber of instances.
a
Measures against Eastern Europe, however, would also be the toughest to obtain. All the allies would be quick to note that these would undermine any movement toward greater liberalization in Eastern Europe, hurtingthe West has tried to wean away from Soviet dominance,
Moscow policymakers would certainly hope that actions taken by the US administration tooviet invasion of Poland or raise its costs after the fact would prove counterproductive. In the United States, they would expect substantial domestic opposition to be mounted by key groups whose interests would be affected by the imposition of various sanctions, and they might hope that attempts to push such sanctions through Congress wouldcleavages within the government and weaken the presentIn other Western countries, the Soviets could count on growing resistance to US efforts to employ the prospect or realityoviet invasion of Poland to get allies to adopt extra sanctions beyond those already agreed upon, to further heighten military readiness, to increase defense spending, to deploy additional or new weapon systems, or to accept the abandonment of various arms control agreements or initiatives. Moscow would attempt to capitalize on this resistance to divide the Western Alliance.ri
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