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invasion of Poland would encounter significant.ead Polish [esisiance by civilians and possibly by some mililary forces. Not only would it require large invasion forces, bul it would also mire some Soviet military units for years in occupation and policing tasks. Soviet prospects for quickly cstabiable indigenous vassal regime would be dim. thus probably involving the Soviets directly in administering Poland for the indefinite future. Civilian morale and rxorJacimty would tumble and the economy would fall inio farther oisatray. Thc important role of Poland's armed forces in Warsaw Pact war p'ans would be seriously undermined even if llsese forces stood aside and acquiescedoviet invasion. If they actively resisted, their current principal Warsaw Pact role would be at an endong period of lime, (s)
Tlie rest-lting costs for thc USSR would be very large. They would include:
A global propaganda defeat occasioned by the intervention, arrest ofnd spectacle of Soviet troops rooting Solidarity elements out of Polish factories.
Thc need toarge Sonet occupation force and to replace the Pol.sh ground force divisions rspposiie NATO with Soviet combat troops.
Long-term subsidization of the Fnlith economy, which abcadyrain al the currenl level of Sd billion per year. Even if Poland's fixed capital sustained no damage, (his drain would ai least double if the Soviets sought merely to keep economic activity from collapsing.
Imposition of Western sanctionsevel anduration consider il>l> greater lhan after Afghanistan. Particularly painful would be constraints on access to Western grain.
A political setback to Soviet efforts to split the Western Alliance.
lhe need to absorb al least some of ihc economic burden imposed oi. ul her Easl European countries by lhe invasion, loss of Polish deliveries, and Western strictures on East-West irade.
Tho roper was prepared by ihe CMTKeot the Nai-mal (niellisenee Officer for USSP indased on contributions by (he Offices of foliiical Analysis. Strairak Research, anrl Loonomic Research. Ii abo inrvxporaic* niosi of ihe material already
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A partial, if only temporary, blunting of Soviet initiatives in the Third World- including the Middle East.
A possible acceleration or defense cooperation between the United States,China
There are offsets to these costs, some of which mig hi be actual gains:
Tbe invasion would shore up Soviet influence in other East European countries, al least in the short run.
Many West Europeans would conclude that Ihe invasion had. at least over thc medium term, weakened the Warsaw Pact and thus reduced the urgency or heightened Western defense measures,
An invasion would not destroy West European financial and indusirial interest in trade with thc Sovici Union, and this interestinitial West European agreement to selected comntodily embargoes-begin lo reassert itself.
Two additional serious penalties lire Soviets theoretically could be made lo pay if ihey did invade Poland would be:
The loss of key Western imports,lobal embargo on grain and severe constaints on steel products. If the Soviets could be persuaded lhat iheyigh risk ofoss, it would actar greater deterrent than likely NATO actions, heightened COCOM controls, or imposition or Western financial re Iraints. At present, Lowevcr. Moscow has reason to doubl thaieally lough Western embargo would bc politically sustainable for long.
Placing Eastern Europe under thc Western sanctions umbrella. This could erfectivcly double the impact or sanctions on ihe USSR. Measures igainil Eastern Europe, though, would be ihe toughest to obtain from US allies.
Actions along these lines taken by the US administration looviet invasion, or raise its costs after the fact, cuuld prove counterproduc*.ive both rrom the standpoint of domestic US politics and of US-West European relations. Moscow would hope, in particular, that heavy-handed US pressure onrope to heighten its depose errorl wouldsures in the Atlantic Alliance
Implicalions of n
Soviet Imasion of
ecent typescript memorandumihc National foreign Assessment Center examined what thc consequences might be if thc Soviets did not intervene militarily in Poland. The present companion paper, equallyexamines what thc consequences might be if thc Soviets did invade Poland. This paper also assesses the eiTicacy or various sicps thc Wesi might take to deler or increase the costsoviet intervention. Clearly, the Soviet leadership would have toegree of resistance to invasion far surpassing (hatungary6 or Czechoslovakiay the same token, the costs of invasion would also be far higher than they were previously, indeed, the magnitude of these costs no doubt explains in large pari why thc Soviets have not already intervened. What thc costs would be and how the Soviets might perceive Ihem arc thc focal issues considered in thc analysis below
How Much Resistance The extent of Polish military and civilian armed resistance to an outright toSoviet Invasion? Soviet invasion would dependumber of factors, including the intensity of Polish ami- Russian sentiment, thc disposition of Polish armed forces, directives from the political and military leadership to resist or not. thc position adopted by thc Church, the military's command and control over individual units, and thc degree of brutality demonstrated by invading Soviet forces. We believe il is likely lhat:
The Polish political and mililary leadership would urge Ihe population nol to resist and would either issue orders to mililary units to remain in garrison or not issue orders at ail.
The leaders of thc Polish Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II would immediately condemn an invasion but would almosi certainly advise the population against armed resistance.
Nevertheless, virulent anti-Russian feelings widespread within thc rsopula-lion at large and in thc military, exacerbated by initial bloodshed, would generate powerful grassroots pressures to fight back.
Thc degree of organized resistance by ground force units would depend on decisions made by divisional and regimental commanders. Some would probably decide to resist. Without organization and control under central authority, however, open military resistancearsaw Pact invasion would be fragmented, not sustainable, and in thc end largely ineffectual.
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would calleneral srikc, the occupation oral! rnajoc factorics, the tempering of Soviet troop movements, and prevention of seizures of food by occupying forces- There could also be coordinated acts of sabotage, such as flooding mines, cutting communications and rail lirtcs, and banking Wast furnaces in steel mills.
would also be substantial spontaneous active resistance to invading forces by thc civilian population.'
Altogether then, we would anticipate significant and widespread resistance by civilians and possibly some mnitary units with much Woodshed. While any overt resistance by Polish military units probably could not be sustained for moreeek or so. armed resistance would probably assume the form of guerrilla warfare or terrorism, and passive resistance would grow in intensity as the invasion phase mergedoviet occupation of Poland.
The Soviet AsseumeotThere is reason to believe lhat Soviet leaders may have felt at one timeSovietWarsaw Pact forces could be inserted into Poland in support of the
introduction of martial law by the Polish regime itself, there might be lessin turn would permit the USSR lo intervenemaller force. The Soviet leadership rrwy also havc entertained the possibil* itycreeping invasion" (beginning, perhaps,akeover of the main rail trunk lines linking the USSR will. Eastr the possibilityro-Soviet military coup that could be supported withedium-sire. Warsaw Pact inlcrvcntionary force. However, wc believe that by now the Soviets, in contemplating military intervention, no longer sec any viaWc alternative to an outrightto be sure, with whatever "invitational" cover could be arranged.
Given the Soviets' likely assessment of the substantial resistance that Pact forces would encounter, wc believe ihey would feel compelled toarge invasion force of alnd perhaps as manyivisions
Early Soviet objectives would include thc seiiureof Warsaw, theof Polish political and mililary leaders, the arrest of some Solidarity officialsand proreform members of lhe intelligentsia, and the establishmentuppei regime. The Soviets would also seek lo gain control of urban centers and seize lines of communications and other key mililary largcts, Thcy would move Quickly lo isolate Polish armed forces garrisons and discourage resistanceapid show of overwhelming mililary force.
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Theyo act quickly lo pul down any Polish units often nj military rcistancc. This wouldarge andcrtaking and, no matter how massive thc intervention, there wouldigh likelihood ofamage lo thc transportation system and other parts of the economic infrastructure of Poland
Polind's factoriespose the biggest problem
andIhc Soviets in thc immediate wake of the invasion. These enclaves would
provide the focal point of resistance, giving heart to those fighting the Sennets, countering Soviet probanda claims over factory radio-trarrsmissions, and denying legitimacy to the quisling regime, (u)
Thc Soviets could not rapidly or easily remove these centers of resistance. The quickest course would be to shell thc factories, but Ihis would inflame hatred of the Russian occupier still more, destroy production facilities, and further Macken the international image of the USSR. If Soviet troops were used to dean out the factories, this would take time and could become prosjrcssivelj bloody
p^bnd LaSecnritr Once the initial invasion pcriud had ended, lhc Soviets
Aftermath face monumental problems, and it seems almost inevitable that they
would be dragged even deeper into fulfilling basic administrative tasks, including those in the security field. Il is doubtful that the Polish police or military wouldeliable force for internal security duties, particularly if. as is likely, there were prolonged passive resistance. The Soviets would probably have lo bear much of thc burden for policing the population for an extended period
Passive resistance and noncoopcraiion with authorities would become Ihe rule, bui this would be punctuatedubstantial amount of violence against the Soviet occupiers and Polishhe Church would counsel against excessive violenceuW be careful not toollaborationiit role. Although Solidarity would probably be officiallyand limits would be placed on Ihe Church. Solidarity woukl become ihe core for an extensive underground Polish society,ide variety of services for the population ranging from und erg round schools to rrooceavored communication to organizing demonstrations, strikes, and other
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Regenerationanctioninx Government. Obviously, the Soviets would prefer to use their own forcesackup to new Polish party and government leaders who would take over the day-to-day governing of thc country. Whether they would have more success in establishingunctioning indigenous regime than they have had so far in Afghanistan is not ccrtam. They would have difficulty finding enough quislings, especially if the intial invasion had been particularly bloody. Thc party, specially at the lower levels would probably disintegrate, and much of the governmental apparatus would slide further into passivity or obstructionism. Thc Soviets could certainly not count oniable pro-Soviet regime with anything like the speed with which they did so in Czechoslovakia, and even the mcdium-to-longer-term chances ofadar-iypc regime enjoying some legitimacy in the public eye would be slim. Thus, the Soviets would probably be heavily and directly involved in administering Poland for the indefinite future
Economic Disarray. Probably the best economic situation thc Soviets could hope for in the wake of inlcrvenlion would be to encounter only general passivityork places. Production in Polish industry would decline rapidly as morale and productivity fell lo new lows. Critical boUlcnecks soon would appear in esscniial services such as transportation and distribution. Civilian disruptions would be made worse by the military's prior claim on the transport network. Widcsrxead hoarding and the withholding of output by private farmers would add to the shortages. Finally, foreign trade probably would quickly grindall. Even if Western ships were willing lo enter Polish waters, there would be no guarantee the ports would have 'he capacity to unload civilian cargoes or that lhe Poles would fcw working the docks. Actsofsaboiage and damage to plant and equipment would of course make Ihe economic plunge even steepei
Poland'snfor war against
andisov,et invasion could do substantial damage to ihc war
fighling capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. Poland's armed forces are the second largest in lhe Pact. Their principal wartime assignment is to form andilitary front (army group) by themselves. They are also assigned responsibility for supporting the wartime movement of Soviei troops and supplies through ihcir territory and securing Soviet lines of wmmumcatior. to Central Europe. Their combat and logisiic assignment exceed thoseof the Czechoslovak or East German forces and make Poland i. some respects the most important of the USSR's Warsaw PaC,
Even if all Polish mililary units stood absolutely asideoviet invasion (which we regard asoscow would not be able to interpret that passive response as ensuring thc continuation of Poland's current role in Warsaw Pact plans for war. The Polish military isonscript force, and each year itr>ercent turnover in its conscript troops. It also relics on mobilized reservists for much of its wartime strength. Thus thc Polish armed forcesubsequent wartime mobilization would be composed for the most part of troops who probably would share thc aniagonism of thc Polish populace toward thc Soviet invaders. Thc Tact that the Polish military did not actively resist 'he invasion at the tine il occurred would be no test of how future conscripts and reservists would respondrisis with NATO.
Acquiescence by thc Polish militaryoviet intervcnlion almost certainly would leadrastic deterioration of morale, even for officers and NCOS, andoss of Polish popular support for lhe armed forces in general. As in Czechoslovakiaoviet invasion would probably cause massive resignations from lhe armed forces and continuing problems in recruiting qualified officers and NCOs. Consequently, thc Polishombat capabilities would sharply decline, and Soviet expcctaiioris as to Poland's ability to contribute lo Warsaw Pact military strength would bereduced .
Resistanceoviei invasion by the Polish armed forces probably would put an end to Poland's crucial role in Warsaw Pact war plans for five toears. Even if the resistance were localized and slight, ii probably would convince lhe Soviets or the needhorough purge of the Polish military. Until this purge was completed, ihe Soviets would place little or no faith in the reliability or Poland's armed forces.urge would take years to complete. This was true of the Soviet purge of the Czechoslovak aimed forces after the invasionhen the Czechoslovak military ofTcrcd no resistance to Ibe Soviet invaders
Finding an alternative means of fulfilling thc wartime responsibilities now entrusted to the Poles would be difficult and cosily for the USSR. Current Soviet plans for war arc sufficiently flexible to allowomewhat lessened role for Polish combat forces. But the Soviets have not exercised plans for securing their lines of communication through Poland with their own troops and do not appear to have forces allocated or prepared to assume such support assignments. An invasion of Poland would certainly require Moscow lo lake on this task. Moscow might even have to compensate for thc loss of most, if not all. of Poland's armed forces lo the Warsawhese
forces number Onren in peacetime and would more lhan double in wartime. Replacing Ihem wouldtaggci lag task for the Soviets, and lhe difficulty would be all thc greater in light both of the sizable additional pentinvasion forces that would havc to be committed simply lo police Ihc Poles, and of lhe need io maintain ihc USSR's current commitment of troops to Afghanistan
Costs. The most immediate cost for the Sovietof tbe invasionprobabiy not loom large in Soviei eyes, even if lhe Poles offered substantial mililaryar more significantburden would be imposed by ihe large Soviet occupation force that would have lobe kept in Poland, possiblyong lime, to cope with ihe widespread popwlarresistance, insurrection, andihc Poles could be espected lo mount. Maintenance oforce, pics the need to replace Polish mililary force* opposite NATO, wouldajor reordering of the Soviet force structure and missions. The incrcijed force requirements would comeime of growing Soviet ma.tpower stringencies, especially inasmuch as thc forces would have to be combat troops that would be drawn largely from thc Slavic rather lhan the ethnic minority popu'aiion. The cost implications of all ihcse measures for the Soviei defense budget are difficult to eslimatc. but ihey would be substantial
An additional, indirect cosl ol Soviet military action could be lhe impair-menl of thc Soviet harvest. Thc harvest season runs from July througheriod during which Soviet agriculture relies heavily on the military for hdp. Preemption by the military of much rolling stock and civilian vehicles would also causetensive and prolonged dislocations in lheeverely strainedion system.
The most serious and longest lasting economic cosl for the USSR, however, would be thai imposed by lhe need lo restore the Polish economy to some functioning basis and lo sustain itevel sufficient tn reestablish some degree of political stability. This wouldainful but inescapablefor the Soviet leaders, since ihey would want, in the short term, to minimize the effects of the crisis on CEMA trade and economic acliviiy and. in lhe long Icrm. to shore upa badly shaken Warsaw Pact alliance
Thc cost lo tbe Soviet Union of subsidizing i'.ie Polish economy ii already substantial: on lhe order of S4 billion this year. This cost would al Icasl double if the Soviets did little more than provide enough grain and other foodstuffs to keep Polish cunsumptKMi from dropping precipitously, and
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enough energy and indosirial materials lo ensure lhal key Polish industries and mining operations were maintained. If ibc invasion resulted ia extensive damage lo fixed capital, ihe costs would bc much greater still, as the restoration cffon might then require rehabilitation of flooded mines and reconstruct ion of damaged ptanl and transport facilities.
Poland's hard currency debt service obligations would not need tourden on thc Soviet treasury. Moscow would not want to sec Poland default on its debt, since that would reflect badly on East EuropeanBut it might encourageebt moratorium and to open discussions on rescheduling. At the same time,ingle Westernemands could plunge Poland into default, andossibility cannot be ruled out.
Moscow is well awareloody intervention in Poland would lead lo lhc imposition of Western sanctions on lhc USSR. What costs these sa net tons might impose would depend on [heir scope and duration. The United Stales by itself could do litlle to hurt iheough sanctions program adopted jointly by ihe United States. Western Europe, and Japan, however, couldar stiffer price than did (he posi-Alghanistan sanctionshe strength and durability of allied cohesion on this issue would depend in pan on how bloody Ihc confrontation in Poland became.
A sanctions effort limited to denials of equipment and technology sales would not create muchardship, simply because few large projects are on the horieon. The notable exception is the proposed gas pipeline from West Siberia to Western Europe. It would be an early casually of Western sanctions,ian jp date completely oui of reach. Particularly painful for Ihe USSR would be constraints on its access lo Western grain. Agreement among the US. Canada, thc EC. and Australia to limit sales would leave only Argentinaotential supplier (although even Buenos Aires has staled il would consider joining an embargo if the USSR invadedestern denials of industrial goods would also be cosily to Sovici planners facedrowing gap between domestic production and needs for items such as machinery, steel, and pipe and chemical feedstocks.
Impact cm Soviet Reiatiom Wit* H'eiternoviet invasion of Poland, particularly if it were bloody and actively resisted, and ledrotracted armed struggle, would destroy optimistic West European assumptions about an East-West security relationship that have persisted
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since (he. In the short term, ihe Sovietsn invasion would heighten Westrceplionsoviet threat and seriously set back Moscow's efforts to weaken thc Western Alliance. The Soviets would not believe, however, that an invasion would destroy West European hopes for eventual East-West rapprochement, or nullify the economic and political desires lhat drive West Europeans toward accommodation with Moscow.
Thc ebb and flow of Polish developments have given NATO some time to prepare iu immediate reaction loan iirrasion. Moscow is probably aware that the allies have agreed on an economic and diplomatic sanctions posture, including trade curtailment, recall of ambassadors, end scuttling of the languishing Madrid review meeting of the Conference on Security and Ccoperation in Europe (although not of the Helsinki Final Acl iisclO. While allied armed forces would be placedlate of heightened readiness, giving NATO some enhanced military flexibility. Moscow would not anticipate that NATO would take any seriousctions.
West Europeans havc viewedcareful construction ofto constrain and define the boundaries of Easl-Wesiwar in Europe less likely, and increasing mulual confidence inand policies of competing powers. Some West Europeansthat detente would increase Ihc Soviei sense of regionalso lhal Moscow would not need lo fear social evolution within
A Soviet invasion of Poland would undermine these assumptions, reviving West European doubts about Soviet intentions, exacerbating West European perceptions of lhe Soviei threat, and thereby reducing public confidence in the East-West relationship Detente, inense, would cease to exist.
Thc West Europeans, however, wouldeedew basis for East-West relations, and would begin to do so once ihe Polish situation had stabilized. Many would believeialogue with the East was still rtcccssary to reduce dangers of war. Some would argue that ihe Soviei invasion occurred within the USSR's own sphere of influence, and therefore constituted an understandable, if deplorable,ore common, tf less immediate, reaction would be thai economic interests required an Easl-West modus vivendi. despite the intrusion of military diplomatic shocks. Resumption of an East-West dialogue would not be far behind.
Soviet military inlervenlion in Poland might helpime to defuse West European opposition to NATO military modernon. The allies probably wouldaccelerate implementation of Long-Term Defense Program goals. Bui Ihe allies probably would notncrease their defense spending. While incremental adjustment; in defense budgets (could be possible as part of an initial, angry reaction lo an invasion, few West Europeans would be willing to sacrifice social welfare andprograms for lhc sakeefense buildup. Indeed, on reflection. West European governments might well conclude lhat the invasion had. at least over lhc mHtum term, weakened thc Warsaw Pact tnu thus reduced the urgency of heightened military spending. The allies perceive little benefitilitary buildup because they do not believe that (hey can match Soviet conventional strength, and do not want lo increase reliance on nuclear weapons to counter ho lance it. An invasion of Poland, therefore, would at besl only temporarily help NATO's effort to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces.
The West Europeans would retain their long-term "hitreat in arms control. While an invasion would freeze or end existing arms control talks, the West Europeans would continue lo believe thai arms control offers ihe besl road to military secutty LRTNF talks, even if suspended in Ihe immediateof an invasion of Poland, would be quickly revivedest European condition for missile deployment.
A similar pendulum swing would be exhibited in ihc area of East-West trade, since an invasion would not permanently destroy West European financial and industrial interest in such lies. Initially, the West Europeans would agree to selected commodity embargoes, although these wouldbe of limited duration. Negotiations for the construction of plants, pipelines, and other major economic facilities probably would bc suspended, bui not permanently terminated. Although West European governments would agree to limned application of economic pressure, they arc skeptical about the usefulness of broad economic sanctions. Theyomplained in the past thai such measures hurt their own economies al least as much t* ihey hurl ihe Soviet economy.
The extent of individual countries' financial exposure in Poland probably would have little impact on their initial reactions,ebt moratorium would undoubtedly bc declared. If default did occur, il would be unlikely to cause widespread bank failures or serious jeopardy lo the international monetary system occause central banks would step in
A Soviet invasion of Poland couldxofoutidly negative impact on the fortunes of West European Communist parties, which these parties would attempt to forestall. Italian Communist Party leaders have already strongly hintedoviet invasion of Poland would lead the PCI to break relations with the Communist Party of thc Soviet Union. Thc Spanish Communist Party, as well as the smaller British. Dutch, and Belgian parties, would strongly condemn an invasion. Even thc French Communist Party would denounce an invasion; the legacy of its stance against the invasion of Czechoslovakia is the sole remaining source of the PCFs claim totatus. The PCF has alreadytronger anti-invasion line as part of the price for participation in the new French Government.
Othern the short run atoviet invasion of Poland would shore upin other East Europeanof course, would have
been one of the primary objectives behind the invasion. An invasion and subsequent rollback of reforms would put an end to any "spillover" effects of Poland, reinforce the more pro-Soviet elements within the other East European regimes, encourage the imposition of hardline internal policies, and strengthen pressures for still closer alignment with thc USSR
The main costs to the Soviets in Eastern Europe would probably beAn invasion would,rolonged period, further reduce Polish deliveries of coal and manufactured goods to some of the other East European countries (notably East Germany andisrupting CEMA economic tics and forcing thc East European trade partners of Poland to seek more costly substitutes. The capacity of the East European economics to cope wilh their economic difficulties by introducing modest reforms would probably be further inhibited. The East European countries could all expect to suffer from reduced credits from and trade with the West, although the severity of the impact would depend in part upon thewith which individual East European regimes wee seen in the West to have fulfilled their "fraternal obligations" in invading Poland. While the Soviets would undoubtedly be unwilling to underwrite all lite costs to their allies of an invasion, they would probably be compelled to absorb some ofihe burden in response to picas that failure on their part to do so might spread dcs!3bilization within the "Socialist
Elsewhere in the world, the Soviets could count on few benefits from an invasion of Poland, although many of the costs would probably prove to be transitory. An invasion would obviously not improve thc Soviet image within
tlic Third World and in thc nonalignedif this had Tew operational oorisequcnccs. An invasion might also have the effect of partially blunting Soviet initiatives in the Middle East and inspiring somewhat greater toleranceS military presence. Most importantly, from thc Soviet standpoint, an invasion of Poland could lead to an acceleration of defense cooperation between the United States and China and, perhaps, to further crystcllizationBeijing-Tokyo-Washington axis."
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Costs. nd US Actions While the present paper is premised on the assumption that the USSR
would invade Poland and that the Soviet leadership would incur thc costs outlined above, it is conceivable lhat some additional Western or US actions beyond those noted above could either enhance thc deterrent nature of costs already anticipated by Moscow to follow from an invasion, or intensify these costs in the wake of an invasion. US leverage in either instance is quiteby the fact that many of the penalties the Soviets would have to pay would be independent of Western action, and by the limits of US influence ever relations between US allies or third countries and thc USSR.
From the standpoint ofoviet invasion, what is most important is sustaining Moscow's perception that those costs which are potentially within Washington's capacity to impose would in fact be imposed (and lhat they would not be imposed in the absence of aneterrence, to thc extent that the United States can effect it. depends on the Soviet leadership's reading of the US administration's willingness and political ability to get Congress and the American public lined up behind threatened responsesoviet invasion of Poland, and its ability to achieve and maintain agreement with allies over punitive actions. Similarly, further raising the costs of an invasion already unleashed by the Soviets would depend on sustaining thc US reaction and that of allies and third countries.
Potentially, the most profound additional deterrent against an invasion, and most serious further penalty the Soviets could be forced to pay if Ihey didPoland, would nol be possible NATO actionsfwhich the Soviets wouldeightened COCOM controls, or Ihc imposition of Western financial strictures, but the anticipation or reality of losing most Western grain imports. The USSRrain import requirement of perhapsillionear, and an add-onillion tons for Poland, assuming thc latter is included in the Western emba rrjo. Argentina in recent years has had an export capacity ofillion tons of coarse grain and wheal.
Thus even if Argentina failed lo adhere lo an cmbaigo. denial of Western grain by lhe US. Canada, thc EC. and Australia wouldajor setback to Soviet consumption and the livestock sector. Moscow has reason to doubt, however, thatomprehensive Western embargo would be politically swiainablc for long in ihc face of tumbling pricesorld grain marker that would quickly become glutted
The West could effectively double lhe impact of sanctions on the USSR by placing Eastern Europeanctions umbrella. Indeed, putting lhe burden of additional support for Eastern Europe on thc USSR's shouldersime of increasing domestic economic stringency would prove far more disruptive lo Soviei plans and options lhan would Western measuressolely against Moscow. To lhe Soviet requirement of al leastillion ions of Western grain would be added an Easl European require* mcnt of aboulillion tons of grain. Eastern Europe also depends on the West for substantial amounts of industrial materials and advancedand equipment. In terms of impact, its denial wouldultiple of Ihc actual value of ihc irade lost. Only by supplying the Bloc from Soviet production could Moscow replace forgone Western trade; even if the USSR were willing, comparable replacements do not existumber of instances.
Measures against Eastern Europe, however, would also be thc toughest to obtain. All the allies would be quick to nole lhal these would undermine any movement toward greater liberalization in Eastern Europe, hurlingthc Wesi has tried to wean away from Soviet dominance.
Moscow policymakers would certainly hope lhal actions taken by thc US ad mi nisi rat ion tooviet invasion of Poland or raise its cosis after ihc fact would prove counterproductive. In lhe United Slates, they would expect substantial domestic opposition io be mounted by key groups whose interests would be affected by ihc imposiiion of various sanctions, and ihey might hope lhat attempts lo push such sanctions through Congress wouldcleavages wiihin (he government and weaken lhe presentIn other Western countrcs. lhe Soviets could count on growing resistanceS efforts to employ ihcprospcci or realityoviei invasion of Poland lo get allies lo adopt extra sanctions bryond those already agreed upon, to further heighlcn mililary readiness, to increase defense spending, to deploy additional or new weapon systems, or to accept lhe abandonment of various arms control agreements or inili3tivcs. Moscov/ would attempt to capitalize on this resistance lo divide Ihc Western Alliance.
Original document.
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