ISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena
294
Nilional Inielligence estimate Memorandum lo Holder*
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF
SOVIET GOALS AND EXPECTATIONS IN THE GLOBAL POWER ARENA
till Ion1 wl uin! in tneki ol Ihu McmD-indvrr
n=nclsciio?kOG?AM of.
- hsincy.
ty
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The loBowing intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
M emorondum:
Th* Central InleKgence Agency, the Detente Intelligence Agency, the Notional Security Ageney. ond the intelligence ocgoniiotioni ol the Dtoorlmenli ol Store ond Treoiury.
Also Participating;
The Altaian! diet ol Sioll for InleKgence. Department of lhe Army The Director ol Novo! Inlelligence, Deportmenl ot the Navy The AtMilonl Chief af Slotf, Intelligence, Department ol Ihe Air FarceOlrector at InlcHigtnee, Heodovorlerl. Marine Corpt
CONTENTS
Pot*
KEY JUDCMENTS
The Central Role ot Soviel Miliiary
Sovid Relations Wiih the United
Weslern
Eastern
The Third
Southwest
Lailn
Domestic Pressures and Possible Policy
Economic
Potential Social
Political Leadership and
KEY JUDGMENTS '
We believe that Soviet leaders regard military strength as the foundation of the USSR's statuslobal superpower and as the most critical factor underlying Soviet foreign policy. As it enters, the current Soviet leadership sees the heavy military investments made during the last two decades paying off in the form of unprecedentedly favorable advances across "the military spectrum, and over the long term in political gains where military power or military assistance has been the actual instrument of policy or the decisive complement to Soviet diplomacy.
Since thehe Soviet Union hasew willingness to challenge the West in Third World settings as exemplified by its actions in Angola and Ethiopia and its invasion of Afghanistan. This more assertive Soviet international behavior is likely to persist as long as the USSR perceives that Western strength is declining and as it further explores the utility of its increased military powereans of realizing its global ambitions.
A central question fors whether the Soviets may be more inclined now than in earlier periods to confront the United Statesrisis. Moscow still viewsrospect as extremelyowever, in light of the change in the strategic balance and continued expansion of general purpose forces, the Soviets are now more prepared and may be more willing to accept the risks of confrontationerious crisis, particularly in an area where they have military or geopolitical advantages.
Policy Toword the United Stotes
The Soviet leadership sees the present US administration ashostile to the USSR and as intent upon linking Soviet behavior in the Third World to Easi-West relations, particularly arms control.has categorically rejected this "linkage" and has reaffirmed ils
In lhe view of iht rH'niff. Bureau ol tnltttigenee and Rtuatth. Oeparlm/nlState, and el iht Special Auuranf ro iht Secreiaiy ol iht T'taiuty tHaiienal SrcumuX 'he Uimmandum ttndi lo HAdtntair iht hUWlcol (oorlnWIr of Ihe uJeofeficot end potUitel undtrplnnUigi ol Soviel auerliorntu
In Ihe Third World" MaKOW hai punned oppoelunllltt andrfunnj periodi ol tttiltot military
.wolnrtimeUduring ptriodi ol enhanced Urenglh (Jot ttample. Koret. Loot.eVih Thelacloei. moreover, lhal have IriJIut+eed Soviel teiUmi In then regioni haoe beenheir oiexo ol ihe lituaiitm and oppoiluaiitei and of iht poienlutl US reioomri lo Sowl latliaiioet lhan lhe
HaieollHlan, prog-ami
5COrfl
commitment lo support "nalional liberation" movemenis. Allhough lhe Soviets may doubt thai thc administration will actually be able loasolicy toward the USSR as it has suggested it would, they are probably reviewing their options for responding over the longer term to thai possibility.
The Soviets will continue to stress the importance of the armsdialogue with Washington as the key to bilateral relations, andwill seek to resuscitate detente as the most promising way ofUS military policies, of advancing their military and political objec-lives, and of controlling the costs and risks of heightened international tensions. If they conclude that there is no prospect in the near term for meaningful results from renewed SALT^ theydecide to go beyond the SALT II constraints, seeking to place the onus for failure on the United States and to exploit the breakdown to widen cleavages in the Atlanlic Alliance. At the same time. Moscow would continue lo urge the United States to enler SALT negotiations and would undoubtedlyto manipulate West European commitment to SALT in order to increase the pressure on Washington.
Moscow apparently views thc policies of the present administration in Washington as likely to sharpen contradictions within thc Atlantic Alliance. The Sovielsack of Westernexample, in implementing NATO's program to modernize its long-rangehey seek to exploit these differencesual purpose; to pursue certain economic and polilical interests with thc Europeans even if Soviet relations with thc United States deteriorate, and lo generate pressures on West European governments lo influence Washington toward greater flexibility in ils dealings with the USSR.
The USSR perceives that some Western governments are moreabout military imbalances such as lhc Soviet preponderanceThe Soviets will continue to act politically to prevent theof NATO's force modernization programsUS LRTNF) through arms conirol offers that wouldmilitary advantages in Europe and through threats of
Poland presents the USSR with thc most threatening and complex challenge to its vital interests to emerge in Eastern Europe in the postwar period. Soviet leaders are prepared lo use miliiary force to preserve Soviet domination if they become convinced lhat changesplace in Poland jeopardize the USSR's hegemony over EasternHowever, because they know that the political, military, andcosts of intervention would be extremely high, they may bring
them wives, so long as Poland's commitment to the Warsaw Pact isto liveuch-modi lied Communist system in Poland.'
The Soviets piobably anticipate that their military intervention in Poland, even under the most favorable scenario, wouldarsh West European reaction and an initially unified US-West European stand against them. They see this as removing or reducing, at least temporarily, what they would otherwise expect to be lhe restraining influence of the European allies on the United States. Nevertheless, the Soviets would expect that differences between the Uniled States and the European allies on the scope, intensity, and duration of counieimeas-urcs against the USSR would gradually emerge and provide the. USSR with opportunities for renewing detenle with at least Western Europe.
China ond Jopan
The Soviets are deeply concerned by what they perceiveuasi-alliance evolving between the United Stales and China, and they will seek to frustrate and to delay the emergenceWashington-Beiiing-Tokyo axis" with links to NATO directed against Moscow. They will also cooperate with the Vietnamese who, although wary of Moscow's embrace, haveunior partner in thc Soviet effort to reduce US influence in Indochina and encircle and neutralise China. The present Soviet leaders developed the containment policy against China and built the forces as well as lhe alliance and diplomatic framework to support .this policy. They are unlikely to abandon ihis policy for the extieme alternatives of either far-reaching concessions lo placate Chineseor military measures to defeat or coerce the Chinese leaders
Third World
The Soviets believe that they have the legitimate right and lhe military strength to pursue an" aggressive foreign policy in thc Third World In seeking to asseit the USSR's statusower wiih btoad. global interests, ihey will attempt to:
Create as well as to exploit opportunities stemming fromconflicts to enlarge Soviet influence, using militaryand Soviet military power.
ReduceUS -influence by expanding lhc USSR's presence and encouraging anti-Western regimes and elements.
ire uft.blt lo Mv ihe rvectte llmll ol So-kidoxtU ihil Ikeletdefi
n dcUrrolnn) ihll limn.
/
SEtVtT
Augment Soviet strategic reach and counter Western military.
Increase hard currency earnings as well as to promote political and strategic interests through arms sales.
More specifically, in the Middle East. Moscow seeks to:
Preserve and exploit the strategic advantages it holds by virtue of geography, potentially reinforced by the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, and by Soviet influence in Syria. Libya, and South Yemen.
hift of Persian Culf statesro-Westernorend eventually pro-Soviet position, while at the same time helping "national liberation" movements that might seize power in the Culf. In this context the Soviets have attempted also to improve relations with the conservative, pro-Western governments in thc Culf region.
Improve Soviet access to and ultimately establish control over Persian Culf oil, with all that would mean for enhanced Soviet leverage over Western Europe and Japan.
In attempting to realize these objectives, Soviet policymakers also have to take into account more fundamental concerns. First, they must approach with care any move that could leadirect military clash with the United States Second, they must assess the impact of actions in the Culf on their own global strategic, political, and economic interests. .And. third, ihey must judge bow they wish tolo be seenoil supplies lo the West. Such considerations might not deter the Soviet leaders if they were confronted by strategicor severe challenges in the Culf region. Soviet behavior during lhe Iran-Iraq war and tbc evolution of its diplomatic position on Culfsuggest, however, that Moscow seems more immediately interested inajor US military buildup in the region and in advancing Soviet claims for recognitionegitimate coguarantor of Culfthan in risking the employment of ils miliiary forces
Moscow's ptesent goals ineasilyto achieve polilical conlrol-and military consolidation while avoiding the introduction of major additional forces. The Soviets seek to establish conditions for political dominationontinued military presence in lhe counliy; the scale and nature of any poslinsurgency militarywill reflect their broader regional objectives Moscow will increase pressure on Pakistan through military threats, border incidents,and possibly strengthened ties with India in an effort to persuade Islamabad to accommodate Soviet objectives in Afghanislan.
nmotrt
With rupect to Iran and Iraq, thc Soviets will seek an outcome of their current war that leavei both dependent to some extent on the USSR, and that does not foreclose the possible further acquisition of oil from Iraq by the USSR and other Soviet Bloc countries. The Soviets will attemptaintain Iraqi dependency on the USSR for arms supply, and they will seek in the near term to prevent any improvement in1 in relations and to influence the Khomeini successionay thai mightollow-on regime toosture more favorable to Soviet interests.
There will clearly be continuing opportunities in Africa for the USSR and ils proxies. The most acute problems Soviel and Soviet proxy action* in Africa may create for the Unitecl Stales in the next several years could be:
A substantial increase in Soviet backing for or involvement in the insurgency in Namibia.
Extension of the USSR's influence elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa by providing militarydirectly or through theSoviet clients in order to develop or exploit intctnal instability in Zaire, Zambia, or Zimbabwe, or by collaborating to further Libyan aims in Chad and Sudan.
Soviet provision of significantly larger numbers of advisers and equipment, ot more support for the Cubans, in order to prop up Moscow-oriented regimes in Angola. Mozambique, orif they are threatened by dissident elements or faced by internal collapse.
Miliiary conflictoviet client regimehirdor without Soviet encouragement. (For example. Ethiopian encroachment on Somalia,between Angola or Mozambique and Soulh Africa related to Namibia or bilateral disputes.)
Inspired by lhc success of revolution in Nicaraguahe USSR is actively seeking to promote insurgencies in Central America armed al bringing anti-US leftist regimes to power Cuba is animportant outpost for Moscow in the hemisphere, as wellurrogate in the Middle East and Africa. The Soviels will coniinue to use Cuban airfields and other facilities and to underwrite the CubanBeginning0 the USSR has actively been encouraging and facilitating Caslro's return lo militancy in Central America Tbe Soviets seek toegree of revolutionary momentum in the region, to undermine US interests, and to keep the Atlantic Alliance embroiled over how to deal with Soviet- and Cuban-sponsored instability and civil war thrust on friendly governments in Cenlral America.
y
SfORfcT
Domestic Coruid-ro lions
Several sources of domestic pressure and vulnerability in the Soviet system could force difficult choices on the leaders in. These Include deteriorating economicrowing possibility of social instability and internal dissidence.hange in leadership. None of these factors alone will necessarily alter Soviet behavior. Their interaction could, however, lead lo significant changes in foreign policy; it certainly will make this policy less predictable.
As the USSR beginsh Five-Year Plan, economic prospects are gloomier than at any time since Stalin's death, and theretrong possibility the economic situation will .get progressively worse in the second half of the decade. Annual increments to national output even in theill be insufficient to avoid having to make choices among the competing demands for investment, consumption, the cost of empire, and continued growth in defense spending. As Soviet leaders survey what they regardostile external environment, however, foreign policy and military requirements are likely to dominate their policy calculations. They will therefore Iry to maintain high defense spending, promote higher productivity and assure domestic control by appealsore extreme patriotism, and, if social instability arising from consumer dissatisfaction or ethnic tensions makes il necessary, by resorting to repressive measures.1
It is difficult to assess what impact the forthcoming leadership succession may have on Soviet policy, particularly since theinew top leadership has to act will probably be more important than the individual views of ils members. If the new leaders believe the global "correlation of forces" to be favorable, especially if they are less impressed than Brezhnev with US military might and more impressed with their own. they might employ military power even more assertively in pursuit of their global ambitions. Crcater caution in foreign policy could result, however, from the pinch of internaldifficulties and popular dissatisfaction. On balance, although thc policies of the new leadership cannot be confidently predicied with any precision, wc believe that they will display general continuity with those of the Brezhnev era.
1 The Specie' AjiIiiw to the Seeitta'v ol tht Trtatmu [Hi iSteurtiyj no'ti ihai laMKmtni. labor, and consumption ihartloHi will mil bt filc'u. aad fV'tini thai ihtie will place lemuaiatt on mate
SovietoltCV inlliatiott
SCQrfl
DISCUSSION
CENTRAL ROIE OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER
I. ThU Memorandum to Holders ot. Soviet Coals end Eioettmttom In tht Global footer Arena, focuses onpedi ot Soviet |lobalmilitary powerwe believe lo be of uppermost concern in lhe hierarchy of Soviet foreign policy interests. The Memorandumthe central judgment of NIEleaders regaid military stiength as the foundation of thc USSR's statuslobal superpower. Wethat Moscow perceives military power to be lhe most critical factor undcilying Soviet foreign policy. In reaching and implementing foreign policySoviet leaders, of course,roadly defined "correlation ol forces" which includes not only military, bul political, social, and economicas well
ince Ihehe Soviet Union hasew willingness to challenge the West in Third World sellings as eicmptificd by ils actions in Angola and Ethiopianvaiion of Afghanistan. This more assertive international behavior hasa Soviel aisessmenl of local opportunities and the risks of Western counteract ion. but It has been Strongly conditioned by lhe steady growth of Soviet military strength and lhe confidence it engenders This Memorandum does not offer detailed analyses offorce poslure or of Soviet policies in those areas singled oul for discussion Rather,eneral level, it seeks to identify incentives and objectives, as well as poteniial vulncrabilit.es. which will shape Soviet pdi-<ies over the nest half decade.
more assertive.Soviet internationallikely to persisl as long ai lhe USSR perce.ivcsslienglh is declining and as il furtherutility of its increased military powereansin global ambilions. Other sources ofbeing comparatively weak, militarylhe provision of military assistance will icmainto Ihc USSR's International piospecls
manipulalion ol the USSR's increasedstrength and capacily io provide military assist-
once, however, will be pragmatic and circumspect. Soviet policymakers now confront unusually com-plci issues, discontent among allies, the possibilityeepening military Involvement ina volatile situation involving Middle Eastcontinued poor relations with China, and an uncertain future fot their relations with ihe West.alpable Soviet miliiary preponderance can be achieved, the SovieU will encourage regional actors eventually to accommodate themselves loregional objectives and seek security arrange-menis based on Moscow's good will with attendant political and miliiary concessions, especially if the alternatives of military self-help and counter vailing alliances prove less attractive In East-Westthe Soviets will continue to view theof military power inlo political gainsong-term process, best promoted by persistenl diplomatic efforts, covert action, and lhe steady amassing of military strength designedlter the security environment gradually while avoiding The Soviets will coniinue to act as lhough detente does not oblige ihem lo refrain from assisting "legitimate" partneis and "iust" causes in Third World ronllicts merely because US orinterests mighl be adversely affected
S As il entershe curiem Sovietsees lhe heavy miliiary investments made during the lasl Iwo decades paying off in the foim of unprecedentcdly favorable advances across lhe miliiary spectrum, and over the long lerm ingains where military power or militaiyhas been (he actual instrument of policy ot (he decisive complement to Soviet diplomacy. Thecredit their sMategic piogrami ofith lessening lhe probability of general nucleai svar with lhc United Stales and probably svilh Improving the war-fighting capabilities of Iheir forces. They piobably believe lhal their strategic forces would deter lhe United Slates from Initialing intercontinental nuclear wai in circumstances shodleai threat to US national survival.igh ilsk ol escalation to the nucleai level in any conflict wiih the United Slates in areas 'such as Western Europe) perceived vital lo US inleiesis
score r
'ORN
is an alternative view lhal lhe SovieU credit iheir strategic programs with improving considerably iheir war-fighting and war-winning capabilities during. These programsto be undertaken with the key obiec,!v; of further improving these capabilities which thcbelieve are the only sound basis (oruclear war. The Soviets piobably believe that the maintenance of superior general purpose forces and strategic nuclear forces will allow them to pursue an assertive, expansionist foreign policy, and give them increased confidence that Western militarywould be inhibited,"
Thc USSR's commitment to Urge military forces and aims assistance will be maintained because:
Political conflict involving force ot conducted in its shadow remains, in the Sovietritical factor driving both the internal developments of Slates and the international system.
The Soviets see theit growing military strength asavorable backdrop for theof an assertive foreign policy.
Moscow perceive* certain advantages in ils strategic nuclear capabilities. The Soviets willto eiploit advantageous trends andtheir strategic nucleai capabilities lo counter new US programs.
Soviels are confident that they possessary superiority against China, and are relatively
confident that they possess military superiority in Euiope; and they ate determined lo maintain their lead.'
military aid has served as the main conveyor of Soviet influence In lhe Third Woild.
U held bv iht Oiteeior. Drfenu foirtfigmcr Agency. aad Unlet Initlhtftr OU"'" af etch of ihe miUiar* trnxn.
En rooc. So-iet WMnonli or om pi-mi successful conduct ol
Initialedt* Wni iKji could. Kowevff. beII IIse-mte NATO utr ol nueUa.rilledATO couW bring Hi litter economic and poooUrton resource* to bear on the coune ol thehe Director. Bumf of laielhetntt and AeieaicK Deportment of Store. Minnaniutnt thehe Soeten Oft otiv tomeeoaUvc In iheti cafcbletioni andumber of
auumclton, uAich hlihliihland Water*
H'mtthi. While the Soon.ht .afur of ihrtr numerical advantage Ina-td mill* catcrciet of veapont. Ihey O'toUo await of.andanatttmpimt to rtmtdv. weafmeuei tohlch isov'a* mo'e ifcem far fiom confident of the outcome ofa mar wtth NATO.ttutt, /uiutrj ait fftrlp lo be mt/ie
Ihan lhehl
In crises, miliiary power Is seen by the SovieU as necessary for defending their interests and for levering crisis solutions In directions acceptable to them.
he momentum of programs already under way and the Soviet leaden' perception of actual andthreaU inakes any letup in theirunlikely. As they seek to achieve the military objective* of superiority where possible, an assuredand Improved global reach, they perceive and are concerned by:
A newly assertive Uniied States preparing toand deploy lignificant new strategicexploit new military technologies, and field improved general purpose fotces.
Other foreign military programs, especially within NATO, lhal threaten to undercut the strengths of Soviet fotces and exacerbate their
weaknesses.
Thc possible developmenlecurily/defense relationship between thc United States and China.
Instability on their southern border and theof an enhanced US military buildup in the Indian Ocean/Persian Culf region.
Developments in Poland which, if allowed to coniinue, could undermine Soviet hegemony not only there but in the ctilical East European aieahole--bul which could entail enormous political, military, and economic cosU to stop.
9 lo an e'fott to meet the challenges lhe Soviet leaders sec looming, the new Five-Year Plancontinues to accord lhc military first claim to Soviet resources:
number of Soviet weapon systems in
production and lhe production rates of major weapons are continuing al high levels.
The number of weapon systems in flighl lest andindicator of the systems that arc likely lo enlei production in the nest fewremains at high Icvels.
In addition, large numbcrsof weapon systems are in pretest stages of development; again, lhe numbers aie consistent with the level of research and developmentffort of the pastears.
Capital construction it under wayumber of keyacilities and production plants In preparation for the development and production of other new weapons, as welt as for the repair and overhaul of deployed systems. '
The addition of men to and the modernization of equipment in the Soviet forces are continuing.
central Question fors whethermay be more Inclined now than into confront the United Statesrisis.still viewsrospect as extremelyin light of the change in lhe strategiccontinued cipanslon of general purpose forces,are now more prepared and may be moreto accept the risks of confrontation in thc event ofcrisis, particularly in an area where theyor geopolitical advantages.
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
More than five months Into the Reaganthe Soviet leadership Is still taking stock of US policies and intentions. The Soviets may doubt thai the administration will actually be able to pursue asolicy loward the USSR as il has suggested it would. In their public commentary the SovieUto declare their commitment to "detente" and to improving relations wiih the Unitedethat they see maintenance ofelationship as the most promising means of constraining USpolicies, of advancing their miliiary and polilical objectives, and of controlling the costs and risks of heightened intetnalkmil tensions. Privately, the Soviet leadership is probably reviewing iU options inover the longer lerm to thc possibility of more assertive US policies
In the military sphere lhe Soviets will attempt touildup in US strategic forces, and lo pre-setve or estend their margin of miliiary advantage in those areas where Ihis is possible. They will seek to engage the Uniied Stales in arms control negotiations, lo appeal to US public opinion, and to increase pres-
l.le lhc broaderconcept "peacefultenet'"eim thil Is often used ot interpreted differently in It* WQI il.sr. in the USSR, Whiteto cue haiOo In ft.with the UnHed Stiles In order lo (sin economic, poUtfnl. snd miUliir benefiU-both di.dl. ind in >re*ioititrrsf de.LSo-leU continue lo pursue unrcmittinc Ideokeicsl sndiiiutcle In ihc imenuiloeal ireru. inctudinc i ind inl.lrS
OKN
surea on the United States by the Allies. If the effort to short-circuit the US buildup fails, the Soviels willtheycompete militarily ho wcver high the costs.ajor increase in defenseng above that which the SovieU currently plan would cut sharply into civilian programs with Ihc attendant possibility ofin the domestic Soviet polilical environment.
espite McacowVof hopeonstructive relationship can be reestablished svlth Ihe present administration, the SovieU believe they could beore competitive aod dangerous USThey view thc November election resulu and evSnU since then as evidence thai the recent, anti-Soviet evolution of US policy it parteeper trend In American politics, and notransientswing in what Ihey initially perceived as lig-tag policies during the Carter adminlstralton.
hc Soviet leadership sees thc present US administration as basically hoslile lo the USSR and more prone to resist Ihe USSR's efforu to expand its influence in the Third World. Moreover, It sees thc United Slates as intent upon linking Soviet behavior In the Third World to East-Wesl relations, particularly arms control Moscow has categorically rejected this "linkage" and has reaffirmed its commitment to sup port "nalional liberation" movements Nevertheless, it slill hopes to use detente and negotiations as means of advancing Soviet interests, particularly by slowing Western arms programs and regulating the US-Soviet arms competition. Promoting dclente is probably also still seen in Moscow as increasing the likelihood ofeconomic relations with the Uniied Slates and access lo ils lechnology and resources.
Moscow will continue to stress ongoing arms conirol and other securily negolialions in itswith the United States. The Soviets can be ei peeled lo negotiate lo preserve their strategic options in area's where -ihey arc strong and making progress, and to reduce the chances that ihe Uniied States and its allies will use iheir economic and technological capabilities to turn thc Uralecic balance against the USSR.
In fact, the Soviets see prospecU for theof So-ict-Amencan relations as dependingentirely in the near lerm on tbcJatc of the arms control dialogue with Washington. The Sovielsdoubl that lhe SALT II Tiealy can be salvaged as il stands. Bul they clearly wish to explore theof reviving arms control negotiations wiih lhe
IWOftN
administration. At any such meetings the Soviets will attempt to discover how extensive US-proposed (cvliioru are But tbey will not limit their approach limply lo responding to US proposab onIssues, nther. Ihey will raise Issues ot their own choosing.
The SovieU ate wary ot* being drawn Into long and inconclusive discussions about an appropriate negotiating framework while lhe SALT II TreatyIn limbo. They suspect that lhetrong defense mandate, might seeV lorawn-out arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union to keep otherwise restive allies In line and maintain pressureMoscow to observe treaty constraints, while al the same time moving ahead aggressivelyaioc miliiary buildup In this connection they will closely monitor US activity in the SALT and ABM fields and address their own force posture options
If the USSH concludes that there Is no piospeet in the near term for meaningful results from renewed SALT, it may decide to go beyond thehe Soviets could place ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIBVs) in launchers of non-MlRVed ICBMs or increase theol MIRVs per missile, thus increasing the threat to US silo- and shelter-based ICBMs. The Soviets would then seek lo place the onus for failure on the United Slates and to eiploit (he breakdown to widen cleavages in the Atlantic Alliance. At lhc same lime. Moscow would continue to urge the United Slates to enter SALT negotiations and would undoubtedly attempt to manipulate West Eutopcan commitment to SALT in orderet ease Ihe pressure on Washington
WESTERN EUROPE
he dominant view in Moscow is apparently thai the policies of the piesentashington arc likelyharpen contradictions within Ihc Atlantic Alliance that can be csploiied by thc USSR. As relations, have cooled between the Uniled Slates and (he USSR, lhe West Europeans haveamage-limiting strategy with respect lo their own lies with the Soviets Thus, lor eiample. thev have attempted to balance participation in US-initiated sanctions in the wake of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan wiih efforts to keep thc dialogue with Moscow open and lhe prospect ol improved ties Intact Moscow has leciprocated, stressing the preeminent importance of continuing detente in Europe, playing
especially on growing Sovlet'European economic ties and European domestic political pressures which have supported continuity and stability In relations with the USSR. The Soviets have traditionally sought to eiploil conflicts of interest betweenUnited States and Europe, and Soviet policy has attempted both to stimulate such differences and to gain West European support In modifying US policies.
regards th* decisive factor in theEuropean relationship as the continuingof Western Europe on the Unitedits iiutilulionali ration in NATO. Thispolitical influence among the NATOThe Soviets, therefore, leek graduallythe West Europeans that genuine securitycannot depend solely or even mostan Atlantic orientation, but rather should bethrough additional security and armswith lhe USSR. Moscow believes UScan be undermined lo lhe extent (hatUnion can:
Undermine West European confidence in the US nuclear "umbrella."
Erode the West European perception of the Soviet threat
Engage theEuropeans In arms control discussions and keep alive the prospects of their success
Encourage West European economicon ihe USSR
nuiribei ol developments cloud Soviettoward Western Europe. NATO nationsIIIUS-sponsoredDefense Program and have formally decidedwith lhc deploymentew generationlong-range theater nuclear foices (LRTNFJ onMoscow has comeegardasse ehangc in longstandingIn the Soviet view, some Westernare more aware of military imbalances suchSoviet preponderanceTNF. Westernto the invasion of Afghanistan haveconcern, ai has the stance of lhe present
t the same lime, however, the Sovieu have ample and giuwlng evidence of West European ambivalence aboul security relations with the United States. They sec and seek to capilaliieack of Weslern consensus on maroi securityeiam-
n/ojn
implementing Ihe LRTNF decision andspending. They have been quick to seizeopportunities provided by increasinglyminorities In Western Europe whoeasing of East-West tensions, andavegenerate pressures on West EuropeanInfluence Washington toward greater flciibilitydealings with the USSR. They wiU continue loto prevent LRTNF deploymentcontrol offers that would ratify SovietIn Euiope and through threatsdeployments. In lhe process, Moscow seeksdifferences In NATO wllh the objectiveblocking and changing US
rccogniies that iU ability toin Western Europe dependseilieme East-West polariiation.East-West tensions probably wouldWest Euiopeans closer to lhe United Stilescould lie convinced that the Uniied Statesand would limit Soviet ability toWestern Euiope away from the Unitedtherefore, will seek toituationthe Weal Europeans would be confrontedchoice between adherence to alliance policies orwith the USSR. Nevertheless, evcnU of theyears suggest to lhe SovieU that they cancertain economic and political interests witheven if relations with the United States
'hus, "differentiated" detenle hasemergedalculated Soviet itrategy for conducting East-West economic and polilical relations.
b keenly aware that SovielPoland would risk the political gains of detenteWest Europeans and the possibility of areUlionship with the Uniied States, includingarms conirol negotiations and technologyThe Soviels probably anticipate that evenmost favoiable inlervenlion scenario lhe Wesl
"^European reaction would be harsh and comprehensive andnote oi less unified US-West European stand would initially be taken against-them They see this as removing or reducing, at least temporarily, what they would otherwise expect to be the restraining influence of lhe European allies on the Uniied States. Nevertheless, Ihe Soviets would eipect lhal differences between the United Stales and the European allies oo lhe scope, intensity, and duration of counter measures againsi lhe USSR would gradually emerge and provide lhc USSR with opportunities for renewing detente with Western Europe.
EASTERN EUROPE
n essential element contributing to an activist Soviet poticytowaid Western Europe and. lo somean asseitlve Soviet policy in other region* of lhe globe,iable position in Eastern Europe. The attention ol the Soviet leadership is now focused on lhe Polishestering crisis in Poland, or an intervention whichrotracted period of consolidation, wouldevere polilical andsetback.
i lhe years Moscow has attempted lolimitations on social, economic, and political experimentation In Eastern Europe. This hai beenonly In part, because each of the East European states Is beset by major economic and polilical(hitomentum of their own. and that could mature into open crises, barring effective coun-tcrmcasures. These problems are longstanding but lhe economic stagnation of recent years and economic as well as polilical reverberations of Poland could eiacet-bate already eiisting sources of potential instability Thus Ihe Soviets may have to devote increasinglo subtitling Easi European regimes andSoviel hegemony in the region Ycl the Soviet ability lo Impose more restrictive international and domestic policies on East European leadeuhlpsaclml use ol force is diminishing How to balance efforts bv East European regimes lo cope with then own fundamental problems through measures likely lo run counter to Soviet interests, aglinsl thc costs of re-sliaining such measures, is the enduiing problem of Soviel policy toward Eastern Euiope
The Polish crisis has accentuated once again the political vulnerability of ihe Communist regimes of Eastern Europe. Poland's agonies are an ominous ie-fleclion of chionic, systemic problems which afflict the Soviet empire low economic growth, decliningpioduclivily, lhc need but irujteaiing inability lo satisfy rising popular demand for consumer goods, unsatisficiory responsiveness to guidance fiomind. not least ofependence on trade and credits fiom Western Europe The USSR his many of the same problems
Polind presents the USSR with lhe mostand compter challenge to lis villi interesU to emerge in Eastern Europe in the poslwai period-Soviet leaders are prepared to use militaiy forceresent) Soviet domination if ihey become convincedchanges taking place In Poland jeopardize the USSR's hegemony over Eastein Euiope. However, be-
cauic they know thai Ihe political, miiitiiy. jivl eu<-nomic coils oi intervention would be eilicmely hisd. thev may. so loo* as Poland'l com milo. law Pact Is assui bring themselves lo liveuch modified Communis! system in Poland/
M Inletvcnlion in Poland by Soviet aimed form most likely would eiscerbiteonse-Quenees of the Poliih ciiiii fo* the Warsaw Pact. Re-listancc to Soviet intervention by the Polish military would lead to lhe destruction of the Poliih forcesand result In suable Soviet hnses. Even if the Polish military acquiesced lo in intervention,damage lo iu morale and popular support would occur- After the intervenlion. substantial Soviet fortes would doubtless be permanently stationed in Poland, both lo compensate for the loss of PeJiih forces to Ihe Pact and to guarantee internal order. If thc Soviets allow the Polish esperlmenl lo continue. Ihey willlo counter its effects on Warsaw Pact cohetron
CHINA
Soviets are deeply concerned byuasi-alliance evolving betweenStales and China, yel they probablyopportunities other lhan possibly the Issuefor driving significant wedges betweenand Beiiing.
tlie end of the last decade, theheavily on US sell restiaim, based onpresumed toigher American slake inihe US-Soviet sirategK nuclear relalionship.the Sino American rehtroothip doman active anti-Soviet security partnership,from encompassing significanttransfers. With the full normalizationrelations at the beginningsaw American inhibitions weaken and. afterinvasion of Afghanistan, erodeotential Sino-US militaiy alliance have
' been recently reinforced by the United Stalesto ease restrictions on aims sales to China.
ov-et leaden now almost certainly find no more reason than in the pail lo believe lhat Iheirpursued toward China sincere likely In leado* mail ration of Sino-Soviet relations sulfi-ciem lo relieve ihc USSR from the pressures of Sino-
' W, I'm c" of V-
limit
stJer
Amerkari vcurity collaboration or lhe possibility of a
pprehension about China'smilitary
-despite iU limited reach beyond
Chinese leaders,anpower advantage and
limited n'f.lear capabilitiesfound eapresslon in
theiet buildup along the Sino-Scmet border
since the mid'ISOOs President Bieihnev and Defense
Minister tsiinov visited lhe Soviet Far East in April
IViKigh command in the Far East
established, subslanlial changes were made in
c-nnurd and control, and forceHnuod
M. These improvements have notesponse to any may* new buildup of Chineae forces9 Sinn-Vietnamesehowever, reinforced Soviel ptfteptkKdeed to continue ihem. Fromoviet forces ace needed to con-lain the Sliv,Soviet gggJIfct, ensure Soviet security against Chinaecisively superior posture, and strengthen the Soviet hand in attempting lo negotiate vime enmpr'a-nise with the Chinese. China'sIn challenge the USSR suuest lhat lhe problem andoviet point ofnm disappear
Vi Against ihe background of intensified USon lapan loreater security role in Northwest Asia, the Soviets perceive evolving Sinotilde and political ties with increasingMoscow nowS-Chinese miliiarydirected against it. and indirectly supported hy Japan,lausible, midterm threat against which il mustoviet policies will seek lo frustrate and In delay ihe emergenceWashinglon-Beijing-Teakya uu" with links lo NATO diiected against Mas-cm thrwevcr. lo dale Moscow has been unwilling to make concessions to Tokyo on lhe most contentious issue. lU: Northern Territories, in order toimm! and economic relations
Over the past decade. Moscow's attemptse-'end iu influence in Indochina through clcne conncratinn with Hanoi have been motivaled by twohe reduction of US influence in lhe region ami llie encirclement and neutialiialion of China. Sinci- llie Si no-Vietnamese borde' waroviet miliiary ad to Vietnam hai increased dramatically An enhanced Soviel miliiary presence in or near lhe country includes greater Soviet naval activity in lhe southwest Pacific. Soviet naval docking rights, and tegular Soviet inlelligence flights from Vietnamese ler-
SEyffr
ritory against China and US naval units tn the western Pacific and South China Sea. The Vietnameseautious ally, wary of Moscow's embrace, but they have neverthelessunior partner In the Soviet effort to block Chinese influence in the rcgion.
or years Moscow entertained some hope lhat Mao's successor mighlragmalic leader who would see China's interests beat served br abandoning Mao's highly personallted and ideologically oriented hostility toward the Soviet Union, and who wouldore balanced Chinese relationship with thc United States and the Soviet Union. Deng and his colleagues did dispense with much of the Maoist personalis! Indictment of Moscow and ill leaden, but in lis place haveeopolitical rationale for opposing Ihe Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviels sec China's commitment lo long-term domestic mode mint ion programs as providing Chinese leaden with incentives for pcnisllng la an anti-Sovietleast as long as such programs depend heavily on extensive economic and technologicalfrom the West.
he Soviets may still hope lhal the US-Chinese relationship will run afoul of domestic politics in one or both countries The preseni Soviet leadenhlpthe containment policy againsi China and built the fotces as well as lhe alliance and diplomaticto support ihis policy The cuirenl leaders are unlikely to abandon this policy for ihe extremeof. either far-reaching concessions to placate Chinese demands or military measures lo defeat or coerce the Chinese leaders. Should pieseni nendshowever, ihese drastic alternatives will remain for consideralionuccessor Soviet leadership.
THE THIRD WORID 1
oviet strategic obiectives in the Third Worldhole will remain unchanged and will shape the Soviet approach to particular regions. Most impof-tantty. lhe Sovicis believe lhal they have lhe legitimate
' Tht O'ti'sr. flvireue fi Reutth:af titii. eid rlw Specie! AirU'eai re ikeiht
TVeeiury fNartonef"Wiroe Iht Win wJI piece gittltt ithtiiteel-intlrata**
l ef tint Itoll-
dm lhe USItl'i poi'ilon. fic-jiati gitttttiom reguxw/td of lheef
lhe ScwWI lele In SoviIimiI Ana, ihtm lhe I'll Ivf/'iN Theibelieve lhe HitlheH'CeprlCHihe piob-leiSa fteet ut ihai xtwa Ofi- Ire* Into.
'.i ,
right and lhe military strength to pursue an aggressive foreign poller in lhe Third World. In seeking lo assert the USSR's statusower wiih broad, globalihey will attempt to
Create as well as eaptoit opportunities stemming from regional conflicts to enlarge Sovietusing military assistance and Sovietpower.
Reduce Western--particularlyby expanding the USSR's presence andanti-Western regimes and elements.
Augment Soviet strategic reach and counter Western military activity.
Increase hard currency earnings as well aspolitical and strategic interests through arms sales.
Southwest Alio
uring the pail three yeanonsequence of lhe fall ol the Shah, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and lhe Iran-Iraq war, lhe possibllily of East-West confrontation has sharply intensified in Southwest Asia, an area immediately adjacent to the southern borden of the USSR Furthermore, allhough the United Slates his only begunignificant military presence there. Washington hasital national interest in preserving the independence of the Persian Culf region, railing Ihe likelihood lhat further Soviet expansion in that area will lead toSoviel leaders ate aware lhal lhe stakes, risks, and consequences of US-Soviet contention in this part of the world are great
hile the international reaction lo lhe Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was piobably more SC'ere ihan Moscow anticipated, lhe consequences of alo acl are probably still viewed in Moscow asthe inveslmcn! Moreover. Ihe Soviet leaders almost certainly recognize lhal any further military eipinsion by lhe USSR inlo lhe Persian Cull region would affect iheir relations wiih lhe West far more adversely, and above all would cany far more seriouscomparison wiih the Soviet invasion ofan escalating military confrontation with lhe Uniied Stales Such considerations mighl not deter lhe Soviel leaders il they wete confronted by strategic opportunities or sevcic challenges in the Culf region. The threatS military presence in Iran,all from an embattled leftist icgimc in Tehnn. or
fOBN
ivgfopr
"invitation"ocal ipinoft* republic in Iran might tempt the Soviet! to introduce military forcex
Soviet behavior during the Iran-Iraq war and the evolution of iu diplomatic position on Culfsuggest that Moscow seems more immediatelyinajor US military buildup in the region and in advancing Soviet claims (or recognitionegitimate eoguarantor of Culf security than In risking the employment of its military forces. Thchave already begun to promote the idea of an eiteinally guaranteed international regime of unimpeded access to the Culfs oil resources In which the Soviet Union would be fe legitimate and coequal participant and guarantor.
Moscow's policy in the Middle East is based on certain broad goals. It seeks to:
and eipioil the strategic advantages it holds by virtue of geography, potentially le-inforced by the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, and by Soviet influence in Syria. Libya, and South Yemen.
a shift of Persian Culf stalesro-Westernorendpro-Soviel position, while at the same lime helping "national liberation" movements that might seise power in lhe Culf In this conteil the Soviets also have attempted to improve relations with the conservative, pro-Western govcrnmenU -in lhe Culf region
Improve Soviet access to and ultimately establish
conlrol over Persian Culf oil. with all lhat would mean fo* enhanced Soviet leverage overEurope and Japan.
n attempting to realiie Ihese obrfctfves. Soviet policymakers also have to take into account moreconcerns. First, ihev must approach with care any move that could leadirect military clash with the Unitedespecially one that ihey could reasonably anticipate might escalate to nuclear warfare Second. |hcv must assess the impact of actions in the Culf on their own global strategic, political, and economic inleresls. And, third, they must judge how ihey wish tolo be seenoil supplies to the
In light of ihe relative proiimily of the Culf lo home based Soviet miliiary power,i ration schemes launched by Moscow to keep out eilernal forces are calculated to hinder Western activity and
preserve Soviet military advantage Thc SovieU may believe Ihcre are good chances for constraining lhe Ametican military buildup tn lhe region, given Moscow's awareness of lhe unwillingness of Culf Hales lo illy themselves openly with the United States o* to gianl the Uniled Stales more thin conditional access to some air and naval facilities. European skepticism about the appropriateness or feasibility of lhedefense design fo* the Persian Culf. and some domestic American criticism of lhe design as
oscow will work lo encourage realignmentthe USSR of Pakistani policies and lheofhange by the United Smcs. Western Europe, and China Moscow will increase pressure on Pakistan thtough military threats, border incidents, subversion, and possibly strengthened lies with India in an effort to persuade Islamabad to lecomincdaie Soviet objectives in Afghanistan.
oscow's present goals in Afghanistan- not easilyto achieve political contiol and military consolidation while avoiding the introduction of major additional forces. The SovieU seek to establish conditions fo* political dominationontinued military presence in the country; the Kite and nature of any post insurgency miliiary presence will reflect their broader regional objectives The Soviets cannot afford to withdraw substantial forces, even if they thought such withdrawals would serve their interests elsewhere No* would Moscow ptobably abandon newly gained forward military positions even ifconditions in Afghanistan permitted, although small cosmetic withdrawals could be made forpurposes
ith respect to Iran, Moscow will seek in the near term lo prevent any improvement in US-Iranian relations and lo influence the Khomeini successionay thai might, leadfollow-on regime toosture more favorable to Soviet inleresls. If ihey are not propelled by events, the Soviets would probablynited, anti'Western lian heavily subject to Soviet influence and witling to barter ol onterms (or Soviet military and technical assistance.eftist coalition were able to scire power, it might request Soviet armed assisuncc in establishing itsIn individual regions of Inn or throughout the country. The Soviet decision to accept such anwould be critically affected by Moscow's estimate of the riskirect military confrontation wiih the Uniled Stales.
fltCT OtN
lies with Iraq have been ittalned by lhe Sovkl refusal adequately to meet liaqi military resupply needs during the Iran-Iraq war. Baghdad is already actively seeking Western sources of aims mp-%Ai. and has been movingloser alignment with the conservative states io the region The Soviets will attempt lo maintain Iraqi dependency on the USSR for arms supply. They abo will hope that the pressure Implicit in their relations wllh thc forces potentially ihreatening to the Saddam Hussein regime (such as Syria and lhe Communist Tarty of Iraq) will lead Iraq to respond to Soviet interest. They willlies if feasible with pro-Soviel or anIt-Hussein elements In lhe Ba'th Party and miliiaryThey will seek an outcome of the current war that leaves both Iraq and Iran dependent to someon thc USSR, and thai does not foreclose lhefurther acquisition of oil from Iraq by the USSR and olher Soviet Bloc countries.
In theontinued assertive SovietIn Southwest Asia iswhich seeks to use Moscow's new forward position and regionalThe Afghanistan occupation has improved the USSR's miliiary positionis Iran and Pakistan and has enhanced Soviet ability to eiercise polilical pressure in lhe area. At the same lime, il hasSoviet, difficulties wiih the regional states The Soviels will attempt lo exploit (hit poslureonce iheir polilical and miliiary position in Afghanistan has been consolidated. II the currentstrategyparticularly if the United States seems likely loiable securityin the Culf and to organize slales in and close to the region into an anti-Soviet front -Soviet behavior will probablytill more assertive luin For the preseni. however. Moscow seems lo believe lhat the USSR's long term interests are best served byS military buildup through preemptive diplomacy rather than by controlling il prematurely wiihdisplays. This relative resliain! could, of couise. Quickly give way if events in lhe tegion threateninterests or create opportunities lor ihem.
Africa
SI. There will clearly be continuing opportunities in Africa for the USSR and JU proxies. The potential openings aie many:
Thc polilical. economic, and social weaknesses lhat will continue lo afflict Africa.
The tendency of African military organisations lo acquire as muchai possibleof the realf threat.
Abiding African suspicions of Europe and lhe United Stale*.
The presence of apartheid In South Africa and Its impact on lhe domestic and foreign policies of other countries in Africa. Clearly, the SovieU view support for the African struggle forrule In Namibia and Soulhall of iU political, economic, military, and diplomaliea key element in their approach
-lo Sub-Sahatan Africa over lhe neat decade.
f (he many problems Soviet and Soviet proxy actions in Africa may create for the Uniied Stales in the neat scvetal years, the most acute could be.
A substantial increase in Soviet backing fot oe involvement in lhe insurgency in Namibia
Extension of the USSR's influence elsewhere in Sub-Sahatan Africa by providing military assisla needirectly or through theSoviet clients in order to develop or exploit internal Instability in Zaire. Zambia, or Zimbabwe, ot by collaborating to further Libyan aims in Chad and Sudan
Soviet provision of significantly larger numbers of advisers and equipment, ot more support for the Cubans, in order lo prop up Moscow-oriented regimes in Angola. Mozambique, or Ethiopia if ihey ate threatened by dissidentor faced by internal collapse
conflictoviet client regimehirdwiih o* without Soviel encouragement. (For example, Fithiopianon Somalia,between Angola Ot Mozambique and Southrelated to Namibia ot bilateral disputes)
Scnrigt acquisitionajor iww foothold in West Africa
An increased Soviet naval and air presence in lhe region If the Soviels were successful In obtaining access to port lacililici and airfields in various counlries.
S3 Bul increased Soviet activity in Sub-Sahatanwill not rseeewarily assure greatly heightenedinfluence- The SovieU are probably concerned about the possibilityeaceful Western-sponsored
SEPTET fOKN
mibiin letilerncnl by ibeir own failure lo bach the light side in Zimbabwe, by US success in winning permission lo use military facilities in Somalia.and Kenya, and by Nigeria* links with the West
lolin America
interest in Latin America hasIn recent yean as It haseakening ofand new opportunities to promoteThe SovieU have exploited an intensifiedmany Inn American nations in undertakingindependent of the United States and theirwillingness lo develop political, economic,tics with lhe USSR Moscow also thinksdevelopments within many Latinfavor Soviet Interests.
facet of Soviet strategy has been torelations with the region's majoras Argentina. Brazil, and Mexico. Althoughhopes lhat over the longer run lhe environmentcountries will be more hospitable to theMarxist and radical leftistoveitly and covertly for such anpresent It has put priority on cultivatingand ami US sentiments and promoting Sovietinterests, such as acquisition of Argentinegrain
Central America in particular,hatiffeient tack and Is seekinginsurgencies aimed at bringing anti-USio power. Inspired by the successorNicaraguahe USSR has delectedrevolution in El Salvador. Cuatemala. andThe SovieU have moved to eiploit these newcurrents by helping lo consolidate thein Nicaragua, uiging their local Communis!lo participate and gain influence in broad-based
^ revolutionary movements, and caiending military and financialh direclly and through suriogates
is an increasingly important outpostin the hemisphere, as wellurrogateMiddle East and Africa. The Soviets wiUuse Cuban airfields and other facilities andlhc Cuban economy Beginning inUSSR has actively been encouraging andCastro's return lo militancy in CentralSovicls seek toegree olin lhe region, to undermine US interests,
- *keep lhe Atlantic Alliance embroiled Over how
lo deal with Soviel and Cuban-sponsored instability and civil war thrust on friendly governmenu in Cen-tr ai America
SS Despite Moscow's new activism In ihe region, some significant constiainu on Soviet activity are likely lo remain. Moscow recogniiet that, compared to the Middle Easi and South Asia. Latinot central to its security concerns. The SovieU recognize thai the United States has the ability to exertmilitary and economic power in the region and lhat Soviet ability in ihis regard is limited Moreover. Moscow realizes lhal. as In the ease of Jamaica where iterious reversal. Its influence sometimes rests on shaky domestic foursdations. Despite these far-ton. it is clear lhat the United States will be faced with more Soviet support for political subversion andactivity in the Western Hemisphere Inhan it faced In the pieceding decade
DOMESTIC PRESSURES AND POSSIBLE POUCY CHANGES
everal sources ol domestic pressure andin th* Soviet system could force difficult choices on Ihe leaden in. These include deteriorating economicrowingof so-ial instabilily and internal dissidence.hange in leadership None of these factors alone will necessarily alter Soviet behavior, but (heir interaction could lead to significant changes in foreign policy The Soviet Union ofill piobablyore volatile society, and ils policies (and reactionsS policies) may be less predictable than in lhc past.
Economic Problems
As ihe USSR begins its Ilth Five-Tear Plan, economic prospects are gloomier and policy choices more difficult than al any time since Stalin's death Shortfalb in industrial production and hack-to-back harvest failures have reduced the growth in grossproduct (CNP) during the past two years lo Us lowest rale since World War II and have left lhelooking for ways lo alleviate economic pressures at home without affecting defense, weakeningcontrol, or generating unrest in Eastern Europe
The economk situation will be poor ineriod. Therelrong possibility it will get progressively worse andore critical factor in the second half of (he decade Soviet economic problems cannot be easily overcome Annual Inere-
riling Invealmeni in energy develop-
mend lo nalional output even In theill be loo small to permit all of thc follo-ing
men)
Ea stern Europe and clieni
The increases in investment In Industry,and transportation needed to revive the economy.
Greater support states else where.
Any substantial increase in consumer wclfate.
And continued g'Owthefense spending at the rates of the pastercent per year on average.
f military spending continues lo growercent per year, iu share of Soviet economic output could increase from about one-eighth now to over onc-sixlh0 More importantly, the miliiary share of the annua! Increment to economicamount that can be distributed each year lo case the political tensions thai arise fiom competition (orincrease Irom about one-dllh lo as much as three-fourths. This would drastically reduce Ihe ability of lhe Soviet leaden lo allocate additional resouices lo investmenl and consumption.
he projection of Soviet military spending most consistent with available evidence suggests lhal pies lures jnfavot of continuing the existing arms buildup are likely to offset any inclination toward change lhat mighl arise fiom the leadership's growing economic concerns. Under conditions o( heightenedtension, the SovieU might even be willing todefense spending more rapidly despite the negative impact ihis would have on investment and consumption. In any case. Soviet leaders are highly unlikely (ot economic reasons alone to acceptsir aims on defense programs lhat they consider vitalheir nalional securily. However. Soviet incentives to constrain US miliiary programs through arms contrnl negotiations will increase as the economy slows in, particularly i( economic difficulties ihicaien to cause serious domestic instability.
hc Sovicl leaders also (ace rising costs asso-cialed with supporting Ihc USSR's Communist allies'
" The 'lives In thil curii-ioh lataaccount Eaiirir. Euione tftulfiiis. CmnaSovakka. East CaaaaafrKFelini. and
Cuba. Vietnam, i. Heal" Reaei.Alaliai.
ir
Last year, the value o( ibis assistance in current doMin totaled ananifold increase from lhe. These costs now equal totalhatd currency export earnings. Although the bill (or trade subsidies is likely lo decline as lhe Soviets narrow Ihe gap between their export prices and world prices and as oil sales stagnate, other cost increases are likely to mote than olfset this (actor. For esimple. poor economic piospecU in Cuba and Vietnam and declining growth In East European countries will add lo this Soviet economic burden. Poland especially willarge drain.
he SovieU are willing to ucrifice the benefiU of foreign Hide lor what they petceive as ovctriding political or military goals. Nevertheless. Moscow wishes lo opand its tiade links with the West,Ihe Uniied Stales. Despite public statements lo lhe contrary. Moscow needs, more than ever, access lo Western grain, equipment, and lechnology, the laslo enhance priority military research and development programs In lhe absence of their own miliiary intervention in Poland or some other action lhal would cause new Western tnde strictures, they are relatively optimistic lhat they can acquire needed imports from Western Europe and Japan even if the United States limits iu own trade ind urges its lilies to do likcwise.
* more extreme patriotism and. il necessary, byo repressive measures.'*
nother pouible source of social Instability tns unrest among the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR. Rising eipectatioru among minority populations could make it more difficult to assurecohesion in the Soviet multinational empire over the longarticular problem is posed by the higher growth of the population In Ihe Muslim regions of the USSR- The possibility of greater self-assertive-ness of these peoples, if combined with spilloverof resurgent Islamic fundamentaliim in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East, could present the Soviet regimeotentially serious, but manageable challenge.
oder ship ond Succession
t is difficult lo assess what impact theleadership succession may have on Soviet policy, particulailv because thc environment inew top leadership has to act will probably be more important than the individual views of its members. Political conflict within the leadership is likely to marie
Tht Spe.wl Aiiiiiear lo iht Stain* of iht ftraiwaSecvnlvJihtl Inwii-ntnl. lalar. aid icnn-MUi
iha-ifaOalltfl hrU tVfwwi ihti rketf wJT glatt torn..
iiibi-ii to ma if Sowrl fffft^ilwMOfi.
the tuceession period, with no single leader becoming clearly preeminent for at least several years In fact, the possibilitywo-stage succession,ew generation of leaden duplacing the cunentonly in the second stage, could ealend theof political maneuvering into the btter part of the decade.
hese conditions, and their conjunction withdifficult choices in economic policy, do not indicate clearly any one particular direction (or future Soviet foreign policy. If the new leaden believe theorrelation of forces" to be favorable,If they are less Impressed than Brezhnev with US military might and more Impressed with their own, they might employ military power even morein punuit of iheir global ambitions. Greater cau> lion in foreign policy could result, however, from the pinch of internal economic difficulties and popular dissatisfaction On balance, we believe the policies of thc new teadenhip will display general continuity with those of the Brezhnev era- military forcea mil of detente and challenge in East-West relations, containment of China, and assertive behavior in the Third World. But, In view of th* re-maikable continuity of policies and personnel under Brerhnev. the generational nature of the turnover after his departure, and likely economicpolicy dunng the period of leadership succession Inill be leu predictable.
H<fO*H
DISSEMINATION NOIICE
I. IKH docyne'itby lhe Notional foreignl Center. Thii <opy ii lor rhe information ond vie ol lhe recipient ond ol persons vdf hii oroeed lo-Vnow basis. Ad4iioiwl eiurnliol rtsieawra'ion moy be CMthoriied by tbe folvwing officials wilhin theirdeporlmenli;
o. Director ol tnieligence and Be search. Ic She Oepurlment ol Stole
b. Direclor. Defense InleTI-jence Agency, (or Ihe Office ol Ihe Secretory ol Dtfime
ond Ihe orgoniia'ion ol lhe iouU Chiefs ol Stall C. Asvilont Chief al Stall Ic- tnietgence. lorhe Army
ol Naral Intelligence, (or the Deportment ol Ihe Novy
Chief al Stall. UteStgeewe. lo. ihef ibe AirDirector ol InleLgenee. lor Hendoucxirri. Morine
AsiislOnt Seceiory for Im emotional tnieligcnc* Anolyiii. lor the Depart-
ment al Energy
. lor lhe federal 8wrou ofOireelar al NSA. (or ihe Noixwrfgency
pecial Alsistoril lo Ihe Secretory fo> Notional Security, far Ihe DecKKlmeni of Ihe Treasury
k. Ibe Deputy Director lor Notional for tip" Asiettmenl lorhc Deportment or Agency
his document may be retoiied. or ririlror'd byn occardanee with opp'ioWe lecuriry regulations, ar returned to the Notional Foreign Aivesunenl Ceoier.
J. VVber- thii document iieai. ihe overseas leeipienli may reloin il lornoi inone year. Al Ihe end al this period. Ihe document should be desl'oye
err reiurned la the fo. wmding agency, or cx'i-.vvo'i vhoutd be xqveited al shegeney lo reloin il in accordance wiih? June 1PS1.
be lirte ol ihis document -he- wed wooo'ely *'om th* led is Unloiwlied
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: