CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASEAS SANITIZED
Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO
N*tioMl Iml-siimale
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The- following inleBigerrxe orgonlzaliom participated in lhc preparation of the
Ihe Central Intet-gence Agency, Defenw In'el&oenc* Agency, the Nolionol Security Agency, ond the Lile>nce organ!ration olmenl of State.
Aho Participating:
Ittant Chief ol Sloff lor feie&genct. Depariment ol the Army TKeof Naval UliKgence. Deportmenlhe Aiintonl OCel ol Slolf, InieXgence. Deporlnenf of lhe Air force The Director of InleKgence. Meodrjuortefi. Marine Corp.
PREFACE
National Intelligences concerned with the ceneral purpose forces of the Warsaw Pact nations that are available for use againstt assesses thc present and future capabilities of these forces for con vent iotwl. chemical, and tlicjtri nuclear warfare ll generallyeriod of five years in its future considerations but extends loears where evidence allows. Because the focus of this document is on Europe, it docs not deal with Soviel forces along thc China-USSH border, the Soviet Pacific Fleet, or other forces in thc Soviet Far East.
' Fv (tie ouipMCi of ihii Etfimale. thev inrluSr iD lhc (found and UCbca' ill loreei tented in ihr
non-Soviet Wini- Pael (NSWp) nation)thaw in the USSR'i Baltic. BeJauaian. Carrulhiin. Lcntagrid, Odau. Kiev. North Caucuui, ind Tnniciucuu* Military DiOiicU. Force to the Moscow.
and Ural Military Piariet- of the USSR iho could be used afiintl NATO, la addition, the icm-ial Durpoie naval forrea In the three wenem Soviel tketi, indwdin* lhe McdUeninean Squadron, and it* NSWP navlei are InductediKc Eitimale abo dealt with ihote iirileficthe Soviel Union
lhal cettiM be Hied aciiiul Eu'OOe-an timcli inpeiipJirij] attach role.
uict
CONTENTS
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KEY
THE
Factor* Underlying Soviet Ceneral Purpose Forces
Soviet Doctrine for Theater Warfare in
Trends in Pact Forces and Capabilities for Theater War in
Cround
Naval
Theater Nuclear
How the Pact Would Co to
The Initial Campaign in the Western
The Initial Campaign In the Southwestern
The Initial Campaign In the Northwestern
The Initial Campaign in thc North
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KEY JUDGMrNTS
We believe thai during the period o( thishe Soviet Union's commitment to improving its military forces wil) not flag and that, despite changes in the political leadership and problems in the economy, its investment in these fofces will continue at the currentercent growth rate (ot at least the next four to five years.
Moreover, with respect to thc general purpose forces that the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies deploy opposite NATO, we estimate that:
Soviet goal is clear-cut forcenuclear, andwhich to fight andhort
one in which NATO would be overwhelmed by thc scale
and violence of thc Pact's offensive before the Allies could bring their strength to bear.
Because of the lessened vulnerability of their theater nuclear foices and their improved tactical nuclear capability, the Sovietsontinuing interestore flexible nuclear doctrine, but they remain profoundly skeptical that nuclear conflict can be controlled. The bulk of the evidence indicates that any substantial use of nuclear weapons by NATO would be metassive Pact nuclear strike.
During, the Pact's drive lo achieve further advances in general purpose forces will have more to do with making qualitative improvements than increases in numerical strength
The qualitative advances will be made primarily by thc introduction of more sophisticated equipment and byof combat elements and improvement of command andin the Soviet Cround and Air Forces.
ATO-Warsaw Pact conflict occurred, we would expect thc Soviets within thc European theater to-.
Concentrate their initial efforts in Central Europe, attacking with ground forces organized into fiveoivisions).
Accompany (hc ground atiackassive air assaultto decimate NATO's theater nuclear capability and to gain air superiority.
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Attempt to seize northern Norway and lhe Turkish Straits and to attack NATO forces in the North Atlantic and
Protect their ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and lo attempt to destroy NATO SSBNs.
We reckon further that the Soviet drive to improve Pact theater force capabilities opposite NATO during this decade will be influenced by:
Creater uncertainty about the reliability of their East Europeanerennial issue made more pressing bv recent developments in Poland
The reluctance of the East Europeans to increase military spending, thus contributing to the continuing qualitativebetween their equipment and lhat of the Soviet forces.
The difficulty of overcoming certain technological deficiencies, such as antisubmarine warfare and defending against very low altitude attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles.
Manpower problemseclining birthrowing proportion of non-Slavs in the Soviet armed forces, and thc challenge of training conscripts to operate increasingly complex weapon sysiems.
Despite these problems, we believe that the threat to the West will grow because the Soviets will make progress in gaining thc more sophisticated weaponry and more flexible approaches to command, and control that heretofore live NATO nations have regarded as their special province and the equalizing factor for lhc Pact's numerical advantages in men and equipment
THE ESTIMATE
Factors Underlying Soviet General Purpose Forces Programs
The Soviels' longstanding commitment lo large-scale investment in general purpose forces is basedumber of factors rooted deeply in iheir world outlook and historical experience. These include the Marxist-Leninist lenet lhal the risk of war is inherent in lhc continuing struggle wiih the capitalistradilional paranoia about external threats; (lie biller memory of World War II that still affect's the thinking of iheir most senior policymakers; and the knowledge that (heir control of Eastern Europe, indeed of lhc many nationalities that make up the USSR, demands an armed forces establishment of inhibitingThe importance of the latter consideration has been underscored for the Soviets by recent events in Poland. Moscow also fa driven toever more potent general purpose forces by virtue of itshostility toward China and its expanding interests and initiatives in the Third World.
s the possibilityiliiary confrontation with NATO, however, that more than any other factor explains why the Soviets invest so heavily in general purpose
Soviet leaders presume that someday Ihey may have toull-scale war with NATO. Moreover, (hey seemthat thc outcome ofonflict can be predetermined in favor of the side that has besl prepared to wage it at any level. The improvement of general purpose forces is necessarily time consuming and therefore essentially unaffected by even the more substantial flucluations in East-West relations. Nevertheless, the apparent decline of detenteominant factor in those relations must reinforce both the Soviels' historic conviction that they are threatened by lhc West and their commitment to being ready lo prevail in any conflict. Moreover, it is evident thai the USSRtility in massive generalwell asin situations short of war. The mereof such power provides substantial leverage in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy and not least of all in Ihe NATO- Warsaw PactFor example, the growing perception among West European
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electorates that attempting to match Soviel military niii*ht has become futile breeds divisions among Allied governments lhat work to Moscow's advantage.
The cost of this commitment to general purpose fotces is immense in both absolute ami relative terms. Since Hrezhnev came to power in the, annual defense spending has all but doubled in real terms and now amounts to more than one eighth of thc gross national product. Sustaining this level of investmenl throughs likely to be increasingly difficult Soviet economic growth is itjllmg while thc price of military research and technological innovation is skyrocketing. Those advantages the USSR has won over the West in some aspects of general purpose forces are likely lo be ever more expensive lo sustain in the face of aroused US defense interests. These problems notwithstanding, wc eipect theercent growlh rale in Soviel defense spending to continue for at least thc nexl four lo five' years. Their political and economic system is slow lo change and their decisionmaking structure has always given priority to miliiaryTheir leadership seems sure lo change in, bul lhc dedication to thc concepts underlying ihew commitment to general purpose forces is unlikely to be affected by lhe change in persona lit ics. As thc Soviet leadership is forced lo make hard choices aboul its priorities over the nextears, it seems certain lhat they will sacrifice economic development and social welfare before making anyreduction In lhc growth of miliiary power.
Based on this conviction, wc estimate that the size, disposition, and capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces inill be shaped to:
Assure the USSR's continued domination of lhe non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries and lhe rule of thc Communist parties in those states.
Provide numerical preponderance and. whenever possible, qualitative superiority in the manpower and weaponry arrayed against NATO.
Maintain sufficient additional manpower and weaponry lo deter and, if necessary, defeat China, Japan, and US forces in Ihc Far East.
Develop sufficient naval forces to defend the USSR and pro-mole Soviet interests at sea.
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Eliminate armed resistance lo the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan; lo maintain sufficient additional forces toevents in lhc Middle East and Persian Gulf area.
Support Moscow's political initiatives and military activities in other areas of the world.
Soviel Doctrine for Theater Warfare in Europe
In keeping wiih lhe world outlook and historical experience described above, thc most basic Soviet military doctrine is lhe defense of lhc homeland. This does noi mean; however, that Moscow is resigned lo conducting defensive warfare on terms and territory chosen by ItsOn the contrary, lhe Soviets are convinced that their surest defense lies iu lhe capacily for decisive offensive action; ihey are equally* determined that that action will not take place on their territory. It is for these reasons that they have developed such massive general purpose forces designed principally for offensive roles and have attached such importance to thc buffer states they control in Eastern Europe.ar with NATO, they intend to carry the fight to the West and make the Allies bear the brunt of combat on lhcir territory.
Soviet doctrine requires thai the general purpose forces of the USSR be prepared to fight and win at anychemical, nuclear, or any combination thereof. Their goalhortin which NATO would be overwhelmed by thc scale and violence of the Pact's offensive before the Allies inthe United States inbring iheir strength lo bear. The Sovicis would prefer to achieve this goal without resorting to nuclear weapons or. al least, without escalatingtrategic nuclear exchange. To achieve these aims, Soviet doctrine calls for clear-cut forceat the outsetonflict and. to the extent possible, using deception and surprise as force multipliers. They intend lo seize and maintain the offensive initiative and to implement it with conventional weaponry for as long as possible.
Soviet doctrine emphasizes offense as the decisive form ofefensive posture for Pact forces is deemed permissible onlyemporary basis and valid only for creating favorable conditionsransition lo an offensive, ln conducting offensive operations, (he key Soviet concepts arering mass lo bear at enemy weak points along (he main axes of advance and to exploit any openings with highly maneuverable forces capable of ravaging thc enemy's flanks and rapidly moving forward into its territory. The key ground forces for im-
s
plcmcnting these concepts arc massed artillery and mechanized armies to create the breakthroughs and tank armies to exploit them. Tactical aviation wouldital role in effecting both types of operation. As these operations get under way, however. Soviet doctrine callsassive air assault, conducted by both tactical and long-range aircrafl delivering conventional weaponsheatcrwide basis. The objectives ofugethc Soviets refer lo as an airbe to establish air superiority over the areas in which Pact ground forces plan to advance and to decimate NATO's capacity to escalate to nuclear warfare by attacking airfields, missile sites, nuclear weapons depots, and command, control, and communications facilities.
goal of this combined air and ground assault insupported by Soviet naval operations in the adjacentis to destroy NATO's committed forces and to occupy Westthe Benelux nations, and Denmarkampaign lastinga month. Simultaneous attacks could be eipected inon Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean, and againstStraits, but it seems unlikely that the Pact wouldextensive operations until It had achieved its key objectivesEurope. Thereafter, Soviet planning apparently encompassesof France and eventual operations against Italy, Iberia,Kingdom, and thc rest of Scandinavia. Soviet writings
L ii 'to accomplish theseentirely with conventionalTorces. but nearly always allow forto turn sooner or later to thc use of (heater nuclear weapons.
respect to chemical warfare, the Soviets are planningcontingency that lethal chemical agents would be used in aNATO and the Warsaw Pact. They have aand extensive program to equip and train Pact forces forand havepectrum of modern chemicaldelivery systems as well as tactics for the large-scale use ofWe do not know thc Soviel doctrine with respect touse of chemical warfare Wc do know that the Sovietsweapons as "weapons of mass destruction" whose initialbe authorized at thc highest political level. However, thethe decision the USSR's leaders would take wiih respect toof first use is very limited and open toesult, there arc at least two schools of lliought on thisthe US Intelligence Community although all believe there isa substantial risk of such use by the Soviets There is also general
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agrccmcnl on Sovicl doctrine for employment of chemical weapons if iheir use is authorized. Evidently, the Pact tees applications for chemical weaponry in bolh offensive and defensive situations and stresses the advantages of surprise, large-scale applications, and joint service operations under centralized conirol. The preferred targets are airfields, nuclear weapons depots, logistic centers, command and control facilities, and large troop concent rations. Soviet writings indicate that chemical weapons would bc used in combination with conventional and even nuclear weapons to heighten their effect. Once their use is authorized by the national leadership, responsibility for employment decisions would pass quickly to thc operational commanders in the
field.
Soviet doctrine with respect to theater nuclear warfare is an evolving matter but, because our evidence on il is more complete than for chemical warfare, lhc Community's estimate Is more unified and confident. As indicated previously, the USSR evidently believes thai the initial stages of any NATO-Pact war probably would be fought conventionally and the evidence we hold shows an increasing Soviet disposition to remainonventional mode for as long as possible. The same sources indicate,onviction lhat thc success of Pact conventional forces against the West would eventually force thc Allies to employ theater nuclear weapons to salvage the situation. Since, we have had evidence lhat if the Pact learned of NATO's intention to employ such weapons, the Soviets would try to preempt.preemption continues lorominent feature of Soviet theater nuclear force doctrine, its application since lhcas been confined to those situations that indicated that NATO wasuclear strike of massive proportions. Wc have noted that Soviet foreknowledge of NATO preparations for more limited use of nuclear weapons mighl not automaticallyecision to employ such weaponsarge scale.
This demonstrated interestore flexible approach loward nuclear response may bc attributable both lo grcaier Soviet confidence in iheir conventional forces andreater inlcrcst in keeping the conflict at this level because Ihey remain convinced lhal any use of nuclear weapons in Europe would probably leadassiveexchange and terrible damage to the USSR. It may alsorowing confidence in their tactical nuclear capability and (hesurvivability of (heir theater nuclear missiles, particularly (heurllier, their weapons lechnology and command and control systems in recent years have been movingapability that wouldolicyore flexible and selective use of nuclear
arms.olicy would be consistent not only with theii desire to avoid strategic nuclear war but with an interest inestern Europe not devastated by theater nuclear weapons. Despite these considerations, the evidenceoviet interest in flexible nuclear response and controlling escalation remains inconclusive. The bulk of the Soviet nuclear arsenal plus the weight of their doctrinal writings continue lo indicate that any substantial use of nuclear weapons by NATO would beor after thc Westa large-scale atiack involving high-yield weapons
ATO's piospeclivc deployment of more advanced theater nuclear forces is seen by the Soviets as further complicating thc chances for controlling escalation. The Soviets think that llie West'sprogram increases the risk of nuclear strikes on the USSRATO-Pact war goes beyond thc conventional level. They also believe that the new NATO missiles will present new uncertainties for them in assessing tbe size and objectivesuclear attack from Western
Europe and therefore in knowing the level st which they should respond.
Trends in Poet Forces ond Capabilities for Theater War in Europe
or more than two decades the USSR has been engagedajor buildup of its military forces and those of its Warsaw Pact allies opposite NATO. During the Khrushchev era, the emphasis was on acauiring offensive missiles and strategic defense forces at the expensearge standing army and conventional air and naval forces. Since Brezhnev came to powerowever, there has been an across-the-board expansion and modernization of al! Soviet forces. Thc new leadership reversed the reductions In ground and theater air forces and approved development programs for new ground force weapons, tactical aircraft, and naval combatants suitable for operations in both nuclear and conventional war. Although much of this buildup in theater forces has been devoted to strengthening the USSR's positionis China, Soviet, and East European forces opposite NATO also have improved dramatically, They have emerged from this decadealf of development with larger, more modern weaponore balanced structure, and greater capabilities to prosecute nuclear,and conventional operations.
f tlie forces opposite NATO, the Pact's theater nuclear contingent has experienced thc greatest growth: moreoubling in the number of aircraft, rockets, missiles, and artillery available for
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nuclcar weapons delivery. There also has been substantial growth in ground force manpower and weapons inventories as thc size of divisions and number of nondivisional combat and support elements has grown. Thc size of Pact taclical air forces opposite NATO has grown only slightly, but the reequiprnent program that began in earnest in theas resulted in substantial improvements in iheir capabilities for counterair operations, nuclear strike missions, and conventional ground attack. Thc Soviet Navy also haswhat in thcasoastal defense force with only limited open-oceana major branch of the military with heavily armed surface ships, high-speed nuclear powered submarines, and improved land- and sea-based aircraft.
Over the next decade the Pact's seemingly relentless effort to improve its general purpose forces opposite NATO almost certainly will continue. The thrust of this effort, however, will have more to do with growth in quality than quantity. Although enlargements of some components of the Pact's military establishment continue to be noted, the record of the past few years and the prospect fors one of stability in the overall size of the forces but substantial improvement in their capabilities. In this process, the Soviets clearly are in the lead and their East European cohorts are trailing at various distances. This growth In capabilities is attributable in large measure lo theof more technically advanced and hard-hitting weapons systems.ess obvious level however, il is due to efforts to improve the ways in which these forces are organized and would be controlled once committed to battle. Much of the most important intelligence gained about Pact forces recently has to do with command, control, and communications developments and about moves to reorganize the ground and air forces. We expect these trends to persist throughout this decade.
Command and control capabilities are increasingly crucial to success on the modern battlefield, given the speed, complexity, and broad ranging effects of current weapons when employedheater-wide scale. As in NATO, the Pact's command and control problem isby language differences, variations in weaponsand the multiplicity of roles to be played by the member states. Such difficulties must be overcome if the Soviets are to manage the multinational, joint-service operations of great complexity that are required by their doctrine. Their approach to ihese problems has organizational, procedural, and technological aspects.
IV. From an organizational standpoint, the putative apex of the command and control system is thc existing Warsaw Pact Combined Arrncd Forces Headquarters in Moscow.ar. however, wc expect this nominally multinational entity to give way to the Soviet Supreme High Command (VerkhoimoycThe Soviet Ceneral Staff would function as the executive agent of the VCK and direct the Pact's operations against NATO through three regional commands, designated as the Western. Southwestern, and Northwestern Theaters ol Military Operations (teatr voyennykhThere also wuuld be at least one TVD dealing with naval operations in the Atlantic. (Seehc concept of multinational, ioint-service command and control extends from the TVD level down to the largest Pact operational force, which is known as theronts initially would be formed by drawing on the leadership, slaff elements, and combat forces in the Pact's existing military districts located throughout Eastern Europe and thc western USSR. Recently we have noted significant organizational changes in the military districts and some streamlining of their chains of command which seem aimed attheir wartime transition into fronts. Although the size andof fronts would vary according to theirypical front would be responsible for the battle management of three to five ground armies, each including three to five tank or motorized rifle divisions. It would also control air forces including several hundred aircraft and, if operatingaritime sector, might control those naval elements chiefly devoted to supporting front operations.
The procedural and technological steps the Pact has taken in recent years to enhance the efficiency of its command and control apparatus include the predesignation and exercise of staff elements to serve In TVD and front headquarters; the improvement ofsupport elements for armies, divisions, and fleets; and thc assignment by the Soviet Ceneral Staff of specific missionsar with NATO to all Pact countries which, in turn, have developed detailed operational plans for their accomplishment. Standardization in command and control procedures has been substantially achieved by Pact adoption of Soviet practice and the increasing use of the same communications equipment, computer programs, andumerous fixed and mobile command andfacilities have been established and key elements of this system have been hardened.
Together these measures have given theommand and control system characterized by the following strengths; standardization
through Sovicl dominance of docltinc. procedures, and equipment; vertical and horizontal flexibility in communicaliw: wilhin ihe full command struclure; good communications security; sufficientto ensure redundancy; and the speed with which the command and control system can bethree to five days. The system is not without its weaknesses, however, and these include operator proficiency; the difficulty some Pact commands experience in working with thc Russian language; and vulncrabilily to physical attack. During the period of this Estimate, we foresee ibe Soviets concentrating on two programs to improve their command and control capabilities: further centralization of lhe Pact command structure and establishmentnified communicalions system. Work on the latter program is under way bul the system is not likely to bc fully operational
Ground Forces
The ground forces of tlic Warsaw Pact have grownin size and capability since Brezhnev came to power. Their combined strength opposite NATO stands alillion of whom justillion arc Soviel. About half of these Soviet troops arc stationed in Eastern Europe and the remainder in the western military districts of the USSR. In wartime, ihese forces would be organized into fronts and armiesull range of combat, combat support, and service support formations. Within this structure, tank and motorized rifle divisions are thc basic tactical units. Currently, the Pactctive divisions at varying levels af strength arrayed against NATO.ar.dditional divisions could be drawn from the active forces in the western USSR andeserveSovietould be mobilized. Over the next five years we expeel to sec continued modest growth in thc number of personnel assigned to various elements of the Pact's ground forces. We believe, however, that thc overall size of the force structure as measured in active divisions wilt remain relatively stable. The key changes will bc inside this structure as the Pact strives for more combal effectiveness by reorganizing its major fighting formations and equipping ihem with more weapons of greater lethality.
Signs that lhe Soviets were testing new organizations for their tank and motorized rifle divisions were evidenl in experimental units as earlyhe decision to implement division restructuringorce-wide basis probably was made inn essence, the changes are intended toore balanced infantry/armor/artil-lery structure wiih greater firepower and tactical flexibility for both
EviKi o( divisions. Tlic implementation of this tcorganidation hat been uneven, but byt least some of thc changes had been noted in nearlyoviet divisions in the USSR, Eastern Euroi>e. Afghanistan, and Mongolia. Thc emphasis has been on strengthening the Soviel forces apposite NATO and when (he program is complete, probablyS. wc0 personnelajor items of combat equipment will have been added lo the Soviel Croups of Forces in East European countries. Moscow can bc eipecledressomparable
rcorganizational effort from ils Tact allies, but it is unlikely (hat most
NSWP countries will be able lo comply.
quipment modernization for (he Pact's ground forces has shown great strides in recent years but remains an ongoing problem. This siluation is due. in part,he large size of lhc forces to be recquipped; il may also bc due to the ever-rising cost of more advanced weaponry.eneral rule, (he best equipment goes firsthe Soviet Croups of Forces in Eastern Europe. The fact lhat their NSWP
counterparts lag considerably in the acquisition of new equipment adds
substantially to (he Pact's standardization problems.
Because Soviet doctrine commits thc Pactlfensivc warfare, (he tank remains (he centerpiece of lhcir modernization effort. Aware of (he improved technology and growing numbers of Western antitank weapons, the Soviets have continuedake (he changes necessary for (heir tanks to survive and win on the modern battlefield. These changes include anm smoothbore gun. automatic ammunition loaders, laser rangefinderi. and advanced armor. Thc Pact has0 tanks in unils available for use against NATO but onlyuarter are the more.
A newdesignated thcexpectede introduced in thc Soviet forces sometime this year and presumably will have greater capabilities. It will be used, along with2o replace the2 tanks which represent (he technology of. If Soviet lank plants maintain currentrales, (he entire Soviet tank flecl in activepposite NATO could0 models by (he end of the decade.c enpect that at least one division per NSWP army will be equipped. but5 will remain (he predominant lank in thc non-Soviet forces. There are indications lhat the Soviets are at work alreadyollow-on loul wc have no persuasive information aboul its technical characteristics.
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ther major trends in ground forces equipment modernization include increases in thc number of artillery pieces and imp*overncnts in their range, mobility, tube life, and target acquisition capabilities. In particular, the transition from lowed toropel led (SP) artillery and thc introduction of guns and mortars capable of firing nuclear rounds arc considered noteworthy In addition to nuclear artillery rounds, the Soviets are introducing unproved conventional cannon and rocket ammunition with proximity fuses and greater terminal effects. NSWP artillery improvements will lag behind those of lhe USSR..
2o. Another important trend in ground forces equipmentis the effort to improve the armored personnel carricis (APCs) which are so vital lo lhc highly mobile warfare icquircd by Pact doctrine Presently, some Soviet and many NSWP divisions opposite NATO cither have older model APCs or remain committed to moving their infantry by truck. Moreover, the reorganization now under way in thc ground forces is creating requirements both for more motorized rifle units and for more APCs in existing units. We expect the Pact loto meet these needsriority basis over the next decade.
n defense of these and other elements of the Pact's ground foices, lhe Sovicls arc concentrating on (he acquisition of more potent antitank and antiaircraft weapons. Thc major Soviet antitankofas thc developmentew family of four antitank guided missilesne expect lo sec further advances in these kinds of weapons, but lhc emphasis will be on getting thc recently developed ATCMs and RPCs more widely distributed. Similarly, although (he development of new surface-to-air missile (SAM) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) systems will continue over (he next decade, thc key eflort will be on trying to get more such weapons into the hands of deployedthose of thc NSWP armies.
n thc past, we have estimated that logistic shortcoming would limit thc Pact's abilily to conduct its planned offensive operations against NATO. For example, the lack of trucks and other means of transportation in Eastern Europe would have required extensivefrom the USSR. Since the, however, thc Soviet Union has largely overcome this and olher apparent logisticsThc Pact probably regards its current stocks of petroleum, oil, lubricants, and ammunition as sufficient to sustain combat operations in Central Europe for several months. During the period of this Estimate, wc expect this buildup of critical supplies and transportation assets to continue.
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Air Forces
The Pact ali forces have not grown substantially in numbers over tbe past decade Currently, theyombined strength opposite NATO ofalf millionixed-wing aircraft,actical helicopters. The ait forces of thc Soviet Union include heavy and medium bombers; tactical aircraft for air defense, ground support, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare; as well as transport aircraft foi thr movement of assault forces and high-priority cargo. All the NSWP counlries have air defense aircrafl and ground support components; none have bombers or sufficient transport aircraft to support other lhan small-scale airlift operations The air forces of the Waisaw Pact, particularly those of the USSH, arc evolving in ways that parallel the developments already recounted about the ground forces. Specifically, although growth in size is noticeable in some elements, growth in capabilities constitutes the most important trend. As in the ground forces, this is being achieved chiefly by new organizational ariaugements and the introduction of more advanced weaponry.
The reorganization under way in thc Soviet air forces appears to be supplanting the traditional division of militaiy aviation into bomber, homeland air defense, and tactical componentsore integrated structure. The intent is to create groups of mixed forces and thc means to control (hem that will be more appropriatehe large and complicated air and air defense operations called for by Soviet doctrine,
As explained previously, the Soviets intend to form ihcir fronts from thc leadership, staff elements, and combat forces of thc Pact's existing military districts. One of the key elements of the current reorganization is thc peacetime assignment of homeland Interceptors and tactical air units to the control of these districts. The change provides potential front commanders and their thcatcr-lcvel superiorsetter means of supporting ground operations and controlling air defense effortsegional basis. It also should facilitate thc transfer of air power between fronts oi even TVDs as operational requirements dictate. Another important element of the reorganization is occurring below the front level as combined arms and tank army commanders arc being given operational conlrol over air assets, particularly fire support helicopter units. Such initiatives arc illustrativeew Soviel willingness to forego traditional organizational arrangements in favorew command structuie intended to increase the effectiveness of their ihcater forces opposite NATO.
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That effectiveness is alio being enhanced bv the improving quality of the aircraft, weapons, and supporting systems assigned to the Pact air forces. The reequipmeni of ihese forces began in earnest in thend substantial progress has been made over thc past decade. For example,0 someercent of the interceptors were unable to conduct engagements in adverse weatlwr, all atlacks had to be performed from thc rear, and there was virtually no capability for intercepting low-flying aircraft. Today, overercent of Pactarc able fta operale in adverse weather conditions and overercentead on and depressed-angle altack0 all Pact fighler-bombers depended on giound stations or dead reckoning to navigate. This limitation forced ihem to operate at medium altitudes al which they were vulnerable to both NATO interceptors and surface-to-air missiles. Now aboutercent of these aircraft have onboard avionics that permit them to navigate accurately al low level in poor weather conditions.he Pact's strike aircraft were loo short in range and loo low in bomb payload lo operate effectively beyond the Rhine. Today, it has large numbers of tactical aircraft that can atlack well into France and thc Benelux countries and some lhat can reach thc United Kingdom. Comparable improvements have been made in tlie quality of Soviei combal helicopters, tactical reconnaissance aircraft, and air munitions. Although thc size of the Pact tactical air forces opposite NATO has grown by aboulercent over the past decade, thc mote important trend has been thc increase in their capabilities.
During thc period of ihis Estimate, we expect this emphasis on qualitative improvement to continue. The number of tactical, fixed-wing aircraft may grow slightly over the next decade, but investment will be concentrated on achieving higher performance from Soviet-designed aircraft and air munitions. Furthermore, we expect lhe Soviets to continue improving their air support systems such as command and control, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance dala link systems No major changes are expected in the number of fixed-wing aircrafl in lhe NSWP countries and qualitative imptovements will continue lo lag behind lhe Soviet standard by several years
Thc mosl signilicant improvement in Soviet interceptorwill remit from live introduction of two new aircrafl intended lo compete with thc56 fighters. Designated as thcndhey are expected toignificant improvement over current models in terms of maneuverability, acceleration, ar-
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mamenL and avionics. Both are expected to have (oil lookdown/shoot-down capabilily and probably will be available in significant numbers in llie. An improvement also is expected in ground attackas lheassault aircrafl" is introduced. Conceptually, this rugged, subsonic aircraft is not unlike the0 and similarly ts intendedrovide dose-in support for the ground forces. Thcill bc complemented bv an expansion in lhe number ofombat helicopters and further improvements in iheir avionics and ordnance. By the end of the decade, we expect ioombat helicopter regiment assigned to every Pact combined arms and tank army.
Naval Forces
The Pact's naval assets opposite NATO are primarily Soviet and assigned to three fleets. The Northern Fleet consists enlircly of Soviet forces and is responsible for operations in the North Atlantic, especially thc Greenland, Norwegian, Barents, and Kara Seas, The Baltic Sea Fleet would consist of Soviet naval units joined by East German and Polish forces to advance Pact objectives in those restricted waicrs- Similarly, the Romanian and Bulgarian naval forces would join thc Soviet Llack Sea Fleet to control that inland sea while thc latter would also support operations in the Mediterranean. The Soviets routinelyquadron of submarines and surface ships in the Mediterranean
Wc sec no evidence of organizational change in thc Soviet Navy, at least notcale approaching the developments now under way in thc ground and air forces. We do perceive,omparable drive for quality in the weapon syslems and supporting equipment assigned to the Navy For many years, lhc core of lhe Soviet Union's growing strengthaval power has been its submarine force. Leaving aside lhc ballistic missile submarines committed lo strategic, missions, thc Soviets have aboutruise missile submarines andorpedo attack submarines for use against NATO in Europe and
1 adjacent waters. The cruise missile submarine threat is of particular importance because of the ongoing introduction of mote sophisticated missiles, all of which are capable of carrying either .conventional or nuclear warheads
surface ships assigned to the ihree Pact fleetsincludeoviet principal surface combatants armedcruise missiles. Seven of these ships have medium- tomissile systems armed with conventional or nuclear warheads.Ihese missiles accurately at long ranges would require external
targcting support, but all ol these ships are equipped to receive such data Irom other surface ships, submarines, or aircraft; the two largest ships can receive targeting information from satellites. The eight other principal surlace combatants that carry short-range antiship cruise missiles are destroyers. In addition, the Soviets haveundred patrol boats equipped with short-range cruise missiles. Thcapacity to use surface ships against NATO forces would depend upon their ability to defend themselves, particularly against air attack. We believe that their defenses against modern air weapons, especially very-low-flying missiles, arc inadequate but lhat new defensive missiles, rapid-fire Run systems, and improved target data processing may alleviate this weakness during the period of this Estimate.
Soviet naval aircraft have three missions: allacking surface ships, antisubmarine warfare, and reconnaissance/electronic warfare. The bulk of these aircraft are land-based although the role of shipborne aviation is growing with the introduction of the Kiev-class carriers. The Soviets have assignedombers to the antiship mission, including about ISO Badgers and someackfires. The latter are the most significant because their higher speed and maneuverability, combined with the latest air-lo-surfacc missiles and electronicgivereater chance of penetrating NATO naval air defenses and attacking targets in the open ocean.
ar against NATO, the Sovieis expect to use thc submarine, ship, and naval air forces described above in varying combinations toroad range of tasks- The priority of these tasks would depend on the way the conflict unfolded but included among the most important would be:
Protection and support of Soviet ballistic missile submarines through control of the Kara. Greenland, Barents, and northern Norwegian Seas.
Destruction of NATO ballistic missile submarines.
Protection of Pad territory, sea lines of communication and miliiary forces from attack by Western sea-based forces,carrier baltle groups.
Interdiction of NATO sea lines of communication.
Support of Pact land operations.
Pact's capabilities to perform these tasks wouldFor example, lhe first two missions would requirecapacity for effective antisubmarine warfare, an area in
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which the Soviets continue to experience difficulties including the lack of long-range undersea listening systems, lhc noise generated by their own submarines, ASW sensor deficiencies, and insufficient long-range aircraft for maritime patrol Thc outlook for overcoming theseover thc period of ihis Estimate is poor. These shortcomings severely limit thc Soviets' ability lo locate and atiack NATO ballislic missile submarines in thc ope" ocean. On the other hand. Soviet efforts to protect their own ballistic missile submarines in areas such as the Greenland. Barents, and Kara Seas probably would involve thcuse of extensive air. surface, and submarine ASW forces thus reducing the impact of some of these deficiencies.!"
1
To protect Pact territory, and their own sea lines ofand military forces from Western navies, the Soviets and theirseem to be better prepared. In the waters near the USSR. NATO surface forces would be subject to detection in open-ocean areas by ELINT and radar reconnaissance satellites, land-based SIGINTand by observation from ships, submarines, and long-range aircraft. Pact surface forces attempting to interdict those of NATO would be aided by land-based aircraft. Moreover, thc Soviets could be expected to use their extensive capability for mine warfareroad scale to seal off these approaches to Pact territory. In those ocean areas more distant from thc USSR, thc Soviets would conduct sea-denial operations aimed at neutralizing all NATO naval forces, particularly those capable of striking Pact territory wiih nuclear weapons. These operations probably would be most intense in the southern Norwegian Sea. its Atlantic approaches, thc North Sea. and the eastern half of thc Mediterranean. In these areas, range considerations would limit the air cover available for the Soviets' surface combatants, but they could count on strong support from cruise missile and torpedo attack submarines.
he USSR will continue to invest heavily in its own submarine force and is likely to achieve qualitative improvements comparable to those made during the past decade. The firstew class of nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines, the Oscar, was launched inwice as large as earlier Soviet SSCNs. it also has three times as many launchers. Moreover, it is equippedew antiship cruise missileange ofilometers. More recently, thc Sovietsew diesel-powered. atiack submarine, the Kilo, but the technical characteristics of this boat are not yet clear. In addition to these programs, wc expeel construction of foi low-om to the Victor III
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nuclear-powered attack submarine andknot Adas* SSN. We believe that al! classes to be buill duringill be quieter than current Soviet submarines, bul still noisier than the latest classes of Western atlack submarines.
n surface combatants, thc Soviets have several majorprograms under way. Although the lotal number of such ships is ex-pected to decrease modestly over the nexl decade, lhc surface force will grow substantially in firepower and in capability for extendedand prolonged com bal. For example, tlie new Kirov-class nuclear-powered, guided-missile cruiserramatic increase in endurance and diversity of weapons for ships of its type. The fourth Kiev-class aircrafl carrier probably will be launched by2 and (here is evidence lhat construction will begin soonarger class of carrier capable of operating conventional takeoff and landing aircrafl.
Theole* Nuclear Forces
Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons lhat could be employed against NATO in Europe are of two distinct types: tactical weapons assigned to the Pact's theater forces and elements of the Soviet strategic forces. Together, theyormidable strike capabilily and one that will continue to improve over the period of this Estimate. Theissile system .mil lhc Backfire bomber, which have prompted NATO lo modernize its own theater nuclear forces, arc two of lhc more important additions lo an ongoing stream of Improvements in this field. The Soviel drive for superiority in weapons of this type is not limited lo numbers; iheir objectives also include greater tactical flexibility. accuracy,arger range of warhead yields.
Thc tactical nuclear forces of the USSR have undergone extensive changes over lhe past decade. Key among these developments have been:
A one-third increase in lhc number of surface-to-surface missile launchers.
A threefold increase tn lhc number of aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
The introduction of nuclear-capable artillery in lhc western USSR
Increases in warhead yields of some older surface-to-surface
mivMli-.v
Maioi qualitative advances in lhe newer land based missile and aircraft delivciy systems.
The capability of the Soviet Navy toide variety of nuclear weapon systems from ships, submarines, or naval aircraft.
Soviet-controlled tactical nuclear weapons are located in Eastern Europe and some of these weapons are earmarked for NSWP usear with NATO. Numerically, thc most important nuclear delivery systems in Eastern Europe are the Pact's lactical aircraft.ighters, fighter-bombers, and tactical bomberswould be available for initial operations in Central Europe, but this number would be limited by thc fact that onlyact pilots are trained for nuclear weapons delivery. Since thclie role of tactical avialion in Soviet planning for theater nuclear war has been growing. Before this time, about three-fourths of the initial strikes were to have been made by missiles. The shift reflects not only the growing capabilities of Soviet lactical aircraftreater appreciation of the role aircraft can play in accurate delivery of lower yield weapons for battlefield support.
There arcactical nuclear missile launchersNATO and they consist chiefly of the FROC and Scud systems. These missiles have ranges of aboutmm respectively. The FROC apparently will be replaced or augmented by thehichange ofm and can deliver nuclear, chemical, or conventional warheads, including clustereplacement for the Scud, theas completed development and could be deployed with field units beginningt is expected to have improved accuracy, range, and reaction time compared to the Scud. Thc nuclear artillery assets of the USSR consist of at least seven active artillery brigades and one mobilization unit located in the western USSR. No nuclear-capable artillery brigades have yet been identified outside the USSllP
he strategic component of the Pact's theater nuclear forces availablear against NATO consists chiefly of bombers, medium-and intermediate-range land-based missiles, and submarine-launched missiles. In addition, thc Soviets couldortion of their intercontinental ballistic missile force against European targets if the situation warranted.
he bomber force available for theater nuclear strike missions in Europe and adjacent waters numbersircraft. Moref these bombers arc Badgers which entered service aboutears ago and have not been producedimilarly, thelinder bombers opposite NATO were introduced2 and went out of productionevertheless, thc Soviets have extended the useful life of these aircraft by equipping them with improved missiles and it is evident that they intend to retain ihem in an operational status throughout the period of this Estimate. Thc most formidable nuclear weapons delivery system in lhe Soviel bomber force is the Backfire. First deployed inlignificant improvement over Badger and Blinder in both combat radius and payload It also has an advanced electronic countermeasures system to facilitate penetration of modern air defenses. There are nowackfires available for use against NATO and additional aircraft of this type are still being produced.
Thc medium- and inter mediate-range, land-based strategic missiles available for use against NATO consist ofaunchers forndissiles.mall percentage of thendaunchers may bc intended for use against targets in the Middle East or Asia, all are judged capable of attacking targets in NATO. Theonsiderable advance over these missiles. Il carries three, independently targeted reentry vehicles, uses solidand has better accuracy, reaction lime, and refire capabilities than thcndoreover, il Is mobile, thus decreasing itsto allack. Within the next few years, lheill become the mainstay of lhc land-based ballistic missile force for peripheral atlack. Moreaunchers for thcave been identified, of which about two-thirds are estimated for use against NATO.
The ballistic missile submarine force believed to be assigned to West European targets includesoats oflasses, each of which has Ihree launchers. Tbelass boats are assigned to the Baltic Fleet and could usemissiles lo hit (argets in West Cermany, thc Benelux countries. Scandinavia, lhe Uniied Kingdom. France, and Italy. Thelass boats are assigned to (he Northern Fleet and would require four days" transit from their home ports before ihey could hit NATO targets other than those in Scandinavia.
Over the next decade, the Soviets will continue to improve bolh their tactical and strategic nuclear forces available for (healer warfare in Europe. Thc tactical ballistic missile syslems will grow in both
qualily and number. In (he, (he Soviets could introduce missiles equipped with terminal homing systems. By the, long-range cruise missiles could be deployed. Among the other (actical nuclear weapon systems, thc Soviets arc eipected to continue establishing nuclear artillery brigades in the western USSR and some may be introduced in Eastern Europe during the period of thisThe potential lor nuclear delivery by tactical aviation is also expected to grow, chiefly by the introduction of more modern aircraft, improved air-to-surface missile systems with low-yield warheads, and the training of more nuclear-delivery pilots
he strategic forces component of the Pacts theater nuclear delivery systems duringill consist chiefly ofissiles and Backfire bombers. Some intercontinental ballistic missile complexesew C-lass ballistic missile submarines may be assigned to European targets past the, but the backbone of the force will be theeotalorceaunchers. Wc estimate thataunchers in the western USSR would oppose NATO with at leastaunchers in the Urals also capable of reaching targets througltout Western Europe. The bomber force is expectedemain about the same size. Badgers and Blinders probably will be replaced by Backfires and by the end of thef the latter aircraft are expected to be inf these could be deployed opposite NATO.
uring the period of this Estimate the Soviets may introduce tactical nuclear warheads with lower yields than at present. The improved accuracy of their newer missile systems would permit the Soviets toomparable probability of damage against targets lo which higher yield weapons are now assigned and the resulting radioactive contamination of the surrounding areas would be much lower. Since thc Soviets appear concerned about nuclear weapons effects, it is possible that they will undertake developmenteduced residual radiation device0 but we expect that they would have difficulty in weaponizingesign. We have evidence that thc USSR has built enhanced radiation devices, but none lhal they have begun production or deployment of weapons of this type These developments notwithstanding, we estimate that for lhc rest of this decade the bulk of the Pad's nuclear weapons inventory for theater warfare in Europe will continue to consist of tlie higher yield weapons.
How Ihc Poet Would Go lo War
he Soviets* experience in World War II, the innateof thc leadership for the USSR, the respect (hey and other East
res
European leaders share (or NATO's capabilities, and their conviction that an East-West conflict probably would become nuclear all suggest that thc Pact would notecision to go tn war in Europeunder desperate political or miliiary circumstances. Once that decision was taken, however, the Paci could move with high speed and great force to achieve its objectives. We do not have access lo lhe Pact's war plans, but we are confident that we can deduce their general nature, at least for the opening phasesar with NATO.
previously described, the Soviels appear lo have dividedin whichonflict would bc fought inlo al least fourmilitary operationsSeet is obvious lhalthat Central Europe, which is the focus of the Pact'swould be the decisive arena. That conviction is made manifestpriority they accord lo this region in the assignment of theirand equipment. It is also evident from their doctrinewhich, despite some variations, consistently call for an effortNATO in Cermanyassive, combined airground offensive. This principal effort notwithstanding, lhethat the Pact must also be prepared to fight in the adjacentsea areas Identified as the Southwestern, Northwestern, and atmaritime TVD. We have little direct evidence on the Pact's viewflank operations in relation to the main thrust in Centralbelieve, however, thai concurrent with the initiation of hostilitiesarena. Ihe Soviets would strike at northern Norway to facilitateof their Northern Fleet, would attack NATO navalthe Mediterranean, and probably would move against theDespite this estimate that thc Pact would notconcurrent, major ground offensives in all theaters, wethat secondary offensives or holding operations wouldon the flanks to weaken NATO forces in these areas andthem from being shifted to Central Europe.
The Initial Campaign in Ihe Western TVD
planning for the Western Theater of Militaryenvisions offensives along three axes in Centralo carry oul these offensives. Ihe Pact probably would seek,initially, to organize its' forces into threefront. Ihe Polish front, and the Czechoslovak-Sovietfronts would bc made up of varying combinations of Sovietforces currently stationed in East Germany, Poland,If time permitted, they would be reinforced by the
2 a
75
llelonissii.il and Carpathian fronls drawn From military districts in thc western USSR.ar between NATO and the Pact could begin in any number of ways, il probably would be preceded by anperiod of rising tension during which both sides would take steps to improve their forces. How long this period would extend is not possible to predict, but if it lasted as long as two weeks, thc Pact would have time to prepare the five fronts noted above and move them into Eastern Europe. This wouldorce oforound divisions plus support and tactical air units ll would also allow enough time for most of the active naval unils in the Pad fleets to get ready to put to sea. The launchingad offensive in Central Europehorter period of preparation and with less than five fronls is feasible but not as desirableoviet standpoint.
The Soviet-East Cerman front would attack NATO forces in central West Germany probably between Hannover in the north and Mannheim in the south. Major elements of this front also could swing norlh of Hannover across the north Cerman plain but this would demand extensive restructuring of its logistic base. The Polish front would attempt to defeat NATO forces in northern West Cermany with an ultimate objective of seizing Denmark and the Netherlands. The Czechoslovak-Soviet front would attack toward thc Rhine in the area roughly belwccn Mannheim and the Swiss-German border. If the two additional reinforcing fronts from the USSR were available, we would expect the Belorussian front to be committed alongside thc Soviet-East Cerman front, probably on its southern flank. The Carpathian front probably would be used to reinforce thc Czechoslovak-Soviet front.
The success of the Pact's apparent planningampaign in Central Europe dependsonsiderable degree on tbe performance of the NSWP forces involved in these fronts. Recent events in Poland have provided new reasons to question thc potential reliability of these forces and we expect that -the Soviets could be planning toarger portion of thc burdenentral European offensive, particularly in the northern part of Cermany. Poland continues to bear the principal responsibility for prosecuting the northern axis of advance and for facilitating the movement of Sovici reinforcements toward WestWe have no evidence thai lhe Sovieis have decided to relieve thc Poles of ihese responsibilities, but we believe thai alternative plans must have been considered. One option that has been tested in Pact cxerdscs is'to bring forces forward from the USSR's Baltic Military District to conduct operations in conjundion with the Polish armed forces.
n lhc Baltic Sea. Pact naval operations would be conducted in the context of the overall campaign in the Western TVD, particularly the ground and air operations of thc Polish front. The broad objectives of the Pact's naval campaign in this area would be to gain control of thc Baltic Sea and access to the North Sea. If initial se3 control and airoperalions were successful. Pact forces in the Baltic would concentrate on supporting the Polish fronts offensive across northern West Cermany and into Denmark.
The Initial Campaign in lhc Southwestern TVD
The Southwestern TVDroad area reaching from Italy to the Persianinterest in the latter area, particularly in Iran. We believe, however, that the principal focus of the Southwestern TVD isar with NATO and, specifically, in conducting operations in conjunction with those in the Western and Northwestern TVDs. First among the Pact's objectives in this campaign would be seizure of thc Turkish Straits. Thc Soviet forces for this operation would be drawn chiefly from the Odessa Military District and most would have to transit Romania and Bulgaria lo reach Turkish territory. In Bulgaria, they would be augmented by some Bulgarian forces to form an Odessa fronl. Thcbjectives would be to destroy Turkish forces in eastern Thrace, break through the fortifications protecling thc land approaches to the Turkish Straits, and seize the Straits.
Probably concurrent with thc effort to seize the Straits wouldajor ground operation through Austria. The attack would be conductedombined Soviet and Hungarian force to be called the Danube front. This front could, however, also be used lo protect thc southern flank of the Western TVD in West Cermany or move south into Italy.
To attack Greece, the Pact wouldalkan front on the western flank of the Odessa front. It would consist of the bulk of the Bulgarian Army and could also include some Romanian forces.the size of thc Balkan front, thc difficult terrain in Greece, and the Questionable commitment of Romanian forces, it seems likely that the front probably would confine its operations to engaging Creek forces in Thrace and .securing the western flank of the Odessa front.
Wc liave some indications that the Pact couldimited offensive into eastern Turkey. Thc primary objectives of such an undertaking probably would be to keep Turkish forces in this area
27
(ruin aiding in thc defense of the Si rails. Thc Soviet forces available (orensivc would bc drawn (rom thc Transcaucasus Military District and. if required, (lie North Caucasus Military District Some portion ol this combined force also could bc used lo move into northwestern Iran and, conceivably, farther south. Since al leasthe Soviets have been investigating the possibility ol large-scale operations into Iran and throughout thc Persian Culf region. Allhough control of ihisarea would bc attractive, thc effort torelude to or in coniunctionuropean wai -could tie up considerable secnod-cchclon and strategic reserve forces that otherwise would bc available (or operations against NATO.
naval operations that would support and extend lhcoffensives in the Southwestern TVD would include effortscontrol of the Black Sea. support the movement ofalong its western littoral, and assist in seizing thc Turkishthe outset of hostilities. Pact air and naval units wouldnaval forces in the Mediterranean, and possibly the Arabiancarrier battle groups and ballistic missile submarines.
The Iniliol Compoign in the Norlhwestern TVD
Soviet objectives in this theater would center onthe security of Northern Flcci ballistic missile submarinesaccess to the North Atlantic for these and otherand aircraft, and protecting lhc Kola Peninsula and thcTo achieve these objectives, the Soviets almost certainlya limited ground offensive into northern Norway early inThe Soviets probably would be deterred from attempting ainto central or southern Norway at an early stage of thcIhe restriction that terrain places on thc employment of forces,strong NATO resistance beyond Finnmark. and thelines of communication from Pact territory.
The Initial Campaign in the North Atlontic
the Soviets clearly espeet navalthe North Atlantic, they reckon thai the heaviestwould occur in and north of thc waters betweenand theK gap. Sovietthis region would be intended lo prevent NATO naval excursionsocean area the Soviets consider critical to defense of iheirlo their Navy's strategic strike mission. The most pressing initial
task In this area would bc fo protect ballistic missile submarinesto and on station in their launch/dispersal areas-of the Northern Fleet's submarines and surface forces wouldcommitted to this
intend to weaken or defeat NATO's navalcarrier and amphibious taskin the southern Norwegian Sea or approaching that area from the United States or the Uniied Kingdom. Their plan is to stage successive and coordinated assaults by submarines, strike aircrafl. and surface comltatants.
extent of operations inbroader readies of thewould depend, in large part, on thc outcome ofor Soviet perceptions ol the threat, in thcand Greenland Seas The most critical Soviet task inwould be the destruction of Western SSBNs beforeGiven their limited open-ocean detection capabilities,Sovicis probably will concentrate their anti-SSBN efforts onand lhe approaches to Western SSBN bases. The Soviets alsoconduct some attacks against shipping engaged in thc resupplyof NATO Europe earlyar.
Conclusions
believe thai during lhe period of this Estimate thecommitment to improving its theater military forces willdespile changes in thc political leadership and problems inThe USSR has too much riding on tbe readiness of itsforces lo permit this to occur and. from Moscow'sare the stakes higher than in its forces opposite NATO.pastears, lhe Soviets made major strides in increasing thecapabilities of the Pact forces in this region. During theimprovements will be made but they will have more lo dothan quantity. This is not to say lhat some growth innot occur. For example, the number of Soviet ground divisionsto remain fairly stable but the number of men assigned towill rise. Thc emphasis, however, will be onto be achieved ihrough thc introduction of moreweapon syslems and the organization of forces intoresponsive to command and the requirements of modern warfare.
effecting these improvements, (he Soviets will continuea series of seemingly intractable problems. Some arcexample, how to overcome their serious deficiencies in warfare; how to stay up wiih thc always changing
29
iti ftUFf-
arinor/antiaunor equation, and how Io cope wiih the Wesl's emerging capahilily for theater nuclear war with long-range cruise missiles. Other pioblems have more to do with manpower: how to dealeclining biith raterowing proportion of non-Slavs in the armed forces; how to train conscripts to operate increasingly complex weapon systems; and how to conduct multinational combal operalions with linguistic differences in thc Pact forces at least as marked as those within NATO. Potentially the most threatening problems for lhe USSR, however, are political. The question of lhc reliability of thc non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countriesar with the West has always been present: recent events in Poland have made it even more pressing. Over the pastears, the Soviets havetrategy that has increased ihcir dependency on their East European partners riot only for logistic support but for sharing the brunt of offensive action in important sectorsATO-Pact conflict. The validity of this strategy has been made doubtfulesult of the current situation in Poland and whether thc course of political liberalization in thai couniry continues or Moscow finally intervenes to suppress it, lhc outlook for the reliability of its East European cohorts cannot be comforting to the leadership of the Soviet Union.
hese problems notwithstanding, the Warsaw Pact forces opposite NATO seem certain lo continue lo evolve in ways that will heighten the threat to the West. During the period of this Estimate, the changes in their capabilities will result substantially from initiatives lhat traditionally have not been characteristic of the Soviet militaryThe strength of thc USSR's theater forces historically has rested on simplicity in equipment and operational doctrine made practical by lhc applicalion of large numbers of men and machines. In thc coming decade, these fundamental strengths will remain, but overlaying them will be an increasing commitment to moreweaponry and more flexible approaches to command and control. In essence, thc Sovicls will be pressing to acquire thc eapabililies thai the Wesl has considered its special province and the equalizing factor for the Pacts numerical advantage in men and equipment. In large measure, thc threat posed by the Pact's forces opposite NATO will grow lo the degree that the Sovieis succeed in this effort.
-Fesaifle-of-
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