At atake la the creation of the legal andbaseluralistic political structure. For the talks to succeed, the party leadership will have to relinquish de Jure seen of the powers that it has notbeen able to exercise for moreear. Solidarity will have to be satisfied with political structures that allow the party too retain the appearance of playing the leading role.
^Moderates on both sides are approaching the talksL_ Tn a'positive-and optimistic way. In the Initial stages
of the talke thia may at least leadower level of
strike activity and confrontation. b| ^
The two aldee have already agreed in principle on several ieaoes, but working out the details willJ| contentioue process. Both party chief Jaruselaki and heor example, have proposed the creation of e
.council that would have vide social
oreseen an extension of theNatlonel Onity Front, whereas Solidarity has" proposedouncil that would have significant economic decisionmaking powers
;n^ reform of the electoral and judicial systemsoiiaarity'a increased access to the media will be the 'most controversial and difficult political issues.'
-in.the union ore intent-on breaking the party's total
monopoly on selecting candidates for electiveelections are-slated for february, but many
solidarity will urge new elections to the national par-
end' solidarity would probably settle for prohibitions against . pnn-py^-jpi. reslqna-
of the prosecutor general nay ease the negotiations.
i! to radio and television. the regime,nyielding about-giving the union_total;contrq acing "prog rami';'
.twoeries" dlnq-economic reforms, worker-self
ome progress has"made'on these questions and further compromises are
government will push especially hardn retail-price increases to try tohe huge excess of money in the economy. fej
ay be possible in giving solidarity
.' the union does not begin with well-defined andbargaining positions. its leaders willo make substantial gains in the talks if they are to
.thevlid on. rank-and-file discontent. the union -
leadership also will have to be able to demonstrate through *
concrete example that the government accepts solidarity 4
erious permanent bargaining partner and that the
government is willing and able to implement the agree- _
rrata that are reached. fffSJJfJ
. solidarity chief walesa and his moderate_
be forcedore militant position to preserve credibility if the regime does not bargain in good faith.
and -file-will not-remain passive if themmto wfc- poliilc! aic -concessions;
the workers might, for example, take control ofic*-end distribution in selected industries.
'Jaxuzelski would like to draw Solidarity Into hia "
ront-of National Accord"ay atab-
odus vivendi with union moderates and isolating -
the militants. It_ is not_clear, however, how.far he
willing to go or would be allowed to go by his hardline colleagues In granting this Front important powers. The
government may conclude that concessions on some issues
are necessary to create the credibility necessary to win acceptance from the populace for austerity oessurea. fJeaV
he party, chief may have.more maneuvering .room in these
negotiations-than Kania would.have had. Jaxuzelski is
seenore decisive and determined leader who will no* oaka concesslOTB without getting. soaetJ Ing In return, "earns
. jeruselskl reportedly has the support of theuro toialogue with Solidarity. Re apparently also has been given aoce latitude by Moscow to seek an mn
Nevertheless, Jaruzelski will have to guard his flanks against criticism from hsrdliners at none and from the Soviets. To maintain his credibility withJaruzelski will have to be able to convince the Soviets that the concessions will create greater stability without destroying the party's role. (C)
Xf the compromises Jaxuzelski is willing to accept do not satisfy Solidarity's minimum requirements, he see-is willing to take forceful measures. At the same time, Jaruzelski appears aware of the possible civil strife that such actions might provoke.
The Role'of the Church- . T"
The Church, under Archbishop Glemp, will continue to play the role of honest broker, encouraging andthe search for Although the Church basically.finds itself in support of Solidarity's goals, its influence baa definite limits.
leaders want toreakdown of socialoviet intervention, but they cannot takethat. vary.significantly from the sentiments of the population. There le almost total distrust of the partynd the Church would risk losing someta credibility if it,sided.too much with the regime.