SUijCc.4 tsix. National Intelligence Daily
IRAQ-IRAN: Implications of trie Iranian victory
Imn'e defeat Tron in thexavjeft pnaidmtSaddx* Huaaein, ti#arahitaol ofvtsr, in dire sirevw. He haaproapeat of vrprovinsi milvuuyr ofran to negotiate. Saddami; eduCta-fitf kKl/rfiWiBjm Jha, iWne teMnjt Jnwc. erltei- Jiwitwu Mhnwat in ^otiaetona ia litoty to auaMwuia a: czptctattow ef Saddam'a domfall inoreaae. Htderate Amb atataaineeisa-ingln apt/rehenBiw about the threatiatorioua Jsw:.
Daspitc suffering substantialthoappnars strung enough to continuewar. Tehran probably it contemplating anotherlater this spring. It night launchho north to threaten theto Baghdad.
Iran's primary effort, however, ia likely toat recovering the area between flhvaz and This ia the largest piece of territoryby Iraq, but Iraqi forces holding It aire
The Iraqi leodd'a total identification with th* war has increased the possibility that his rule will bo challenged. Ihm military i'ailure will heighten otherincluding Saddam's "personalityis doemphasis of tho Ba'th Party's status, and his refusal to share power with his colleagues. These differences are over style more than policy.
A palace coup involving both Ba'th Party andfigures is the .nost serious threat. Party and military leaders probably are concerned that opposition to "Saddam's war" could engulf the entire regime. change in Baghdad night improve prospectsegotiated settlement with Iran, but Tehran would still renain opposed to any lasting accommodation with aBa'thist regime.
A post-Saddam regime initially would be eollegial. Dramatic foreign pulley changes are unlikely. Contacts with both the Kcat and the USSR would be maintained to facilitate rebuilding the economy and tho miliary, and to avoid political isolation, jj the face of collaboration between Syria Iran.
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