SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER: BUILDUP AND IMPENDING CONSTRAINTS (SOV 82-10085)

Created: 6/1/1982

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soviet military manpower: buildup and impending constraints

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Soviet Military Manpower: Buildup and Impending Constraints

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Soviei Military Manpower: Buildup aad Impendom I'ainis

The Soviei aimed forces havey one-lhird during Ihe Brcrhnev years, from J2 million5illion' We raiimaleere added lo combat missions, while ihe rest of ihe increase went io support (unctions/ The dcploymeni ofalf million personnel io (he Sino-Soviet border dominated ihe buildup. In conuaii, ihe increase0 men deployed io ihe NATO Guidelines Arc.Gr nany. Poland, andas much smaller.esult. Soviei combai forces opposite China arc nowerceni as large ai those opposile NATO, up from IS perceniilitary manpower Erew fasleil. averaging moreear;, net annual gro-lh slowed lo0

On ihe basis of our analysts of weapons procurement and deployment, we capeci only limited increases in So-sel military manpower in ihe near term More subsuniial increases could result if rcducecj-sircngih Ground Forces units arc mot* Ii red to support operations in Afghanistan. Poland, or other rxobkm areas and become permanent additions io ihe arrived forces Bailing such cwitiivgericies. we espect the Scmct armedto incicasc only slightly byby haserceni of their present size

lu'lher. unless the Soviei leadership dramatically revises its long-term views ol national security requirements, we eapcel no significani change in total manpower0 Several developments, howevei. ma, causereallocations amone services and missions;

Soviei weapons: The wider use of technologies such as solid fuels, computers, and solid-stale electronics probably will reduce the combat manpower required to operate many weapon systems, but iheir COfflptCK' ity is likely to increase support and maintenance requirements

rnntnarucai wnb. ihe United Sun*.define Ihe Soviet st-vrd fiwcei io include ihrnc dementi -hit* fill -bni ihe Uaitcd Sulci )ud|cs io be uin*i! mura, it-cs

oneallherient, aad Imcrnalops Research smderiakci.ihe last threehat larscd shts ni.autc b> apPMti-asaidr antsooa Hv-ov."he- rrrMMMj taka. sss> BUM tpt-t . l ibex wis don nor i. nota* raa Santt ihrcatII Tact asedj waeadweinuaa Sv net eaase'v"

' ee. luessatcw rocs theOclcasaaad riaeie. anforiu IDITCl *ad cnupjunni itl US iad lew

.aw latitat

Soviei force structure; Wc expect reorganization in the Ground Forces torb the bulk of the small projected overall growih. We do not espect reorganization lo have an cerscrvable impact oa manpower in the other Soviei services.

Nf- US weaponr. If the United Stales develops and deploys new strategic systems during, (he Soviets may have lo increase manpower in sysiems designedounter ihese forces. The net impaci is uncertain, however, since older Soviet weapons may be retired as new ones arc deployed.

- Arms controlf agceemenu on strategic weapons stabilize Sovieiffensive forces at2 level, ourf armed forces maripower woo idercent lower by the end of tbe decade

However, we believe agreements at ihe MBFR talks probablyse the relocation rather lhan Ihe eliminaiion of (he affected

un] igi

The changing demographics of the Soviei poemm will necessitate major

changeshe conscription system even if the Soviets do do more lhan mainiain current force levels. The number of males reaching draft age

annually will declineillion in iheillion6 Further aegravaiing this situation is the shifting ethnic composition

of the draft age pool. Persistently high birth rates among Muslim ethnic groups mean thai the less cducaicd. less politically reliable non-Slavic minorities will account for more than one-lhird of draftyouth by mid-decade, upne-fourth share in the

We espect two main rcspoftscs io these demographic phenomena: an ultimately unsuccessful eruesi for manpower savings in surxsort units and an Overhaul of the conscription system.illion support personnel are already the target of elTicicncy drives, bul despite the exhortation! oflh Five-Year Plan. Ihe size of support units is unlikely lo decline. Efficiency in combat support units is increasing, bul improvement is not being convened intonun power savings. The Soviets instead have retained the manpower in those units and eipandcd iheir capability. In addition, existing manpower policies arc rooicd in establishedpriorities lhat Ihe leadership will be icluclant to compromise.

Although ihe conscription system will provide sufficient manpower lo maintain current force levels in ihe short run, major changes will be necessary lo keep conscription rales from rising sharply in lhc. They could easily reach levels thai would be difficult io support in peacetime even by further limiting medical, family hardship, anddeferments. Wc therefore expect an extension of the term of service at the most likely measure to meet manpower requirements throughout the decade.

In contrast, the minorities problem has no obvious solution. Moreover, we have little insight inio how the rising number of non-Slavic minorities will affect miliiary manning practices. The foremost uncertainly is ihe exicnl to which the military can continue concentrating minorities in noncombai roles wiihoul lowering force effectiveness.

The slowdown in Soviet economic growth, caused in partivilian labor shortage, may bring ihe leadership to consider again reducing military manpower, although this in itself would do little to resolve lhc underlying economic constraints. As the needevised manpower policy mounts over the next few years, internal debate may reveal more about lhc approaches lhal are likely to be laken by Ihe leadership. At present, wean extension of the term of service is more likely, than absolute reductions in manpower.

BLANK PAGE

Contents

Key ludimeoi|

Canem Force

Shilling Perception ol Military

IS and Sc*iei

Tbeaier

SgitoOiwWt

Grouwl

Air Defense

Air

Strategic Rocket

National Command and

Oiher Uniformed

Civilians in Defense

Oui look io

Forcelopo-jinc

Methods and

Manpower Eitimaica.

Soviet Military Manpower Organiration

Soviet Military Manpower

Impact of Polky Change* on Manpower in lhc Soviet Armed Foioa

US aad Soviet Manpower by Mission

Combat Manpower Opposite China and NATO

Ground

Soviet Military Manpower; Buildup and Impending Constraints,

The organization and manning of tbe Soviet military are determined by military traditions and by It* leadership's perceptions of ester nil threats Thisof present perceptions and past cipe'ieaec resultsorce lhai is large by Westernajor considerations alTeciini military manpower requirements include:

- Long vulnerable bordersistory of foreign invasions and internal canqueai.

Continued tension with China, raising theof two wjnime fronts.

Use of military conscription for indoctrination as well as military purposes

Geographic dispersal of forces.

Limited support from allies, whose defense efforts arc lnialler and whosencertain

A large inventory ol* increasingly rnoderrihaianpower-heavy mainitnaacc and

ontingent

A nenchanl for labor rather lhan capital-intensive technologies.

Preference for military personnel over civilians in support positions as. Western practice.

esult of these (actors, the ra-tscM site of the Soviet military is notarger scale response lo Western armed forces bui the productontttand-ing Soviet approachecurity problems.

For comparison with ihe United Stales, we define Ihe Soviet armed focccs lo include those elements thai fill what ibe Uniied States judges to be national aeeariiy redes. These elements are ihe Ground Forces. AM Defense Forces. Navy. Air Forces. Sua let re Rochet Forces, parts of national command and support, and ihe llordcr Guards of the Committee (or State(KGDL This definition eacludea some Urgeelements of the Mmisiry of

tiMn-ain.

If oaut'i-her in support unm lortotalnd

Construction. Railroad, and Civil Defenseand the Internal Troops of ihe Ministry of Internal Affairs |MVD). "

The Soviets include theseaniiat ionieir legal Cef-niirt* of ihe armed fcaxes and consider sea-rice in Ihern to fulfill the military obligaiioci imposed by7 la- on Universal Military Service, although ihey do not have whal ihe Uniied Stales considers to be national security functions (seehese organizations arc included Miil <in of conscription requirements for, hut call males for them arc presenied separately

Our manpower estimates reflect the actual peacetime manning of individualhis approache most direct use of intelligence data, whichrepon existing manpower, and supports assess -mcnls of Ihe resource implications of Soviet militaryll maamrr figures presented here arc midyear estimates.

Although women are not subject to conscription, Ihey may volunteer for military service. The number of such volunteers is extremely limited. However, women in certain civilian occupations, nurses or cominumca-iloiii operators, for instance, arc assigned to the reserv"ire occasionally called op for military duly..

' Sotor aa eUbwilion a' CIArallmtiint

mil Nod |

Ihiiidditional vail minwafpwaikH iiriifih and vartis*Aashnlird

iN. isfWci miiin hjradj viih altWliii fatal.

Tha aaai haeaast afll ll

dwl(. or leanmBj hifhei than

-current" mnniat. Ihe Sewiei msiim minnlni wmpii*lalland eadri waiti withe

niiaiilc that biiaf lagcutlnglo luO iiraaih weald

teavltcndsilliaa iratevises. mostli In Ike Crowd

ikeil addiUoaal wain would rn-'i Ihr eallup al

fuwiiuJ t

-

Figure 1

Soviei Military Manpower

3

Imparl ol Pulley Change* on Manpower in Ihe Soviet Armed Forces *

T>wua*infMi<iui> ffiHimwl

SSaoOoAil IVnci

B KliB Soldi.AilrAUl

(2gOrouml IWi

B

rooo

ach of the armed servicesduiing this period, however, so lhat ihe share of men among ihcm is relatively unchanged. The increased size of the forces without national security missions is due principally lo greater numbers of construction troops, accounting for roughlv mm-thirdi of the growih in ihis manpower category.

-

u i- mn

Pereeplloos of Military Recrements The steady growih of ihe Soviet military under Brezhnevajor shlfl in strategicfrom Ihe Khrushchev era (seeuring the Khrushchev years, Soviei docuSe helduture war would be short and decisive, escalating almost immediately io iheaierwide and intercontinentalstrikes. In support of these ideas, Khrushcho

emphasized the development of strategic offensive and defensive forces and downplayed Ihe role e* conventional forces and large standing armies.

Hence, although manpower grew rapidly in thesa tcsuli of ihe Korean8 million, it declined steadily thereafterillion men ai

i- IjiI ngn>en Krsibchcv jnn-jiixd rUaihe

orces byddillion ay the end

During the Berlinfhruikcbc> iodicsicd raaMidj lhat Ibe deitsotaliuiion had beeoed temporarily. Some Soviei writers have ed ihai live planned reductions were laicr rcaumcdand oxniuallyeiMiiplelcd. Information fromoihci sourcesto etraTirrn thai acane further rJcmoMbutioe cvealttilly took Ware but does nor verify rrrJaenom olmagnitude described by llae Soviets..

In the, inicieit in turgor, more balanced milllat) forces wal tea wakened ac

Sonet pUnncr:their doctrinehon nuclear war with NATO and begaa to planonventional war of tome duration.

Tcnaion wiih China raited ihe apcescreeondtimeajor new eoramiunrru.

- The Berlin and Cuban mitiile crises alien,thence! Soviet reaolvc io redress strategic infenoriiy

By tees lime of Khruthcboi outtcroaacrt-nn araa caaergiag in favoralanced acrou the-boardo morlcrnlxatWn of tbe military The Brarhncv recirnc reversed the reductions In the Ground Forces and under loot, vigorousi for both conventional and naclcat IcMcet. These shifia in poticr. cc-apled with iacrcatwf tea. sions with China.i:aeied in all th; armed aervicct through the present.

US andomparison

Tbe Semes armedurrentlyasoee ihaa twice ihutc of the United Slates US manning dropped from aboutillion8 toanpeosi-inaicly <lapreaenl levelsiallkxin eontratl. Soviet maiinina leveit have rise" each yest aarsee ihe

Heeauie the Soviei miliury it structured dilfcrcoily from thai of live Unitedfive nia/oe tervicrt ralhcr ihaa three organizational coin par.-sons arcie allocation of maaoowcr io mililaryhowever, can be roughly eompared

uilrig the definitions ol the US Defense I'laanlne and Proenmine Categoric* iDPPCl These dleee-io rcafi'cgate the armed forces into lunponariety of combai mnsioru. Merc again, wc inclvds only those Soviei personnel who fill what in lite United Stoics are considered national security rolet. On the USsiie. the nunromr total includci all of ihe armed forces and the Coata

The comparison inighlights several differ -encci between US and Soviet minions andihey have changed over time.

strategic offensive manpower ia larger ihaa thit of the United Stales bccauie of the USSK'i large peripheral force composes! ofomber* and balliitlc missiles ihoi uoutd curryi.

.iagainst Lwrupe and Alia. Because the Unitedistaal from potential war ibcalcra. it haaotiifiarjbk fores

Sovietsarge force lo strategic it, fense re Recline llieii concern wild the US Intcreoo. lincnial boaibt' force and ibciiar Uhcatci Besaosee imjllcr So-let imirsoMUKDial bomber forceniied Siaiei haintiled strategic defense

- The Soviet land forces, which have tradition ally received beav> emphasis, grew substantially due soand the Sino-Soviet boildop: ihr, arc

lrattf aW bfga 'ii* fow.

US ground forces peaked8 atnd declined substantially as the United Statei withdrew from Vietnam.5 they have remained nearly aiabte at.

The support share of the Soviei military stayed irin lunged at approximatelyercent, while tlie US suppori share remained roughlyrice in

medaapta jirmnm lev mm, Mataad twwa.mml, ihaarOwod ritwnndui nMI ac

i i

he NATOexiented teflon include* force* In lhc NATO Guidelines Are* (Poland, Oeehotle-'akin. and Cat! Germany) and force* In Hnnjarv andi western nil ii jr, dntricti of Ibeur

definuonorienled fotCCtote in

Monf oft* *adfoot cancan military diiiricti tea* upiti dutaal from ihe Sino-ScMet

f the allocation of men to the combat force* inreallhal iht Soviet* currently have appro*imalet*ercent ai many men) 'iciq| China ai arc oppcoiat NATOon allocation hai shifted martidlrhen th* number cf peoconelChina was oci'y I) percent of the NATO-otlentcd force (tec fiiurc SJ.

Another itxJea of the chanting priority of China in Soviet deftrue plnnninf it lhcof wartimeal which unit! arc maintainederiod, the foind force* in Eaiura Europe were kept at abouterceni of wartime ftrenffh. while those in lhc western USSR (which would serve aa Ihe iccand echelon in wartime) were kepi atercentotcci opposite China, whick) also weie manned al about J5 percent, hare been it neerenath Ot" SO percent

The half million soldtcri added to Qunn-oncated forcca51 represent primarily Incrcacri lo Ihe Ground Forces, which account forfowth. Tactical air forcei and MR/IKIIM forcei accounted for virtually allremainder..

utton of tbc Ground Force* accounted for some of the manpower increase* in forcei opt*"'" NATO. Further increases accompany! ni (he adoption of heliooplcii and the new around attack rote of Frontal Aria lion more than compensated for lhc decline in Siratcfk Rocket Forces manpower ia tbc

IfI nfSCWMHm

sHi innvMiMihan* am a* lariBM

la (hut hi vm THt alianUu am nail Ilia)m- "i- iiaiaaal bKilduBn Imlwfri.

i-nmi nif taaioti minimal

*II* hK.p*ihiaa.ona Ctamixa.TiasiuiKauan MiSnaii Dimali..

Flsure S

Soviet Combat Manpower Opposite China and NATO

1flomnl

Forcepo lilt Cat*OpgeiKr NATO

NATO mlaillMt

P2 weiietn uxs*.m

itumi

a*lfr.*iu

weitcrn USSR Ihat was aisociaied wilh ih* retlie-meni of aomtndUUiciIheir replacement brnumbers of

Anted Senlct* Crvwtb

The fenaawiac acctioaamporiani dc-clop-menu in each at" the -lajor service*5 and provide projection*5 for major onaniialiooat catcforiu. Ncne thai "lappofi" in the dlscvtiion below cumuli primarily of service ana naiional-lcvel

t

hudo.uanot find unm directly subordinatechools, and rear service units. Thit if noi the same as ihe DPPC support category thai it usee) forwith Ihe Uniied Slates elsewhere in (his paper.'

Ground forceu The main combat element of the Soviet Ground Forces fa Ihe motor tied rifle, lank, or airborne division. These divisions are subordinaic io corps, army, and miliiaryosjaricrs, which provide combat and logistic support.1 the Ground Forcesivisions.orps and army headquarters, and mrscclUoeous command and support units.'

he Ground Forces have grown by nearly half, fromillion toillion men (seebout ihree-fourths of this growth is in response io conflict with China. Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, while ihe resi represents long-termto modernize and expand the standing foror

Expansior. of the Ground Forces probably began6 when corps and aimles Incorporated larger and more mobile artillery, engineering, and transport detachments. Divisional increases began in the. The motorized rifle division of ihe, (or example, had about one-third more major weapons lhan thai of ihe. With this increase in firepower came an increase in manpower within existing divisions. In ihe Group of Soviei Forces in Germany, the strength of tank divisions rose0 and that of motorized rifle divisionsor thcGrouod Forceshole, wc estimate ihai these changes io combat units have res-'i'd in an overall increase of ai0 men.

Units creaied in response io problems along (he Soviei bordersreat deal more manpower. The buildup of ground forces opposite China involved the stationingore men in thai area,for SS percent of ground forces growthhe legacy of8 invasion of Czechoslovakia kd to the addition of an0 men. and the

'In sddilKn iters sre Z* mcOitiuUOn stlnwu. fcish ,wi all tcniriiy end milnicniiKc staff el aboM ZOO ind aatia nrlimc wovtd be aianntd bi

re ir a

occupaiion of Afghanistan resultedowincreaseThe0 men in Afghanistan were already t* the Ground Forces prior lo9 invasion.) ,

Air Defense forcer. The Air Defense Forces (PVOl is the second-UrgesI Soviet service, reflecting Ihe Soviei emphasis on homeland delcnse against air and missile

7

osiei Ait Defense Fortes

mtjor facta: in PVO manpower growth is the SO. perceni increase in IIW/CCI sites, approiimaielr half or which were added along the Chinese border. This growth reflects aa effort to ensure nsearc effective commanrJ and control of the defense forces. In add.he deploy men. ofBM launchers and associated radars beganw can. goer of approi0 men by

Airial ion manpower changed httle daring most of (hit period. Manpower savings assoeiaiedajor icduciion ofhird in the number of air defense forces aircraft were offset by the larger maintenance conUngenU required by mote complei replacemeni aircraft. "

0 SAM manpower rose as new sysiemi more than offset phaseouu of olderites. DuringOs, Isowescr. manpower requiremcais fiom the continuing deployment ofnd SA-S* have almost eiadly offset the savings fromcaetiva-lions

Air Forces For Ihis paper, we divide (he Soviet Air Forces fSAF) Into iu ihree functional elementsAviation. Long Range Aviation, aad Military Tiaresporl Aviation "Led by major e< pa as kmin tactical amiiraa, SAF manpower has grown byercent to its present estimated levelsee figure IL

Ariailon. This force provides tactical air lupporl lo Ihe Ground Forces, and it is by far Ihe largest of the air forces. With the large additions of rotary and fiaed-wtng aircraftS. il has beenlor essentially all of theanpower growih duringeriod.

Aboul Ihree.fourths of the increase in Frontalmanpower is the result of the introductionarge lorcc of helicopters.ivefold increase in

- Ihru ii rnknee ihn fhe SAF tit been haiomtrlrvhiim aaa Lone lwaev^cneeihit assetshrw .s- lirrfoal, a*u.s.

aircraft types throughout ihe USSR. Wilh the re. siruciuriru? of the air force* for "an initially con-en-ttonai air offensive aimed aiclear weaptactical aviation tookew emphasis on ground attack and also obtained improved fighter capabilities. Adoption of these mote capable aircraft has required an additionalenC

Long Rant* Aviation. Intercontinental and peripheral strike bombers of tbc LRA ire intended for strike* aeainst theater or strategk targets In Europe, Asia, and North America. Manning has declined sleadily through thes land- and sea-bated missiles have taken over most of the strategic mission, la addition. Sif nifkanl reductions in medium bombers have also taken place.

Miliiary Trantporl Aviation. This force provides support for airborne divisions, general logistic support both within and outside Soviet borders, and orerseis delivery of economic and miliiary assistance.caigo capacity in ton.miles lias nearly doubledhis has been achieved wiih minimal impact on manpower, mainly by replacing small and medium aircraft wlih heavy transports. Personnel requirements rose in lhciih theof transport helicopters but have fallen backbout5 level wh the retirement of tome of the smaller transports

Nary. Since thehe Soviet Navy hat beenransformedorce oricnicd toward defense of Soviet coastal watersne whicharryariety of missions. Including some in open-oeean areas One aspect ol ihii change has been (heof VTOl. aircraft carriers and increased numbers of major surface combatants The newer shipi. larnerand more complex than their prcocces-sort. rcQuirc substantially larger numbers of ship* board and support personnel, and an0 meneen added to (he Navyesult (ice

Strategic Rocket forces. Establishedhe Strategic Rocket Forces (SKI) is the newest Soviei service. It is responsible for launching satellites and lot opcraiing nuclear-armed land-bated ballisticThe widespread deployment of ICOMs in the

Srm-c

oviet Navy

Ih-wundKifMisilnn rtixitiiHl

Gu

Figure 10

Soviet Strategic RocfccI Forces

missiles The decline isto continue as less man power-in tensiveeplace aging missiles

Border Guard's. The KGB Border Guards are responsible (or patrolling thef land and sea borders and for initial bordet defense in case of invasion. We estimate lhai apptoaiorder Guards arc assigned io tomeegimental-sire outposts (orryddT) concentrated mostly along the Chinese and West European borders0 serve in air. sea, and signals units and in supporl (unctions. Manpower assigned to the KGB Border Guards has increased by05

Naiioaal Command and Supporl. The national com mand and support category includes the General Staff, the Main Political Administration, and Minis try of Defense offices Tit site of these units is more a

It

Soviei National Command and Suppori

Figure II

Oihct Snsicl Uniformed Manpower'

lib" "I Mi

hi nv Ii

of the growth of lhc armed forcesholeeflection of internal changes Conscouently. iheie units have grown a> neatly the same taic as ihe armed services and currently accountotal olen (see figure ll;

Other Uniformed Manpower

In addition to the units -iih clear national sccuritv roles, the Soviets include the Construction. RinlicuC. Civil Defense, and MVO Internal Security Troopsiheir definition of military organizations In US Soviet comparisons, these units are deludedither the United Slates has no counterpart or be-cause their function is performed hy civilians Togcth. cr. these four categories amoiimillion men. one-fourth of all uniformed manpower (teelthough Ihe size of ihese units in the pastn.ci tain,0 ihey were probably

Our present eslimate of the siie of these units is roughlyeicent higher than wc estimated" This is primarily the result of improved analyt. icjI methods and

Research conducted over the lasthas suosiantiallyestimates

ero. The fust major upward

revision, flamo tO million, look placerincipally due lo ihe findingstudy of Ihe Conitc ueimnn update of lhal aladt and funher (cteiich on Ihe Railroad and Imcrnal Security Troops are icsponiible for another increaseringing Ihe current cMintatcen ion. Became ibese amis do neeational security role, our better appreciation of their sire docs not alleelea*meM ol ihe overall Sonet threat.

Two ciciiiiramatic irovith oier the pan ix decades in these units. One was the rapid recovery from the aevere manpower shortage of liteOi.7 the number of persons turningi- twice Ihathe other was the change1hree year term of service totwo-year trim This inc'catcd (be number of male)each year byercent. Together, these change! provided Ihe miliiary wuh abundant man* power to Increase both lhc armed icrricca and the non-national-security units.

Consriucticald and maintain aO lane military facilities. In addition, theyey source of labor for high -priority civiliantsoy are not ocianiiedor equipped for combat, and in wartime ibeir mission would be io build fortificationi and

i'-n n-.

numbers increased fromauring ihen response lo lhc large miliiary projects iheu undermissileBM and MM sites, airfields, and SinoSe-iet border faolii'fi A* this workorn pie ted. effort shifted towatd civilian projccii on whichstimaic they now spend at least half ol their lime

The fsrlnuryf tbe Railroaduction and rruinienance of rail" wartime, they would build, reconstruct, and operate rail lines at necessary to support ihe moventem of combat hoops. We believe thai their numbers have remained uibts at appro*ince thehen

a new corps wai formed for the eomiruction of lhc

Baikal-Amur Mainline

In the eventuclear aiiack on Sonet cities, military ciril defense units siaiioncd nearby arc ei-pcttcd io esublah con tmunki inns, idem ify and rtwrk toniaminatcd cones, perform decoruaminanon. open blocked iraniporianon routes, andcivilian units in letcue and repair work. Wt believe ihtic units were first eitablitncd in ihrnd grew toe have no evidence of new units being lornaed*

The Minitiry ef Internals troopa to main-lain public order in urban areas throughoui lhc Soviet Union, io guard numerous government initaliinons. and lo guardillionenal facili lie*.i1: tccuriiy at otheiand Induitrialn wartime, MVD troops would maintain order in rearncludingterritory. We citimalc lhal Ihetr numbers have increased gradually ewer the year*

Oitlent la Defease Actiilrles

The SmMi use of civilian* in defense differs subtle lially from thai in the United States The Soviets prefer to use miliuiy personnel in positions roQUiriogmilnaryad lhc United States usespersonnel only in ran-tioni requiringIf military skills.csalt. Soviet civilian defense Markers tend to be in unskilled or clericali the total Soviei military nowaviliarti is compared0ha* i* si.ll fc-tr ibane United Sum Theof military lo civilian defense workers ia ihe USSRn the United Slates

Our csiimaics of civilians working for the erwliiary generally are made on the bast* of kit information man ihene for uniformed nubia'Several type* of institutions inbordinaie to ihe Ministry of*ueh asrun directly by the military, miliiary cumnwicisl and rccicntiooal services, and certain researchemptcy civilians, bui theynot been included here lor lack of suffieieei information io estimate then numbers. Theircould substantially raise our estimate

Outlook0

Our projections uf manpower levels arc bated on ihe force levels projected in ihe CIA's Soviei military-economic data base (see appendix Al. These force levels are Ihe resuliof an annually updaied all-souiec analysis of Soviet deployments, defense industrial produclion. and weapons research and development ll does noi make any assumptions about whether Soviet leaders might respondnternational or do-meslic problems by changing defense spending. In effect, then, ihi*base case" projection which is linked explicitly to foreeasleel deployment and

Force Site. Because much of Ihe buildup in military manpower was due lo ihe depfoymeniarger force opposite China, we expeci future manpower growih to be at much lower levels lhan in the past. Although ihe Soviets will continue producing laige ouamilies of military equipment, most of thit will go toward upgrading existing units raiher than creating new

ariii

onlinualion of Ground Forces rcorgantza-lion and expansion will almost certainly increase Iroop strengih by0 men. and the deployment ol addilional ground auack helicopters ts cipected lo raise manpower requirementsdditional reduced strength Ground Forces uniu could beio suppon Soviet operations in Afghanistan. Poland, or oilier problem areas. If (his resultedong-term occupation, there might be furtheiaddilions to the armed lorces

Recent Soviet statements

express determination to respond io the expanding defense efTori of Ihe United Stales. Although we nave noi confirmedesponse, il is possible thai ihe Soviets may have changedconomic Han

accommodate large increases in defense activities

ove occurred, it would probablyombination of increased production for selectedin lite near term and longer term increases in investment andntil wc couldthe types of new produclion or deployment.

-in.

however.would not be able to estimate the impact on miliary manpower.

Unless the Soviei leadership revises its views of military rcejuiiements dramatically, we expect very limited growth in the number of uniformed personnel5here are several possible development, however, that may cause modest reallo-caiions of men among services and missions:

.Vosiel weapons: The wider use of manpower-saving technologies such as computers, solid foeis. and solid-siate, modular electronics probably will reduce the numbers of men required to operate many Soviei weapon sysiems. On ihe basis of pan analysts, however, we expeci compensatingin the manning of support and maintenance for these more complex weapons.

Soviet fartr structure: As the organization of the Soviei military continues lo evolve, manpower levels and distribuiion will change. This will be mosi important in the Ground Forces, wherehas increased overall manning0 since

c do not expect reorganizaiion in Ibe other services to have an observable impact on overall manpower.

* iVrw (IS weoponr. If the United Statesew strategic bomber and continues deling cruise missiles. Ihe Soviets will probably deploy more SAMsand inierceplors. resultingarger air defense force and noticeably higher overall -manpower levels. On the Olherew land-based ICBMa.ger US Navy would have little effect because the Soviei defensive forces assoeiaied with ihese threats are relatively small. However, the net impactoviet response is uncertain because it depends on ihe retirement of older weapons as well as ihe deployment of new ones.

eoiirol agreements: II agreement! onweapons Stabilized ihe number of So-iet tCBMs at2 level, our projection o< armed forces manpower would declineercent in Ihe laic

c believe lhal an) agreement reached ihiouch Iht: Mutual and Balanced Five* Reductions iMBI'Rj uiks fvohahty srould cause (he relocation caihcr than the elimination ol lhc aiTccicd Soviei units.*

Impending Constraints. The biggest challenge ahead (or the Soviet military "ill be changing demogiaphics.he growth rate of lhc population has declined, and il is canceled to continue declining through the end of the centuiy. The number of males reaching draft ageill dropillion in theillionince the Soviet draft pool consists of males agedhe full impact will be delayed unlit the. In addition,9 census confirmed the risingof the USSR's Moslem nationalities. Thein binh rales between Moslem and European peoples means that the piofwtion of Moslemwill approach one-third of draft-3gcyouih while theof ihe total pool is (ailing. We eipeci two developments inargely unsuccessful Quest for manpower savings -ind revamped conscription practices.'

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The main target (or improved manpower e'lteicney is likely io be support personnel. We estimate their numbersK million, overercent of the armed forces. Manpower savings in this area will be difficult to achieve, hov-evci.he need lo maintain (he large Soviet equipment slocks. More importantly, il will conflict wiih Ihe high priority lhc Soviets place on mntericl readiness. For example, current practice is to minimize equipment use and to rely on civilians al factories for major repair. In addition, wc estimate lhal the IJ9 rcduccd>*lrcngih ground forces divisions are already structured to be mainuined wiih aof suppoil personnel. Finally, pasi increases in support efficiency have not been used to achieve economics in manpower. Instead, support manning stayed tbc same. :tnd the improvements were used to obtain greater capability. Such practices dim the prospect! for saving much manpOwet in the supruri services.

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Another artt for la bursa vi rig jetmny is the Construe-lion and Railroad Troops, estimatedillion men. orerceni of the Soviet military, but ihe prospects of reducing then Slrenglh tonflift withpraeisccs. Const iuci ion aad Railroad Troops arc key sources of labor for high-priority civilian projects, especially in remote areas, aad their military disciplinr rnaMci them io achieve much higher produeirVhv than tmluni Moreover, byethnic nsinrxiliei in these units theseful noncombat means forthe lean poetically reliable and least educated members of the draft pool. The increasing numbers of draft-age minorities will make the retentionarge number of nonrxmtxst positions for assimilaiion even more important.

The remaining ascn arc primarily ir. combat units, which by their nature offer few opportunities for rtuiv-ower savings Overall, ihe military will be hard prcDcd to achieve nunpowur cffiaicrrcics without eomp- mising lengstandirtg management pc4lcica.

We eipeci Ibe Scn-ietl to tense their conscript ion practices io keep consetipnon rates (rom eieeeding sustainable levels. We believe the three grounds for deferment from militaryhardship, health, andeiling that limits conscription rales lo betweene estimnlc current rales are already overercent and are rising

Evidenceeaction to ihe manpower shortage is beginning io appear Early2 the Sovietscducalronil deferments it many universities and instiiuiesesalt. manystudents will be conscripted be lore they complete lor even before ihey begun their higher education This action willr the crwaliiy aad number ofonly mar-nutly ji man it will incrc.se drafla-bit youth byerceni

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Although the Soviets will have to lake additional .if turn lo deal with ihr manpower lhortagc. mi farhave no indication! of further change) to manpower practices. Thcic il evidence thai manning leveb in some combat uniti has* hern dorrn. bui il ii too early ioend Howe.er the problem ol Ihe shrinking draft pool could be overcomeis-month extension of the (wo year term ol Mr vice Ibe Soviet* could alio attemptircumvent ibe demographic constraints by increasing the number ol careerists, having more freooenr rctervce using greater acmbers of women and civilians, bai each of these action* would be more difficult anduch smaller payoff lhan ciicniron of ihe term of service

The growing number of minoritiesilemmaoviet planners, who arc crriain to be concerned wiih the reliatility and performance of ethnic groups However, little can be said aboul how trus might actually affect force effectiveness Foremost among oures ii the Client to which the Soviei military feeb lhat hi traditional practices (orethnic groups can absoib Hie largei numbcn

The distribution of minorities in Ibe SfWiemilitary is heavily skewed away fieam (Omiwand and comba* po-iiKSra la pan lowei cdwcatiO* assd iHsguisiM problemskf.^stli lo obtain trchaseal or ecmmusHyied positions, bul iheir nearidusiea from the officer rants suggests ihai ooliircsl rchabst ity ts of even greater concern Well ewer half of minorityerve in the Construction. Rail road, or Internal Security Iroops Most of iheaie assigned lo noncombal roles t" the Ground Forces or Air Defense Forces Relatively few arc assigned to the Navy. Air Forces, or .Strategic Rockei Forces or are stationed outside Soviet borders |The initial Soviet units in Afghanistanrief exception since manyol these wete composed of

o srriiiu called up (torn contiguous aicas Altciays of reserve duty captrcd. they were 'cplaeed with legularajor cutback of Con-siruciron and Railroad iroops might relieve ihr man. power shortage but at the costailed increase ta the ftoruaiion of non.Slavic minorities in ihe armed force*

Worsening civilian labor shortages, rcspontible in part lor iheeconomic decline, may cause the leader-ship iu consider reducing mililaiy manpower. This policy, however, would Itself do link to resolve ihe fundamental problems underlying the slowdown in Soviet giowili The leadership is undoubtedly>bemi the low birth rates among the Slavic national, lies Alh ParlyebruaryBrrrhacvcgioaallyic> aimed al ratling the btrih rate in predominately Slavic regions However, the announced inecniixi arc looI lo have moreinimalven if ihey were luccessful, there would be no benefits tobot fore* orhe draft pool until the end ol ihe century Crriainly. pressure will increase on the lead' .ishipake majormliia'v manpower policy but it will be iwoor three yeanj- has io be made As lhai" nears. ihe shapeW debate should beeoiw clearei Ai pre sent, wc eapcet an increase to ihe term of tei'iee ;jihc* thanannowei

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Appendix A

Estimating Methods and Concepts Estimating Methods

The CIA model of So>iel mlliioiy manpoweratterned after our understanding of the organization of ihe Soviei military. The model is pan of Ihe SOVA military-economic data base and has seven majorfive services, national command and support (including units not consideredational securitynd the militarized security forces. Detailed csiimaies aic made of the ordei of bailie and manning levels ol each ofnit types and arc updated annually. Estimated manpower is simply the sum ol the products o( order of bailie and manning levels. In Ihis way. estimated manpower isinked to the Intelligence Com-muniiy's estimates and nroicciions of Soviet forces

The duality of estimated manning levelse types of data available. Thewhich Ihese estimate; are based is oftenand sometimes contradictory Estimating(actors is complicated by the fact that even inunit, manning wiil vary as iroopsand training cycles arc completed.iven lypearc sometimes mannedlevels Civilians, who lend to be in supportunits, are particularly difficultountarc noi always eolocated with military unitsdifficulty distinguishing

which civilians in me work forcencnarc employed by ihe military

New Methods and Concepts

Since ilie publication of the CIA's previous review of Soviei manpower fendsumerous changes have been madeui manpower data base. Most of these have resulted frum the IntelligenceS periodic updating and refining o( lis Soviei order of battle and combat strength However, the changes thiit tend ioreater impact on manpower arc those lhatelief understanding of theand staffing of support (unctions Although many changes have been made in ihis area. too. several stand out as most sigm(ican'

Pciliaps moai important foi useis of Ihese estimates is the distinction now made between ihe armed foices and lulal mililmy manpower Since the SovietRailroad. Civil Defense, and MVD troopsariety or lasks not relatedhe US definition of nationals important to .separate ihis manpower (rom thaiske moie Minilare US aimedThis is the same distinction made in CIA comparisons of US and Soviet delihis is pan ten Lilly significant

*incc our present estimate for rr-fjiditsonal-iecuriiy manpower liillion,etceni ol total militaryower, [i:

The largest chance occurred in our estimate ofruction Troops. Previously, we simply counWas they were identified

However, this led to an undc rest mum, owiscno allowance for units which pTobablywhich were not picked up

better, unbiased estimate can be matjfiaibtical adjust meni taking inloaccouai the number of units that are sekntilsed more than once- Ifew units are Identified more than once, thereoed chance thai our sample misses many units and thai our estimate is therefore quite low. If many units come up repeatedly, our sample is likely to be tnistincew units.

Combinatorial probability theory can be used to estimate ihe "maiimum likelihood value" 'or the actual bui unknown number of construction battalions given Ihe size and structure of our report sample. In our sample onlyerceni of ihe battalions were reported more lhan once, so ihe estimate of ihe total computed by this method was more than twice the number of reported battalions.

A sludy of military training and <choolsariety of changes. The nei effeei was to increase both military aod civilian staffing. Civilian manning also increasedesulttudy of Ground Forces support unitstudy of civil defense manpower subordinate to theeview of information onKGB Border Guardsoreorganizational structure and documented the increasing size of units in sensitive border areas. t

The original basis of the estimated manpower in Military Transport Aviation was simply the number of transport aircraft in ihe Soviet Union. Our present estimate takes imo account the fact thai many of the transports arc actually subordinate lo individualnot lo Military Transport Aviation, Consequent-ly. estimated manning for MTA is less than half its previous level, and the difference is now allocated tohe services according to the number aod types of iheir aircraft.

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Original document.

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