The Technology Acquisition Efforts of the Soviet Intelligence Services (u)
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
THE TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (u)
InlMmMionfyS2 wu in Ibe preMiHion of it* Menmtndum
Sovicl Scientific and Technical Collection Efforts:
Trends and Historical
Soviet Acquis.tKXtt of Militarily Significant Wcsiern
Soviet Tasking in the Techrnlorry Acqrufltion
State Committee for Science and
The Soviet and East European Intelligence Service* Organization and
Operational Methods in Acquiring US and Other Western Tedtnologv
The Committee for State Security
The Main Intelligence Directorate
ollection Methodology of the Soviet Intelligence
Soviet Technical Collection: Communications
East European Services
IMPLICATIONS AND .
This Interagency intelligence Memorandum addresses the key role of the Soviet intelligence services and their surrogates in acquiring advanced US and other Western (including Japanese) technology. This particular focus of the Memorandum is not intended to overshadow the significance of acquisitions by other Soviet and East Europeanand the consequent need for stringent US export controls. Indeed, the continuing Sovicl acquisition of technology from thc West using all means at Moscow's disposal is one of thc most complex and vexing issues confronting US policymakers.
The term "technology transfer"ide range of scientific and technical, economic and industrial, and trade and communications activities; there is no single definition. When viewed in terms of their national security implications, the means by which technology transfers occur take on even greater significance. These means range from open-source publications through legal trade and illegal trade diversions to traditional clandestine operations. In certain instances, transfers not normally considered cost-effective in the usual commercial sense (such as reverse engineering) may be used by actual or potential adversaries thai otherwise would be denied such technology.
This Memorandum was prepared under lhe auspices of the National Intelligence Council by thc Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, the DCI's Community Counterintelligence Staff, and the intelligence components of the Department of State, the Departmenl of Energy, the Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, and the Air Force, Army, and Navy. It was reviewed by and coordinated with thc intelligence components of lhc Departments of Commerce and the Treasury. This Memorandum was approved by the DCI's Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee and, ononcurred in by the National Foreign Inielligence Board.
SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW
The USSR is engagedell-organized, centrally directed, and growing worldwide program to acquire US and other Wesiern military technology, embargoed equipment, and manufacturing technology to satisfy its military and defense-industrial needs. The Soviet intelligence services and their East European surrogatesajor role in this worldwide programroad range of,clandestine, technical, and overt collection operations. Although these intelligence operationsmall part of the overall Soviet technology acquisition effort, we believe these operations are responsible for acquiring the overwhelming majority of the militarily significant Western1 that finds its way into the Soviet Union.
Acquisitions of Western technology by the Sovicl intelligence services and their surrogates have afforded the Warsaw Pact significant military and industrial benefits. These include:
Increasing the pace of indigenous development of weapon systems and reducing military research and development costs and risks.
Developing effective countermeasurcs against US and other Western military systems.
Modernizing and broadening critical sectors of the Warsaw Pact defense industrial and support bases.
These and other acquisitions of Western technology by nonintelligence organizalions have contributed substantially to the growth of Soviet military power and the steady erosion of the technological superiority on which US and allied security currently is based, fn turn, this has Stimulated lhe Uniied States and its allies to make even greater efforts io overcome or defend against these enhanced Soviet capabilities.
The Soviel and East European inielligence servicesast array of methods to acquire US and other Western technology. The most effective of these collection methods include:
agents-in-place from business, government,academic sectors both in the United Stales and overseas.
1 Ai usedd iwhr.de*,
hi "in* dtieei andedian- imparl an Soviel mitrtio rev'ich, develoiiment. ind production
illegal trade diversions through third countries to evade US export controls.
ncd but locally chartered firms to acquire controlled technology and lo support clandestine collection operations.
US and other Western telecommunications to acquire proprietary and controlled industrial technology and unclassified but sensitive defense program information.
official scientific'and technical exchanges andorganizations.
large amounts ofnformation available in Western countries.
Thc technology acquisition efforts of thc Soviet and surrogate intelligence services have become more systematic and effective in the pastoears. Their collectionlegal andwell coordinatedlobal scale to maximize the total effect of theacquisition effort. Their collection activities are closely tailored to the changing security practices of Western governments and their industrial, commercial, and academic sectors. Among the trends we have noted over time in the Soviet intelligence services* efforts are thc following:
Weapon-related acquisitions increasingly arc more selective, focusing on critical components and materials necessary to achieve greater performance.
Creater emphasis is being placed on acquiring Westerntechnology and equipment, reflecting Soviet needs to increase the efficiency of large-volume production for the Warsaw Pact; much of this technology and equipment is subject to export controls, and its acquisition often isthrough intelligence-directed trade diversions.
Commercial and emerging technologies are becoming priority targets in their own rights, indicating the military value placed on Ihem by thc USSR as well as their greater vulnerability toservice acquisition methods.
Acquisitions of US technology are being stepped up abroad,elatively freer operational environment overseas than in the United States.
- The role of the East European inielligence services has been increasing steadily over thc years, and the Soviets are providing them with an ever expanding set of collection requirements; the rate of increase has risen recentlyesult of Western embargoes on technology transfers to the USSH in the wake of Afghanistan and Poland.
As the vast array of the Soviet and East European intelligence services' scientific and technical collection activities suggests, neither the US export control community nor the Intelligence Community separately can respond adequately to this mounting threat to US national security. Furthermore, the Soviet intelligence services and their surrogates havearge majority of US export-controlled and government-classified technology overseas through illegal tradeand intelligence operations. Thus,oncerted and multi-faceted approach to thisboth effective export control policies and vigorous counterintelligencethe United States and its allies can counter the broad-based Soviet and East European technology acquisition effort.
Scientific ond Technical Collection Efforts: Trends ond Hiitorieol Context
The USSR traditionally hasigh priority on and devoted Unite amounts of resources to thc acquisition of Western technology by illand illegal. The primary objective of these efforts is to support Soviet and Warsaw Pact military programs, particularly In developing new weapon systems,eiliting ones, or developing counter measures The secondary aim of those acquisition efforts has been to reduce costs and Increase efficiency in Soviet defense-industrial producllon, Including those civilian sectors of thc Soviet economy ihat support the USSR's defense effort.
Thc Soviets assign tlie highest priority toand exploiting US and other Western militarily significant technology. This effort began innd continued throughout World War II as the Soviets reproduced US weapon systems that were provided to them under Lend-Lease auspices. The effortigh point in Ihe immediate postwar. period with clandestine Soviet acquisition of US atomic-weapons-related technology. From thehrough the, the Soviets continued lo acquire and copy US and other Western military technology, often duplicating entire weapon systems.ew instances, they have even loleraled short-term militaryon foreign technology In order to Incorporate designs and features not available through indigenous Soviet research and development, or to speed the development of high-priority weapon systems
Since thc mid-lSGOs. however, the Sovietshave been more precise in their search for military technologies in the West. Having developed a
capable technological base and in evolutionary design philosophy suited to their military doctrine, they now
evaluate foreign military technologies more carefully.
seeking to acquire and assimilate only those Western
design elements, engineering features, and production technologies lhal best fit Soviet mild my requirements
and induslrfal capabilities
he Soviets* well-coordinated, high-level effort lo acquire US and other Western technology has enabled the USSR and the Warsaw Pact to increase their military capabilities and spurred the United States to commit even greater resources to its defense effort In addition to their traditional emphasis on acquiring Western military technologies, and their more recent emphasis on industrial production know how and cqutpmenl, the Soviets now appear to be targeting new. emerging technologies underin the West. Theseadaptive optics, very-high-speed Integrated circuits, superconductive systems, state-of-the-art computerand genetic engineering and recombinantarc thc most advanced and least protected technologies in the United Slates and other Western countries This focus is intended by thc Soviets both to satisfy Ihcir military and industrial obseclives and to prevent "technologicalthatituation in which the USSR is caught unaware of lhe military applications of hitherto basic scientific reseatch
Soviet Acquisitions of Militarily Significant Wo stern Technology
5 The USSR is engagedell-organiied.directed, and growing worldwide program to acquire Western technology to satisfy ils military and defense-industrial needs (Seehe Soviet inteliiRcnee services and their Easta)or role in acquiring US and other Western miliiary technology, embargoed equipment, anil manufacturing technology required lo meetmilitary objectives. This effort complements thc overall Soviet program tor legally acquiring such technology and equipment for their military and defense-industrial needs Although Soviet and East European intelligence services" acquisitions olsignificant Weilem technology'mall
1 Ai uvd hrie. miUyi it. imtiliiw lerhnuloavdiillaeiihil rqiiltimml. mtleriil. and wlinologv Kj.m* il.iartimmtdijic impart on So*irt milluit ntciteh. drveloptneM.wodurtion.
Sovielucopean Legal and Illegalibeeeling Key Area, ol Soviet Militaiy Technology
tll'lil aad legal Madeol enmplHe mlnm hardware and toft-air.ide variety ol WeaWrnpgr orrUnaComcnteri. lot .miliary appl-onon. cl.ndcallne icoubitiofa ol rwrirlarvoruo and
With Iraal and iTtrct
ew ICOal thet>
llioul Hide acquiiiiion ol kuiak ttieunnti <nd euoolaled computer! and ofipeclrtim
aiwlyrer* foi aMuubnurinr wtilwc (ASW)
i olud nmafar I
I aid poaiibly Optical lad latanmWMO cUndotlv xqmWkki of dofuiatnu
lawileeWoo of .aim.arcr.lt pom. turbine bUdi.nd rleetraalc rnrnponenti
Metal foil) (ore-beam taten ind optical component) aoiuiied tLttmah Ictil ami HWil ehaoneh
Letil .nd .lleaalnd otherUodotiwofpatajaagati kafiadvca-d UStidailwgradan. iMirid-aUoai raonla. and
l-.ii- aid MrfaoMo-gtgt led of ASW nHard OdKal
ballm* nliWlelent acQuititton of prectaoo machinery Ic. bear.na product ion
otehaiei ind intelliiirmcr aeoulOtloni ol Wortetn MinMiraami welding equipment.
MuaU*llUtoenl-if-linf lechnolofy throach leaal and illegal Irade. wane found proe-alKo*.
lachooloc*d, illegal and legal (no* (eWU.nd rotarlral aubmjnne aucba.
: avacarat legal ud iaVgaJof adraaetd id
akl INeoat.rowb clandeMl" aaa,**
Chemical Eipknlvea .
Acoiraie Senior. (ASW)
of various bom In wailwidi andehicle-related data tbrouiK rltndeainr mnm
Clu.leuiiw acQUUUIon uf manalaeluilnit detail, of ad.ineedipioiivei (oi nuclear weapam.
Oandotine acqoiiitian cl unrbr>aieraiad dlwelloa-finding en^panaM. leWnle ggfaagfj acqwnd IhiDcaa illeeil trade dixras
US utelliletllecal uod- arquiaulorB of burr
KipawallMi of captured terrain-folio, in. rada. and an lorn* iraetcept radar, riandeatlnr acquUatlon of ladari lor flekei aireraft. an drferur radan.cimi deabna (oi US luriacB-lo-air mUBIr MMm
Uandeillne acoauibono>iuatMn rirn tor taak.
porlion of Ihe overall Soviet effort, we believe that thc overwhelming majority of worldwide Sovietof militarily significant Western technology is obtained through their collectionand overt. The amount of classified technology acquired is believed to be relatively small, and the vast majority of that has been acquired outside the United Stales.
6 In addition to the significant clandestineof US nuclear weapons technology that led to Soviet nuclear bomb capabilities earlier thanthe Soviet intelligence services clandestinelyover the past two decades details of several US nuclear warheads; US and British manufacturingof advanced high explosives required for thc production of nuclear weapons; and designs of nuclear propulsion systems, all of which have benefited Soviet military programs.
ther clandestine acquisitions of Westernctjuipment, and systems bv the Soviet and East European intelligence services that have been copied in their entirety or used In designing or manufacturing new Soviet weapons include:
The US Sidewinder missile, which, when copied in its entirety, gave the Soviets their first heat-seeking air-to-air missile, thc Atoll.
The US Redeye, which aided the Soviets in developing their first shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile, tIveSA-7.
In addition, thc Soviet Bloc services clandestinely acquirxjj: _
Data on thc guidance subsystem of thc US Minutcman ICBM.
Technical data on moreyrosubsidiaryS high-technology Firm in Oermany.
Data on solid-propcllant missiles, an area in which the Soviets considerably lag USespecially for use aboard submarines.
Data on radars used on8 fighter aircraft thatlikely lo be mcd in developing similar Soviet radars.
Data on thc TOW and MILAN antitankprobably to develop counlermcasurcs.
A Ccrmart Leopard tank engine, probably for modification and use on the newest Soviettank.
Although it is likely that there have been many other significant acquisitions of which wc are unaware, these clandestine acquisitions by the Soviet and Eastintelligence services have permitted Ihe Soviets to develop military capabilities much sooner than otherwise possible, and they have enabled the Soviets to reduce the qualitative edge of some Western
The Soviel and East European intelligencealso use overt collection operations quiteto acquire Western scientific and technical (SAT) informalion. Their overt collections against US and oilier Western technologies have contributed to Soviet military systems. These acquisitions range from data on US ICBM silos (used by the Soviets in developing silos lor their first solid-fuel ICBM. theo technical data drawn from NASA's research onwing designs (which helped thc Soviets to design and toew transporto technical documentation on US and other Western military systems and their associated training and maintenance procedures.
The Soviet intelligence services and their East European surrogates also collect muchnformation through technical collection means,communications intercepts in the United States and abroad. We believe that thc USSR lias acquired technical dala and design conceptsumber of Western missile, aircraft, and naval systems in this manner, and that this information is valuable to lhe Soviet Union's military and defense industries.
Soviet Tasking in the Technology Acquisition Effort
hc Soviet Unions effort to acquire US and other Western technologyassive, well-planned
41x1 well financcd iiitionjl-lcvel program Overalllot ihc Soviet acquisition effort is given by lhc Central Committee of lhe Communiw Party of theluch rt the final authority loc all polities of lhe USSR. CI'SU directive, cuoccinin* So'ljt archnologv icqiitsitioe) activities aieby the Council of Minute" of live USSR, which i. the highest level of government in the Soviet Union and coordinates the official policies ol the Sovicl state. (See figure I)
Mil) lory-Indus tr iol Commission
II The high priority tbe Soviets assign lo theof US and other Western technology is reflected in the dominant role played by the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers Thc VPKrimary role is lo coordinate thc development and production of Soviet weapon systems. Thc VPK also plays Ihc key role in developing requirements for both legal and illegal acquisitions of military and advanced dual-usetechnology The VPK directly oversees theol lhe nine key Soviet defense industries in acquiring and exploiting foreign technologyequests from these and the defense-support industries for Western technology are consolidated and validated by the VPK. The VPK also centrally directs the end use ol design and productionlor thc Soviel defense-industrial complex, and coordinates thc technical examination and exploitation of foreign weapon samples in industrial research and development organizations. Finally, the VPK provides policy guidance for Soviet technology acquisitionabroad
PK requirements are issued formally and in great detail (Seehe complete VPKhitook, containingages of requirementsroad spectrum of rtnlilaiy hardware and related production technologies and technical data. The VI'KIts' probjbly is revised and updated annually, reflecting changes in collection priorities and target availability The VPK requirements list includes the itemshen collection priorities, how long each requirement ts valid, which Sovirt ministry levied thc collection requirement, the most likely sources of the technology lo lie acquired; and tbe budget for each
acquisition. Provisions are also made for ad hoc. target-of-opportunity collections.
be VpK requirements list is levied directly on lhe Soviet intelligence semen In those Western countries withollection targets, the residency of lhc CRU (seerobably has Ihe entire requirements list. In mosl CRU residencies in the Third World, only ihose items likely to be available in country are specified for collectionprobably in an abstract from the largerlist The KCB (seeorks from the VPK requirements list in much the same fashion, as its SftT collection effort includes supporting Soviet de-fcnse-industiiil production.
Stole Committee for Science and Technology
hc VPK requirements list is coordinated wiih lhe Stale Committee for Science and Technology (CKNT) of the Council of Ministers, which supports the VPK in both legal and illegal Soviet efforts to acquire foreign technology. The CKNT's scientific and technical information gathering and processing activities are vital to the generation of Sovietfor foroign technology acquisitions. These CKNT activities resideationwide, centrally directed system that comprises0 information departments affiliated with Soviet research institutes, design bureaus, and production facilities. The CKNT also collects technical informationast, complei network ofand induslnal agreements and exchange programs wiih olher countries and multinational corporations. The CKNT's All-Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information (VNlFTi) collects, translates, and disseminates scientific and technical publications, industrial palenls. and technical joumab from atoreign countries. Through VNIITI Sovietengineers, and technicians arc kept abreast of foreign scientific, technical, and industrial
he CKNT. in conjunction wiih the Ministry of Foreign Trade, also cierts substantial control over legal purchases of US and other Western technology through its control over hard currency expenditures. This contiol help* io ensure that alln terms ol defense priorities befoic they are executed It also serves lo prevent
plicationffort across lite lull range olmethod* available lo the Soviet Union
he CKNT abo manages efforts to acquire Wrsteji (tchnologv through the collection activities of Soviet scientists and engineers in academic,and official science and lechnoloitv exchanges, including those sponsored by the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In addition to overseeing Soviet participation in these exchanges, the CKNT serves to coordinate technology acquisitions throuiEh them by levyingrequirements on officially spoi.wed Soviet scientists, engineers, and academicians This CKNT collection effort is closely coordinated with that of the Soviet intelligence services to miniraire over bp and duplication of effort.
inally, the CKNT also levies collectionon Ihe Soviet intelligence services when US and other Western technology sought by the USSR cannoi legally be obtained under its auspices The CKNT abo provides scientific and technical guidance and support lo the collection activities of these serv-
Tho Soviel and East European Intelligence Services; Organization and Operational Methods in Acquiring US and Other Western Technology The Committee foe Slote Security (KGB)
IS. The First (foreign operations) Chief Directorate of the Committee for State Security (KGO)ajor portion of the Soviet cUndcittneechnology collection effort.ollection has existed since well before World War II. but has increased steadily in the postwar years in direct response lo pressures from the highest levels of the Soviet Government lo intensify thc acquisition of US and other Western science and technology
rganizationally, the increased Importance of SA l' collection in the KCB was reflected in thc upgrading of theh) Department of the First Chief Directorate to directorate status int was known as the Scientific andDirectoratehen it was redesignated Directorate T. Then, inhe Central Com mittceiaf.ibjg CPSU and the Council of Ministers of thc USSH, alter careful review,esolution ipe-
cilically designed to strengthen further the work ofhe resolution stressedcientific and technical revolution was taking place and thai, in the interests of national defense and development of the national economy, it was rseccssary for the Soviet Government to obtain timely information on scientific and technological plans and trends throughout the world.
2ft The KCB was encouraged to locus on the coroequences of military and industrial application of these developments, and particularly on thc possibility thai there would be qualitative changes in theof armaments and technology in enemy conn tries. The resolution nolcd that It was particularly important to obtain information on works of applied military significance being carried oul in the United Slates, the other NATO countries, and fapan
ntensified its efforts,irect rcsull of1 CC/CPSU resolution, andlan with expanded operational objectives The KGB alio expanded Directorate T's Scientific ResearchThb Insiitule collects, reviews, and analyzes all SAT information available to thc KCB. and it also prepares requirements for the operational components of the KCB. To accomplish these tasks, the institute was expanded1 fromomployees, about SO of whom were KCB slafl personnel and the rest civilian workers with various technical backgrounds.
fli Within the First Chief Directorate of therimary respoasibility forollection operations rests in Directorate T, which hasfficers on its staff in the USSR and abroad KCB foreign residenciesissionsomponent that goes by the name of Line X, manned bypecialists.fficers conduct lhe majority ofperations. There arefficers serving abroad at present
ll instances, these dedicated officers are assisted by other intelligence assets.
23 fliorn in the Westihc potential lo upset irVThus
concentrated largely in North America. Japan,haside tange ol banc reseaich in
Western Europe There are. however. significantImlds as laseis. weather modification, earthquake
perations run against SAT targetsi,unami wave inducement, andin other countrlei These includecountries thai may be developing iodig-
MDB t'echnoJogical liabilities and/or obtainingmie&oence Oirectorotethe West as well as spotting, assessing, aiul
lecruiling US citizens abroad and foreign studentsThe Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the
may study in thc UnitedGeneral Staff hasigh priority on collect-
he best available insight intonformation since the earliest days of
tasking is contained in the long-range work plan IHUI3 there was .
Directorale T. covering lhend Technical Department within thc GRU.
outlined both operational and informationalforollection program. It appar-
lives. An analysis indicates thai this planwas decided tliat this represented an unnecessary
valid. Among the most important of these objectivesof specializationilitary inteJligcncr
Ihe penetralion of the leading scientific researchand the department was abolished in
tors, firms, and government insttlutes in theSince then, there has been no simile component
Stales. Western Europe, and Japan for the purposelhr CRU frtponsible forol-
obtaining Ksenhfjc and lechnicale rtt00rMiblmv has been given to the
and documents'^ jThe^ gC0fiupi,lfa, dlrwlonite a( one of iheir
was. and continues lo be. intere^ied in banc , 1
, , I. . . . gra functions Most otol ec-
and development efforts having potential . . _. . _ .
.- . . j . . work is done by Ibe First Directorate (Europe)
nsnd Third Directorate (North and South America! Encepl for Japan, the Directorale* for Asia andEast haveargets of priority interest
apptcihom This is particularly true if such_ , . , ,
he CRU differs from the KGB In that the CRU has no dedicated cadre ofr-cialists. Instead, most CBU officers have leehnk..and educations, and all of ihemollection as an Integral pari of their responsibilities.
As in the KCB, CRU residencies in the West
operate on lhe basis of an annual plan, sent fromcenter each year, which outlines therequirements for the following year inin question These requirements arefiom lhe VPK requirements list. Thesuch things as the military policy of tliespecific requirements on lis armedinformation concerning neighboringinterest, separate requirements on weaponsspecialized areai of technology, and, in asection, military-economic requirements. This the framework in which the GRU resident conducts
Third Directorate (North and Soulh America)
Thcsc targel* include American businessmen andofficials,f foreign government!,firms, and forcixn subsidiaries of US firms;livesiernalional org*nIzalions havingadvanced and/or proprietary technology; and West-
ern scientists, academicians, and students
llegal Oioertiom. Illegal diversions offall Into two general categories.he illegal diversion ol controlled US technology Irom lcgllimate trade channels to proscribed destinations This is done through foreign firms willing to engage in profitable impjopricty. agents-in-place In foreign firms or foreign subsidiaries of US firms, Communlst-counlry owned bul locally chartered firms, andpurchasing agents (including arms dealers}}
many instances, these iTJegu.1
oKoction Methodology of the Soviet Intelligence Services
n conducting SAT collection operations, the KCB and thc CflU use all of their normal operational methods,ew refinements thatperations. Alth>ugh the Unitedhe primary SAT target, both the CRU and lhc KCB have long believed that itomparatively difficult place in which lo operate. For this reason, US technology is more easily acquired abroad.third country operations have been stressed, both againsi Americans abroad and against foreign firms affiliated with American companies of SAT
landestine Operations. Thc basic clandestine activities of the Soviet and East European intelligence services involve lhe use of recruited agents-in-place to commit espionage- These services have focusedruitiq^nt^efloil on both Americans and foreign nationals* wilft access to controlled US technology.
diversions ate accomplished through (he use of forged shipping and licensing documents employed bvlirnu either established by or having dose ties wiih tbe Sovicl intdlrgenoe services or their East turopean surrogate! In one example. East Germany's Ministryu.,ir Security establislied dummy firms in Vienna for me sole purpose of acquiring advanced microtiec-tronics technology illegally The Soviet Inielligence services and their surrogates are in lhe mainstream of this illegal irade flow. The other category ts in-plarc diversion in which legally acquiied technologies arc put to illegal end uses and/or used by unauthorised end users Both types of illegal diversions ore exlrcme-ly difficuli lo detect and monitor.
USSR has been the dominant lore*Irade diversions of Western technology,and Hungary apparenlly being majorparticipants Thc principal entitlesfor illegally divcited Western lechnologylocated in West Germany. France, andprincipal third-country In termediesUS lechnology hat been illegally divertedWest Germany. France, Austria.japan. Illegal -iadc diversions are also reportedtaken place in Belgium. Ihe Nelheitanrls,Africa. India. Canada, the UniiedSweden, and some Middle Eastern andcountries
firms provide anSoviet Woe iritdligence servicethc Unitedorward base forlegal traveler" intelligence operations in thean effective means for overt acquisitionUS lechnology; and an opriationalto acquire illegally US technology insectors (electronics, preclilnn machinecomplete Industrial procew-s' subiect to
ost West European countries have at leastommunist -count ry-owned. locally chartered firms each, wiih some having as many aslie location of Ihese firms abroad (bolh legillmatc and dummy firms)
facilitates the acquisition of US technology because oversight overseas is sharply limited Q
ver ilia post few years thcie has beenevidence of lhe use of Communttt country-owned firms by Soviel snd East Euioprin intelligence sen Ices in theab'nitrd Stales to acquire controlledThese films can legally purchase com roiled US technology and study it without actually violating US export controls unless they attempt lo ship theor related technical data out ol the Untied States. Such activity is difficull lo assess because ihesearc formed under state laws and are not required to incorporate with the US Government' Furthermore, because representatives of Coram must-country-owned but US-chartered companies are not obligated to identify themselves as agents of foreign governments, Ihcrereat risk that joint ventures between such firms and US corporations could result In serious technology losses.
xploitation of Scientific and TechnicalEf lorts by the Soviets and East Europeans to acquire US technology are extensively abetted by the overt (and essentially legal) collection activities of their scientists and engineers who participate in academic, commercial, and official SftT exchanges. The Soviets believe that then icienlisis participating in thesearc able to acquire Western technology ofnd military benefit. Soviet and East European students and technical delegations visiting the United States are generally of high quality, and we suspect many of ihem are associated with classified work in the couniry Irom which they come
isits and various arrangements that permit STrect Soviet access to US companies arc considered Fo be among the more important sources of technology loss because of the "hands-on" eaperience and collegia! working relations with US counterparts gained by Soviet participants.
he Soviet intelligence servicesajor role in overallollections In thc exchanges. Soviet parllcipanli in this program am briefed onntelligence collection targets beforefor their assigned placements in the United States. Once in the United States, these co-optees of Ihc Soviet
' Tlwrr irr KilaNorwwihi fanoantelKn InrrMmml i* the United Sain Howem. then ne limitol
lo eniiila thii luuc nockThr decree lo wliich even lliiiiadeM IfS lilt*licence and law-enforcement oil ll tilt ii vir nil. IuiuIaI by law
intelligence services seek lo satisfy these requirements and to assess their American colleagues for potential intelligence operational purposes On their return to the USSR, these scientists are debriefed by Soviet intelligence officers seeking to gleanof potential use to the Soviet military effort.
The Soviet intelligence services abo use the exchange program io facilitate theirollection effort. This is doneumber of ways, including supporting other clandestine, technical, and overt oceialiora in North America
Exploitation oj International SOTExamples al such organlrations include thc International Institute lor Applied Systemshe International Atomic Energy Agencyndff tret associated with lhe UN The Soviets and East Europeans have taken advantage of their positions in these organizations lo acquirenformation and proprietary
technology. All Soviet, personnel in sucliobliged lo acquire such information Therebeen instances where these positions havelo facilitate thc acquisition of controlledand to mount traditional clandestine
relayedheir headquarters limply for translation and analysis, or residencies may extract information on paiticular subjects over lime and then write reports based on this open research. Finally. Soviet Bloc intelligence officers have been engaged in exploiting US and Other Western data bases. This activity has led in lhe pasl to massive Soviel purchases of unclassified and occasionally declassified US Governmentdocuments through thc Department ofNational Technical Informationractice that was endedhc East Europeans, however, continue to have access lo this source of technology. The Soviets also have gained access to Western commercial computet data bases through 1IASA, including the Lockheed dala base Dialog, thc European Space Agency's dala base Diane, and Ihe International Patent Documentation Center. Thealso subscribe to at least one privately owned US microfilm information management system containing; morenclassified documents published by various US Government agencies, including training manuals of thc armed forces. Finally, allhough we have no evidence of Soviel Bloc intelligence service use of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to acquire US technology, the FOIA does provide the potential for such acquisitions to the extent that useful information not subject to FOIA exemptions isin federal records. These overt collectionafford the USSR broad access tonformation, some of which may be export controlied.
Overt Collection Activities. The Sovietservices arc engaged heavily in acquiring open-source scientific and technical information. Thus,intelligence officers frequentlyairs, exhibitions, and conferences. They then send written reports to their headquarters recounting thc lectures and briefings they have heard, and attaching the brochures and other documents they have collected. In addition, Soviet intelligence officers subscribe heavily to ScVT periodicals and other literature. These may be
Soviet Technical Collection; Communications Intelligence
he USSR has mounted an extensiveintelligence (COM INT) effort to acquire US and other Western technology. Through this effort, the Soviet intelligence services have been able to acquireexportand even government information which in the aggregate clearly is classifiedvalue to the
* Ahhr-ish US Cavernmeni recuUrtoru require the trarwnusionmi RftP infornutioo tb secure meant, theserktlr observed. Moreover, because of
of leleeenimurncatloni by US defense contractors and other high-trchnolocv firms (often via faBranOcJ. Urge amount! of export controlled and nroortctary SaT information are vulnerable lo the Soviet COM1NT threat.
Tact's military and defense-indusirialThe Soviet* regularly monitor theof US defease contractors Assessment! made with thghfip of such contractors revealed thaiby this means enable the Soviets to gaininformation on ley defense programs, including strategic and tactical baihslic missiles, new miliiary aircraft, ships and submarines, and space andsystems, some of these programs are still under de^loprnenl In addition to its direct use in acquiringnformal Km. COM INT can also be used by lhe Soviet intelligence services lo guide their other colleclion efforts.
the area from NorloIL. Virginia, lo the Hondand periodic presence off the US west coasl near lhe western lest range. Collection of technical intelligence it likely in view of the vulnerable emanations in those areas Surveillance of sea liiab. missile testing, spaceand shore-based naval and military signab oflers Iheealth of BAD technical data wiih direct military application
hc Lourdes Central Signal's Intelligence Complex al Torrent,
COMINT Sites in Ihe USSR. The KCBhas at leastntercept facilities in lhe USSR thatission of monitoring foreignsatellites These facilities are probably used lo monitor commercial traffic, which would include scientific and technological data, transmitted over the INTELSAT network.
he CRU COMINT effort is the responsibility of the QiiJi (Radio andntelligence) Directorate. This directorate is tasked wiih collecting intelligence derived from foreign militaryand electronic emissions, primarily from the military forces of (he United States, the Westcountries, and China. The CRU effort abo includes monitoring the INTELSAT network
eneral Intelligence Veuelt. The more lhanCI vessels in tlie Soviet and East European inventory are charged with monitoring both communications and noncommunications ciectromas;-netic emanations via such missions as area palrob along coastalurveillance of US and NATO fleet eaerctses and ship transits, surveillance of sea trials,eats, and space operations. Established ACI patrol) include one off the US east coast (covering
Cast European Services
any Soviel requirements for the acquisition ofechnology are closely coordinated among the East European intelligence services This coordination is achieved in Ihree general ways. The first isriority list of general requirement! supporting economic development in the member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistancehis CEMA list is approved by lhe chiefs of thc various East European intelligence services and guides thc general lilac efforts to acquire Western technology
through illecal and/of clandestine meant The second is through direct Sovicl (asking of an Eatl European service These special requirements are levied bv the KCJII and lhe CRU in support ot Soviet military and/or economic priorities. The Soviets delegate these 'pn^jl/assuinmerits to particular surrogate services on (heoalii of their collection capabilities against specific Western technological targets Finally, individual East European intelligence services may apprise thetrcounterparts of collection opportunities outside the scope of thc CEMA priority list and direct Soviet tasking
hc Soviets value highly the SAT collection activities of iheir East European satellllcs. and often will offer (hem preferential treatment in return for their acquisitions of US and other Western lechnology In many instances, this preferential treatment may lake the form of increased military and/or economic assistance
In the past two years, the L'SSIl has made increased use of ils East European surrogates loWeslerti lechnology. This stems primarily front the Western post-Afghanistan embargo on technology transfers lo the USSR but not to Eastern Europe, and it coincides with an overall increase in Sovtel and East European efforts lo acquire Western technology earlv oo in lhe reseatch and development cycle before it is classified ot protected by procxietiry controls.
The principal East European intelligencetasked by the Soviets for acquisition of Western technology appear loose of Bulgaria. Csechoslo-vakia. East Germany, Hungary, andach of theseiscussed below.
IWlearia.0 tbe Bulgarian Directorate of Slate Security (DS) reorganized ils First Chief Diroc-(orafe (foreign intelligence) to upgrade (he SATto directorate level. This reorganizationa high-level Soviet request that the chief target of the Bulgarian service be SAT collection abroad.intelligence officers have said (hat (hey will do anything to get this type of information and (hai (he specific field is not important. The prime mover behind this remion is Ognyan Doynov. the
'ndicate! thai the Rominun and VHrmlavfan iMclli-rtence iettineully arc toto Sortcc inline for luch coNnrioii adivitm.
Bulgarian Politburo member in charge of industry.
As part of lhe new SAT program many more Bulgarian scientists and engineers will be ami on visits to the West lo acquaint themselves with the latest developments in their fields of specially as well asevelop information and accessoes' In addition, many more science attaches, all of whom aie DS officers, will be assigned to Bulgarian embassies in the West. Thc number of science attaches will be more than doubled in the near future lo aboutll are said to be technically well qualified and are, or will be. targeted against specific technical areas in iheir countries ol assignment.
White (here is no evidence lhal (he Bulgarian mililars inlcllinence service (RUMNO) lias beenlontelligence, II stands lo reason lhatnformation lhat would have military application would be of concern lo (he CRU and hence RUMNO. which is under CRU tutelage.
ztehotlooakUt. For more thanears there hasepartment inforeign operations) ofederal Ministry of Interior (FM V) responsible for scientific and technicalBy the beginning of,eople weie assigned to this department. Betweenndcrvt atcadauarters, wiih anotherossigned to (he Ministry for Technological and Investment Development and various Czechoslovak foreign (lading companies. The remainder are abroad In various Sprava I residencies.
recent years the SAT depart men! of Spravaincreased in both size and importance.re*Ks Insdget and staff in order lo carry out its
mission, andperates within the contest of an executive agreement between the FMV and the KCB. The SAT department receives specific requirements from thc Ministry of Technological and Investment Development and from Czechoslovak militaryinstitutes
o current reporting onperations of the Czechcrilovak militaiy intelligence service (ZSCS) We assume, however, lhal lhe ZSCS works closely with Ihe CRU.
Bail Germanv- The primary point of contact for Soviet coordination of Bloc technology acquisition
effort* in tail Germany is lhal country'* Ministry for State Security (MfS) TV MfS esreutive management is responsible far coopcrallru: with the KCO in support ol lbc military and industrial sector* ol the Soviet economy Within the MfS. the Science andSector (SWT) of the Main Admimslration (or Intelligence lias thc primary responsibility foragainst Western technological targets)
he cote target of the SWT acquisition effort Is military-related technology held in the NATOparticularly in ihe United States and Weal Germany. The most important of these technologiesthose involved in ihc development, production, and planned combat use ol nuclear, biological, and chemical -capon systems The SWT is abo tasked lo collect intelligence information onemerging high-technology developments inasenergy (includingaterials and production, andpotential lor both miliiary and industrial applications
CO. The SWT is tasked by the KCU to collect scientific and technological intelligence in the United Stales and Western Europe Thts collectionoordinated in two ways First, the director of the SWT meets at lean annually with his KCBThe thrust of these Moscow consultationsis to discuss particular collection requirements and problems These meetings are complemented and given continuilv by thc presenceCB liaison officer on permanent assignment lo the SWT. Thb officer Isosilion lo levy both written and verbal requirements on the East Germans, and selects the SWT acquisitions (or distribution by thc KCBoviet end
Hungary. There is increasing. evidence that Hungary is actively engaged in operations involving technology transfer and illegal trade diversions. These efforls are undertaken largely at thc behest of the Soviets, who levy the requirements and provide the money. Although there is little available information concerning tbe ealent to which ihe Hungarianservices are Involved In Ihis activity, they obviouslyole. Thc HI Main Croup Directorate of thc Ministry of Interior, Hungary's civilianservice, uses its officers and co-optees stationed abroad in commercial positions not only to negotiate trade deab with Western companies but lo obtain covertly from Western businessmen SAT information and embargoed items. Intelligence officers withbackgrounds work under cover in Hungarian foreign trade enterprises concerned with tpccialired fields such as electronic equipment and computers, and It must be assumed that they also are involved in illegal trade diversions
t is not known to what eatent the Hungarian military intelligence service (VKF-II) is involved in
technology transfer activities, but ill officers Stationed at mud al miliiary attache offices are engaged in the
collection of overt information in lhe SAT field ai well
as In military related fields
oland' The major focal point in Polandf efforts lo acquire Westernis the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSWJ The MSW's miior eiternal intelligence (unctions include the colleclion. evaluation, and dissemination of scientific, technological, and industrial information and matcrlab Thb effort Is complemented by lhe Second) of the Polish Army's General Staff, carried out with CftU coordination The eiternal functionsI include collecting, analysing, and disseminatingand technological information related to theand intention! ol NATO
IVm aW Baa*jrtite gawaaal ta ttohave ben redumJ in the vale ol Poland i
pohticat and rconomU dilficuilio.
Soviets reportedlyeenthe success of Polish efforts to acquireand have agreed lo subsidize themcontribution to thc Polish budget.eportedly amounted0ercent of the total plannedillion for acquisition of Western
MSW is under constant pressure Iromto procure Western production know-how jnol microdccttonics and computers,and engines, avionics, andtechnologies These emphases probablyme Soviet concerns about rapidlyin both military and civilian production, asprojected manpower shortages in the Soviettogether with rnore traditional Sovietas relatively lower productivity and
IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK
operations of the Soviet and Fast European intelligence services coniinue to pose lhe most serious and Immediate threat to thc security and protection of militarily significant Western technology Theirand central direction for the collection of Western lechnology have been developedigh degree of precision over (lie lostoears in order to meet the changing needs of Soviet weaponsand defense manufactuiers. Al lhe same time Ihey have developed appropriate clandestine, technical, and oven collection operations tailored to thesecurity practices of Western governments and their industrial and private sectors. Taking advantage of the openness of Western research centers and inadequate commercial security, Soviet and EastIntelligence services have moved quickly to eiploii Ihese sources of new and emerging technologies foi their miliiary needs.
The task of stepping Soviet intelligence operations aimed at Western military and industrial technologies alreadyormidable pccJ-lem. both in thc United States and abroad This task is likely to become even more difficult in the future as several trends Identified inontinue into
since the, the Soviets and their surrogates among the East Europeanshave used their national intelligence services to acquire Western civilianex-ample. automotive, energy, chemicals, and even consumer electronics.
Second, since Ihe. Soviet and East European intelligence services have emphasized the collection of manulacluring-relatedin addition to weapon technology.
Third, since thc, there has beenemphasis by these hostile intelligence services on acquiring new technologies emerging from Western urn vein tics and research centers
The combined effect of these Ircrvdseavy focus bv the Soviet intelligence rervices on lhe commercial sectors in Iheectors thai normally arc not
The acquisition ol Western miliiary technology and industrial produclion equipment by lhe Sovietservices tin saved the USSll's defensevaluable lime and resources in its effort to keep pace wiih military developments in lhc West.designs and technical documentation haveproven approaches and technologies (bustechnical risks and RAD costs Engineering insights gained from the exploitation of acquired Western military technology have permitted the Soviets to gain Improved weapon performances bv copying Western designs and incorporating effective counter measures into their new systems development. Western produc-. lion equipment and industrialof this acquired bv illegalbeen used to manufacture critical military components years before the Soviet defense industries could develop Iheir own. Furthermore, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies, often wiih direct assistance from their intelligence services, have been able to acquire much defense-related equipment, material, and lechnology through open and legal means Finally,onsequence of tin-'- and other acquisllions of Western equipment and teclinoJogies. the Soviets have been able to allocate more resources lo lite support of iheir war-fighting capabilities.
The acquisition and effective use ofetrimenlal effect on US nation.il security In at least two ways. First, throughof Western technology the Soviets have been able toreater variety ol more sophisticated and effective weaponshorter period of time This has peimitted Ihem simultaneously to improve military capabilities and to devolc more resources to the development of advanced weapons concepts such as directed-energy weapons, ant (satellite programs, and titanium hull attack submarines. Second, infusions ol Western technology and equipment have lightened the burden of continuing growth in Soviet RAD and defense spending.on sequence, lhc United Stales and its allies must devote even more of their own resources lo offset Iliac increases in Soviet military power
protected from hostile intelligence services. Inthe security provided by ceanrnercialo match (or ibe clandestine operations of suchservices. The most alarming aspect of this commercial focus by the Soviet inlelligence services and (heirowever, is thatesult of thHi 'operations they have access to those advanced technologies that arc likely to be used by thc Wat in its own (ulurc weapon systems.
Thc Soviet intelligenceollection units luve grown in both the numbers of highly Qualified scientific officers and technical collection capabilities. Theseollection efforts today arc worldwide, focusing first oo the United Stales, Europe, and Japan, and secondly on thoae less developed countries that possess or have access to advanced Western technology Through the useol its East European allies' intelligence services and other surrogates such as Cuba, the USSR's collection effortsukificeted threat to the West Thcol (hc Sonet Union's national-level requirements for Western equipment and military technology serve as the common denominator lor thc direction and coordination of Ihis multifaceted and multinational collection program
Wc estimate Ihat future Soviel and East European intelligencecquisitiontechnical, andbe concentratedon lhe following types of Western technology.
Weapons designs and related defensetechnology, particularly against USboth in the United States and abroad with some increased emphasis given lo the technology of US allies
equipment. Roods, products, and material, and associated technologies,dual-use items obtained through theefforts of thc Soviet and East European intelligence services.
Cimpany proprietary technology necessary to manufacture advanced commercial components and systems, using clandestine and illegal means to acquire these for future military and defense industrial applications; intelligence efforts against these types of technology are as likely to be concentiated in other Western countries as in lhe United States.
nformation and unclassified hut defense-applicable technology produced largely by the' United States, acquired mainly by overt Soviet and East Europeanand through multinational open-sourceprocurement, organized and directed by Soviet Bloc intelligence
technology from Westernresearch centers and universities, using visiting Soviet and East European scholars and researchen and commerciat delegations targeted and supported by Soviet Bloc intelligence, since the post-Afghanistan sanctions, these activities have declined in the United States and increased abroad, especially in West Germany and (apart In the Untiedrendhat Soviet and East European visitors increasingly have made use of unofficial,exchanges io avoid US Governmentassociated with official exchanges.
Tocounter the general Soviet technology acquisition effort, and in particular the collection activities of the Soviet intelligence services and their surrogates, the United States and its allies must develop aprogram combining improved export control and enlorcemcnt policies with vigorousactions. Onlyoncerted and multifaceted approach lo the technology loss problem can oppose successfully the broad-based Soviel and East European acquisition agenda.