USSR-POLAND: SOVIET CONCERNS

Created: 4/3/1982

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS USSR-POLAND: Soviet Concern*

After almost four months of martial law in Poland, tha Soviets remain concerned over the slow progress toward rebuilding the Polish party and creating unions that will be both subservient to the party and able to attract workers. Although Moscow appears convinced that Premier Jaruzelski is for now the best available leader, it is using Warsaw's need for economic aid to prod him into reorienting Poland's economy toward the Bast.

The Soviets want the polish military regime tothe reconstruction of the partyoreand ideologically orthodox body, which Moscow views as an essential aspect of future civilian rule. During Jaruzelski's visit to Moscow early last month, Soviet offioials reportedly chlded him by conparlnghis military governmentatin American junta. MB

The Soviets believeirst step is theof party members too closely linked with reformist ideas and have publicly supportedurge. Senior party officials from both countries appear to have ^jgpsed upon this area during recent exchanges of visits.

Economic Leverage

Moscow is using Poland's need for Soviet economic aid--mada more serious by Westerninfluence Jaruzelski. During his visit, the Soviets reportedly agreed to increase their assistance. Moscow, however, apparently acreedonly^to^the accelerated delivery of goods. BBHsmeeBBBntV

Moreover, the communique issued et the end of Jaruzelski's visit implies that Soviet aid will beupon the reorientation of Warsaw's economy more toward the East, on its taking steps to balance its trade with the USSR, and on its progress in stabilizing the political situation. Tho fundamental, long-term nature of these conditions suggests that negotiations will be protxacted^and that disillusionment may grow on both sides.

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Fear of Worker Opposition

The Soviets are particularly concerned that Poland' labor movement not againival to the party over the long term. Because of Solidarity's enduring opular support, Moscow is emphasising that tightwill have to he jgposed ovt; whatever trade union structure emerges.

President Brezhnev reportedly recommended tothat Polandrade organizationthe Soviet model, but the Polish leaderommitment. The cpmmunigue made noagreement on this issue.

The Soviets, nonetheless, recognize the importance ofnion organization more representative of the workers than that which existed before the rise of Solidarity. They believe that such an organization is essential to increasing labor productivity and to remov^ ing the issueource of division in the party.

Some Soviets reportedly hope that the moderating influence of the Church can help pave the way fornew trade unions more acceptable to workers but still under firm party control. They appear to seriously underestimate the extent to which Jaruzelski would have to accept reformist ideas toenuinewith labor. ^

Despite concern over Jaruzelski's slow movement on these issues, the Soviets appear convinced that no one else could maintain order as effectively while rebuilding the party and the unions. His elaborate welcome in Moscow is^being^repeated as he visits other East European capi-

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