MEMORANDUM for the PRESIDENT
the VICE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE^
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE COUNSELLOR to THE PRESIDENT
O THE PRESIOENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS THE CHIEF OF STAFF to THE PRESIDENT THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF to THE PRESIDENT THE CHAIRMAN, OOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: , Poland's Prospectsoonths
1. m sending you this copy ofSpecial National Intelligence Estimate recently produced by the Intelligence Community on Poland's Prospects Over the Nextoonths.
2. The takt-off point for the SNIEhe Imposition of martialjaw Which so changed the country's political dynamicsery broad assessment of the situation was necessary. In the process the SNIE became longer than we would have preferred. For that reason, let me highlight for you the SNIE's major findings!
--The primary Soviet and Polish regime priority is control.
--Thereittle prospect over the next year or so for political accommodation between tha Jaruzelski regime and Polish society, although the regime may wall approve certain cosmetic changesartial law deslgnad toelaxation of Western sanctions. The likelihoodor continued or Intensified repression.
--The chances that unorganized violence will occur .In the coming months are very high. However, we think that the Internal security forces are strong enough to.keep any disturbances localized and prevent natlonwidaecessary with the support of some reliable military units. Thus the likelihoodoviet militaryrf mrM^Tjg fgjj RELEASE
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--The economic situationffeteriorating, snd Itroblematicisastrous further slide can ba prtvanttd. The key factorhortage of Western Imports, whichxacerbated by the Impact of Western sanctions.
will be unable to make any significant principal payments on Us tZT billion dollar debt for the foreseeable future, and will not meet much of5 billion dollars In interest due banks The risk of default will continue to grow.
--In short, the West cannot expect Its pressure to lead to serious political liberalization in Poland over the near term. The most we can hope forhat the combination of Soviet and Polish need for Western economic cooperation, steadfast Western rejection of business-as-usual, and continued passive resistance to the authorities by tha Polish population will hava some moderating influence on the regime and maintain the possibility of long-term compromise within Polish soclaty.
Attachment: As stated
William
Original document.
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